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A b str a c t
China has been in great transition since the end of the 1970s. It has gradually moved from 
a rigid planned economy with public ownership of the means of production toward a 
socialist market economy. The changes at the firm levels have called for a general reform 
o f the legal system as a whole, with a particular focus on the reform of corporate 
governance. Chinese commentators' views on the concept o f corporate governance have 
been substantially influenced by corporate governance theories in developed economies.
One main objective of this study is to analytically explore cultural, social, institutional, 
historical, economic and other factors affecting the resulting differences in 
implementation that have been observed in China.
Simply copying from the West without effective implementation and compliance o f the 
standards to appease the international investors is unlikely to work in the long run. When 
learning from the West in finding appropriate measures, care needs to be taken to 
understand the background and reasoning to the measures adopted in the West and 
whether such measures are likely to work in China. China is engaging in selective 
adaptation of international norms and the success of that exercise depends also on 
institutional capacity building.
Corporate Governance in China: A ‘Law’ unto itself
Chapter 1 Introduction
1. Background
The rapid economic development of China over the last thirty years has 
been impressive.1 Whilst the current slowdown due to the global credit 
crunch has presented a new set of challenges, the important debate 
concerning the governance of China’s corporatized state owned 
enterprises (SOEs) remains a key element in understanding the success of 
that development. The governance processes at play during the journey 
from central planning to the emergence of what is officially termed a 
‘socialist market economy’ have been complex and at times intricate with 
multiple layers of competing interests tugging in different directions."
1 The developm ent o f  China since its opening up has led to a plethora o f  books on virtually every aspect o f  China’s 
com plex society. Ever since C live Buttercup recounted his experiences as one o f  the first Western journalists 
allow ed back into China after the Cultural Revolution, see Butterfield, F. ( 1982 ). China: A liv e  in the bitter sea .
N ew  York, N.Y. Tim es Books/There has been a great demand for books that offer insights into how  the country is 
developing. A  few  useful exam ples include Schell, O. (1994), M andate o f  heaven : a new  generation o f  
entrepreneurs, dissidents, bohem ians and technocrats lavs claim  to China's future. N ew  York ; London, Sim on & 
Schuster.; Kristof, N . D. and S. WuDunn (1994). China w akes : the struggle for the soul o f  a rising pow er. N ew  
York., T im es B ooks.; Child, J. (1994). M anagem ent in China during the age o f  reform. Cambridge, Cambridge 
U niversity Press.;N olan, P. (2001). China and the global econ om y. B asingstoke, P a lg r a v e .; Z w eig , D . (2002). 
Inte rnatio nalizing China : dom estic interests and global linkage s . Ithaca; London, Cornell U niversity P r e ss .;Waiter, 
C. E. and F. J. T. H ow ie (2006). Privatizing China : inside China's stock m arkets. Singapore ; Chichester, John 
W iley & Sons (A sia).; Burgh, H. d. (2006). China : friend or foe? Thriplow, Icon.; Mutton,W. (2007), The Writing 
on the Wall; China and the West in the 2 1 st Century , Little Brown.
2 See for exam ple W eideman, A., "Corporate Capitalism and Socialist China." in G om ez, E. T. and X . X iao (2003). 
C hinese enterprise, transnationalism, and identity. London, Routledge.; and Phil ion, S. E. (2009). Workers' 
deniocracy.jn..Chinals.,.traiisitipri.ij;pni.state„^ N ew  York ; London, Routledge.; Cao, L .(2000), "China’s 
Privatisation: B etw een plan and m ark et." Law and Contemporary Problems (Autum n) 63.
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Also, the continued absence of a privately held but publicly quoted sector 
remains a related issue.3 A consideration of this phenomenon helps to 
shed light on corporate governance in the context of China’s almost 
miraculous economic achievements.
Corporate governance has developed as a major interdisciplinary field of 
study since the early 1990s with roots going back to the governance crisis 
in the USA during the 1970s4 and even earlier in the works of Berle and 
Means,5 and later Coase6 and others. Whilst various waves of scandals7 
have led to renewed efforts in improving corporate governance and 
vigorous debates on the best ways forward, the major theories that have
3 Kirby, W. C. (1995). "China Unincorporated - Com pany Law  and Business-E nterprise in 20th-Century China." 
Journal o f  A sian Studies 54(1).; B ow en, J. R. and D. C. R ose (1998). "On the absence o f  privately ow ned, publicly- 
traded corporations in China: The Kirby puzzle." Journal o f  A sian Studies 57(2): 442-452 .
4 H am ilton, R.W. (2000), "Corporate G overnance in A m erica 1950-2000, Major C hanges but Uncertain  
B en efits ." Journal o f  Corporations Law, 25.
5 B erle ,A .A . and M eans G. C. (1932), The M odern Corporation and Private Property. N ew  York, M acm illan Co.
6 C oase, R.H. (1960), "The Problem o f  Social Costs." Journal o f  Law and Econom ics 3;C oase, R. H . (1988). The 
firm, the market and the law . C hicago ; London, University-' o f  C hicago P r e s s .; Posin, D .Q . (1990), "The Coase 
Theorem: I f  pigs could fly." Wavne Law R eview  89; Cam pbell, D. (1994), "Ayers versus Coase: An attempt to 
recover the issue o f  equality- in law and econom ics." Journal o f  Law  and S ociety ,21 ,
7 O ver the last 50 years corporate scandals have tended to com e in w aves, the 1970s bribery' scandals in the U SA  
fo llow in g  in the wake o f  the Watergate affair led to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. In the UK a number o f  
scandals in the 1980s and early 1990s from Re Atlantic Computers, Q ueens M oat H otels, Pollypeck, Bank o f  
Credit and C om m erce and the Mirror N ew spaper Group are but a few  in a long list w hich resulted in increased  
em phasis on corporate governance and through the deliberations o f  several com m ittees, the evolution o f  the 
C om bined C ode on Corporate G overnance. Barings Bank in the early 1990s was a forerunner o f  the recent 
Banking Scandals w hich have alm ost ruined the econom ies o f  the Western world and resulted in unprecedented  
governm ent action and intervention, particularly in the U S A  and U K . In betw een these w aves, the Enron Scandal 
and many others in the U SA  at the turn o f  the 21s1 Century had led to major changes with the Sarbanes-O xley Act. 
They ought to lead to fundamental questioning o f  many o f  the assum ptions underlying corporate governance 
practice, see generally H am ilton, S. and A. M icklethw ait (2006). Greed and corporate failure : the lessons from  
rece nt d isasters. B asingstoke, Palgrave M acm illan.; Clarke, F. L,. G. W. Dean, et al. (2003). Corporate collapse : 
accounting, regulatory, and ethical failure. Cambridge ; N ew  York, Cam bridge University Press.; Jacoby, N . H., P. 
N ehem kis, et al. (1977). Bribery and extortion in world business : a study o f  corporate political payments abroad. 
N ew  York, M acm illan ; London : Collier M acm illan.; N oonan ,J .T .(l984), Bribes: The Intellectual History o f  a 
Moral Idea .Berkley, University o f  California Press.; Baker, R .W .(2005), C apitalism ’s A ch illes Heel: Dirty M oney  
and How' to Renew' the Free-M arket System  ,N ew  Jersey, John W iley. China too has had numerous corporate 
scandals during the reform period these will be dealt with later but for a consideration o f  the first ‘overseas’
C hinese corporate scandal see Jackson, K. T. (2009), ‘The China Aviation Oil Scandal’ in M atulich, S. and D. M. 
Currie (eds) Handbook o f  Frauds. Scam s, and Swindles: Failures o f  Ethics in Leadership, B oca Raton, CRC Press.
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tended to hold sway in terms of influence have been agency theory,8 the
related nexus of contract9 and various other iaw  and economics’ 
influences.10 To these have been added the law matters thesis,11 political 
determinants of corporate governance,12 path dependency13 and others. 
From another perspective, but directly related to the central debate on 
corporate governance namely, the question of in whose interests are 
corporations managed? A number of theories are relevant. These include 
stewardship,14 stakeholder theory15 and corporate social responsibility.16
8 Jensen, M. C. and W. H. M eckling (1976). "Theory o f  F inn - Managerial Behavior, A gency C osts and Ownership  
Structure." Journal o f  Financial E conom ics 3(4): 305-360.; Fama, E. F. (1980). "Agency Problem s and the Theory 
o f  the Firm." Journal o f  Political Econom y 88(2): 288-307.
9 C heung, S. N . S. (1983). "The Contractual Nature o f  the Firm." Journal o f  Law  & E conom ics 26(1): 1-21.; 
Easterbrook, F. H. and D. R. Fischel (1989). "The Corporate Contract." Columbia Law  R ev iew  89(7).;Bratton, W. 
W. (1989). "The N exu s o f  Contracts Corporation - a Critical-Appraisal." Cornell Law R eview  74(3).; Bratton. W. 
W. (1989). "The N ew  Eeonom ic-Theory o f  the Firm - Critical Perspectives from History." Stanford Law' Review' 
4 1 (6 ) .;  U len . T.S. (1993), "The Coasean firm in Law and Econom ics " Journal o f  Corporate L aw  18 at 301
10 For a critique o f  the developm ent o f  the law' and econom ics approach see Ireland, P. (2 0 0 0 ),‘D efending the 
Rentier: Corporate Theory and the Reprivatization o f  the Public C om pany’ in Parkinson, J., A G am ble and G K elly  
(eds) The P o litic a l E conom y o f  the C om pany  , Oxford, Hart Publishing.
11 This is particularly relevant to the debate over concentration o f  share ownership, see La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de- 
Silanes, et al. (1999  ). "Corporate ownership around the world." Journal o f  Finance 54(2): 471-517 . But is o f  wider  
sign ificance in terms o f  law and developm ent more generally, see in particular Dam, K. W. (2006). The law-growth  
nexus : the rule o f  law and econom ic developm ent. W ashington, D .C., Brookings Institution Press, and M ilhaupt, 
C. J. and K. Pistor (2008). Law-' and capitalism  : what corporate crises reveal about legal system s and econom ic  
developm ent around the w orld . Chicago, London, U niversity o f  C hicago Press at 140.
12 The political determinants o f  corporate governance often go to the core o f  various corporate m odels, see  
Hadden, T. (1977). Com pany law and capitalism . London, W eidenfeld and N ico lson ., Chapter 12; Roe, M . J. 
(1994). Strong managers., weak owners : the political roots o f  Am erican corporate finance. Princeton. N .J., 
Princeton U niversity Press.; Roe, M. J. (2003). Political determinants o f  corporate governance : political context, 
corporate im pact. Oxford, Oxford University' Press.; Roe, M. J. (2005). Corporate governance : political and legal 
perspectives. Cheltenham , Edward Elgar.; Gourevitch, P. A. and J. Shinn (2005). Political power and coiporate  
c o ntrol : the new' global politics o f  coiporate governance. Princeton, N.J. ; W oodstock, Princeton U niversity Press.
13 Bebchuk, L. A. and M. J. R oe (1999). "A theory o f  path dependence in corporate ow nership and governance."  
Stanford Law R eview  52( 1): 127-170.
14 See for exam ple, D avis, J. H., F. D. Schoorm an. et al. (1997). "Toward a stewardship theory o f  management." 
A cadem y o f  M anagem ent R eview  22(1): 20-47.
15 The stakeholder debate concerns w hose interests should be taken into account when m aking corporate 
decisions and the quest ion o f  vo ice  in the com pany in so for as som e o f  those interests m ight have representation  
on the board or advisory board, see Goldenberg, P. (1998), "Shareholders versus stakeholders: The bogus 
argument" The Com pany Lawyer 19 (34); Clarke, T. (1998). "The stakeholder corporation: A  business philosophy  
for the information age." Long Range Planning 31(2).; Letza, S., Sun ,X. and Kirkbride, J. (2004) "Shareholding 
versus Stakeholding: A Critical R eview  o f  Corporate Governance" Corporate G overnance an International R eview  
12, 239; for a more market fundamentalist critique o f  stakeholder theory see, Steinberg, E. (1999), "Stakeholder 
Theory Revisited; D efects o f  the Stakeholder Doctrine" Corporate Governance International 2(2).; Steinberg, E.
(2004) .Corporate Governance: Accountability' in the M arketplace ,London, Institute o f  Econom ic Affairs.
16 See for exam ple, M orrissey D. J .(1989), "Toward a N ew /O ld  Theory o f  Corporate Social Responsibility"  
Syracuse Law R eview  40; Pettet.B. (1997), "From Cakes and A le to Corporate Social Responsibility" Current 
Legal Problem s 50. The UK. Com panies Act 2006, s 172 g ives broader scope to the board o f  directors in terms o f  
considering the interests o f  a wider range o f  stakeholders rather than the shareholders only and possibly allow ing
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From a more international and comparative perspective of corporate 
governance are notions of convergence in corporate governance norms if 
not always forms and structures17 with related questions of the transplant 
effect.18 In short, the various theoretical lenses through which one might 
perceive and examine the development of corporate governance in China 
are potentially kaleidoscopic in nature as is the very subject of attention 
itself. As the title of this thesis suggests, the development of corporate 
governance in China has been a rather Chinese specific process with 
some Western influence, indeed a law unto itself.
In this thesis I will therefore draw on the various theoretical lenses of 
analysis as I think appropriate in order to cast as much light on the 
situation as is necessary to draw an understanding of the forces at play in 
corporate governance in China.
Since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, the Chinese
for a activities that are more socia lly  responsible, albeit that the com pany benefits by im proving its corporate 
im age in the long term. There is nothing to prevent a substantive philanthropic or charitable object, R e H orsley  & 
Weight L td  [1982] Ch 442 . In China the overriding political bias is often in favour o f  preserving social cohesion  
and stability which inevitably entails the consideration o f  various stakeholder interests particularly at more local 
v illage  and tow nship enterprise level and often in larger towns and cities as w ell, see for exam ple Chen, C. J.
(2 0 0 5 ),"  The path o f  C hinese privatization: A  case study o f  v illage enterprise in southern Jiangsu"  Corporate 
G overnance an International R ev iew .13.
17 See for exam ple Clarke, T. (2004). Theories o f  corporate governance : the philosophical foundations o f  
corporate governance. London, Routledge.Part 7.
18 See for exam ple,W atson, A . (1993). L egal transplants : an approach to com parative law . A thens, G a .; London, 
University o f  Georgia Press. ; Watson, A. (1976), "Legal Transplants and Law Reform s” Law  Quarterly Review’ 79; 
Legrand, P. (1997), " The Im possibility o f  Legal Transplants" Mastrict Journal o f  European and Comparative Law  
4; for sim ilar issues in relation to M alaysia, see Salim, M. R. (2006). "Legal Transplantation and Local K nowledge: 
Corporate G overnance in M alaysia " Australia Journal o f  Corporate Law  20(55). See also Friedman, L. M. (1996). 
"Borders: On the em erging soc io logy  o f  transnational law." Stanford Journal o f  International Law  32(1): 65-90.;for  
a consideration o f  the background to the debate, see Twining, W. (2005). "Social science and diffusion o f  law." 
Journal o f  Law and Society 32( 2): 203-240 . And for the start o f  the debate on the efficacy o f  transplantation, see  
Freund, O. K. (1974),"O n U ses and M isuses o f  Comparative Law" M odern Law R eview  37(1).
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Government adopted a strict socialist planned economy, under which 
enterprises were owned and controlled by the state, “with all key 
decisions being made in accordance with State policy and objectives”19 
The largest share of China's economy is the state-owned economy named 
“the all-people-owned economy.” China's Constitution provides that the 
all-people-ownership system is the primary component and the base of 
China's economy.20 Chinese SOEs used to be production units as well as 
social and political organizations.21
Dengxiaoping broke the conventional boundaries of socialism and 
capitalism by claiming that “social practice (praxis) is the only criterion 
of seeking truth.”22 “No matter if it is a white cat or a black cat; as long as 
it can catch mice, it is a good cat.”23 John Gittings in The Changing Face 
o f China quotes Deng Xiaoping as stating: "Planning and market forces 
are not the essential difference between socialism and capitalism. A 
planned economy is not the definition of socialism, because there is 
planning under capitalism; the market economy happens under socialism,
19 Gul, F. A. and J. S. L. Tsui (2004). The governance o f  East A sian  corporations : post A sian  financial crisis. 
B asingstoke ; N e w  York, Palgrave M acm illan, at 27.
20 The Constitution o f  P eop le’s Republic o f  China, (1982), art. 7; the Constitution (2004) “The state-ow ned  
econom y, namely, the socialist econom y under ownership by the w hole people, is the leading force in the national 
econom y. The state ensures the consolidation and growth o f  the state-ow ned econ om y”. S ee the Constitution o f  
P eo p les’ Republic o f  China (2004) art 7 .
21 Walder, A . G. (1986). Com m unist neo-traditionalism  : w ork and authority in Chinese industry. B erkeley ; 
London, University o f  California Press.
22 See reports in the P eop le’s Daily, May 9, 1998;
23 D en e  ,1962  From a speech in a m eeting o f  the Secretariat, actually a Sichuan proverb.
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too. Planning and market forces are both ways of controlling economic 
activity.” 24
As a result of this change of policy at the top, China has been in great 
transition since the late 1970s. It has gradually moved from a rigid 
planned economy with public ownership of the means of production 
toward a socialist market economy. The changes at the firm levels have 
called for a general reform of the legal system as a whole, with a 
particular focus on the reform of corporate governance.
Broadly speaking, the Chinese company law system is a hybrid one, 
containing institutions borrowed from both common law systems, as 
practiced mainly in the United States, and the collection of continental 
civil law jurisdictions, in particular from Germany. The hybrid nature of 
the legal systems is reflected in the board structure of China’s listed 
companies, which are mandated to have both a management board with 
independent directors and a supervisory board. However, the “transplant 
shock” i.e. the possibility that legal rules that work well in one nation 
may not work well, and ultimately may be rejected, in a nation with a 
different historical, political, or culture background is a concern.25
?A G ittings, J. (2005). The changing face o f  China : from M ao to market. Oxford, Oxford University Press, at 253.
"5 Stout, L. A . (2002). "On the Export o f  U .S .-Style Corporate Fiduciary- D uties to Other Cultures: Can a Transplant 
Take?" UCLA. School o f  Law Working Paper N o. 02 -1 1 .; See also Miihaupt, C. J. (2001). "Creative norm 
destruction: The evolution  o f  nonlegal rules in Japanese corporate governance." University' o f  Pennsylvania Law 
R eview  149(6): 2083-2129 .
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2. Understanding the characteristics of Chinese corporate 
governance
2.1 Culture and tradition can play an important role
Culture and ideology might influence a country’s choice of corporate law. 
Law in traditional China was an instrument of the state. Its purpose was 
to enhance the power of the government and maintain imperial control. 
Rather than protecting the rights of individuals, legal codes focused on 
the individual’s obligations toward the state.26 The law traditionally 
focused on peoples’ responsibilities rather than their rights.
China has continuing imperial history of over 2000 years, characterize 
throughout by its authoritarian Confucianism. Confucian governance was 
thus a matter of using moral teaching to shape people’s behaviour. 
Chinese society is constructed of morally binding relationships 
connecting all. The individual is rather a ‘connection’, and the “totalness” 
of society is passed down from one binding relationship to the next, 
rather than by the Western mode of uniting loosely coupled and “free” 
individuals by their separate espousal of coordinating ideas and principles. 
As such the law of the State was not very interested in social regulations
26 In contrast to traditional China. ‘The monarch (o f  m edieval Europe), it is argued, may make law, but he may not
make it arbitrarily, and until he has remade it-la w fu lly  he is bound by it.' See Berman, I I. J. Law and revolution :...
The Formation o f  the Western Legal Tradition. Cambridge, Harvard University Press at 9.
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among autonomous individuals, and least of all in defending individual 
rights against the state."' As a result, no independent legal system (as well 
as specialized legal practitioners) had ever been built to serve the interests 
of capitalist enterprises in Chinese history.28 “So that, by default, the 
family and the relationships of trust became a more secure basis for 
business activity than formal bodies of law, such as company law.”29
The Chinese way of life continues to affect how business is run in 
China.' For example, Chinese entrepreneurs do not trust outsiders. 
Secrets of the business and success are often kept “in the family.” This is 
one factor making it difficult for independent directors to function
O |
effectively in China.' This is also the case in relation to former 
corporatized SOEs where the dominance of persons in authority acts in a 
similar way.
In this context legal reform is fraught with problems. Some commentators 
regard the recent wave of legal reform as statist in nature and represent an
27 B odde, D . and C. Morris (1967). Law  in Imperial China: exem plified  by 190 Ch’ing D ynasty cases, w ith  
h istorica l socia l, and juridical com m entaries Cambridge (M ass.): Harvard U niversity Press; London: Oxford  
University Press ,at 4.
28 Ibid. S ee also Redding, S. G. (1990). The spirit o f  Chinese capitalism . Berlin, W. de Gruyter, at 48.
29 Tom asic, R. and J. Fu (1999). "Company Law in China", in Tom asic, R. (1999). Com pany law in East A sia . 
A ldershot, A shgate at 135.
30 “Ultim ately, there is the issue o f  market culture and the general m urkiness o f  the China business environment. 
Can w e really expect former governm ent workers (as red-chip em ployees are) to em brace a culture o f  shareholder 
value, or are they more likely to v iew  corporatisation as an opportunity for personal enrichm ent?” said a 
commentator. Brooker, M. (2002). Tannery Stink Spoils Theory. South China M orning Post. A ugust 27 , at.2.
31 In 2005 , the three independent directors in G uangdong Ivelon Electrical H oldings w ho resigned stated in a 
resignation letter: “ We think the com pany does not support our duty to protect shareholder rights,” alleging that the 
com pany did not listen to their advice or provide enough information when they looked into several “abnormal” 
transactions. See ‘K elon gets fined for accounting fraud'. P eop le’s daily, 2005 , D ecem ber 8, at 3.
attempt to rest the legitimacy of the post-Mao regime in part on an 
ideology that complements the government’s attempts at economic 
reform. ’- Whilst there are views that to some limited extent there has
been an erosion of communist party control over law making in China33 
and attempts have been made to centralize power and rationalize the legal 
system, particularly in recent years, the legalization process remains 
primarily a relatively new means for the CCP to legitimize its regime and 
power control over the Chinese state. Nevertheless, the various processes 
of legalization remain inherently embedded with the characteristics of the 
Chinese legal tradition and their impact on the legal system remains 
dubious. The ‘moral education’ proposed by Jiang Zemin in 2001 ’4 was 
just one effort amongst several others to balance the rule of law with the 
rule of (socialist) morality and more recently President Hu Jintao called
 ^5for ‘building a socialist harmonious society’ “ clearly building on 
traditional Confucian elements in a socialist context. In such a cultural 
and political context the future of the legal system and the long march 
towards the rule of law remains speculative at best.36
32 See for exam ple Potter, P. B. (1994). "Riding the Tiger - Legitim acy and Legal Culture in Post-M ao China." 
China Quarterly ! 138): 32 5-358. :Potter, P. B. (1999). "The Chinese legal system: C ontinuing com m itm ent to the 
primacy o f  state power." China Ouarterly(159): 673-683.
Tanner, M. S. (1994). "The Erosion o f  Communist-Party Control over Law m aking in China." China 
Ouartcrlv(T38): 381-403 .
34 There w ere many reports in the C hinese press on Jiang’s proposition o f  the moral education, see  for exam ple  
com m entaries in The People's Daily, 1 and 22 February, 2001; 7 and 29  April, 2001.
35 This call w as m ade at the sixth plenary session  o f  the 16th Central Com m ittee in 2006. For a full report by 'Wu 
Bangguo, Chairman o f  the Standing Com m ittee o f  the National Peoples Congress, see The P eop le’s Daily, 20  
October, 2006.
36 S ee for exam ple Liang. B . (2009). T he changing Chinese legal system . 1978-presen t: centralization o f  power 
and rationalization o f  the legal system . London, Routledge.; Peerenboom, R. P. (2002). China's long march toward 
rule o f  law . Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.; Lubman, S. (1995). "Introduction - the Future o f  Chinese  
Law." China Quarterly! 141): 1-21.
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Again, the cultural values of China 57 may indicate that the practice of 
auditing and behaviour of auditors as practiced and required in Western 
countries may not be easily transported to PR China. Guanxi (complex 
interpersonal relationships) and networking are important components of 
Chinese business behaviour. Regarding financial transparency, most listed 
companies in China are audited by local accounting firms but no reliable 
information exists to determin which accounting firms are more reputable.
2.2 The largest shareholder is the state
Most of the listed companies are SOEs, and mostly controlled by the state. 
The state has incentive to keep enough equity interest so it can achieve 
some policy goals easily through the listed firm vehicle, such as the 
maintenance of urban employment levels, direct control over sensitive 
industries, or politically motivated job placement.'58 Indeed, the Chinese
37 In this context the greater cultural norms generally affecting a society, see Trompenaars, A. and C. Hampden- 
Turner ( 2000). R iding the w aves o f  culture : understanding cultural diversity in business. London, N icholas  
Brealey.; H ofstede, G. and G. J. H ofstede (2005). Cultures and Organisations: Softw are o f  the M ind N ew  York. 
M cG raw -H ill.; H ofstede, G. (2001). Culture's consequences : com paring values, behaviors, institutions, and 
organizations across nations. Thousand Oaks, C a lif .; London, SAGE.; Lew is, R. D. (2006). When cultures 
co llid e : leading across cultures. Boston ; London, N icholas Brealey International. To som e extent P sychological 
aspects are important, see  N isbett. R. E. (2003). The geography o f  thought : how A s ians and W esterners think 
differently— and w h y. London, N icholas Brealey.
3,s Thus, w e should understand as internally contradictory various proposals for the state to retain ownership o f  
certain enterprises but to run them entirely on profit-oriented lines. Tenev and Zhang (2002) go  even  further by 
suggesting that the state’s current equity stake be replaced by an interest akin to nonvoting preferred stock.
See,T enev, S., C. Zhang, et al. (2002). Corporate governance and enterprise reform in China : building the 
institutions o f  modern m arkets. W ashington, D .C ., World Bank : International Finance Corporation. 'The problem  
o f  continuing state ownership o f  enterprises cannot be finessed so  easily. N on voting preferred stock m ight be a 
good  investm ent in the right circum stances, but it is hard to see w hy a policy maker w ho b elieves that state 
ow nership ought to mean som ething w ould be satisfied with it or w hy the state should com m it itse lf  never to sell it. 
Indeed, in replacing its equity stake with nonvoting preferred stock, the state would be g iv ing up its ability to use 
control not just to pursue noneconom ic goals, but also to defend itse lf from exploitation by management or 
controlling shareholders or even to exploit other shareholders for its ow n econom ic benefit.
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Communist Party’s role is central within most listed Chinese companies 
and Art 19 of the Company Law (as amended in 2005) provides that “In 
accordance with the Constitution of the Communist Party of China, the 
organization of the Communist Party of China shall be established in a 
company so as to carry out the activities of the Communist Party. The 
company shall provide its communist organization with conditions 
necessary for carrying out its activities.” It is often the case that the 
Chairman of the company is also the Party Secretary of the local 
Communist Party branch within the company, effectively fusing 
managerial and political control in one office.
Secondly, the ownership structure makes it very difficult to establish an 
efficient takeover market and a primary stock market. “A prominent 
characteristic of Chinese listed companies is an overwhelmingly large 
percentage of non-tradeable shares, which represent about 2/3 of all the 
listed company’s combined equity. The tradable shares represent the 
remaining 1/3” 39 The local office of the Bureau of State Asset 
management (BSAM) or its local subsidiaries, called state asset 
management companies, act as the largest shareholder. The chairman of 
the board of directors is usually a representative from the BSAM. This 
causes BSAM officials to align their interests with the local government,
39 China Corporate G overnance Report 2003 -  E xecutive Summary, Shanghai Stock Exchange, at 8, available at 
http ://72 .14 .203 .104/search?q=cache:ZzgLIt8 VI vOJ :rru.w orldbank.org/D iscussions/0.
11
whose political interests may be to preserve employment rather than 
increase the efficiency of listed SOEs. This also has implications for 
minority shareholder actions since the ultimate majority shareholder is 
the state.40
2.3 The role of the CSRC
In theory, the securities market principal watchdog-China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC), should assume the primary 
responsibility of supervising and monitoring the stock market by 
promoting good behaviour and truthful disclosure and by punishing 
wrongdoers. In practice, they have to face conflicting situations. On the 
one hand, the controlling shareholders of most listed companies are 
usually local governments or entities controlled by them. On the other 
hand, as a quasi-govemmental agency, the CSRC lacks independence and 
is ultimately subject to government interference. Even worse, at times the 
CSRC is blamed for being unable to control the corruption cases that its 
own investigative efforts are increasingly bringing to light.
40 See for exam ple, W eideman, A., supra footnote 2; and M cN eil, M. I. (2002). "Adaptation and C onvergence in 
Corporate Governance: The Case o f  Chinese Listed Companies." Journal o f  Corporate Law  Studies 289: 308-312.
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2.4 Different nature of the judicial system in China
The Chinese courts are widely perceived as lacking independence from 
government and as having insufficient experience to deal with corporate 
and securities disputes. The Chinese view their judicial system as merely 
another bureaucratic body. For example, Courts’ loyalty to the Chinese 
Communist Party was re-emphasized in 2006 with the launching of a new 
campaign on “socialist rule of law theory”. Thus, the judiciary in China 
has not played a dynamic role in developing a body of law to protect the 
interests of minority shareholders. Indeed, it is not unusual for courts to 
decide not to deal with a particular matter, regarding it as beyond their 
competence, and instead referring it to another branch of government.41
2.5 The role of investors
There are so many investors coming into the Chinese stock markets who 
do not understand the risks. Investors have very few alternatives for 
capital investment in China. Because of capital account controls, 
investors cannot easily remit financial assets out of the country to invest 
in equities overseas. Investing in equities has been a popular way to 
invest.
41 Tom asic, R. and A. N eil (2007). "Minority shareholder protection in China's top 100 listed companies."
Australian journal o f  A sian law 9(1).
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Only a third of the shares of a typical SOE are tradable in the market. The 
market is not very liquid in general. Thus, some investors view stock 
buying as a speculation tool for gains from short-term share trades in the 
secondary market rather than a long-term, value-based investment vehicle. 
Some even believed that as long as there was a ‘fool’ willing to buy 
shares from the previous holders, everybody can make gains in share 
trades until the last ‘fool’ is unable to find anyone else to sell the shares to, 
and bears all losses as the unlucky end chain of the ‘fool’s game’42. As a 
result, investing in the stock market has become one of the most risky 
investment activities in China.
2,6 The principle of the corporation’s responsibility to society is a 
product from the era of planned economy
In 1949 the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to power. The 
communist government assumed the responsibilities of protecting all 
worker interests. From the earliest days of communist rule, membership 
of a Danwei (a general term for a unit of production) as a SOE worker 
was of great value to workers not only because of the monetary benefits, 
but also because workers regarded their job as their lifetime employment
42 Leng, J. (2006). The interaction betw een dom estic and overseas capital market and coiporate governance o f  
C hinese Listed com panies. Corporate go vernance Post-Enro n: Comparative and internationa l Perspec tive s 
J. J. N orton, J. Rickord and J. K ieinem an, British Institute o f  International and com parative law at 293
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position which also defined their social identity within society. During 
that period, China adopted a socialist planned economy, under which 
enterprises were owned and controlled by the state, “with all key 
decisions being made in accordance with State policy and objectives”43 
SOE employees usually enjoyed health services, housing, pensions, 
education, and entertainment provided by their enterprises. In every sense 
the system provided workers with what was colloquially called the ‘iron 
rice bowl’. This provides an interesting scope for the study of corporate 
governance in China in terms of the borrowings (or transplants) from 
Germany in the adaptation of the two tier board system and worker 
representation. The extent to which co-determination has been adopted in 
China in a context where party control remains central will provide 
insights into the political determinants of corporate governance in a 
system where independent trade unions simply do not exist.44
Since 1978, China has chosen a route of evolutionary transformation 
from a central-planned economy to a free-market economy. Market 
reform has changed state-labour relations. The government abandoned all 
ideological, political and moral imperatives for job security in SOEs.
43 Gul, F. A. and J . S. L. Tsui (2004). The governance o f  East Asian corporations : post Asian  financial crisis. 
B asingstoke ; N ew  York, Palgrave M acm illan, at 27.
44 See Philion, S. E. (2009). Workers' dem ocracy in China's transition from state socia lism . N ew  York ; London, 
R outledge.;B lecher, M . J. (2002). "Hegem ony and workers' politics in China." China QuarterlvC 170): 283- 
3()3.;Solinger, D. J. (2002). "Labour market reform and the plight o f  the la id -off proletariat." China Guarterlv(170): 
304-326 . : Cai, Y. S. (2002). "The resistance o f  Chinese la id -off workers in the reform period." China
Quarterly(170): 327-344 .
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When workers relationship with the SOEs cease, they lose their high self­
esteem as members of a leading class. This has led to a degree of 
resistance and arguments based on the former promises of the communist 
government.4*
2.7 The Chinese supervisory board’s apparent resemblance to the 
German model is confined mostly to its name and the participation of 
workers
The law makers in China adopt the German model of a two-tier board 
system because the ideal of co-determination between capital and labour 
would seem to enhance internal unity and company performance. The 
Chinese Company Law expects that the board of supervisors will perform 
a supervisory role by simply saying that it will, without actually giving 
the board any significant powers46 or providing structurally for its 
independence from those supervisors.47
The establishment of the supervisory board in China is not based on the 
same social and philosophical considerations as for the setting up of 
supervisory boards in the German codetermination model of corporate
45 S ee in particular Cai (2002) and B lecher (2002) supra note 44.
46 See Wang, J. (2008). "The Strange R ole o f  Independent Directors in a Two-Tier Board Structure o f  China’s 
Listed Companies." The C om pliance and Regulatory Journal 3: 49.
47 Ibid ,at 52.
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governance. No broader social and historical issues seem to have been 
involved in designating the official functions48of the supervisory board in 
China, other than a desire to provide another organizational layer for a 
rather loosely defined monitoring role over the board of directors and 
managers.49
3. The objective of this research
Chinese commentators’ views on the concept of corporate governance 
have been substantially influenced by corporate governance theories in 
developed economies most of which have been referred to at the 
beginning of this introduction. There are clearly certain corporate 
governance practices and mechanisms, mostly from the European and 
Anglo-American models, that are adopted in China.
One main objective of this study is to analytically explore legal, cultural, 
social, institutional, historical, political, economic and other factors 
affecting the resulting differences in implementation that have been 
observed in China. Chapters in this research address these issues from 
various perspectives.
48 The Com pany Law 2005 , A rticles 67, 81, 118. Only limited liability com panies and joint stock com panies with 
limited liabilities are to set up supervisory boards, w holly state-ow ned com panies do not have supervisory boards.
49 Tam, O. K. (1999). The developm ent o f  corporate governance in China. Cheltenham , Edward Elgar, at 86.
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The methodology used is a library based one. Given the wide range of 
issues which it is proposed to cover in this thesis it is proposed to draw 
together and integrate key aspects that influenced the unfolding story of 
corporate governance in China. By drawing on a wide range of factors 
(and therefore disciplines) which it is argued impact on the 
corporatization of SOEs it will be argued that China’s path of corporate 
governance development is uniquely Chinese in nature. This is because 
the processes involved remain imbued with Chinese characteristics, 
particularly political and cultural ones which have impacted on the 
development of the legal regime and corporate governance practices. A 
library based methodology is therefore considered appropriate to draw 
together various strands of thought which help to illuminate and give 
some recognizable pattern to the kaleidoscopic nature of corporate 
governance in China.
4. The structure of this research
Globalization has had major impacts on business activities in countries
throughout the world. Chapter 2 focuses on the questions of whether a
transformation in the world business environment has [already] caused a
convergence of corporate governance whereby cultural factors are losing
their influence. Whether globalization is reducing the diversity in
18
corporate governance practices in China or not is an important question 
considered in this section of the thesis.
In order to understand China’s current approach to enterprise reform and 
corporate sector development in its institutional and developmental 
context, it is important to consider the background and meaning of 
several key concepts and practices, some of which China has borrowed 
from mature market economies. Thus, Chapter 3 focuses on internal 
corporate governance mechanisms and corporate performance in China. 
This chapter evaluates the effectiveness of independent directors, 
directors’ duties and the role of the supervisory board in China.
The purpose of chapter 4 is to assess the role currently and potentially 
performed by institutional investors in China. In exploring whether the 
rise in institutional shareholdings has had a measurable impact on 
corporate performance so far in China will help to examine whether this 
development has potential for enabling future improvements in practice.
Chapter 5 focuses on the legal infrastructure and minority shareholder
protection in China. The Chinese regulatory body adopted policies based
on Western theories on the positive link between capital market
development and public shareholder protection. However, the real
19
situation in China is different. The issue of how to protect the rights of 
minority shareholders is an important one in China where the State is by 
far the largest majority shareholder of many listed companies, and where 
auditors and the judiciary lack independence from governance. Given that 
there is presently and for the foreseeable future no real market for 
corporate control and minority shareholder protection is in its infancy, 
China lacks mechanisms for the disciplining of management.
The social responsibility model of governance in China is a product from 
the era of planned economy. SOE employees usually enjoy health service, 
housing, pensions, education, and entertainment provided by their 
enterprises. Market reform has changed state-labour relations. Chapter 6 
discusses the issues that have arisen as a result of the shift in the 
governance practices in China. Will similar institutions, trade unions or 
collective bargaining, be stable institutional responses to their 
circumstances? Will workers have voice in the company and are their 
interests a legitimate concern for those who direct and manage China’s 
corporations?
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Chapter 2 Globalization and tradition: When East meets West
2.1 Introduction
Globalization appears to be associated with a disjunction of space and 
tim e,1 a shrinking of the world.- The global economy - driven by 
increasing technological scale, alliance between firms, and information 
flows3 is one “with the capacity to work as a unit in real time on a 
planetary scale”.4 It is also one in which national economies become more 
interdependent in terms of trade, finance, and macroeconomic policy.5 
Some scholars argue that convergence in organizational patterns is taking 
place as result of globalization.6 Other researchers see globalization as 
promoting diversity in the world as opposed to homogeneity.7
However, one of the most frequent complaints about globalization is that 
it is equivalent to Americanization. There are widespread fears that in 
today’s borderless, high tech world, national differences will be
1 G iddens, A. (1990). The consequences o fm od ern ity . Cambridge, Polity in association with B lackw ell, at 64.
2 M ittelm an, J. H. (1996). The D ynam ics o f  G lobalization. G loba lization : critical re flections- International 
political econom y year book . J. H. M ittelman. Boulder, C o lo .; London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, at 3: .
3 Kobrin, S. J. (1998). "Back to the Future: N eom edievalism  and the Postmodern Digital World Economy." Journal 
o f  International A flairs 51.
4 C a s te lls , M . (1 9 9 6 ) .  T h e  r ise  o f  th e  n etw o rk  s o c ie ty . C a m b rid g e , M a ss . ; O x fo r d , B la c k w e ll  
P u b lish e r s , at 9 2 .
5 G ilpin, R. (1987). The political econom y o f  international relations. Princeton University Press.at 389
6 Ham el, G. and C. K. Prahalad (1996). "Competing in the new econom y: M anaging out o f  bounds." Strategic 
M anagem ent Journal 17(3): 237
7 G uillen, M . F. (2001). "Is globalization civ ilizing, destructive or feeble? A  critique o f  five key debates in the 
social sc ience literature." Annual R eview  o f  Socio logy 27: 235-260 ., and Macey, J. R. and G. P. M iller (1 995). 
"Corporate governance and com mercial banking: A com parative exam ination o f  Germany, Japan, and the United 
States." Stanford Law R eview  48(1): 73-112.
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overwhelmed by American economic and cultural domination.8 Indeed, 
corporate law scholars debate whether a transformation in the world 
business environment has [already] caused a convergence of corporate 
governance whereby cultural factors are losing their influence.9 An often 
posited question has been whether the United States style of corporate 
governance practices and structures ultimately will prevail in China?
2.2 Globalization means Americanization?
Some scholars believe that the increase in foreign direct and portfolio 
investment—with the concomitant rise of powerful multinational 
corporations and institutional investors—are commonly cited as pressures 
tending toward convergence.'0 Large multinational corporations such as 
Daimler-Chrysler list their shares both on European and United States 
stock exchanges." The SEC (US Securities and Exchange Commission) 
had been working with the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) to develop international standards for
8 D ale, R, (2000). ""Americanization" Has Its Limits " International Herald Tribune 25: 9.
9 Fanto, J. A . (1998). "The role o f  corporate law in French corporate governance." Cornell International Law  
Journal 31(1): 31-91.
10 G uillen, M. F. (2004). Corporate governance and globalization: is there convergence across countries. Theories 
o f  corporate governance : the philosophical foundations o f  corporate governance. T. Clarke. London, Routledge:
226"’”
“ Cunningham, I... A. (1999). "Commonalit ies and Prescriptions in the Vertical D im ension o f  Global Corporate 
G overnance." Cornell Law R eview . 84: 1194.
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nonfinancial statement disclosure.12
The Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) document 
highlights the increased profile that governance issues have attained 
around the world. The OECD’s recommended principles of corporate 
governance cover five areas of concern (1) the rights of shareholders (2) 
the equitable treatment of shareholders, (3 ) the role of stakeholders in 
corporate governance, (4) disclosure and transparency, and (5) the 
responsibilities of the bourse.13
Most financial experts and money managers would prefer companies 
throughout the world to observe shareholder rights, maximize shareholder 
value, and be transparent in their reporting of corporate activities and 
results. The rise of globally diversified mutual fluids seems to create 
pressures for the standardization of information on companies in major 
overseas institutional investors like Calpers (the California State Pension 
Fund) have required standards of disclosure and governance practices 
similar to those in their home jurisdictions.14 Given that evidence and its 
largely United States-European bias, it seems a stretch to conclude that
12 Ibid, at 1194
13 Em m ons, W.R. and Schm id E  A. (2000). "Corporate governance and corporate performance" in Cohen, S. S. 
and G. B oyd (2000). Coiporate governance and globalization : long range planning issues. Cheltenham , Edward 
Elgar.
14 Ibbotson, R., G. and G. P. Brinson (1993). Global Investing:The Professional Guide to the W orld's Capital 
M arkets. N e w  York., M cG rawH ill.
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“[cjross border alliances among businesses are leading to the articulation 
of a new global corporate governance template which uses existing tools 
to build a new corporate world order.”15 Thus, two prominent specialists 
even proclaimed ‘The end of History for Corporate Law.’16 As a result of 
the pressures for convergence which they identify they argue that the last 
decade or so have brought strong evidence of a growing consensus on 
convergence issues among the academic, business, and governmental 
elites in leading jurisdictions.
Others believe that the globalization of the financial markets will, 
inevitably, lead to a convergence of corporate governance expectations 
and, thus, practices.17 Professor John Coffee predicts global convergence 
through “the backdoor”, so to speak, as foreign firms seek stock exchange 
listings in the United States and thus make themselves subject to United 
States style corporate governance norms.18 Foreign issuers arrive on 
United States shores because of the strength of United States capital 
markets. In turn, the strength of United States capital markets stems from 
the protection United States law extends to minority investors in United
15 Cunningham , L. A. (1999). "Comm onalities and Prescriptions in the Vertical D im ension  o f  Global Corporate 
Governance." Cornell Law  Review. 84: 1194.
16 Hansmann, H. and R. Kraakman (2001). "The end o f  history for corporate law." G eorgetow n Law Journal 89(2): 
439-468 .
17 Editorial (1999) "Corporate G overnance-the global state o f  the art" Corporate G overnance-A n international 
review  7(2) at 118; Hansmann. H. and R. Kraakman (2002). Toward a single M odel o f  Corporate Law? In 
Corporate governance regim es : convergence and diversity. J. McCahery. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 56.
18 C offee, J. C. (1999). "The future as history: The prospects for global convergence in corporate governance and 
its im plications." Northwestern University Law R eview  93(3): 641-707.
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States enterprises.19 However, the China Aviation Oil (CAO) episode 
exemplifies the limits of strategies aimed at outsourcing law enforcement, 
for example by listing a Chinese company on a foreign stock exchange 
and thereby subjecting it to a more robust legal regime -  in this case that 
of Singapore.20 The basic theme of such outsourcing arguments is that 
firms located in weak corporate governance regimes, in particular those 
in developing countries and emerging markets, may counter these 
disadvantages by obtaining listings on foreign stock exchanges. 
Theoretically, the firm integrates into the governance and disclosure 
regime of the foreign country thereby signalling to investors that its 
management is capable of compliance with higher governance standards 
than those pertaining in the firm’s home country.21 Whilst there is some 
empirical evidence in support of this thesis22 the CAO example is one 
example where the weak domestic corporate governance regime was 
exported to the foreign listing environment. As a result minority 
shareholders were victimized by a foreign parent company operating by 
very different rules whereby, in exploiting a gap in Singapore’s listing 
rules the Chinese SOE parent company was able to privately place shares
19 Ibid. at 644 ,698
20 Burton, J. (5 Jan 2005). CAO Seeks S50()m D ebt W rite-offs. Financial Tim es
" ' C offee, J. C. (2002). "Racing towards the top?: The impact o f  cross-listings, and stock market com petition on  
international corporate governance." Colum bia Law R eview  102(7): 1757-1831.; G ilson, R. J. (2001).
"G lobalizing corporate governance: C onvergence o f  form or function." A m erican Journal o f  Com parative Law  
49(2): 329-357 . For a contrary view , see Licht w ho argues that cultural factors often m ilitate against the influence  
o f  the governance norms and practices o f  the host listing country, Licht A . N ., “The M other o f  A ll Path 
D ependncies: Towards a Cross-Cultural Theory o f  Corporate G overnance” available at 
http:/papers.ssm .com /paper.taf?abtsract_id=208489.
22 R eese, W. A. and M. S. Weisbach (2002). "Protection o f  minority shareholder interests, cross-listings in the 
U nited States, and subsequent equity offerings." Journal o f  Financial E conom ics 66(1): 65-104.
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without full disclosure, in order to raise capital to cover its listed 
subsidiary’s losses. All of this was done to save both the subsidiary and 
its parent from disgrace.23
Foreign issuers go to the United States shores, however, because that is 
where the money is, not because of the protection United States law may 
once have given to minority shareholder interests. And the United States 
supply of capital is not inexhaustible and is not exclusive. There is a great 
deal of money elsewhere in the world, for example, in Dubai, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Shanghai and Tokyo, to name a few international banking 
centres. In fact, in February 2000, perhaps aware of strong capital 
markets in East Asia, seven United States high tech firms listed their 
common shares on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.24 The growth of 
Asia's emerging economies will also shift the world's financial centre of 
gravity east. As a result: "Wall Street will no longer be the centre of the 
universe," according to Stephen Green, group chairman of HSBC 
Holdings Pic when he gave a speech at the Spruce Meadows Changing 
Fortunes roundtable in Calgary.25 Today, Sovereign wealth funds are the 
investment funds established by governments in the Middle East and
23 See M ilhaupt, C. J. and K. Pistor (2008). Law and capitalism  : what corporate crises reveal about legal system s 
and econom ic developm ent around the w orld. Chicago, London, U niversity o f  C hicago Press at 140.
24 "International D evelopm ents: Seven N A SD A Q  Stocks to be available in Hong Kong In Pilot Program", 
available at http://english.peopledaily .com .c a /english /200005/29/eng20000529__41836.htm l
2'" "HSBC's Green says A sian dem and to spur inflation", available at
http://www.forbes.com/reuters/feeds/reuters/2008/09/05#0()8-09-05T20S619Z 01 N03S4146 RTR1PST 0 CANADA-BANKS-HSBC- 
P lx’Titml.'
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China, with large surpluses of money. Indeed, after the recent banking 
crisis in the Western developed countries, this is increasingly the case. 
Recently, OECD Secretary General Angel Gurria even said that sovereign 
wealth funds were part of the solution to the current credit crunch.26
Again, some United States scholars have a very one-sided view of what 
globalization is and what may be expected of it. They believe that 
“Global” convergence in corporate governance is that United States style 
corporate governance practices and structures ultimately will prevail in 
some world wide market-place of ideas. Instead, the recent globalization 
is, in part, a technological and telecommunications revolution, a 
phenomenon of the information age, which will not necessarily erase all 
differences and barriers between nations and cultures.27 The previous age 
of globalization was brought to an end by the First World War and is not 
simply a modern phenomenon.28 The process of globalization does not 
as yet seem to have changed national structures very much. As Scott has 
pointed out, from a sociological perspective, any comparative account of 
corporate control, whilst recognizing that there are common uniformities 
in all of the major capitalist economies such as the use of technologies 
and business practices there remain, however, equally important
24 “ Lifting the lid on sovereign wealth funds4’, available at http://new s.bbc.co.U k/l/lii/business/7430641.stm
21 G uillen, M . F. (2004). Corporate governance and globalization: is there convergence across countries. Theories
o f  corporate governance : the philosophical foundations o f  corporate governance. T  Clarke. London, Routledge:
226.
28 Freguson, N . (2005). "Is G lobalization Doomed." Foreign Affairs 84.
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divergences. These arise from different countries’ and regions’ specific 
historical experiences and various cultural and legal systems. As a result, 
he argues for example, that the pattern which taken by impersonal 
possession in Britain, the USA Australia, Canada and New Zealand is to 
be seen as the outcome of a specific convergence of national and 
international forces in the Anglo-American, English speaking world. The 
national variations referred to earlier shape the constraints which operate 
on the actions and orientation of business leaders. This results in a 
number of alternative patterns of capitalist development.29 Whilst there 
considerable variations within the Anglo-American countries listed 
above30 in other parts of the world, which are impacted by other forces, 
even greater differences in patterns of impersonal possession are apparent. 
In terms of convergence in corporate governance fundamental reforms 
must be enacted in individual countries in the face of what is likely to be 
strong resistance by parties well served by the current system.
29 Scott, J. (1990). "Corporate-Control and Corporate Rule - Britain in an International Perspective." British 
Journal o f  Soc io logy  41(3): 3 5 1 -3 7 3 .;  See also Scott, J. (1997). Corporate business and capitalist c la sses. Oxford, 
O xford U niversity Press. For the literature on varieties o f  capitalism , see Hall, P. A. and D. W. Soskice (2001). 
Varieties o f  capitalism  : the institutional foundations o f  com parative advantage. Oxford, Oxford U niversity Press, 
at 387, 388.; Dore, R. P. (2000). Stock market capitalism, welfare capitalism  : Japan and Germany versus the 
A n glo -S axon s. Oxford, Oxford University P r e ss .; and for business system s in Asia with particular reference to 
China, Japan and Korea, see W hitley, R. (1992). B us iness sy stem s in East A sia : firm s, markets and so c ieties. 
London, Sage. : W hillev, R. (1999). D ivergent capitalism s : the social structuring and change o f  business system s. 
O xford, Oxford University' Press.
30 See for exam ple, M iller, Cl. P. (1998). "Political Structure and Corporate Governance: Som e Points o f  Contrast 
betw een the U nited States and England." C o lum bia B usiness Law R eview  52. W hich argues that in the U K  the 
market for corporate control is the real force discipling m anagem ent whereas in the U SA  it is shareholder 
(including m inority shareholders) actions; M orck R. K, Percy M , Tian Gy and Yeung B , "The R ise and Fall o f  the 
W idely H eld Firm: A  History o f  Corporate Ownership in Canada"which outlines the failure o f  the ‘Berle and 
M eans’ type corporation in Canada and Franks J., M ayer C’. and R ossi S., "Spending L ess Tim e With the Family: 
The D eclin e o f  Family Ownership in the U nited Kingdom" outlining the change in fam ily control o f  corporate 
businesses in the UK, both in Morck, R. (2007). A history o f  corporate governance around the world : family 
business groups to professional m anagers. Chicago, 111., University o f  C hicago Press ; Bristol : University' Presses 
M arketing [distributor].
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2.3 The U.S. style has shifted
The United States, so strongly identified with the Berle-Means pattern of 
separation of ownership and management control today, was not always 
thus. In the late nineteenth century, patterns of ownership of large firms 
looked far more like Germany than they do now. U.S. firms began with 
concentrated inside owners, the blockholding model, as have most firms 
around the world. At that time, large ‘trusts’ or oligopolies were 
controlled by shareholder blocks in the hands of individuals and banks; 
minority shareholder protection was weak, insider trader scandals 
common. The United States then began to create shareholder protections 
through listing requirements on stock exchanges. Legislation, stimulated 
in part by earlier scandals, produced financial separation of firms from 
insurance companies and banks.31
The laws were passed: the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890, several laws 
following the 1905 Armstrong Commission on the insurance industry, the 
Glass-Steagall Act on banking in 1933, the Securities and Exchange Act 
of 1934, and now Sarbanes-Oxley of 2002. It is this legislation, 
regulatory structure, and their enforcement that changed corporate
?1 G ourevitch, P. A. and J. Shinn (2005). Political pow er and corporate control : the new global politics o f  
corporate governance. Princeton, N .J . ; W oodstock, Princeton University Press.
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governance in the United States.32
The United States has relatively low private blockholding ratios. However, 
there are still several old-line, family-controlled firms on U.S. exchanges, 
the American equivalent of Germany’s Mittelstandt, and even a family- 
controlled industrial gaint, Ford Motor, controlled by the eponymous 
family through the mechanism of closely held preferred voting shares just 
like the Quandt family at BM W. Aside from this handful of old-line, 
family-controlled firms, most current private blockheld firms in the 
United States are in relatively young high-tech firms with a large market 
cap such as Microsoft, Oracle, and Google, whose founder-entrepreneurs 
continue to hold a stake in the firm above the 10 percent control 
threshold.33 Nevertheless, family controlled firms have played a major 
part in the history of corporate America and remain an important 
contributor to the US economy.34
32 Ibid. at 2
33 Ibid, at 242
34 Hall, P. D . (1988). "A Historical O verview  o f  Family Business in the United Stales." Fam ily B usiness R eview  
1 (1 ) .;  Astrachan, J, H . and M. C. Shanker (2003). "Family B usinesses' Contribution to the U S Econom yrA  Closer  
Look." Fam ily B usiness R ev iew  S ep tem b er  1 .;  and see Lam oreaux, N . R. "Partneships, Corporations and the 
Lim its on Contractual Freedom  in U S History: An Essay in E conom ics, Law and Culture"and D unlavy A . C.,
"From C itizens to Plutocrats: Nineteenth-century' Shareholder Voting Rights and Theories o f  the Corporation"both 
in Lipartito, K. and D. B. S icilia (2004). Constructing corporate Am erica : history, politics, culture. Oxford, Oxford  
U niversity Press.
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2.4 Culture can thrive beneath the law
The starting point for mapping the processes of legal change is the 
empirical view of law as an ‘aspect of society’.35 It takes the view that 
law and the social context in which it operates need to be examined 
together. ’6 This view emphasises the ways in which law and legal culture 
are embedded in broader social structures including history, politics, state 
and possibly non-state institutions.37 To invoke Professor Alford:
“Legal doctrine cannot be understood simply as written, in isolation 
from other social phenomena. Implicit in this is the idea that law is 
contested and dynamic, even in our own legal system [the author is 
referring to the USA] and others that we might be inclined to think of 
as already largely ‘developed’”.38
The legal argument against convergence in corporate governance notes 
that corporate law is intimately related not only to social custom but also
35 Cotterrell, R. (1995). Law's com m unity : legal theory in socio log ica l perspective. Oxford, Clarendon., 
d iscussing em pirical legal theory and contrasting it with nonnative legal theory. See also his idea o f  law  as 
‘institutionalised doctrine’ (at 4). Legal doctrine, he argues is shaped by ‘pre-existing patterns o f  p ow er’ (at 8), as 
w ell as the practical and institutional contexts in w hich law is developed and used (at 4).
36 M oore, S. F. (1978). Law as process : an anthropological approach. London, R outledge and K egan Paul.
37 See, generally Young, A. (2008). "Rethinking the fundamentals o f  corporate governance: the relevance o f  
culture in the global age." The Com pany Lawyer.; Zimmertnann, R. O. and M. Reimann (2006). The Oxford 
handbook o f  com parative law . Oxford, Oxford University Press.
'l!< Alford, W.P. (2003). "The more law, the m ore...?  Measuring legal reform in the P eople’s Republic o f  China." in 
H ope, N . C.. D. T. Yang, et al. (2003). H ow  far across the river? : Chinese policy reform at the m illennium .
Stanford, C a lif , Stanford University Press at 56.
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to other legal areas, such as banking, labour, tax, and competition law. 
Such complex systems of laws and regulations evolve in a path- 
dependent way and are resistant to change.39 In most ‘Western’ free and 
democratic societies, the citizenry have, over time, insisted on a right to 
investigate and criticize lawmakers and place constraints on their 
behaviour.40 When faced with international or “global” proposals akin to 
law, the nation state may view the proposals with a greater degree of 
scepticism. This is often because, even if the domestic decisionmaker is a 
bureaucrat, he still bears some political accountability for the 
government’s choices. On the other hand, the international lawmaker 
rarely faces the same degree of political accountability. What often 
underlies the sceptical position is a belief that the more accountable 
decisionmaker should receive the benefit of the doubt.41 International 
unification and harmonization efforts also encounter scepticism because 
they lack the transparency of local lawmaking. This is because interest 
groups tend to incur lower costs of expressing their preferences to 
executives engaged in international lawmaking than in conveying their 
wishes to domestic legislators. In contrast the general public has higher 
monitoring costs with respect to international lawmaking.42
39 G uillen, M. F. (2004). Corporate governance and globalization: is there convergence across countries. Theories 
o f  corporate governance : the philosophical foundations o f  corporate governance. T. Clarke. London, Routledge:
226.
40 Stephan, P. B . (1997). "Accountability and International Lawmaking: R ules, Rents and Legitimacy." NW . J. Inf 
1L.& BUS 17: 682.
41 Ibid. at 732.
42 Ibid. at 699
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Again, bureaucrats will decrease transparency and engage in turf 
protection because they will feel threatened by harmonization-unification 
and the end of their ability to engage in rent seeking.43 Zweig has 
particularly criticized this aspect of ambiguous laws in China which has 
allowed government officials at many levels from the various hierarchies 
of local government to industrial ministries and enterprise zone officials 
to earn fees for guiding the foreign investor through the regulatory 
maze.44 In the context of corporate governance, foreign institutional 
investors may also be dubious of the laws for minority shareholder 
protection in relation to their investments in listed Chinese firms. 
However, they also factor into the equation the rapid growth in firms’ 
aggregate revenues and in earnings which can offset many sins, including 
an expropriation “tax” to corrupt officials and venal managers.45 These 
global investors can also reap the gains in portfolio diversification from 
holding in stock markets whose correlation with the NYSE are far lower 
than Europe or Japan, and for most emerging markets. 46 Some 
multinationals were hailed for introducing concepts of market-driven 
competition and business fair play, and for bringing in capital, but it
4j Agrawal, A. and C. R. Knoeber (1996). "Finn performance and m echanism s to control agency problem s 
betw een m anagers and shareholders." Journal o f  Financial and Quantitative A nalysis 31(3): 377-397 .
44 Z w eig , D . (2002). Internationalizing China : dom estic interests and global linkages. Ithaca, N .Y .; London, 
Cornell U niversity Press at 264-7 .
45 Such as, Zhang Enzhao , the former head o f  Construction Bank o f  C h in a , was g iven  a 15-year sentence for 
corruption. But Zhang w as not the only guilty party. The U .S. com puter giant IBM is also em broiled in this scandal. 
Zhang, former chairman o f  the China Const ruction Bank, was accused o f  taking a 4 .15  m illion yuan (520 ,000  
U .S.dollars) bribe to arrange loans and facilitate contracts. IBM was only one o f  a number o f  foreign com panies 
w hich had secret deals with Zhang. Available at
httn://english.p eoD le .com .cn /200611 /l7 /en g 2 0 0 6 1 1 17 322399.htm l
46 Som e o f  the less conflicted international institutional investors, such as CalPERS, have declined to participate in 
the Chinese Listed market.
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seems that many of them have adapted to the local business environment 
in the wrong way.47
2.5 The culture beneath the law and behind economic and other 
institutions
The culture beneath the law and behind economic and other institutions is 
as, or more important than, law itself, legal structures, and good 
governance practices. Licht asserts that culture does matter in corporate 
governance and notes:
"A nation's culture can be perceived as the mother of all path 
dependencies. Figuratively, it means that a nation's culture might be 
more persistent than other factors believed to induce path dependence. 
Substantively, a nation's unique set of cultural values might indeed 
affect—in a chain of causality-the development of that nation's laws 
in general and its corporate governance system in particular."48
According to Tricker (somewhat reflecting Scott discussed earlier) the 
heart of the matter is the manner in which culture, as a process, tends, 
cultivates and regulates particular types of economic outcomes.”49 Lannoo
47 S ee note 36. See also C om panies international: Probes under foreign corruption law. Financial Tim es, Published  
on Feb 14, 2007 .
48 Licht, A. (2001 J. "The M other o f  All Path Dependencies: Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory o f  Corporate 
Governance System s." Delaware Journal o f  Corporate Law 26( 1): 149.
49 Tricker, R. I. (1990). Corporate Governance: A  Ripple on the Cultural R eflection,. Capitalism in contrasting
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observes that European legislators have fought considerable battles over 
the last 25 years to bring some harmonization to standards for corporate 
control in the EU, but that their efforts have been thwarted by 
‘irresolvable disagreements among member states”.50 Instead, he argues 
that either the private sector, industry or the European Commission 
should take the initiative to come up with a European-wide code of best 
practice. In his view it is improbable that any significant harmonization of 
corporate governance standards will occur at the European level.51 
However, Susan Binns, of the European Commission, notes that 
researchers remain engaged in searching for economic evidence that one 
approach to corporate governance produces better results than another. 
She concludes that it is better to leave these issues for regulation at the 
national level, whilst avoiding “too much divergence in national rules and 
practices.”5-
Some debates from Asian countries suggest that many Asian 
administrations widely believed that ‘one size does not fit all.’ This is 
basically a metaphor for North American attempts to impose their 
standards on developing economies. From this Asian perspective an
cultures S. C legg. S. G. Redding and M. Cartner. Berlin : N ew  York, W. de Gruyter: 32.
so Lannoo, K . (1999). "A European perspective on corporate governance." Journal o f  Com m on Market Studies
37(2): 270.
51 Ibid.
Gindin, S.E. (1998) As the cyber-world turns: the European Union's Data Protection D irective and Trans-border 
Flow s o f  Personal Data, available http:/V'\vww.info-law.com /eupriv.hlnil
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international code of best practice is unworkable.53 For example, South 
Korea had recently undergone corporate governance reforms in the 
aftermath of the Asian financial crisis. Licht writes:
’’The architects of corporate governance reforms may want to 
consider the idea of culturally compatible governance ... [t]he far 
reaching reliance on American models may bring about some 
improvement. But Korean reformers could devise better corporate 
governance that draws on the country's huge social capital that its 
cultural endowment embodies."54 
The former Prime Minister of Singapore, speaking of the potential 
twilight of Occidental style capitalism and the rise of Asia and the Pacific 
Rim as economic powers, described the uniqueness of Asian institutions:
“ for America to be displaced, not in the world, but only in the 
western Pacific...is emotionally very difficult [for American policy 
makers] to accept. The sense of cultural supremacy of the Americans 
will make this adjustment most difficult. Americans believe their 
ideas are universal-[for example] the supremacy of the individual and 
free, unfettered expression. But they are not-they never were.”55
53 A llen , J. (M arch 2000). "Code C onvergence in Asia: Sm oke or fire." Corporate Governance International 3(1): 
154.
1,4 Licht, A. (2004). "Legal Plug-in: Cultural D istance, Cross-Listing, and Coiporate G overnance Reform."
Berkeley Journal o f  International Law  22( 1): 232.
Interview w ith Lee Kuan Y ew  (1996), 13 N ew  Persp.Q.4.
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United States economic success,56 with its concomitant supremacy of the 
individual, is viewed in much of the world as destructive of social 
cohesion and to be avoided rather than emulated. 57 To observers and 
opinion makers in many countries, the United States’s high divorce, 
murder, and incarceration rates, categories in which the United States 
leads the world,58 together with the obscene rate of United States 
corporate executive compensation,59 symbolize the abandonment of social 
cohesion and the ascendancy of market style individualism and unbridled 
greed. In fact, in much of the world the belief is that, by emulating the 
United States and copying its economic thoughts and institutions, a sort 
of Gresham’s Law60 will prevail: bad capitalism (United States style) will 
drive out good capitalism (family capitalism, bamboo capitalism, guided 
capitalism).61 Then, Gray in his criticism of Globalization has argued that 
the evidence suggests a logical chain that begins deep in the idiosyncratic 
national histories behind durable domestic institutions and ideologies and 
extends to firm-level structures of internal governance and long-term
'6 Unfortunately, the current financial crisis draws gloom y picture for the U S econom ic growth.
>7 Gray. J, (2002). False dawn : the d elusions o f  g lobal capitalism . London, Granta,at 26.
58 Ibid, at 116
59 In 1989, U S CEOs earned 160 tim es the pay o f  the average worker, w-hile in Japan the figure w as 16 and in 
Germany 21. See Graef, S. Crystal (1991), In Search o f  Excess -The O vercom pensation o f  A m erican Executives, 
W. W. Norton & Company, at 205-09 . In 2000 , com pensation consultant G raef Crystal says “it is ‘north o f  400  
tim es and heading rapidly to 500 tim es.’” Kathleen Day, A ug. 27, 2000 , Soldiers for the Shareholder, Wash. Post, 
at H I.; In 2009 , huge B onuses paid to executives o f  the American Insurance Group (A IG ) have caused widespread 
outrage in the US after the U S governm ent bailed out the insurer to the tune o f  $170bn. See “AIG em ployee quits 
at 'betrayal'” available at http://new s.bbc.co.U k/2/hi/business/7964250.stm .
6U Sir Thom as Gresham explained that “bad m oney d ives out good .” Lipsey II. G  and Steiner P. O. (,3rd ed. 1972), 
E conom ics 592.
t’1 Gray, J (2002), supra note 57, at 78-79
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financing. In turn, those structures are linked to continuing diversity in 
patterns of corporate research and development operations in the complex 
connections between corporate foreign direct investment and intrafirm 
trading strategies. According to Gray, the basic linkage is that distinctive 
national institutions and ideologies shape corporate structure and vitally 
important policy environments in home markets. As a result, the external 
behaviour of firms continues to be marked by their idiosyncratic 
foundations.62
"The Myth of Globalization” tells us what is, namely that “national 
roots remain a vital determinant” and that multinationals’ “corporate 
cores remain national in a meaningful sense.” 63
2.6 Chinese culture and law
Culture and ideology also influence a country’s choice of corporate law. 
Deresky notes that a society’s culture comprises the shared values, 
understandings, assumptions, and goals that are learned from earlier 
generations, imposed by the members of society, and passed on to 
succeeding generations. This in turn results in a shared outlook. People 
share to a considerable degree, common codes of conduct and attitudes, 
and expectations that subconsciously guide and control various norms of
62 Ibid. at 139
63 Ibid. at 145
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behaviour.64
American culture, for example, resists hierarchy and centralized authority 
more than, for example, French culture.65 German citizens are proud of 
their national codetermination. Italian family firm owners may get special 
utility from a longstanding family controlled business66, while an 
American family might prefer to cash the company earlier and run the 
family scion for the U.S. Senate. In China, for example, the existence of 
Confucian and communist traditions has left deep impressions in the 
social fabric and the economic landscape67.
In the popular view, Confucianism is presented as a deeply rooted 
despotic socio-political system and an unchanged state-run ideology.68 
Confucius lived between 551 and 479 B.C., and his ideas were adopted as 
state orthodoxy in the Han dynasty which lasted from 206B.C. to 220 
A.D. For the next thousand years, they contributed to the stability of the 
state and to the flourishing of a very advanced civilization, clearly pre-
64 Deresky, H. (2008). International manag e m e n t: managing across borders and cu ltures : text and cases. Harlow,
Prentice Hall, at 91-92.
6' Bebchuk, L. A. and M. J. Roe (1999). "A theory o f  path dependence in corporate ow nership and governance."  
Stanford Law  R eview  52(1): 127-170.
See Bohlen, C„ A  D elphic Oracle Has Seen the Future, and Likes It, N .Y. TIM ES,Apr. 14, 1998, at A 4  
(describing how  G iovanni A gn elli’s prestige is based on his fam ily’s control o f  Fiat, the Italian autom obile maker). 
6/ For a discussion  o f  path dependence in China’s econom ic transition, see Guthrie, D. (2002). Dragon in a three- 
piece s u i t : the em ergence o f  capitalism  in China. Princeton. N .J .; W oodstock. Princeton University Press, at 24-41. 
Som e o f  the distincti ve features o f  C hinese corporate governance are discussed by Tam, O. K. (1999). The 
developm ent o f  corporate governance in C hina. Cheltenham , Edward Elgar, at 86.
68 You-Zheng Li, " Towards a M inimal Com mon Ground for Humanist D ialogue: A Comparative A nalysis o f  
Confucian Ethics and Am erican Ethical Humanism", in Mou, B. (2003). Comparative approaches to C hinese 
philosophy. A ld ersh o t; Burlington, Vt., Ashgate, at 170.
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eminent in world terms by the Sung period. During this same period 
however, alternative philosophies also flourished most notably Taoism 
and Buddhism. This synthesis became known as neo-Confucianism, and 
having developed the original ideas from an ethical code to a full 
philosophy, it has lasted until the present day.69
Confucians emphasized the power of moral teaching as the way to 
cultivate li and to achieve order. They believed that human nature was 
basically good and that people were responsive to the moral examples of 
the king and the nobility. Confucian governance was thus a matter of 
using moral teaching to shape people’s behaviour.70
At the core of Confucian social order was a series of social relationships, 
most importantly the ‘five basic relationships’-between father and child , 
husband and wife, elder and younger brother, ruler and subject, friend and 
friend. Human beings are differentiated and defined by the role each 
plays in these networks of social relations.7i In these circumstances, there 
is much to be said for a value system which places a constraint on the 
expression of individual desires and also sponsors group sharing of 
limited resources.72 The self-sufficiency of the family unit, based on its
99 Redding, S. G  (1990). The spirit o f  Chinese capitalism . Berlin, W. de Gruyter, at 48.
70 Ibid.
71 Wang, H. (2002). Weak states, strong: networks : the institutional dynam ics o f  foreign direct investm ent in China. 
N ew  York, Oxford University' Press, at 23.
'2 Bond, M. H., & Hwang, K. K. (1986) The social psychology o f  the Chinese people. In Bond, M. H. (1997). The
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ability to manage its affairs well, was its only insurance against disaster, 
and the common budgets and common property of the chia (family) 
formed a rational collective response to the surrounding circumstances.73
Confucian society is constructed of morally binding relationships 
connecting all. The individual is instead a connection, and the “totalness” 
of society is passed down from one binding relationship to the next, 
rather than by the Western mode of uniting loosely coupled and “free” 
individuals by their separate espousal of coordinating ideas and principles. 
For the Chinese, Mfilment comes from the very structure and dynamics 
of the relationships and emphasis on belonging.74
In terms of its manifest workings, there are three differences separating 
Confucianism from many other religions. Firstly, it contains no deity but 
is based instead on rules of conduct. Secondly, it is not promoted in such 
a way as to compete with other religions, living as it does in the minds of 
many alongside Buddhism, Taoism and even Christianity. Thirdly, it has 
no large-scale institutional “church,’ with priests, ceremonial and laity.75
Hamilton has provided a valuable distinction between Western and
P sych ology  o f  the Chinese peop le. H ong K ong ; Oxford, Oxford U niversity Press, at 215.
73 C ohen, M, L. (1976). H ouse united, house d ivided : the C hinese fam ily in Taiwan. N ew  York ; London,
Colum bia U niversity Press, at 22.
74 Ketcham, R. (1987). Individualism and public life : a modern dilem m a. Oxford, Basil B lackw ell, at 1 11.
75 Ibid. at 47
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Confucian societies in saying that the Western system emerged via the 
institutionalizing of power, and thus of jurisdictions. The traditional 
Roman Patria potestas defined a field within which the head of the family 
could exercise personal discretion and control.76 For Tang Junyi, the 
fundamental difference between Chinese and Western culture is that 
Chinese culture is oriented in humanism, while Western culture in 
materialism. This brings about further differences: Chinese culture puts 
more emphasis on morality and arts, human responsibilities and unity, 
while Western culture stresses science and religion, individuals’ freedom 
and differentiation.77 These different roots between the Chinese and 
Western (based on ancient Greece and Rome) ways of viewing the world 
have also been emphasized by Nisbett in his work on the geography of 
thought.78
Although Confucianism lacks either a deity or an organized church, 
Confucian values permeate the lives of Chinese peoples everywhere.79 
Prior to the CCP’s ascendancy in 1949, from a very early age, in the
76 H am ilton, G. G. (1984). "Patriarchalism in Imperial China and W estern-Europe - a R evision  o f  Weber Socio logy  
o f  Dom ination." Theory and Society 13(3): 441.
77 Tang J. "Moral Idealism and Chinese Culture", in Cheng, Z.-y. and N . Bunnin (2002). Contemporary Chinese  
p hilosophy. Oxford, B lackw ell Publishers.
'8 See N isbett, R. E. (2003). The geo g raphy o f  thought : how  A sians and Westerners think differently— and w h y. 
London, N icholas Brealey.
79 Other nations such as Japan and Korean are said to be influenced by “post C onfucian” values. The Post- 
Confucian thesis is attributed to Kahn, H. (1979). World econom ic d ev e lo p m en t: 1979 and beyond. NY, M orrow ., 
Kahn proposed “that the success o f  organizations in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, H ong K ong and Singapore w as due in 
large part to certain key traits shared by the majority' o f  organization members which w ere attributable to an 
upbringing in the Confucian tradition.” C legg ,S. et al., " Post-C onfucianism ”, Social D em ocracy and Econom ic 
Culture, in C legg, S., S. G. Redding, et al. (1990). Capitalism in contrasting cultures. Berlin ; N ew  York, W. de 
Gruyter, at 3 8 . .
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school context, Confucianism was taught by the study of the main 
writings and the discussion of their implications. Children were 
encouraged to memorize the classics and to build relationships based on 
the Confucian principles.80 Central to those relationships is a high degree 
of abnegation of self and tolerance and patience for others.81 One has to 
question how a corporate governance model that entails a certain degree 
of confrontation and a high degree of individualistic behaviour fits with 
beliefs that an individual must fit into and conform to the basic social 
order of his surrounding world.82 The Confucian order is strongly 
hierarchical with each individual regarding himself not only as part of 
nature but also part of the natural order.
“One of the most important effects of Confucianism, and one of the 
principal determinants of social and economic behaviour...is the 
passivity induced by a system which places the individual in a 
powerfully maintained family order, itself inside a powerfully 
maintained stated order, itself seen as part of a natural cosmic order, 
and all dedicated to the maintenance of the status quo.”83
80 R edding, S. G  (1990). The spirit o f  Chinese capitalism . Berlin, W. de Gruyter, at 48.
81 “The Confucian ideal is that family, clan , and head o f  state take precedence over the individual.” Ibid. at 63. In
a series o f  interview s w ith C hinese business m en, a representative answer demonstrated the Chinese principle o f  
tolerance: “ [B ]e tolerant-it creates less worries. Try to put the lawyers out o f  business.” Ibid. at 87
83 Ibid. at 58. In the Confucian context, “the individual has a built-in sense o f  the legitim acy o f  the superior- 
subordinate relationship... it is an extension o f  a natural order. The open challenge o f  formal authority is rare.”
83 Ibid. at 52.
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Core values in economic behaviour included a concern for reconciliation, 
harmony and balance coupled with a central focus on practicality.84 It is 
doubtful whether individuals taught from an early age that “the shiny nail 
is the first to feel the sting of the hammer’ will confront and forcibly 
remove underperforming CEOs or step forward to file derivative or class 
action lawsuits.85
The economy is embedded in the social order and social cohesion, not 
rugged individualism, is the value in the ascendancy.86 For example, from 
the Asian perspective, life in a collectivist and group-dominated society 
means that the Chinese self is not isolated in the same sense as the 
Western one. 87 In some cultures, firms are independent legal entities 
which are well bounded and distinct from their environments.88 By 
contrast, theorists have recognized Asian business firms’ form and 
operation as contingent, socially contextual phenomenon varying across
84 Ibid. at 76
85 In the United States m odel, by contrast, the 1990s witnessed an unprecedented number o f  forced rem ovals o f  
CEOs o f  major United States corporations. See Dorem us, P. N . (1998). The rnvth o f  the global corporation. 
Princeton, N .J . ; Chichester, Princeton University Press, at 26.
80 Gray, J. (2002). False dawn : the delusions o f  global capitalism . London, Granta,at 2 6 .(“In the normal course o f  
things markets com e em bedded in social life. They are circum scribed in their working by intermediary institutions 
(such as labor unions and professional associations] and encumbered by social conventions and tacit 
understandings”). 182 ( ‘A s in other econom ic cultures, C hinese capitalism  com es em bedded in the networks and 
values o f  the larger society .”).
87 Redding, S.G. (1990), The Spirit o f  C hinese Capitalism , Walter de Gruyter Inc, at 95; see also, A cton, T. A. 
Ethnicity and R eligion in the D evelopm ent o f  Family Capitalism: Seui-Seung-Yahn Immigrants from H ong K ong  
to Scotland, in C legg, S. R. and Redding, S. G  (eds.) Capitalism in Contrasting Cultures. Walter de G ruyter, at 
391 ( “E conom y’ and 'culture’ have been seen by westerners as two great independent variables or value system s  
w hile A sian cultures see them as closely  interwined or one (econom y) deeply em bedded in the other”).
88 R edding,S .G  and W hitley,R .D., "Beyond Bureaucracy. Towards a Comparative A nalysis o f  Forms o f  Econom ic  
Resource Co-ordination an Control”, in C legg, S. R. and Redding, S. G. (1990) (eds.) Capitalism  in Contrasting 
C ultures .Walter de Gruyter, at 95.
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cultures and historical periods.89 This view has been reinforced by the 
underlying norms of businesses in corporate form, for according to 
Ruskola, the Anglo-American norm is contract based whereas in the 
Chinese context the basic norm has always been a kinship, connectedness 
and guanxi norm.90
2.6.1 Confucianism and Chinese Law
Confocians, believed that the ideal social order was one of harmony (he) 
and humanity (ren), and that it should be maintained by propriety (//). 
The word Li expressed a very comprehensive idea and had an 
extraordinarily wide range of meanings.91 It can be translated as 
ceremonies, rituals, or rules of social conduct.92 It regulated social 
relations, curbed the natural desires of man, and cultivated moral habits. 
In fact Confucianists called all rules which upheld moral habits and 
served to maintain social order by the generic name of / / \ 93 The 
Confucian philiosophy took the view that without li it would be 
impossible to tell the difference between the position of a prince and that 
of his minister, between the position of a superior and that of an inferior,
89 Ibid.
90 Ruskola. T. (2000). "Conceptualizing corporations and kinship: Com parative law and developm ent theory in a 
C hinese perspective." Stanford Law R eview  52(6): 1599-1729.
91 Indeed, C onfucianists saw  it as their duty to dedicate their w hole lives to studying and interpreting the m eaning  
o f / / ,  which they believed w as created by the ancient sage.
Fung, Y.-L. (1966). A  short history' o f  Chinese philoso phy. N .Y .: London : Free P r .; Collier-M acm illan, at 147.; 
Qu, T. (1965). Law' and Society in traditional china. Paris. Mouton, at 255.
9:’ C heng. C.-y. ( 19 9 1). N ew  dim ensions o f  Confucian and N eo-C onfueian philosophy. Albany, N . Y., State 
University o f  New' York Press, at 4.
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or between the position of an elder person and that of a younger one. 
Without li it would be impossible to fix the degrees of relationship 
between the sexes, between father and son, and between brothers,94 and to 
be without these differences, 4it is to be like the beasts’.95 In other words, 
the final goal of good government was the correct operation of 
hierarchical human relationships.96
Li was a set of general rules governing proper conduct and behaviour by 
which rulers could maintain an ideal social order.97 It was never a body of 
detailed rules designed to deal with all situations, but a general instrument 
for training character and nourishing moral force. 98 When people 
understand and act according to li, a harmonious and humane order will 
prevail.99
Similar to Western notions of natural law, Confucianism assumed the 
existence of a ‘natural’ order on which social order should be based.100 
But the content of Confucianism differed from that of Western natural 
law founded on individual rights. In the Western tradition, several
94 Ibid. at 2
95 M encius cited in Fung, Y-L (1966), supra note 92, at 151.
96 Qu, T. (1965) supra note 92, at 239.
9' Ibid at 230.
98 Schwartz, B., "On Attitudes Toward Law in China", reprinted in Cohen ,J.A. (1968), The Criminal Process o f  
the P eop le’s Republic o f  China 1949-1963: An Introduction .Harvard U niversity Press, at 64.
99 Ibid.
Iu0 This sim ilarity as w ell as the sim ilarity between legalism  and positivism  is noted in Needham , J. (1962).
Science and civilisation in China. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp.530-2. This analog}' is, however, 
limited. Natural law has a super-human dim ension that is incom patible w ith the secular nature o f  Confucianism .
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principles have been associated with the idea that law should be 
autonomous from politics and therefore above government. In China, the 
state has not traditionally maintained order by jurisdiction. During the 
Imperial dynasties the ruling elite was small in number and scattered over 
a vast land. To govern a state was similar to regulating a family, which 
was achieved through the cultivation of individual morality, as the 
Confucian social formula suggested: cultivating the personality- 
regulating family life-ordering a state-ensuring world peace (xiushen- 
qijia-zhiguo-pingtianxio).101 The fusion of the concept of family with that 
of state thus provided a basis for elevating morality to the status of state 
law.102
According to Confucianism, only a government based on virtue could 
truly win the hearts of men.103 This idea is reflected in one of the most 
cited Confucian passages:
“Lead the people by regulations keep them in order by punishments 
(Xing), and they will flee from you and lose all self-respect. But lead 
them by virtue and keep them in order by the established morality (//),
101 It is stated in the Great: Learning, one o f  the Confucian classics, that: 'The ancients w ho wished to illustrate 
illustrious virtue through the K ingdom , first ordered w ell their ow n states. W ishing to order w ell their states, they 
regulated their fam ilies. W ishing to regulate their fam ilies, they first cultivated their persons” Cited in Qu 
(1 9 6 5 ),supra note 92, at 255.
102 In fact, a great part o f  C onfucianism  is the rational justification or theoretical expression o f  the Chinese fam ily  
system  as a social system . See Fung Y-L(l 966), Supra note 92, at 147. ; Qu (1965), supra note 92, at 22-22.
10'! Bernhardt. K. E. and P. C. C. E. Huang (1994). Civil law' in Q ing and Republican China Stanford University  
Press, at 14.
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and they will keep their self-respect and come to you.”104
Thus, in reply to a question concerning the conduct of good government, 
Confucius said: ‘Set yourself as an example to the people both in conduct 
and in physical labour’.105 As such the Confucian idea of government has 
been described as a government of ‘rule by man’.106 But perhaps this 
should be understood to be ‘government lies in man’.107 As Xun zi (d.ca. 
210 B.C.) said:
“Laws cannot stand alone...for when they are implemented by the 
right person they survive, but if neglected they disappear... Law is 
essential for order, but the superior man is the source of law. So when 
there is a superior man, even incomplete laws can extend everywhere. 
But when there is no superior man, even comprehensive laws cannot 
apply to all situations or be flexible enough to respond to change.”108
Indeed, law in traditional China was an instrument of the state. Its 
purpose was to enhance the power of the government and maintain 
imperial control. Rather than protecting the rights of individuals, legal 
codes focused on the individual’s obligations toward the state.109 As such
104 Ibid. at 21-22.
105 For an E nglish  version, see Library o f  Chinese C lassics-A nalects, China Hunan Publishing H ouse, 2000 , at 189
106 Yu R onggen, ‘Q uestioning the Theory o f  Rule by Man in Confucianism  and Rule o f  Law in L egalism ’, (no.4, 
1984) Law Science Quarterly (Faxue Jikan) 60.
107 Qu (1 9 6 5 ) ,supra note 92, at 230.
108 For an English version see Library o f  C hinese C lassics-X unzi, China Hunan Publishing H ouse, 2000 , at 127
109 In contrast to traditional China. T h e  monarch [o f  m edieval Europe), it is argued, may m ake law, but he may not 
make it arbitrarily, and until he has remade it-law fully -h e  is bound by it.’ See Berman, H. J. (1983). Law and
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it was not very interested in social regulations among autonomous 
individuals, and least of all in defending individual rights against the 
state.110 As one of the early authorities on Chinese law Wang Chun-hui 
observed in 1917 that Anglo-American law emphasises the individual as 
against the family, while the Continental system inherits something of the 
old Roman familia. As the family was the basic unit of Chinese society 
reform in the early twentieth century naturally sought to preserve this 
EndNote><Cite><Author>Hart</Author>< Year> 1995</Year<RecNum>
In his study, Weber paid close attention to Chinese traditions such as 
Confucianism and Taoism and tried to find something comparable to (or
1 1 Tdistinct from) the Western religious impact on the capitalist system. “ He 
concluded that the incentive for economic rationalization appeared only 
briefly in Chinese histoiy during the Warring States period (475-221 B.C.) 
and never established its dominance afterwards. Rather, patrimonialism 
and traditional clan (the kinship, or Zu) dominated Chinese society under 
the influence of Confucianism and strongly weakened the state’s 
centralization of power and administration. As a result, no independent
revolution:the Formation o f  the Western Legal Tradition. Cambridge, at 93. .
110 B odde, D. and C. Morris (1967). Law in Imperial China: exem plified by 190 C h'ing D ynasty cases, with  
historical, social, and juridical com m entaries Cambridge (M ass.): Harvard U niversity Press; London: Oxford  
U niversity Press .at 4.
111 Wang Chung-hui, ‘Legal Reform in China: A  Sociological A nalysis \  in Chinese Social and Political R eview , 
Jun 1917, quoted in Cameron, M . E. (1931). The reform m ovem ent in China 1898-1912 . [S.L], Stanford 
U niversity Press.
I|: Weber, M. (1968). The R eligion o f  China: Confucianism  and Taoism . Free Press: N ew  York; Collier-M acm ilian: 
London. See also Weber, M. (1930). The protestant ethic and the spirit o f  capitalism . London, George Allen & 
Unw in Ltd.
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legal system (as well as specialized legal practitioners) had ever been 
built to serve the interests of capitalist enterprises in Chinese history.1'3
In this sense the initial stimulus of traditional Chinese law was therefore 
also unrelated to economic development,114 although some contemporary 
Chinese scholars have argued that law was often used to implement 
‘economic reforms’ in traditional China.1,5 Thus, civil law was not 
developed in China. Instead, a system grew up in which the social order 
could operate by itself, with the minimum of assistance from the formal 
political structure.116 Indeed, the Confucian order was in the final analysis 
more fundamentally moral than it was rational.117 Contrary to Weber’s 
theory some scholars have argued that the success of the recent economic 
reforms was due to the decentralization of the planned economy. This 
gave more power both politically and economically to the local 
governments. There was, for example, a considerable increase in local 
laws and regulations as local governments gained room to manoeuvre to 
substantiate general laws and policies from the central government. 
Therefore the systemization of law was helped by the early
11J Ibid.
111 B odde, D . and C. Morris (1967). Law  in Imperial China: exem plified  by 190 Ch'ing D ynasty cases, with
histo rical, so c ial, and jurid ical com m entaries Cambridge (M ass.): Harvard U niversity Press; London: Oxford
University Press ,at 4.
115 See e.g.Z hang Jin fan, A C ollection o f  Paper on legal History (Fashi Jianlue) (Beijing: Press o f  the M asses,
1988), at 12& 42-43; Wang Qianghua, ‘On the Role o f  Law in Reform and the Three Legal Reform s in Our 
H istory’, (no.5, 1982) Studies in Law  (Faxue Yanjiu) 58.
11(1 Yang. C.K ., "Some Characteristics o f  Chinese Bureaucratic Behavior" in Wright, A  (ed.) (1959), Confucianism  
in A ction . Stanford, Stanford University Press, at 164.
117Bary, D. and W. Theodore (1959). Approaches to the Oriental Classics: Asian Literature and Thought in General
Education. C olum bia University Press: N ew  York, at 41,
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decentralization of legislative power which went hand in hand with the 
first decade or so of the development of the economic reform.118 However, 
this lent itself to the type of ambiguity and rent seeking criticized by 
Zweig and others.
2.6.2 When the East meets the West
I The late Qing dynasty reform
In China, the late Qing reforms were a moderate attempt by the 
government to introduce legal, institutional, and educational reforms in 
order to satisfy popular demands for change and modernization while 
maintaining the political status quo of a conservative imperial 
monarchy.119 In May 1902, Shen Chia-pen (Shen Jiaben), Junior Vice- 
President of the Board of Punishments,120 and W Ting-fang (Wu Tingfang), 
a former ambassador to the United States,121 were appointed by the 
Imperial Court to carefully examine and re-edit all the laws then in force,
1,8 Zhu, S. (2005). The change o f  law and its characteristics in the Peoples' Republic o f  China: 1978-present. 
U npublished master's thesis. Ternpe, Arizona, Arizona State University.; Lu, H. and T. D. M iethe (2007). " 
Provincial laws on the protection o f  wom en in China: A partial test o f  Black's theory." International Journal o f  
O ffender Therapy and Comparative Crim inology 51: 25-39.
m  G oetzm ann,W  and K oll, E. ( 2 0 0 5 ) ,"  The History o f  Corporate Ownership in China: State Patronage, Company 
Legislation, and the Issue o f  Control", in M orck R. K. (ed), A History o f  corporate governance around the world: 
Family B usiness Groups to Professional M anagers. The U niversity o f  C hicago Press at 161-162.
120 For a brief biographical background on Shen Chia-pen, See C hinese Encyclopedia-Law  (Z hongguo Dabaike 
Quanshu-Faxue) (Beijing/Shanghai: The Chinese Encyclopedia Press, 1984), at 525-526; and China University' o f  
Political Science and Law, A  Study on the Legal Thought o f  ShenJia Ben (Shen Jiaben Falu Sixiang Yanjiu) 
(Beijing: Publishing House o f  Law, 1990).
121 For a brief biographical background on Wu Ting-fang, see Chinese E ncyclopedia-Law  (Zhongguo Dabaike 
Q uanshu-Faxue) (Beijing/Shanghai: The Chinese Encyclopedia Press, 1984), at 627.
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to bring them into accord with the conditions resulting from international 
commercial negotiations, to consult the laws of various countries, and to 
ensure that new laws would be commonly applicable to both Chinese and 
foreigners and for the benefit of the Government.122
Finally, the Japanese model became the jurisdiction of choice. This 
choice was not an accident, Japan’s success in reversing extra­
territoriality and in becoming a mighty power in the Asian area was seen 
to be a result of its having a constitution and a legal system based on 
Western models. The similarity of the two countries in historical, 
ideological, and cultural features as well as in written language was seen 
as a further reason for the emulation of the Japanese model.123 Also 
important is the fact that the Continental European, mainly German, 
system, which the Japanese legal system was modelled on, was seen as a 
form of Western jurisprudence that had been tested in an oriental 
society.124 Within a few years several new codes were drafted and issued: 
the General Principles for Merchants, the Company Law, and the 
Bankruptcy Law were promulgated in 1903.125
122 For a C hinese text o f  the Edict, See Yang H unglieh, A History o f  Chinese Legal Thought (Zhongguo Falu 
Sixiangshi), vol. II (B eijing Com mercial Publishing H ouse, 1937), reprinted by Shanghai Publishing H ouse, 1984, 
at 305; for an English translation o f  the Edict, see Mei jer, M. J. (1967). The Introduction o f  M odem  Criminal Law 
in China. D e Unie: Batavia.
122 Foo, P.S. ‘Introduction’, in The C ivil Code o f  the Republic o f  China (Shanghai: K elly & Walsh, Ltd., 1930), at 
xi; Cheng,F.T. ‘Law  C odification in China’, 1924 (6) J. o f  C om p.Leg.283, at 285; Li G uilian, ‘Legal Reform s in 
M odern China and the Japanese Influence’, (n o .l , 1994) Studies in Comparative Law (B ijiaofa Yanjiu) 24.
124 Chang, H. C. (1973). A History o f  the Modern Chinese Legal System  ('Zhongguo Jindai Fazhishi) The 
Com mercial Press, Taipei, at 285.
12> Zhang, J. F. (1986). A  Chinese Legal History (Zhongguo Fazhi Shi) Press o f  the M asses,B eijing, at 340.
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It is therefore not surprising that the reforms met strong opposition. 
Between 1904 and 1908, some 272 companies registered with the 
Chinese government, over half of them as joint-stock companies with 
limited liability.126 Although these numbers are impressive, they represent 
only a fraction of the unlisted Chinese enterprises operating in China at 
the time.127 Many families opted not to register their firms for fear of 
losing control over management and equity. Family businesses have a 
long tradition in China and have been highly successful in the production 
or distribution of commercial goods, including long-distance trade.128 
Nevertheless, the reforms were seen as challenging the traditional 
institutions and structures, ignoring the traditional values as embodied in 
Confucian //', and underming the social foundation built on centuries-old 
social morality and customs.’29
II The continuing reform under the Kuomintang
But by 1904 the government of the Qing dynasty was collapsing; it first
126 Chan, W. K. K. (1977). Merchants, mandarins and m odem  enterprise in late Ch'ing China. [Cambridge, M ass.], 
East A sian  R esearch Center, Harvard University ; Cambridge at 180-82.
127 G oetzm ann, W. and E. Koll (2005). The History o f  Corporate Ownership in China:State Patronage, Company 
Legislation, and the Issue o f  Control. A  history' o f  corporate governance around tire world : fam ily business groups 
to professional m anagers R. Morck. C hicago ; London, University- o f  C hicago Press, at 163. S ee also Kirby, W. C. 
(1995). "China Unincorporated - Com pany Law and Business-Enterprise in 20th-Century China." Journal o f  A sian 
Studies 54(1).; Bow en, J. R. and D. C. R ose (1998). "On the absence o f  privately ow ned, publicly traded 
corporations in China; The Kirby puzzle." Journal o f  Asian Studies 57(2): 442-452 . ; Cochran, S. (2000). 
Encountering Chinese networks : Western. Japanese, and Chinese corporations in China. 1880-1937 . Berkeley, 
C a lif .; London, University o f  California Press.
128 G oetzm ann and K oll (2005) supra note 127.
1211 Meijer, M. J. (1967). The Introduction o f  M odem  Criminal Law in China. De Unie: B ata v ia ., chs.2 & 5; Guo, 
C. W. (1990). Legal Thought o f  Shen Jiaben and the Controversies during the Qing Legal Reform . Publishing 
H ouse o f  Law. Beijing.
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was replaced by a military government and then further disintegrated into 
what we now refer to as the warlord period. A Republic was established 
in 1912 by the revolutionaries led by Sun Yatsen.130 Although it overthrew 
the Dynasty, the Republican government allowed the continued use of the 
Qing law: all imperial laws formerly in force were repeatedly declared to 
remain effective unless they were modified by new laws or were contrary 
to the principles of the Republic.'131
During this period, certain specific writings of Sun Yatsen were declared 
to have the force of formal law.132 Law, seen as an instrument for social 
change, was used largely as a tool for implementing the Kuomintang 
(KMT) doctrines and goals. 133 Moreover, the KMT law and legal 
institutions were far from reaching the Chinese people and had no 
substantial impact on the society at large.134 As a result, they broke down 
traditional systems, values and practices and separated private law from 
public law, civil law from criminal law, and the legal system from the 
administrative hierarchy. Most importantly, they laid down a foundation 
for Western law and legal systems to be further studied, developed and
b0 Established in 1912, the R epublic o f  China encom passed much o f  mainland China. After 1949 w hen the 
Kuomintang lost the C hinese C ivil War to the Chinese Com m unist Party and the People’s Republic o f  China (PRC) 
was founded in m ainland China.
Resolution o f  the Provisional G overnm ent o f  April 3, 1912, in Zhang J.F., et al. (eds.), A  C hinese Legal History' 
(Zhongguo Fazhi Shi) (Beijing: Press o f  the M asses, 1986), at 394; and Resolution o f  the Central Political Council 
(Zhongyan Zhengzbi H uiyi) o f  1927, in Ciilpatrick, M. P. (1950). "The status o f  Law and Law -m aking Procedures 
Under the K uom intang 1925-46." The Far Eastern Quarterly 10(1): 45.
Marc, v. d. V. (1939). An O utline o f  Modern C hinese Family Law , Catholic U niversity of, Peking, at 165.
The K uom intang o f  China, also often translated as the C hinese Nationalist Party, is the founding and the ruling 
political party o f  the Republic o f  China. Starting in 1928, the Republic o f  China was ruled by the Kuom intang as 
an authoritarian one-partv state.
" Tay, A. E.-S. (I9 6 0 ). "Law in Com m unist China-Part I.” Syd. L.Rgy 6(165).
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adapted in China.135 For instance, regarding the progress of legislation 
under the KMT, which clearly was a continuing process from the Qing 
reform, Pound has remarked:
“Thus in twenty-four years, from the overthrow of the Empire and 
setting up of the Republic, the work of providing a modern 
Constitution, modern codes, and a modern organisation of Courts was 
done, and well done. This would have been a remarkable achievement 
in any case, seeing that it had to be done with little to build on, by 
study of foreign institutions and laws and adaptation of new ideas to 
an old country in a time of profound changes, even if there had been 
propitious conditions of peace and stability. To do it under the actual 
conditions is an achievement without parallel.”136
However, with the advantage of greater hindsight this view may be 
somewhat overstated. Legal reforms require more than changing a few 
laws. Prior to the Communist regime, China’s former company laws were 
enacted in 1904, 1914, 1929 and 1946 respectively. Tomasic and Fu argue 
that all of these corporate legal regimes have reflected a considerable 
degree of centred government control. Partly because of this, and family 
dislike of outside interference, they have had limited impact on the 
organisation of business activity in China. Throughout its history,
13:> Chen, J. (2008). C hinese law : context and transformation. Leiden. Martinus N ijh o ff , at 37.
m  Pound, R. (1948). "Law and Courts in China: Progress in the Adm inistration o f  Justice." A .B .A .J 34: 274.
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commerce has not been encouraged by Chinese governments. This is due 
to some extent to the long-standing policy of national isolation which has 
been broken only by relatively short and intermittent periods of 
exploration such as the early Ming voyages of the great admiral Zheng 
H e.137 At other times, eg the early Ching dynasty, monopolies were 
granted over certain trades in specific areas in return for various services 
in support of the government.138 It is also a reflection of the Confucian 
disdain for the world of business. As a result the state provided minimal 
protection for private business. Merchants and businessmen were forced 
to fall back on the family and local and regional ties and kinship in which 
the relationships of trust became a more secure basis for business activity 
rather than formal bod ies of law, such as company law.1'’9
The importance of the relational and networking system called guanxi in 
Chinese society including business dealings and politics cannot be 
underestimated. It is this system of personal relationships which has
l3/ For a consideration o f  this period see Levathes, L. (1994). When China ruled the seas : the treasure fleet o f  the 
Dragon Throne. 1405-1433 . N ew  York ; London, Simon & Schuster.; for a more controversial version o f  events 
see M enzies G, (2002), 1421. The Year China D iscovered the World London, Bantam B ooks.
,j8 The background to the Chinese classic by Cao Xucqin,( 1760), A  Dream o f  Red M ans ions {H ong lou m eng) 
otherw ise known as The Story o f  the Stone (Shiiouji) is indicative o f  this in that the family had been textile  
com m issioners in N anking and Soochow  for alm ost 80 years. This involved supervision o f  governm ent ow ned  
textile factories. In addition to their duties as textile com m issioners they were the Em peror’s ‘m en on the spot’ 
charged with observing and reporting on the high ranking officia ls in their area and keeping him privately 
informed on a variety o f  topics ranging from market 'fluctuations to the weather and am using local scandal. After 
the death o f  the Emperor Kangxi in 1722, the Emperor Yongzheng cam e to the throne by m eans o f  a coup d ’etat. 
Yongzhen had his own highly organised army o f  secret agents and did not trust his father’s former intelligent 
network. In 1728 the Cao fam ily lost their positions and had their wealth confiscated. Cao X ueqin w as living in 
poverty near B eijing w hen he wrote his story. See Cao Xueqin (translated by David H aw kes) (1973)The Story o f  
the Stone: Volume I The G olden Days (Penguin C lassics) at 25-32.
1,0 Tom asic, R. and Fu J. (1999). " Com pany law in China", in Tom asic, R. (1999). Company law in East A sia . 
Aldershot, A shgate at 135.
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played an important role in China for millennia. In China the Confucian 
concept of renzhi (a respect for peoples’ feelings: renquing) mean’t that in 
theory law should be in harmony with, or in the case of contradiction 
subordinate to, “the peoples feelings.” Individuals are therefore more 
concerned about the feelings of those with whom closer personalistic ties 
(guanxi) exist. The combined influence of renzhi and its direct 
counterpart guanxi led to the “rule of the virtuous man” rather than to 
anything like the rule of law.140 According to Yang the practice o f guanxi 
has varied throughout Chinese history and had largely disappeared after 
1949 as communist ideals and practice suppressed patronage but 
reasserted itself during the Cultural Revolution as society broke down and 
the collapse of production and distribution created the need to find food 
and other necessities. In these times of institutional chaos and uncertainty 
Chinese society drew upon its traditions to develop networks of 
interpersonal relationships.141 Williamson posits that the pace at which 
contracts and arms-length market transactions gain ground over guanxi 
arrangements within the PRC may depend upon security of both 
prosperity and the reliability of institutions.142 Whilst some argue that 
guanxi has played a diminishing role in China’s economic development,
140 See for exam ple Lawton, P., (1996), "Berle and M eans, Corporate Governance and the Chinese Fam ily Finn" 
Australian Journal o f  Corporate Law 6, 348 at 354-6.
141 Yang, M . M .-h. (1994). G ifts, favors, and banquets : the art o f  social relationships in China. Ithaca, N .Y .; 
London, Cornell U niversity Press.
142 W illiam son D, (2005), "A m anagement control assurance in the different cultures and institutions o f  China and 
the UK " in Brown. D. H. and A. I. M acBean (2005). C hallenges for China's d evelo p m en t: an enterprise 
perspective. London, Routledge
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particularly as China has developed administrative and bureaucratic 
processes, 143 others argue that guanxi is not a fixed essentialized 
phenomenon which can only whither away with the onslaught of new 
legal and fixed regimes. Rather, guanxi must be treated historically as a 
repertoire of cultural patterns and resources which are continuously 
transformed. This transformation takes place as the guanxi practice adapts 
as well as shapes new social institutions and structures. It is also affected 
by the particular Chinese experience with globalization. Guanxi may 
decline in some social domains but appears to be flourishing in others 
such as business transactions. In doing so it may display new ways of 
expression and new social forms. A historical approach to guanxi is more 
sensitive to the important issues of power both within the Chinese social 
order and in relation to power issues between China and the West.144 The 
latter would include the transplantation and adaptation of certain 
corporate governance structures and norms such as the two tier board 
adapted from Germany and the independent non executive director 
concept seemingly bolted on from the Anglo-American system. 
According to the historical approach many recent arguments for the 
decline of guanxi tend to be embedded with unreflective positive 
methodology and the technology of modernization theory/narrative and
143 See e g  Guthrie. D . (1998). "The declin ing significance o f  Guanxi in China's econom ic transition." China 
Quarterly! 154): 254-282 .
144 Yang, M. M. 11. (2002). "The resilience o f  Guanxi and its new  deploym ents: A  critique o f  som e new  Guanxi 
scholarship." Ibid.(170): 459-476 .
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neo-liberal discourse.145 Another perspective of the analysis of guanxi is 
the sociological one which admits of different possible market 
configurations in contrast to the economist view which tends to narrowly 
define the concept of the market as ideal typical transactions between 
legal equals in costless transactions institutionalized in private property 
rights defined and enforced by the state.146 In China, where private 
property rights are at best ambiguous and until 2007 have received 
relatively scant recognition within the constitution and legal system147 it is 
submitted that the economists’ approach is seriously limited in its view of 
guanxi relationships. In recent years as the size of the family has been 
limited it has become increasingly important to extend guanxi networks 
and the impetus to do so has remained strong. Guanxi has important 
implications for organizational studies as well as marketing and corporate 
governance. 148 I will return to its importance and implications for 
corporate governance in later chapters.
Another major issue relevant to the role of guanxi in Chinese society is 
that of law and development. It has been argued that relationship
145 ibid.
146 See for exam ple Wank, D. L. (1996). "The institutional process o f  market clientelism : Guanxi and private 
business in a South China city." China Ouarterlv(T47): 820-838.
147 S ee for exam ple, M o Z, (2008) "From Public to Private: The N ew ly  Enacted Chinese Property L aw  and the 
Protection o f  Property Rights in China" (Temple university, B easley School o f  Law, Legal research paper series 
2008-39); Rehm , G. H. and Juhns, H., (2008) " The N ew  Chinese Property Rights Law: A n Evaluation from a 
Continental European P erspective" , available at http:/ssrn.com/abstract=l 132343.
148 S ee for exam ple Child, J. (1994). M anagem ent in China during the age o f  reform. Cambridge, Cambridge 
U niversity P r e ss .; Li Y. Y., Parnell M . F. and Hawkins N ., (2005) "Guanxi, relationship marketing and and 
business strategy" and W illiam son D ,(2005) "A management control assurance in the different cultures and 
institutions o f  China and the UK" in Brown, D. II. and A. I. M acBean (2005). Challenges for China's d evelo p m en t: 
an enterprise perspective. London, R outledge .
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transactions diminish the need in Chinese society for universally 
enforceable contractual rights and other legal rights. This relates to 
arguments as to whether legal rights are a necessary precondition for 
economic development or whether it is economic development that 
stimulates the growth of enforceable legal rights.149 Whilst China may 
enact laws such as contract law based on international models these 
appear to be impacting relatively slowly. More recent research has 
indicated that China’s growth has been supported by non-legal substitutes 
such as the official bureaucratic supervision and sponsorship of enterprise. 
These models have considerable historical precedents. 150 This has 
important implications for corporate governance in that the system 
remains embedded to a large degree in such systems.151 Though, on the 
supply side, the development of formal law has developed into an 
important tool for the central government to use in managing the state 
owned sector.152
I ll Reform under the Communist Party
After the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to power, the country’s
149 Clarke, D. (1996). "Power and polities in the Chinese court system: the enforcem ent o f  civil judgem ents."  
Colum bia Journal o f  A sian Law 10.
b0 See for exam ple, G oetzman, W. and K oll, E., (2005)," The History o f  Corporate Ownership in China: State 
Patronage, Company Legislation, and the Issue o f  Control " in M orck. R. (2007). A history o f  corporate governance 
around the world : family business groups to professional m anagers. Chicago, 111., University o f  C hicago Press ; 
Bristol : University Presses M arketing [distributor].
151 M ilhaupt, C. J. and K. Pistor (2008). Law and capitalism  : what corporate crises reveal about legal system s and 
econom ic development around the w orld. Chicago, London, University o f  C hicago Press at 140. See also Dam , K. 
W. (2006). The law-growth nexus : the rule o f  law and econom ic developm ent. Washington, D.C., Brookings 
Institution Press, in particular Chapters 10 and 11.
^  M ilhaupt and Pistor (2008), supra note 151, at 141.
connection with the outside world, especially economically advanced 
Western nations, was very limited (mainly due to ideological 
confrontations during the Cold War). Chinese legal institutions took yet 
another turn. Alongside the imperial traditions, the communist legacy has 
been a major source of influence on today’s legal system in China.153
From classical Marxism, the Chinese communists took over the notion of 
law as a tool of class struggle. From the Soviet Union, they learned the 
practical importance of law for revolutionary dictatorship. During this 
period, the function of Law and the legal system was reduced to serve the 
communist government as an instrument. The notion of an independent 
legal system governing all actors in a society was as alien to the Chinese 
communists as it was to the imperial mandarins.
From the “Anti-Rightists” campaign and the “Great Leap Forward” 
movement in the 1950s to the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and 1970s, 
law and the legal system were used as tools for class struggle, and their 
existence and functions were subject to politicians’ discretions. As a 
result, China suffered significantly from the chaos caused by endless 
class struggle. This period of time was usually labeled as the “rule of
153 The com m unist era is defined here as the era from the com m unist victory in 1949 to the beginning o f  the 
econom ic reforms in 1979. Although, the Chinese Com munist Party continues to m onopolize political pow er in 
China, gradual but substantial changes have taken place in China's econom ic and the political system . The 
com plexity o f  the political system  in China today is such that it is no longer appropriate to characterize the present 
reeim e as com m unist.
61
man.”
It should be noted that Chinese communist law was not a product of 
Marxism alone. It was also a product of Chinese traditions. Scholars have 
already pointed out some commonalities between Marxian practices and 
Chinese traditions. First, both emphasized moral and ideological 
education and internalization, and law and the legal system were only 
secondary as means to reach the ends.154 Second, based on Marxism, the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maintained that national and CCP’s 
interests are by definition synonymous with those of the masses. 
Individuals’ rights were granted from above and only so long as they may 
serve the overall societal good.155 This practice was consistent with 
traditional Confucian views of individualism, in which one’s value was 
realized through the fulfilment of one’s duties and responsibilities in 
certain social groups.156 Third, class distinctions in the new China were 
not unfamiliar to Chinese people because under Confucianism, traditional 
Chinese society was hierarchical and class-based.157 All those seemingly 
common features to a large extent helped China’s transition into a 
communist nation.
1M Ren, X. (1997). Tradition o f  the law and law o f  the tradition : law. State, and social control in China. Westport, 
C o n n .; London, G reenwood Press, at 3.
155 Polumbaum, J.( l 994). "Striving for Predictability:The Bureaucratization o f  M edia M anagement" in Li, J.
(1994). China's media, media's China. Boulder ; Oxford, West view.
L'6 Ren, X. (1997), supra note 154, at 3
157 Ibid.
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The door was reopened after the economic reform initiated in 1978. In 
that year the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of 
the CCP declared that large-scale nationwide mass political movements 
should be stopped and ‘the emphasis of the Party’s work should be shifted 
to socialist modernisation as of 1979’.158
Further, Deng broke the conventional boundaries of socialism and 
capitalism by claiming that “social practice (praxis) is the only criterion 
of seeking truth.”159 Under Deng’s theory, the market economy does not 
belong to capitalism any more, and it is consistent with the necessity of 
socialist economic division and productions.160 This was summarised by 
Deng Xiaoping as a ‘Two-Hands’ policy: On the one hand, the economy 
must be developed; and on the other hand, the legal system must be 
strengthened.161
A legal system was declared a necessity for socialist modernisation.162 
Then the Party leaders also repeatedly emphasised the importance of law 
for providing a social order conductive to economic development.163
‘■''s See the Com m unique o f  the Third Plenary Session o f  the Eleventh Central Com m ittee o f  the CPC. An English  
translation o f  the Com m unique appears in Liu Suinian &Wu Qungan , (eds) C hina’s Socialist Econom y: A n  
O utline History' (1 949-1984) (Beijing: B eijing R eview  Press. 1986), at 564-577.
159 "Social practice (praxis) is the only criterion o f  seeking truth” (Shijian Shi Jianyan Zhenli de W eiyi Biaojun); 5, 
G uangm ing Daily, Novem ber, 1978,
160 The P eop le’s Daily, June 8, 2000.
,<i1 See Wang, J.F. et al., ’On the Rule o f  Law ', (no.2, 1996) Studies in Law (Faxue Yanjiu) 3, at 7. See also  
Q iao,W ., ‘G uidelines for B uilding Up a Legal System  in the N ew  Era-Comrade D en g X iaop ing’s W ritings on 
B uilding a Legal System ', (no.2, 1984) Legal Science in China (Zhongguo Faxue)67.
162 Ibid. at 573.
193 See e.g . Jianying, then chairman o f  the Standing Com mittee o f  the NPC, 'O pening Speech at the Second
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Deng and other leaders have said that it is necessary to establish the 
authority of law.164 It was announced after the Third Plenary Session of 
the Eleventh Central Committee of the Party in 1978 that the practice 
whereby the ‘Party decides the case5 would be abolished.165
Under Deng’s leadership in the 1980s and 1990s, in sharp contrast, China 
witnessed the massive and rapid enactment of laws and regulations, 
particularly laws and administrative rules regulating economic and 
commercial relations.166 A major ideological breakthrough was made 
during Deng Xiaoping’s surprise visit to Shenzhen and Zhuhai in January 
1992 (now commonly referred to as the ‘Southern Tour’) During his visit, 
Deng was reported as saying that ‘reforms and greater openness are 
China’s only way out5 and that ‘if capitalism has something good, then 
socialism should bring it over and use it5.167 Party Secretary-General Jiang 
Zemin then proclaimed that the market and planning were both means of 
regulating the economy, but not criteria for distinguishing between
Session  o f  the Fifth National People's Congress on June IS, 1979', in Main D ocum ents o f  the Second Session o f  
the Fifth National P eop le’s Congress o f  the People's Republic o f  China (B eijing : Foreign Languages Press, 1979), 
at 3; and Hua G uofeng, then Chairman o f  the Party and Premier o f  the State Council, ‘Report on the work o f  the 
G overnm ent’, in id., see particularly Part I (A Historical Turning Point) and Part 111 (Strengthening Socialist 
Dem ocracy and the Socialist Legal system ).
,(’4 See D eng X iaoping, “zai zhongyang zhengzhijiu changweihui Shang de jianghua” (Speaking to the Standing 
Com m ittee o f  the Political Bureau o f  the Central Com m ittee o f  the Com munist Party o f  China), Jan. 17, 1986, in 
D eng X iaoping wenxuan (The collected works o f  D eng Xiaoping) (Beijing: Renm ing press, 1993), 3:152-54.
See “zhangguo G ongchandang di shiyijie zhongyang wciyuanhui di sanci quanti huiyi gongbao" (Comm unique 
o f  the Third Plenary session  o f  the Eleventh Congress o f  the Com m unist Party-preamble), the P eop le’s daily,
D ec .24, 1978.
166 By March 1998, the National P eople’s Congress (NPC) and its Standing C om m ittee had promulgated 328  
statues and decisions. The State Council had issued more than 700 regulations and the local legislatures had 
adopted over 5 ,000  local rules. See People's D aily (R enm ing Ribao), internet edition, 14 March 1998.
u’7 The Sydney M orning herald, 31 January' 1992, at 6. An edited version o f  D en g’s Speech w as later published in 
the C hinese media: ’Major Points o f  Speech Made in W uchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai (by D eng  
X iaoping)’. P eop le’s Daily (Renrnin Ribao), 6 Novem ber 1993, at 1; and translated as ‘Gist o f  Speeches Made in 
W uchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai(by D eng X iaop ing)’, Beijing Review. 7-20.February 1994, at 9-20.
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socialism and capitalism. l6SThe Party’s programme of reconstructing the 
legal system was further elevated in importance in 1996, as one eminent 
Chinese legal scholar has suggested, to the ‘same theoretical level as the 
socialist market economy’169 with adoption of the slogans ‘Use law to rule 
the country, protect the long term peace and good order of the state’170 and 
‘ruling the country according to law is the basic programme by which the 
Party leads the people in ruling the country’. 171 Keith and Lin cite 
arguments put forward by Chinese scholars supporting an emphasis upon 
the concept of rule of law (fazhi) as it ‘forms part of the progress from a 
traditional to a modern society’.172 In the primary stage of socialism, the 
task of law was to facilitate development of the market economy, to assist
168 P eop le’s D aily (R enm ing Ribao), (Oversears edition), 14 March 1992, at 1. A ccording to the P eop le’s Daily, the 
concept cam e directly from D eng Xiaoping: at the end o f  1990 D eng X iaoping pointed out that ‘planning and 
markets are not criteria for distinguishing socialism  from capitalism ’. D eng re-stressed this point during his tour to 
Shenzhen and Zhuhai Special Econom ic Zones in February 1992. See ‘Great Practice, Bright C’hapter-the Birth o f  
the Political Report o f  the 14lh C ongress o f  the Party’, in P eop le’s D aily (Renm in Ribao) (O verseas edition) 24  
O ctober 1991. at .3. According to other scholars, D eng had in 1979 said that socialism  could also practise a market 
econom y. See Gao Lu, ‘The Em ergence o f  the N otion o f  “Socialist market Econom y”’ (no. I, 1993) Xinhua D igest 
(X inhua W enzhai) 40, at 40-41.
169 K eith,R . and Lin,Z. (2001), Law and Justice in China's N ew  M arketplace. Palgrave M acm illan, at 35, 
attributing this assertion to Professor Li Buyun, one o f  China's leading legal scholars. The decision to establish a 
'Socia list market econom y with Chinese characteristics’ was adopted at the 14th CCP Congress held on 12-18 
D ecem ber 1992.
170 (Y ifa zhiguo, baozhan guojia Changzhi j iu ’an) Jiang Zem in, former president o f  China , “Hold H igh the Great 
Banner o f  D eng X iaoping Theory for an All-round Advancem ent o f  the Cause o f  B uilding Socialism  with Chinese 
Characteristics into the 2 1 st Century’, 12 September 1997, report delivered at the 15th National Congress o f  the 
CCP
,7’ This programme w as incorporated into the Constitution in March 1999, am ending ait. 5 by adding: ‘The 
P eop le’s R epublic o f  China governs the country according to law and makes it a socialist rule o f  law country.’ The 
proper translation o f  the last phrase is contested. An alternate interpretation could be ‘ make it a socialist country 
ruled by law ’. This is the translation used in the English version o f  Jiang Z em in’s speech, Hold high the great 
Banner o f  D eng xiaoping Theory for an All-round Advancem ent o f  the Cause o f  Building Socialism  with C hinese 
Characteristics into the 2 1 st Centry, 12 September 1997, in the Beijing Review. Keith, R. and Lin, Z .( 2001), prefer 
an alternate translation: ‘socialist rule o f  law state’, supra note 171, at 33. The bases for different translations is 
discussed in Bill Brugger and Stephen Reglar (1994), Politics Econom y and Society in Contemporary China, 
Stanford University' Press, at 177-81.
1/2 Keith, R. and Lin, Z..(2001), supra note 171. at 33, citing Q iao Keyu. Ronald Keith argues that the earlier 
academ ic debates over ‘rule o f  m an’ versus ‘rule o f  law ’ were also, in fact, a debate about ‘transition o f  Chinese  
legal culture from tradition to modernity'’. See also Keith. R. C. (1994). China's struggle for the rule o f  law . 
Basingstoke, M acm illan.
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maintaining public order and to eliminate political threats.173
Thus as a consequence of the new policy Chinese scholars began to 
openly argue that a ‘market economy’ was a result of human wisdom; it 
was not a ‘privilege’ (tequan) for the West.174 A socialist market economy, 
it was now often asserted, was an economy under rule of law (jazhi 
jingji).175 The establishment and perfecting of a socialist market was thus 
said to be a process of establishing the rule of law.l7ti To establish a market 
economy in China therefore demanded a revolution in legal theory and 
legal thought.177
Nevertheless, many commentators saw legal developments in China as 
either statist in nature in that law is a mechanism to exercise state power 
in China rather than a limit on the state power.178 Many aspects of the
173
' Wen jiabao, Prime M inister o f  China, ■'Our Historical Tasks at the Primary' Stage o f  Socia lism ” B eijing review, 
2007 , 12. available at h!1p:/Avww.bjreview.com .cn/Iianghui/txt/2007-03/ 12/content_ 58768.htm  
1,-4 Liu Jinghua(!995), ‘G lobalisation: An Historical Process Full o f  Paradoxes’, Pacific Studies (Taipingyan  
X uebao) n o .l , at 70.
1 ?5 See.e.g .X iaoY ang, Market E conom y and Legal Construction (Shichang Jingji yu Fazhi Jianshe)(Beijing: 
Publishing House o f  Law, 1994); Chen Shixi, ‘Our Legislative Trend in the 1990s’, G uangm ing Daily (G uangm ing  
Ribao), 9 March 1994, at 5; "The L egislative Train is Speeding Up towards the Market E conom y’, Legal D aily  
(Fazhi R ibao), 7 March 1994, at 1; and Min X ianw ei, ‘ A  socialist Market Econom y Is Naturally an Econom y  
Under the Rule o f  L aw ’, (Special Issue, 1994) Journal o f  Shandong Norm al University (Shangdong Shifan 
D axuebao) 93. Such an assertion is not without challenges (though rather isolated), See e.g. Lin Jie, A Q uestion on 
the Proposition ;A Market Econom y Is an Econom y Under the Rule o f  L aw ’ (n o .l , 1994) Legal Science in China 
(Zhongguo Faxue) 68, at 68.
I7(> See Wang Jiafu et al., ‘On the Rule o f  L aw ’, (no.2, 1996) Studies in Law (Faxue Yanjiu) 3, at 3.
1/7 See G uo D aoxu, ‘The xMarket Econom y and the Change in Legal 'Theory and Legal Thought’, (n o .2 ,1994) 
Jurisprudence (Faxue)2; X ie Hui, ‘From a Planned Econom y to a Market Econom y: A R evolution in Legal 
'Theory’, (no .4 ,1994) Gansu Journal o f  Theoretical Research (Gansu Lilun Xuekang)52; Wen Zhengbang, ‘Som e  
Legal and Philosophical Thoughts on the Market E conom y’, (no.4, 1995) Legal System  and Social D evelopm ent 
(Fazhi Yu Shehui Fazhang) 1;
1/8 See for exam ple, Potter, P. B. (1999). "The Chinese legal system: Continuing com m itm ent to the primacy o f  
state power." China Ouarterlvf 159): 673-683. ; Potter, P. B. (2001). "The legal im plications o f  China’s accession to 
the WTO." China Ouarterlvt 167): 592-609.
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concept of a rule of law in the west are very inadequately developed in 
China. These include a number of important ideas and concepts such as 
supremacy of law, judicial independence, separation of powers, checks 
and balances and also equality before the law. Parliamentary systems and 
the protection of human rights (a concept of which the CCP is wary) are 
also part of the picture.179 Also, Chinese judicial independence did not 
originate from the concept of separation of powers. The Chinese concept 
of judicial independence (shenpan diili) is more of a reference to the 
elimination of the CCP’s political influence in actual judicial decisions as 
opposed to the party’s influence over the general policy direction of the 
judicial process. Other commentators have argued that China’s legal 
system is more of a case of ‘rule by law’ rather than developing a ‘rule of 
law.’181 The development of the legal system was described as rather like 
‘riding a tiger’ as the development of due legal process in a society 
largely dependant on communist party fiat and the maze of guanxi 
relationships in which, even within the communist party, as well as 
society as a whole posed difficult political problems for as law developed 
as a system within China the question could be posed, and often was, is
179 Chen, J. (1999). Chinese law : towards an understanding o f  C hinese law, its nature and developm ent. The 
Hague ; London, Kluwer Law  International.
180 Brugger, B . and S. Reglar (1994). Politics, econom y and society in contemporary China. London, M acm illan. ; 
see a lso Keith, R. C. and Z. Lin (2001), Supra note 171.
181 E J Epstein, (1992), "A M atter o f  Justice" in Kaun, II. and M. Brosseau (1992). China R ev iew . Hong Kong, 
C hinese U niversity Press.; Brugger and Reglar, (1994) supra,note 180; Zheng, Y. (1998). From rule by law to rule 
o f  law? A  realisticview  o f  China’s Ieaal d evelopment East A sian Institute, National U niversity o f  S in gap ore.; 
Peerenboom , R. P. (2002). China's long march toward rule o f  law . Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. ; 
Peerenboom, R. P. (2004). Asian discourses o f  rule o f  law : theories and implementation o f  rule o f  law in twel ve 
Asian countries. France, and the U .S . London ; Routledge.
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the CCP itself subject to those same laws?182 During the period of the first 
Emperor of China the legalist school of thought had been relatively 
triumphant but was swept away during the later Han dynasty.183 However, 
it remains unlikely that systems of connectedness which are long 
fundamental to Chinese civilization will wither away as a socialist legal 
system with Chinese characteristics develops. On the contrary as that 
system has developed it has remained imbued with Chinese 
characteristics overlain with issues of political expediency.
IV The Company Law and securities market in China
The first Chinese Corporate Law was enacted in January 1904, during the 
late Qing Dynasty. When the People’s Republic of China was founded in 
1949, business corporations gradually disappeared. This was due to 
importation of the highly centralized economy model from the former 
Soviet Union. In the late 1970s, China started to introduce a market 
economy, SOEs were redefined as business corporations, and private 
businesses were incorporated.184 However, China did not have a single 
law regulating business organizations, even though by the late 1980s as
182 Liang, B. (2009). The changing Chinese legal system . 1978-presen t: centralization o f  power and 
rationalization o f  the legal system . London, Routledge.
183 Fung Y  -L  (Translated by Derk B odde), (1952) A  History o f  Chinese Philosophy (Vol. I) The Period o f  
C lassical Learning (2 nd edn) Princeton, Princeton University Press. See Chapter XIII for a consideration o f  the 
legalists school o f  thought and Chapters XIV and XVI for a consideration o f  Confucianism  under the C h’in and 
Han dynasties and the eventual triumph o f  Confucianism  respectively.
I8'4 Schipani, C. A. and J. Liu (2002). "Corporate Governance in China: Then and Now." Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1(36).
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many as five million companies had been established.'85
The need for a company law was soon recognised by law-makers, and 
thus efforts to draft a company law began to emerge in 1983, first jointly 
by the State Planning Commission and the State Commission for 
Economic structural Reform, and later by the Legislative Affairs 
Committee (LAC) of the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress (SCNPC).186 On 29 December 1993 the SCNPC finally adopted 
the Company law of the PRC.187 The event was seen by the Chinese press 
as a ‘historical leap forward’.188 The Company Law, according to the then 
Vice-chairman of the State Commission for Economics and Trade, 
ChenQingtai, was the ‘most important’ piece of legislation for regulating 
business entities.189 It remains important to bear in mind that use of the 
law was to corporatize the SOEs and raise capital rather than encourage a 
large scale sell off of state businesses. The corporate form was a useful 
legal tool for the organization and modernization of the key sectors of the 
economy.
The reform of China’s stock market systems began in 1990 with the
185 Z hongguo baike nianjian 1990 .(China encyclopaedic year book 1990), (Beijing: China Encyclopaedia  
Publishing house, 1990), at 315.
186 See ‘A  H istorical Leap Forward’, G uangm ing D aily (G uangm ing Ribao), 18 January 1994, at 4.
187 Promulgated by the president o f  the PRC on the sam e day. The Law becam e effective on 1 July 1994.
188 See ‘A  Historical Leap Forward’, supra note 186.
189 See D aily o f  the Legal System  (Fazhi Ribao). 19 January 1994, at 2.
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redevelopment of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges.190 In the 
first year, only 15 companies dared to try the once forbidden apple with a 
total market capitalization of 10.9 billion Yuan.191 It took little time, 
however, before people accepted the new test, and China’s stock market 
started expanding with incredible speed. By 2004, more than 1,300 
companies had gone through public offerings, and the total market 
capitalization jumped to 4.8 trillion Yuan in 2000 before it cooled off to
3.7 trillion Yuan by 2004.
In October 1992 the State Council formed the Securities Committee 
(SCSC) and its executive arm, the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC), to take charge of overall supervision and regulation 
of the securities market in China. In April of 1998, and as part of the State 
Council structural adjustment, the SCSC and CSRC were merged into 
one single authority- the China Securities Regulatory Commission-as the 
sole State Council securities regulatory authority responsible for the 
uniform administration and supervision of securities and futures markets 
throughout the country.
!9<) See for exam ple Walter, C.'. E. and F. J. T. H ow ie (2006). Privatizing China : inside China’s stock m arkets. 
Singapore ; Chichester, John W iley & Sons (A sia). A ccording to this work the first business to issue shares to the 
public (despite there being no com pany law at that time) was Feile A coustics in Shanghai in 1984 and w as the first 
to be registered as a business operating under the ‘shareholder system ’. The business issued 10,000 shares at 
RJV1B50 each. See also F Hu, (2007) "The Effects o f  Stock Market Listing on the Financial Performance o f  
Chinese Firms " in C'alomiris, C. W. (2007). China's financial transition at a crossroads. N ew  York ; Chichester, 
Colum bia U niversity Press.
191 For more detailed information on the first experience o f  C hina’s stock market, see Green, S. (2003). China's 
stoekm arket: a guide to its progress, players and prospects. London, Profile at 30.
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Two decades of economic reforms have transformed China from a 
centrally planned system into a rapidly expanding economy with double­
digit growth rates. But how to build a sound corporate governance system 
and improve the reputation of Chinese enterprises based on the concept of 
harmonious society, technically and practically speaking, has a long way 
to go. Undoubtedly, in my view China may combine its own traditions 
and needs with whatever is helpful from the German/Japanese and Anglo- 
American models of corporate governance. Though it remains debateable 
what exactly will work and the extent to which China ought to develop 
elements of governance which are particularly it’s own and which work 
best in the Chinese context.
2.7 Conclusion
The recent law reform is actually a continuation of many earlier efforts. 
In the late Qing dynasty, Chinese reformers grappled with models derived 
mainly from Germany as conveyed by the Japanese. China then adopted 
certain Soviet legal forms in the 1950s and Western models again in the 
1980s.Unfortunately, none of these appear to have yielded much success. 
Indeed, within China’s existing political structure and traditional culture, 
legal processes can never escape an embededness in Chinese 
characteristics and a susceptibility to political pressures.
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The Chinese government indeed made no intention to hide the guidance 
(as one form of control) of the CCP over the building of the legal system. 
The official definition of “ruling the country in accordance with the law” 
(yifa zhiguo) was codified as follows:
“Under the lead of the Communist Party and based on the 
Constitution and laws, the people administer national affairs, 
economic, cultural, and social affairs via various means. It is to 
guarantee all national affairs to be accomplished according to laws, 
and to realize the systemization and legalization of the socialist 
democracy. The basic system and law will not be changed with 
changes of national leaders or changes of those leaders’ personal 
opinions.”192
Too many reform initiatives have been partial and poorly conceived, 
undertaken without considering the fundamental interdependence 
between corporate law and corporate finance, and between corporate 
governance and the rest of the economic system.193 Nor is it enough to 
know the Taw on the books.’ Much depends on whether and how these 
laws are enforced. Many countries have extensive codes and shareholder 
protections-but these are not implemented well, particularly in terms of
l9: The People's Daily, June 20, 2001; N ovem ber 1, 2002,
!9i B erglof. E ,(2000) " Reform ing corporate governance: Redirecting the European agenda", in Cohen, S. S. and G. 
Bovd (2000). Corporate governance and globalization : long range planning issues. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar.
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being enforced. Or, if enforced, their interpretation can alter their 
meaning substantially. The actual application of law turns, again, on 
politics and choices. Despite the globalization of corporate activities, 
production and investment notwithstanding, corporations and investment 
funds remain very much rooted in their home countries and defined by 
their domestic political and legal environments.
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Chapter 3 Internal corporate governance mechanisms
3.1 Introduction
The corporate governance literature typically distinguished two major 
corporate governance models, one based on equity finance and control 
primarily by capital markets, the other on debt finance and control by 
banks in the dual role of shareholders and major creditors.1 The former is 
typically associated with the United States and the United Kingdom, the 
latter with Germany and Japan. The reasons for the major differences 
between these two major models are as much due to the accidents of 
history as they are to reasons of a political and cultural nature.2
Germany and Japan were heralded as the model economies that other 
countries should follow in the 1980s. Companies in both countries were 
believed to benefit from being controlled by stable, large shareholders
' Roe, M . J. (1993). "Some D ifferences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United-States." Yale 
Law  Journal 102(8): 1927-2003.; B erglof, E. "Corporate Governance in Transition Econom ies: The Theory and Its 
P olicy  Implications", in Aoki, M . and H .-K. Kim (1995). Corporate governance in transitional econom ies : insider 
control and the role o f  banks. W ashington, D.C., The World Bank, at 3-32.; A oki.M ., "Controlling Insider Control; 
Issues o f  Corporate G overnance in Transition Econom ies", in A oki, M. and H.-K. Kim (1995). Corporate 
governance in transitional econom ies : in sider control and the role o f  banks. W ashington, D .C ., The World Bank, at
3-327 ........................... ................................
2 See for exam ple Dore, R. P. (2000). Stock market capitalism, w elfare capitalism  : Japan and Germany versus the 
A nglo-Saxons. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Japan had looked to Prussia, the leading German State in the 19th 
Century as a m odel to fo llow  because its martial spirit seem ed m ost akin to its ow n Samurai past; Stewart, R., J.-L. 
Barsoux, et al. (1994). M anaging in Britain and Germany. London, M acm illa n .; Charkham, J. P. (1994). K eeping  
good com pany : a study o f  corporate governance in five countries. Oxford, Clarendon Press. ;Charkham, J. P., II. 
Ploix, et al. (2005). K eeping better com pany : corporate governance ten years on . Oxford, Oxford University Press.
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who made long-term investments possible and were able to commit other 
stakeholders over the long ru n .3 However the circumstances have 
changed very quickly. Until the recent corporate scandals and credit 
crunch over the last nine years, many countries looked up to the UK and 
the US for their flexible labour markets, highly liquid stock exchanges 
and rapid growth in high-tech industries. Germany and Japan were no 
longer the models to follow.4 Today, the current credit crisis has led many 
people to re-examine the Anglo-American model.
Thus, Letza, Sun and Kirkbride note that "the so-called superiority and 
priority of any model is not permanent and universal, but rather 
temporary contextual"/ It is now generally accepted that there is no 
single system of corporate governance applicable to all countries 
although the globalization of the world economy has exerted some 
pressure on the need for convergence and harmonization in key areas of 
governance arrangement.6
Legal reforms in China have been comprehensive and have affected not 
only areas immediately relevant for the enterprise sector, but the entire
3 See, eg  D a Silva. L. C., M. Goergen, et al. (2004). D ividend policy and corporate governance. Oxford, Oxford 
University P r e ss .; S ee also M iles, D . (1993). "Testing for Short Termism in the Uk Stock-Market." E conom ic  
Journal 103(421): 1379-1396.
4 G oergen, M. (April 2007). "What D o We K now  About Different System s o f  Corporate Governance?" Journal o f  
Corporate Law  Studies 7.
5 L etza,S., Sun,X, and Kirkbride, J. (2004), "Shareholding versus Stakeholding: A  Critical R eview  o f  Corporate 
Governance" 12(3) Corporate Governance: An International R eview  257.
6 Tricker. R. I. (1994). International corporate governance : text, readings and cases. N ew  York ; London, Prentice 
H a ll.,44-45.
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legal system, ranging from constitutional, administrative, criminal, and 
civil law to the organization and procedural rules of the court system.7
Commentators have raised concerns about the relevant factor being not 
“law on the books” as much as the combination of law and its 
enforcement mechanisms.8 The “transplant shock” i.e. the possibility that 
legal rules that work well in one nation may not work well, and ultimately 
may be rejected, in a nation with a different historical, political, or culture 
background is a concern.9 Eastern European privatization experiences 
have shown that in order to be successful such programmes require 
complex regulations and specialized administrative skills, both of which 
are not readily available and cannot be easily created in sufficient 
quantity in these transforming economies. 10 Again, the Russian 
experience, suggests that so many of these factors were lacking that they 
would not constitute sufficient conditions.11
Thus, it is important to adapt selectively for China features from mature 
market economies on the basis of a clear theoretical and empirical
7 Pistor, K. (1995). Law M eets the Market: M atches and M ism atches in Transition E conom ies. The World Bank.; 
Gray, C. (1993). E volving Legal Framework for Private Sector D evelopm ent in Central and Eastern Europe.,, The 
World Bank, Sachs, J. and K. Pistor (1997). The rule o f  law and econom ic reform in R ussia. Boulder, C olo. ; 
Oxford, W estviewPress.
8B erkow itz, □ ., K. Pistor, et al. (2003). "Economic developm ent, legality, and the transplant effect." European 
E conom ic R eview  47(1): 165-195.
Ibid.
10Fox, M. B. and M. Heller (2006). Corporate governance lessons from transition econom y reforms. Princeton, 
N.J. ; Oxford, Princeton University Press, at 38.
" Ib id , at 113, 116.
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understanding of the evolution of such systems. The key question is what 
kind of corporate governance system would best suit China’s economic 
and social developments in its quest to become a more competitive and 
prosperous economy.
In order to understand China’s current approach to enterprise reform and 
corporate sector development in its institutional and developmental 
context, it is important to consider the background and meaning of 
several key concepts and practices, some of which China has borrowed 
from mature market economies.
Unlike most developed countries, corporate governance is a relatively 
new concept in China. Since the founding of the People’s Republic in 
1949, the Chinese Government adopted the public (state) ownership of all 
production means and the formal Soviet style planned economy.12 In 1984, 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party adopted the Decisions to 
Reform the Economic System.13 The aim of the 1984 Decisions was to 
create an enterprise that was a relatively independent business entity. The 
Genera! Civic Law o f the People s Republic, o f China, which came into 
effect on 1 January 1987, stated that SOEs and collective-owned
'* Zu, J. L., 1. M . Liu, et al. (2007). "The developm ent o f  corporate governance in China." The Com pany Lawyer 
28(7): 200.
13 Jiang Qiangui, "Like Wading A cross a Stream: Law, Reform and the State Enterprise", in Bacliner.B. and Fu ,11..
(1995) (eds), Com mercial Laws in the P eop le’s Republic o f  China, Butterworths A sia, at 3.
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enterprises satisfying certain capital, organizational and approval 
requirements were to be turned into legal persons. Indeed, it was not until 
July 1994 when China’s Company law came into effect that a national 
legal framework was introduced for formalizing the creation of the 
designated forms of companies14 as legal persons.
China’s corporate governance reform began in the 1990s. The Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) became increasingly aware that a good 
governance system for China’s enterprises was of critical importance in 
delivering its goal of sustainable economic growth. Intense public interest 
on corporate governance was spurred in 2001 by the notorious 
YinGuangXia Scandal, which concerned unbridled fabrication of sales 
receipts and false disclosure by a company listed in the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange under the leadership of a few “core” insiders, causing losses to 
thousands of minority shareholders.15 Since then, corporate governance 
“has become a high profile topic and has been made top priority of the 
(Chinese) regulator’s agenda.”16
Recently, the CSRS (China securities regulatory commission) has 
released a Code of Corporate Governance of Listed Companies to serve
14 C hina’s Com pany Law covers tw o forms o f  com panies: C om panies with limited liabilities, and Joint stock  
com panies w ith limited liabilities.
15 Wang, J. Y. (2004). "Dancing with Wolves: Regulation and Deregulation o f  Foreign Investment in China's Stock 
Market " A sian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal 5: 40-42.
16 Ibid.
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as a benchmark for evaluating whether a listed company has a good 
corporate governance structure.17
3.2 Internal corporate governance mechanisms in China
According to the PRC Company law, the basic organisational structure of 
listed companies comprises three tiers of control, namely the 
shareholders’ meeting, the board of directors and the supervisory board. 
The shareholders’ meeting in China is known as “the organ of power of 
the corporation” 18 and it assumes supreme sovereignty in corporate 
governance. The boards of directors of Chinese listed companies enjoy 
the usual breadth of managerial powers of their Western counterparts.19 In 
August 2001, CSRC issued the Guidelines for Introducing Independent 
Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed Companies (hereinafter 
Independent directors Guidelines), mandating that by 30 June 2003 at 
least one-third of companies’ board members should be independent.20 
The independent directors shall be independent from the company’s 
management as well as its controlling shareholder. The supervisory board 
represents yet another watchdog over management. Pursuant to the PRC 
Company Law, the supervisors supervise the directors and managers for
17 C ode o f  Corporate Governance for Listed Com panies (Zhengjianfa) N O  1 o f  2002 , issued by the CSRC on 7 
January 2002 , preface (hereinafter CSRS Code o f  Corporate G overnance).
18 Arts 37 and 99 . PRC. Company Law 2005
19 Art 109, PRC. Com pany Law 2005
^  Promuleated by the CSRC on 16 A ugust 2001, Zhenghjianta (2001) N o  102, Art 1:3.
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any violation of laws, regulations or articles of association of the 
company during their performance of company duties.21 The members 
include shareholders’ and employees’ representatives, of which at least 
one-third shall comprise employees’ representatives.22
3.3 The supervisory board in Germany
Germany is classified as a “late developer,” entering the game in the mid­
nineteenth century at the iron-steel stage of economic development, when 
capital requirements were large and when Britain already dominated the 
scene. It embodied the features Gerschenkron ascribed to it,23 namely an 
important role for banks and for the state, and interlocking relationships 
among firms - “organized capitalism’, as it was called.24
In contrast to many western economies, Germany has a two-tier board 
with a management board ( Vorstand) and a supervisory board 
(Aufsichtsrat).25 The supervisory board represents the shareholders and 
employees. Under the law of codetermination introduced in 1976,
21 Arts 54 and 1 18 , PRC Com pany Law 2005
22 Art 118, PRC Company Law 2005
23 Gerschenkron, A . (1962). Econom ic Backwardness in H istorical Perspective. A  book o f  essays. Belknap Press o f  
Harvard U niversity Press: Cambridge, at 456.
24 G ourevitch. P. A. (1986). Politics in hard times : comparative responses to international econom ic crises. Ithaca ; 
London, Cornell U niversity Press, at 267.
25 The Netherlands also has a two-tier system  with a Raad van Bestuur (m anagem ent board) and a Raad van 
Com m issarissen (supervisory board). In France, corporations have the choice between a one-tier board and a two-
tier system ; but more than 95%  o f  the listed com panies have opted for a unitary board. See Dherment-Ferere and 
Rermeboog, "Share price reactions to CEO resignations and large shareholder monitoring in listed French 
com panies " in iVleCahery, J., P. W. Moerland, et al. (2002). Corporate governance regim es : convergence and 
diversity. Oxford, Oxford University Press at 297-324.
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employees are legally allocated control rights over all corporate decisions 
in the form of seats in the supervisory board. This is widely seen as one 
of the hallmarks of German corporatism.26 Employees have the same 
rights to representation on the supervisory board as an owner of equity. 
This regulation also gives trade unions a foothold in the governance of 
firms entirely independent of the degree of organization (or lack there of) 
among the company’s employees. The general idea is that the suppliers of 
capital and suppliers of labour steer the firm ‘cooperatively’.27 The role of 
the supervisory board is that of overseeing the management of the 
company.28 The functions of the supervisory board have been defined as 
appointing and removing the members of the management board,29 
representing the company in court and out of court in its relationship with 
the members of the management board, supervising and overseeing the 
management of the corporation; evaluating (studying) matters relating to 
the corporation; having insight into the corporation’s books and cash; 
approving the corporation's financial statements; and reporting to the 
shareholders' meeting.30
2t* A  recent critical analysis can be found, eg, with du P lessis, J. J. and O. Sandrock (2005). "The Rise and Fall o f  
Supervisory Codeterm ination in Germany?" International C om pany  and Co mm erc ia l Law R eview  16: 67.; A  study 
found that com panies with equal representation o f  em ployees and shareholders on the supervisory board trade at a 
31 percent stock market discount as compared with com panies where em ployees representatives fill only one third 
o f  the supervisors' board seats, see Gortonm, G. and F. A . Schm id (2004). "Capital, Labor and the Firm: A  study o f  
German Codetermination." Journal o f  the European E conom ic A ssociation 2.
11 SiebertJL , "Corporadst versus market approaches to governance" in Mopt, K. J., W. Eddy, et al. (2005). 
Corporate governance in c o n te x t : corporations, states, and markets in Europe. Japan, and the U S. Oxford : Oxford 
University Press at 287.
28 See A ktiengesselschafien  (Law on stock corporations) § 111(1), translated in Com mercial law s o f  the World:
Germany (rev. ed. 1995).
~ See O ppenhoff W. and Verhoeven, T.O., ‘ Stock Corporations’, in Bernd Riister (eds)(2003) B usiness 
Transactions in Germany , Berlin, M atthew Bender , ch. 24. § 24.03  
50 Ibid.
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However, the performance of companies with a supervisory board in an 
international comparison is a heavily debated issue. On the one hand, it 
can be argued that the advantage of this system is the cooperation 
between different groups of a company so the interests of the employees, 
the shareholders, and the firm are considered when important decisions 
are made.'51 This gives labor control rights over corporate decisions and 
leads to a kind of negotiated management where - in the terms of 
Hirschman - labour has voice as an alternative to exit. The result is a 
willingness to practice long-term commitment.32
One the other hand, many legal scholars have criticized that system: for 
example when difficult problems have to be solved within the company, 
the trilateral interdependence among members of the management board, 
the representatives of the shareholders and the representatives of the 
employees in the supervisory board often lead to agreements that burden 
the shareholders.33 Employees working abroad are not entitled to 
participate in the elections of the representatives of the employees to 
serve on the supervisory boards of some large German companies.34 The 
employees' representatives 011 supervisory boards are sometimes faced by
51 Siebert, H .(2005), supra note 27,at 288-289
32 Streeck,W . and Yamamura, K.. "Introduction: Convergence or Diversity? Stability and Change in German and 
Japanese Capitalism" in Yamamura, K. o. o. and W. Streeck (2003). The end o f  diversity? : prospects for German 
and Japanese c apitalism . Ithaca. Cornell University Press at 13.
33 du P lessis, J. J. and O. Sandrock (2005). "The Rise and Fall o f  Supervisory Codeterm ination in Germany?" 
International Company and Commercial Law R eview  16: 67.
34 Ibid, at 70 .........
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serious conflicts of interest, e.g. when they call for a strike against the 
company on whose supervisory board they are sitting. 35 It has been 
argued that the German statutory regulations on codetermination have the 
effect of "poison pills" on foreign companies that consider taking them 
over peacefully. Certain investors keep away from Germany because 
they are afraid of German codetermination, which is largely an unknown 
factor to them.36
3.4 The supervisory board in China
After studying the various available Western models, the law makers in 
China chose the German model of a two-tier board system because the 
ideal of co-determination between capital and labour would seem to 
enhance internal unity and company performance. Its ‘communitarian’ 
capitalist approach was more appealing to them than the theoretical 
shareholder dominance of the Anglo-American system.
3.4.1 The function of the supervisory board in China
Chinese company law provides for a two-tier board structure, with a 




directors, and contemplates a relatively active managerial role for the 
board of directors;57 The responsibilities of the supervisory board include 
the following: (a) examining the company’s financial affairs; (b) 
supervising directors and managers to see whether they violate laws, 
regulations or the company’s articles of association in the performance of 
their duties: (c) if an act of a director or manager harms the interests of 
the company, to require him to correct such an act; (d) proposing to hold 
extraordinary shareholders’ general meetings; and (e) other functions and 
powers provided for in the company’s articles of association.38
3.4.2 The gap between reality and expectation of the law in the role 
and powers of the supervisory board
Although Chinese commentators often compare China's two-tier model to 
Germany's, the Chinese structure differs in a crucial way: the Company 
Law expects that the board of supervisors will perform a supervisory role 
by simply saying that it will, without actually giving the board any 
significant powers39 or providing structurally for its independence from
37 See Tang X .. Zhongguo Shangshi G ongsi Zhili Huanjing De Xin Fazhan [N ew  D evelopm ents in the Governance 
Environm ent for C hinese Listed Com panies](Paper for 21st Century Com mercial Law  Forum, Tsinghua Univ., 
B eijing, N ov. 18, 2001).
j8 See PRC Company Law 2005 , art. 54
39 Wang, J. (2008). "The Strange Role oflndependent Directors in a Two-Tier Board Structure o f  China's Listed 
Companies." The Com pliance and Regulators' Journal 3: 49.
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those supervisors.40 Indeed, a relatively recent study41 indicates that over 
half the companies surveyed maintained supervisory boards with only the 
legal minimum number of members suggesting that this institution plays 
no real role in corporate governance.
In China, a board of supervisors may lack independence as well. Under 
the Company Law, a board of supervisors must consist of members from 
the ranks of shareholders and employees.42 In most cases, shareholder 
board members are predominantly appointed by majority shareholders 
and therefore represent only majority interests.43 Furthermore, since 
employee board members rely on top management for annual evaluations, 
promotions, and remuneration decisions, they find it difficult to play a 
totally independent role without considering their personal career
A A
interests. Consequently, a board of supervisors in China is “merely a 
figurehead and not a monitor in [any] real sense.”45
The establishment of the supervisory board in China is not based on the
40 Ibid ,at 52.
41 M iles, L. and Z. Z hong (2006). "Improving corporate governance in state-ow ned coiporations in China which  
w ay forward." Journal o f  corporate law studies: 229.
42 P.R.C. Com pany Law  2005 , article 118
43 Zu, J. L., 1. M. Liu, et al. (2007). "The developm ent o f  corporate governance in China." The Com pany Lawyer 
28(7): 200.
44 Tai, K. and C. Wong. (2003). "Corporate Governance in China." from http:// w w w .acga- 
a s i a.org/i oad 111 e . c ftn ?S 1 T E F 1L E 1D= 187.
45 Yang, P., "The tw o m odels o f  corporate governance and the institutional reform o f  C hinese enterprise " in 
Nakamura, M. (2008). Changing corporate governance practices in China and Japan : adaptations o f  A nglo- 
Am erican practices. Basingstoke, Palgrave M acmillan at 20-23 , see also Xiao, Z. z., J. Dahya, et al. (2004). "A 
Ground Theory Exposition o f  the Role o f  the Supervisory Board in China." British Journal o f  M anagem ent 15: 39- 
45.
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same social and philosophical considerations as for the setting up of 
supervisory boards in the German codetermination model of corporate 
governance. No broader social and historical issues seem to have been 
involved in designating the official functions46of the supervisory board in 
China, other than a desire to provide another organizational layer for a 
rather loosely defined monitoring role over the board of directors and 
managers.47
The Chinese supervisory board’s apparent resemblance to the German 
model is confined mostly to its name and the participation of workers.
In the Chinese case, however, the supervisory board consists of 
shareholders’ and workers’ representatives, but the mix is to be 
determined in each case by the company’s articles of association. The 
number of supervisors could be just one or two for smaller limited 
liability companies, and greater than three in the case of joint stock 
limited liability companies. A priori, given its limited function and 
unclear mode of operation, the supervisory board cannot be expected to 
play an effective role.49
46 The PRC Com pany Law 2005 , Articles 67, 81, 118. Only limited liability com panies and jo int stock com panies 
with lim ited liabilities are to set up supervisory boards, w holly ow ned state-ow ned com panies do not have 
supervisory boards .




The lack of motivation and resources certainly forms part of the 
explanation for the limited effectiveness of supervisory boards. However, 
is should be recognized that it has been common practice to have 
employees of the company acting as representatives of shareholders on 
the supervisory board, along with other employees who act as workers’ 
representatives. Therefore, these employees cannot reasonably be 
expected to carry out effectively the primary supervisory board role as 
this would be likely to involve confrontation with their superiors in the 
company hierarchy for whom they work.50
3,5 The independent director in the UK and US
Policymakers in several countries have turned to independent directors as 
an important element of legal and policy reform in the field of corporate 
governance. They are a monitoring tool put forward by agency theorists. 
Britain's own set of corporate scandals led to the Cadbury Report, which 
recommended, along with subsequent similar reports and studies, a 
greater role for outside and independent directors/''1 The Combined Code
Ibid-
:>I As o f  2001 , outside directors were a board majority in 53% o f  com panies on the London Stock Exchange.
See Hashim oto, M. (M ay 2002), Com mercial code revisions: Promoting the evolution o f  Japanese com panies , 
N om ura Research Institute, NRI Papers, N o.48: In 2004, however, Pensions Investment Research Consultants 
reported a board majority o f  independent directors in w ell under 15% o f  LSE-listed com panies. See Pensions 
Investment Research Consultants Ltd. (PIRC). Presentation o f  Corporate Governance Annual R eview  2004  (Nov.
18, 2004), available at http:/Avww. pirc.com .
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2008 clearly distinguishes them by stating: 'The board should include a 
balance of executive and non-executive directors (and in particular 
independent non-executive directors) such that no individual or small 
group of individuals can dominate the board’s decision taking.”52
In theory, independent directors are free of management pressure and 
powerful enough to remove a CEO, so they can have a controlling 
influence. Independent directors have been claimed to provide a 
comparative advantage in that they are less dependant on the CEO and 
more sensitive to external assessments of their performance as directors, 
less worried about the disclosure of potentially competitively sensitive 
information. They also have credibility in the "checking” of market 
signals against intrinsic measures of the firm’s prospects. Thus, they can 
solve three different problems. First, they enhance the fidelity of 
managers to shareholder objectives, as opposed to managerial interests or 
stakeholder interests. Second, they enhance the reliability of the firm’s 
public disclosure, which makes stock market price a more reliable signal 
for capital allocation and for the monitoring of managers at other firms as 
well as their own. Third, and more controversially, they provide a 
mechanism that binds the responsiveness of firms to stock market signals 
but in a bounded way.5'5
The C om bined Code on Corportate Governance 2008, section 1 A .3
Gordon, J. N . (2007). "The rise o f  independent directors in the United States, 1950-2005: O f shareholder value
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To be sure, the evidence is mixed concerning whether director 
independence actually curbs agency problems and increases efficiency of 
board decision-making.54 In general, the thrust of the empirical literature 
does not seem to support the common perception that board independence 
increase decision-making capacities of the board and the value of the 
firm.55 The recent comprehensive study is that of Bhagat and Black, who 
in a review of other studies as well as with their own research find, 
among other things, that:
* There is no evidence that greater board independence leads to better 
firm performance. Poor performance is correlated with subsequent greater 
independence, but there is no evidence that this strategy works to improve 
performance.56
r  *7
* having insiders on the board can add value/
^independent directors with significant stock positions may add value, 
whereas others do not.58
Evans and Evans found that the presence of independent directors on 
board or compensation committees had no effect on CEO pay levels/*’9
and stock market prices." Stanford Law R eview  59(6): 1469.
'ss Zhang, C., L. R enneboog, et al. (2008). "Do U K  Institutional Shareholders M onitor Their Investee Firms?" 
Journal o f  Corporate Law  Studies 8(1).; Romano. R. (2004). "The Sarbanes-O xley A ct and the Marking o f  Quack 
Corporate Governance." Yale L J 114.
75 Bhagat, S. and B. S. Black (2002). "The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and Long-Term Firm 
Performance." Journal o f  Corporation Law 27: 231.
56 Ibid, at 263
57 Ibid
58 Ibid, at 265-67
59 Evans, R. T. a. E., John P. (2002). The Influence o f  N on-Executive Director Control and Rewards on CEO  
Remuneration: Australian Evidence. EFM A 2002 London M eetings.
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As one commentator noted:
u[B]oard independence has done little to prevent past mismanagement 
and fraud. For example, thirty years ago the SEC cast much of the blame 
for the collapse of the Penn Central Company on the passive non 
management directors. No corporate boards could be much more 
independent than those of Amtrak, which have managed that company 
into chronic failure and government dependence. Enron had a fully 
functional audit committee operating under the SEC's expanded rules on 
audit committee disclosure.”60
Independence is matter of objective judgment rather than definition. In 
practice, however, many independent directors do not have significant 
enough investments in the companies on whose boards they serve to 
really care about performance, and have difficulty following company 
operational details. Many are not experienced business executives, or if 
they are, they may be too busy to keep themselves well informed.61 And, 
of course, rational CEOs are inclined to get rid of troublesome, overly 
critical directors by arranging for them not to be reappointed.62
60 Ribstein, L. E. (2002). "Market vs. Regulatory R esponses to Corporate Fraud: A  Critique o f  the Sarbanes-Oxley  
Act o f  2002." Journal o f  Corporation Law 28(1). It is particularly noteworthy that Enron's audit com m ittee "was 
headed by a w idely respected accounting p ro fessor . . .  and included another respected academic." Mealy, P. M. 
and K. Palepu (2002). "Governance and Intermediation Problems in Capital Markets: Evidence from the Fall o f  
Enron." Harvard N O M . Working Paper N o. 02 -2 7.
61 Smith. II. C. and I. Walter (2006). Governing the modern corporation : capital markets, corporate control and 
econom ic perform ance. N ew  York ; Oxford. Oxford University Press, at 92.
65 Ibid.
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In continental Europe, the creation of independent boards is problematic. 
In most member states, controlling shareholders retain the power to 
appoint and dismiss both the board and the management of the company. 
Thus, the effectiveness of adopting US-style board independence rules to 
ensure independent audit committees-where the board remains exposed to 
controlling shareholder influence- is likely yield few benefits.63
3.6 The independent director in China
The Chinese literature and regulations contemplate a number of roles for 
independent directors. One sees generalities about how they will reduce 
corruption, bring an objective view to board meetings, dare to ask 
uncomfortable questions, criticize company management, and ensure 
good corporate governance practices.64 Many Chinese commentators 
appear to view concentrated ownership as almost perverse and unnatural, 
and see the stereotypical Berle and Means Corporation as the ideal 
ownership structure.6'^  Independent directors will, it is hoped, represent 
the interests of small shareholders and prevent the recurrence of corporate
256 C offee, J. C. (2005). "A theory o f  corporate scandals: W hy the U SA  and Europe differ." Oxford R eview  o f  
E conom ic Policy 21(2): 198.
64 See, e.g ., Li Yining: Shangshi Gongsi Duli D ongshi Zhi Shang Nan Fahui Z uoyong (Li Yining: It Is Still 
Difficult for the Listed Company Independent Director System  to Play Its Proper Role), China N ew s A gency, June 
12. 2004.
65 Som e C hinese academ ics assert (incorrectly) that corporate law in the United States prevents large shareholders 
from dom inating by prohibiting any person from exercising over 20% o f  shareholder voting rights. See , e .g., Gu 
Gongyun, Gongsi Fa Xiugai Ying Jiejue de Ruogan Shiji Wenti (Several Practical Problems that Should Be Solved  
in a R evision o f  the Company Law), (Falii Chubanshe 2004) ,at 60
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scandals.66 The increasing worldwide interest in independent directors 
had not gone unnoticed by Chinese policymakers.
In November 2000, the Shanghai Securities Exchange issued a set of draft 
guidelines on corporate governance (SSE Guidelines) for companies 
listed on the exchange.67 The SSE Guidelines stipulate that each listed 
company must have at least two independent directors, and that 
independent directors should constitute not less than 20% of the board of 
directors (30% where the chairman of the board and the general manager 
are the same person). Independent directors may be nominated by the 
board’s nominating committee or by shareholders holding at least 5% of 
the stock. Controlling shareholders may not, however, nominate more 
than one director, indicating that the SSE Guidelines contemplate 
independent directors as a shield against dominant shareholder abuses as 
well as management abuses.68
The SSE Guidelines contemplate a major role for independent directors.69 
All subcommittees of the board of directors—including those for 
compensation, nomination, and investment decisions, which are
66 See Jiang Q iangui. Gongsi Zhili yu Guoyou Q iye Gaige. Zhongguo Zhengquan Bao (China SEC. N ew s),
Internet ed., June 12, 2005; Ye X iangsong & Cao Zongping, Tuixing D uli D ongshi Zhidu, Wanshan Faren Zhili 
Jiegou (Prom ote the Independent Director System , Perfect the Legal-Person G overnance Structure), Qiushi Zazhi 
(Seek ing Truth M agazine), N o . 6, 2004 , at 30-31.
67 See Shoufen G ongsi Zhili Zhiyin Chutai (First Guide to Corporate G overnance Appears), Z hongguo Jingji 
Shibao (China ECON. 'l im es), Nov. 6, 2000.
68 Ibid.
fi9 T kO I
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specifically mentioned—are to be composed principally o f  and chaired 
by, independent directors. In early 2001, the Securities Regulatory Office 
of Shenzhen promulgated the ’’Guidelines for the Implementation of an 
Independent Director System in Listed Companies” (Shangshi Gongsi 
Duli Dongshi Zhidn Shishi Zhiyin). These provided detailed rules 
respecting the qualifications and functions of independent directors and 
presumably applied to companies listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.
The CSRC in August 2001 issued its "Guidance Opinion on the 
Establishment of an Independent Director System in Listed Companies" 
(Independent Director Opinion). The Opinion covers Chinese companies 
listed in China; it does not cover Chinese companies listed overseas* 
which stipulated that listed companies in China shall revise their 
constitutions and hire appropriate people as independent directors 
(including at least one professional accountant) so that there would be at 
least two independent directors prior to 30 June 2002 and that at least 
one-third of directors would be independent prior to June 2003.70 
To strengthen the powers of the independent directors, the Independent 
Director Guidelines provide that independent directors are required to 
approve major related party transactions (including loans to related 
parties) whose total value exceeds RMB 3 million or 5% of the
70 Guanvu Zai Shangshi G ongsi Jianli Duli Dongshi Zhidu de Zhidao Yijian (Guidance Opinion on the 
Establishm ent o f  an Independent Director System  in Listed Com panies), CSRC, 2001, 5 (1)
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company’s net assets: may appoint and remove the company’s auditors; 
may propose to call a meeting of the board of directors or a shareholders’ 
interim meeting; and can appoint an outside auditing and consulting 
organisation independently.71 The opinions of the independent directors 
must also be sought in the nomination, appointment and removal of 
directors and senior managers, as well as in the remuneration of directors 
and senior managers.72
On paper, the independent director institution in China looks poised to 
play an effective role in corporate governance, but the reality may be 
rather different.
As shown in the optimistic words of a CSRC official stated in the 2005 
OECD Policy Dialogue on corporate Governance in China:
“As [ the ] Chinese independent director system has not been established 
too long and experienced independent directors are badly needed, we 
have to wait a longer time to witness the obvious effect of independent 
directors’ impact on corporate governance; however, we are deeply 
convinced that the establishment of the independent director system is a 




understanding of the idea of corporate governance.” 731 now turn to the 
problems and difficulties connected with the introduction of independent 
directors in China.
3.7 The gap between reality and expectation of the law in the role and 
powers of independent directors
3.7,1 Chinese entrepreneurs do not trust outsiders
The Chinese way of life continues to affect how business is run in
HAChina. Secrets of the business and success are often kept “in the 
family.” This makes it difficult for independent directors to function
»7 c
effectively in China. " The traditional kinship, which dominates the clan 
corporation, continues to affect and dominate contemporary Chinese 
society, even in Communist China.76 In other words, Business operations 
are traditionally run like a family (for example, within a clan corporation) 
in Chinese society and the younger and lower-ranking members of the
73 Yang, H. (M ay 2005 ), "Overview o f  governance o f  State-owned Listed Com panies in China", OECD  
Proceedings o f  the Second P olicy  D ialogue on Corporate Governance in China, Beijing, 19, available at 
http://w w w .oecd.O rg/dataoeed/14/6/34974067.pdf.
74 "Ultimately, there is the issue o f  market culture and the general murkiness o f  the China business environment. 
Can w e really expect former governm ent workers (as red-chip em ployees are) to embrace a culture o f  shareholder 
value, or are they more likely to v iew  corporatisation as an opportunity for personal enrichment? "said a 
commentator. Brooker.M ., "Tannery Stink Spoils Theory",South China M orning Post, August 27, 2002 , p.2.
?' In 2005 , the three independent directors in Guangdong Kelon Electrical H oldings w ho resigned recently stated 
in a resignation letter: “We think the com pany does not support our duty to protect shareholder rights,” alleging  
that the com pany did not listen to their advice or provide enough information when they looked into several 
“abnormal” transactions.
'6 Ruskola, T. (2000). "Conceptualizing corporations and kinship: Comparative law and developm ent theory in a 
C hinese perspective." Stanford Law' R eview  52(6): 1599-1729.
95
family trust the older members of the family to look after them - a 
tradition of “high trust, low structure.”77
3.7.2 Difficulties in finding appropriately experienced and qualified 
independent directors
The Independent Director Guidelines state that independent directors 
should, before taking office, make a declaration to the board of directors 
and the board of supervisors guaranteeing that they have sufficient time 
and energy to carry out their duties, and promising that they will perform 
them with diligence.78
The Opinion takes a positive approach and a negative approach to the 
qualifications of independent directors. On the positive side, an 
independent director must (1) be qualified to serve as a director pursuant 
to the Company Law and other regulations; (2) possess the independence
70required by the Opinion itself;' (3) possess basic knowledge relevant to 
the operations of the listed company, and be familiar with relevant laws
77 Potter. P. (20o4>, "Legal Reform in China-rn>titutions* Culture, and Selective Adaptation." Law & Social Inquiry 
2(4 ): 465-95 ., citing Eisenstadt, S .N . and L. Roniger (1984). Patrons, c lients and friends : interpersonal relations 
and the structure o t trust. in society. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, and Merton, R. K. (1967). Social 
Theory &  Social Structure. IS.tjj* frree Press. M acmillan.
!;S' S ee  supra n >fe ~0
w First, Section  K21 states that independent directors "are not to be influenced bymajor shareholders, controlling  
persons, or others w h o  h ave a  relationship o t interest w ith  the company." Second, the negative requirements o f  
SeJic n 1 'icui y further c'em enis ifnedelT i tion China Securities Regulatory C om m ission, Guanyu Zai
■S'1" if 4  a G u i i i  fian.i Dub D o r_ sn  7 ndu de /h id a o  Yijian (Guidance Opinion on the Establishment o f  an 
Ir Dt u aor n Lt r.J ' issued Aug. 1 6 ,2 0 0 1 , 1(2), 3.
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and administrative rules and regulations; (4) possess at least five years’ 
work experience in law, economics, or other fields necessary for the 
proper exercise of his functions as independent director; and (5) possess 
other qualifications stipulated in the company's articles of association.80 
In a later press release, the CSRC stated that independent directors must 
also undergo a training course organized by the CSRC in conjunction 
with Tsinghua University.81
On the negative side, the following persons may not serve as independent 
directors: (1) a person who holds a position in the listed company or its 
subordinate affiliates as well as the direct relatives of, and those with 
important social connections to, the former; (2) a person, or the direct 
relative of a person, who directly or indirectly holds at least 1% of the 
company’s stock or is among the top ten shareholders of the company;84
(3) a person, or the direct relative of a person, who is employed by an 
entity that directly or indirectly holds at least 5% 8:>of the company's stock 
or is among the top five non-natural person shareholders of the company;
80 Ibid, 2.
81 See Z heng Jian Hui: Jiaqiang Peixun Duli D ongshi Houbei Rencai (CSRC: Strengthen Training o f  a R eserve o f  
Q ualified Candidates for Independent D irector), Shanghai Zhengquan Bao Wangluo Ban (Shanghai Securities 
N ew s, Web Edition), Oct. 8, 2001, available at http://finance.sina.com .en/y/20011008/113694.htm l.
82 "Direct relatives" are defined as a "spouse, mother, father, son, daughter, etc. China Securities Regulatory  
Com m ission, Guanvu Zai Shangshi Gongsi Jianli Duli Dongshi Zhidu de Zhidao Yijian (G uidance O pinion on the 
Establishm ent o f  an Independent Director System  in Listed Com panies) 2, issued Aug. 16, 2001. It is not clear to 
m e what the "etc." is intended to cover. "Important social connections" are defined as "brother, sister, father-in-law, 
mother-in- law, son-in-law , daughter-in-law, spouse o f  a brother or sister, brother or sister o f  a spouse, etc." Ibid. 
A gain, it is not clear how  far the "etc." is intended to reach.
8j The Chinese here is ambiguous; it could be "over 1%." Ibid.
84 “Natural person shareholders" may be meant here. Ibid.
85 Ibid.
97
(4) a person about whom any of the above conditions have been met 
within the last year; (5) a person who supplies accounting, legal, 
consulting, or other similar services to the company or its subordinate 
affiliates; (6) any other person specified in the company's articles of 
association; and (7) any other person specified by the CSRC.
Commentators at the time expressed doubts that companies governed by 
the Opinion could find qualified persons in the time available.86 The total 
number of independent directors nationwide was quite small - a survey by 
the Shanghai Securities Exchange showed that only 0.3% of directors 
surveyed could be classified as "independent" ' (other sources suggest 
0.99%88 and 3%89) and another claimed that only 314 existed in the whole 
country.90 By the end of July 2004, 1382 out of 1386 listed companies 
had independent directors on the board (i.e., four companies still had no 
independent directors at all). There were 4559 independent directors in
86 See, for exam ple, the com m ents to this effect by Li Yining, the c h ie f  architect o f  the Securities Law, in Li Yining: 
Shangshi G ongsi Duli D ongshi Zhi Shang Nan Pahui Z uoyong (Li Yining: It Is Still D ifficult for the Listed 
Company Independent Director System  to Play Its Proper Role), CHINA N EW S AGENCY, June 12, 2001.. See  
also N i, J. (2001), Gongsi Zhili Jieguo: Falv Yu Shijian, (The Structure o f  corporate governance: Law and Practice ), 
(Falii Chubanshe), at 120-21.
87S ee M cGregor, R. China Plans N ew  Market Rules, FIN. TIM ES, Apr. 19, 2001, at 25; Ni,J. (2001), supra note 86. 
at 125.
88 See Touzizhe Repan Duli D ongshi (Investors Eagerly Look Forward to Independent Directors), X inm ing  
Wanbao (N ew  People's Evening N ew s), June 23. 2001, available at
http://wwvv.pcpa.com.cn/ch/com m unicate/].tem _content.asp?id=266
89 See, for exam ple, the figures cited in X ie C.B., Shangshi Gongsi Faren Zhili Jiegou Yu G udong Quanyi Baohu 
[The Corporate G overnance Structure o f  Listed Companies and the Protection o f  Shareholders' Rights] (Paper for 
21st Century Com mercial Law Forum, Tsinghua Univ., Beijing, N ov. 18, 2001).
90 See Duli D ongshi yu Duli Jianshi (Independent Directors and Independent Supervisors), Guangming Ribao 
(Enlightenm ent D aily). Sept. 18, 2001. Citing annual reports for the year 2000, another source puts the number at 
103. See Touzizhe Repan Duli Dongshi (Investors Eagerly Look Forward to Independent Directors), X inming  
Wanbao (New' P eople’s Evening N ew s), June 23, 2001,
98
total, yielding an average of just over three per company.91
3.7.3 Independent directors do not really have power
Independent directors are supposed to pay special attention to the 
interests of small and medium shareholders, but there is no mechanism to 
push them in this direction. The Independent Director Opinion seems to 
give special powers to independent directors by requiring that they 
constitute at least half of the members of a board's audit, nomination, and 
compensation committees.92 On the other hand, there is no 
requirement that these committees be established, so a company could 
keep inside director control over such matters by having them decided by 
the entire board.93
The independent directors apparently do not have the power to actually 
call a meeting of shareholders or the board; they have only the 
power to recommend to the board that such a meeting be called. The
91 See Duli D ongshi Zhidu Wanshan Zhi Lu Reng Manchang (The Road to Perfecting the Independent Director 
System  Is Stili Long), Shichang B ao (M ARK ET N E W S), Sept. 14. 2004, at 11, available at 
h ttp://finance.sina.coni.cn /roll/20040914/024010135.shtm l.
92 China Securities Regulatory C om m ission, Guanyu Zai Shangshi G ongsi Jianli Duli D ongshi Zhidu de Zhidao
Yijian (G uidance Opinion on the Establishment o f  an Independent Director System  in Listed C om panies) issued  
Aug. 16 ,2001  , 1.3
9-' A survey o f  listed com panies show ed that as o f  m id-M ay 2003, about h a lf had not established any o f  the board 
com m ittees on which independent directors have a special role under the Independent Director Opinion. See Jin 
X in Securities, Dui W oguo Shangshi Gongsi Duli Dongshi Zhidu Shishi Zhuangkuang de Fenxi j i Jianyi (A nalysis 
and Suggestions Concerning the Situation o f  Implementation o f  the Independent Director System  in China's Listed 
Com panies). Aug. S, 2003, at h ttp ://new sL jrj.com .cn/new s/2003-08-07/0000006l 8234.htm ].. The information 
contained in this report is based on a survey o f  69 listed com panies.
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powers listed above cannot be exercised by individual independent 
directors; their exercise must receive the consent of a majority94 of 
the independent directors as a body. More importantly, the only real force 
pushing strongly for independent directors seems to be the CSRC, whose 
authority over internal corporate governance matters has been questioned 
and which in any case has not required companies to give independent 
directors real power.9:> The Opinion does not actually confer these 
powers on independent directors. It calls on companies to confer these 
powers, presumably through provisions in their articles of incorporation 
or other internal rules. A company that does not do so may encounter 
pressure from the CSRC to make appropriate changes, but it would not be 
acting illegally in failing to do so.96
It is submitted that the early experience gathered by independent directors 
in China shows that the institution has long way to go before it can take 
an effective role in corporate governance. For instance, whilst the 
Independent Director Guidelines and the Code of Corporate Governance 
provide that independent directors shall not be related to the listed 
company’s management and major shareholder, interviews with 
independent directors have found that an overwhelming majority of
9.1 2001 Guidance Opinion on the Establishment o f  an Independent Director System  in Listed Com panies, CSRC,
5.1
9> Green, S. (2003). China's Stock Market: Eight myths and som e reasons to be optim istic, Royal Institute o f  
International Affairs and Cambridge University: 8-9.
96 See Jin Xin Securities (2003), supra note 93.
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independent directors are appointed by the largest shareholder, are 
relatively weak in appraising and supervising management, and are 
subject to interference by the largest shareholder and the management.97 
The Dean of the Changjiang School of Business, who serves as an 
independent director, was recently quoted as saying, "I have never 
thought that the independent director is the protector of medium and 
small shareholders; never think that. My job is first and foremost to 
protect the interests of the large shareholder, because the large 
shareholder is the state."98
Shi Xinghui’s interviews with 104 independent directors in 52 Chinese 
listed companies revealed the following empirical results.99 First, the 
Ability of the Independent Director to act as a Monitor of management is 
Low. Shi’s interviews showed that the average number of independent 
directors in a listed company is two, in contrast with the rest of the 
directors, who may number as many as 19. How can we expect two or 
three independent directors to stand up against the dominant
97 Lu, T. (2003), “D evelopm ent o f  the System  o f  Independent Directors and C hinese Experience”, Institute o f  
World E conom ics and Politics, Chinese A cadem y o f  Social Sciences, available at
http://o ld .iw ep .o rg.cn/ecca /pdf/D evelo pmcnt% 20of% 20Svstem % 20olTo20Iudcpcndent% 20Directors% 20and% 20t 
he%20Ch%A 1 % A D .p d f . A survey o f  the China Securities Daily show s that 67.5%  o f  the independent directors 
were nominated by the board o f  directors, w hile 27.5%  were directly nominate by the controlling shareholders, 
“Zhangguo Dudong D iaocha Ji Zhidu Fansi” ( “Survey on China’s Independent Directors and R eflections on the 
Institutions”), China Securities Daily, 28 July 2005, available online at 
http:// w m v.cs.com .cn/sylm /04/t20Q 50728 723933.htm .
98 X iang B ing, quoted in D uli D ongshi X iang Huaping? (Are Independent Directors Just Decorative?), Gang-ao  
Xinxi Ribao (I long K ong-M aCao N ew s Daily), Jan. I. 2003, available at http://ww w.chinainfobank.com .
99 Shi, X. (2001). "Wei Duli Dongshi D iaocha Fenxi Tamen Shi Shei? (An Investigation and Analysis o f  104
Independent Directors: W ho Are They?)." Zhongguo G ive Jia (The C hinese Entrepreneur) 7: 17.
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shareholder’s nominees who comprise the majority of the board? They 
are simply outnumbered.100
In another report by the Financial Times, it was found that independent 
directors of at least three listed firms were forced to resign after 
challenging management decisions, including requesting an audit of one’s 
company’s account. 101 Again, Shi’s interviews102 found that independent 
directors are generally old in age, with 30.7% of them in their sixties. In 
terms of their professional capabilities, 42.6% are technical experts, 
22.8% are economists, 47.6% are college teachers or researchers, 15.5% 
are government functionaries and only 22.3% are entrepreneurs. A CSRC 
study in 2002 found a similar number, with accountants, lawyers, and 
other intermediaries making up another 30%. Only 10% were executives 
from other companies.10’ A more recent study based on a random sample 
of 500 listed companies found that 45% of independent directors were 
university professors or researchers from institutes, similar to the figure 
in previous studies. Other (presumably industrial) companies were the 
source for 28% of the independent directors, while lawyers, accountants,
100 Shen, S. B. and J. Jia (2005). "Will the Independent Director Institution Work in China?" L oyola o f  L os A ngeles  
International and Comparative Law R eview  27,: 223.
101 “Director Loses Seat for Hiring Auditor” Financial Tim es, 18 August 2004.
10:7 Shi, X . (2001), supra note 99.
103 See Du D ong Duiwu Jisu Kuorong (Ranks o f  Independent Directors Q uickly Enlarged), Zhengquan Shibao 
(Securities Tim es), March 2003. A 2003 study put the number o f  professors at 39%; this is not necessarily  
inconsistent with the other studies, since the category "professors" may have been more narrowly defined than the 
category "professors and technical specialists." See Jin Xin Securities (2003), supra note 93.
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and other service industry professionals accounted for 14%.104
These data are disturbing as they confirm that independent directors in 
China cannot act as a counterbalance to the rest of the board. Independent 
directors cannot be expected to detect dishonesty hidden in the neat and 
professionally turned-out documents presented to him for board meetings, 
assuming he gets invited to the board meetings.105 In some cases, the 
listed firm withheld negative information from the independent directors, 
and even refused to invite them to board meetings.106
3.7.4 Independent directors do not have the financial incentive
There is no financial incentive to act impartially and professionally as an 
independent director. Evidenced by a survey of the China Securities Daily, 
which revealed that 52.5% of independent directors had their 
remuneration determined by the company’s “senior managers” whilst 
37.5% had theirs determined by the company’s controlling 
shareholders.107 So how can one expect the independent directors to be 
independent when their remuneration is decided by the very people they
11)4 See, Yue Q ingtang (2004), Dui 500 Jia Shangshi G ongsi Duli D ongshi N ianling Zhuanye D eng G oucheng de 
Shizheng Yanjiu (An Empirical Study o f  the A ge and Occupational Com position o f  the Independent Directors in 
500 Listed C om panies), Jingjijie (ECON. World), N o. 2, at 86-88.
105 Shen. S. B . and J. Jia (2005). Supra note 100.
106 Green, S. and J. Mo (2004). "Old Stocks, New  Owners: Two Cases o f  Ownership Change in China's Stock 
Market." Journal o f  C hinese Econoinic and B usiness Studies.
107 Lu. T. (20031. supra note 97.
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are supposed to monitor?108 The remuneration of independent directors in 
China is not linked to the performance of the director or the company, and 
is not high by Western standards.
One study reports annual director fees in the range of 5000 to 12,000 
yuan.109 This is between US$730 and $1,700 at current exchange rates. In 
view of other studies, however, this figure seems low. The recent study is 
based on data from the annual reports for 2002 of 81 listed companies 
that had independent directors since at least 2000.110 The authors found 
that over half the companies paid less than 30,000 annually to each 
independent director.
In 2002, Lu JIahao, an independent director of Zhengbaiwen, was fined 
RMB 100,000 by the CSRS for failing to take action when the company 
submitted a false accounting report. Lu subsequently sued the CSRS for 
this decision, but the No 1 Intermediate People’s Court of Beijing 
dismissed the lawsuit. Lu was the first independent director punished in 
China and his situation was deserving of sympathy. He was a retired 
professor with a monthly income of only RMB 1,500 (US$181) and he
108 Shen, S .B . and J.Jia (2005), supra note 100.
i0<> Wu, J. et al., Duli D ongshi Zenm e Yangle— Shangshi Gongsi Tuixing Duli D ongshi Zhidu Xianzhuang Diaoyan  
Fenxi (H ow  Are Independent Directors D oing? An Investigation and A nalysis o f  the Current Situation in the 
Im plem entation by Listed Com panies o f  the Independent Director System ), Zhengquan Shibao (Securities Tim es) 
Jan. 10, 2002.
110 See Luo Pinliang (2004) et al., Duli Dongshi Zhidu yu Gongsi Yeji de Xiangguanxing Feaxi: Laizi Hushi A-Gu  
D e Shizheng Yanjiu (An A nalysis o f  the Relationship Between Independent Directors and Corporate Performance: 
An Empirical Study o f  A-share Performance in the Shanghai Stock Market), Shanghai Guanli K exue (Shanghai 
MGMT. SCI. ), N o .T , at 20-23.
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received no compensation from Zhengbaiwen for the directorship. 
Immediately after the incident, at least 66 independent directors resigned 
from listed companies.111
Gao and Ma examined all 1151 reporting companies on the two Chinese 
exchanges (yielding an effective sample of 1018 companies), 83 of which 
had appointed independent directors in the previous three years.112 They 
found no support for the hypotheses that (a) there is a clear difference in 
performance between companies with independent directors and those 
without, or that (b) there is a positive correlation between percentage of 
independent directors on the board and corporate performance.11'5 Indeed, 
the introduction of the independent director to China has many 
similarities noted by Lawton in relation its introduction to Hong Kong.114
1 would submit that there are deeper reasons for the apparent failure of 
the institution of the Independent Non-executive Director in China. These 
reasons are to a degree also applicable in their countries of origin, but in 
the Chinese context are even culturally stronger. As Brudney pointed out
111 Shen,S .B . and Jjia (2005), supra note 100.
112 Gao, M. and S. M a (2002). "Duli D ongshi Zhidu yu G ongsi Jixiao Guanxi de Shizheng Fenxi (A n Empirical 
A nalysis o f  the Relationship Betw een the Independent Director System  and Corporate Results)." Nankai Jingji 
Yaniiu (Nankai U niversity Econom ic Studies) 2: at 64-68.
113 Ibid.
114 Lawton P, (1995), "Directors’ Remuneration, Benefits and Extractions, an A nalysis o f  their uses, A buses and 
Controls in the Corporate Governance Context o f  Hong Kong " Australian Journal o f  Corporate Law  4, 430  at452- 
455; Lawton, P (1 9 9 6 ),"  Berle and M eans, Corporate Governance and the C hinese Fam ily Firm " Australian 
Journal o f  Corporate Law 6, 348 at 365-368. The large number o f  independent directors who are professionals 
rather than executives o f  other com panies and the large number o f  friends and contacts w ho were appointed in the 
early stages is similar. A lso  the im plications for director interlocks are similar.
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as long ago as 1982:
“The institutionally generated disinclination to hold colleagues at 
arm’s length is furthered by other psychological and social 
considerations. Besides pressure to follow the leader in the boardroom 
along lines described in the learning on small group dynamics, other 
factors make independent directors particularly apt to view 
management’s demands congenially. If they are not themselves 
corporate executives, independent directors tend, nevertheless, to 
share common business and professional backgrounds with, and to 
live in the same social and economic milieu as does, management.”113
Similar findings in other jurisdictions supported this view of independent 
directors’ tendency to support management.116 More recently, Morck117 
has pointed to the role of misplaced loyalty at the heart of every recent 
corporate scandal emphasising that, according to much work in empirical 
social psychology, loyalty is emotionally hardwired into human behavior. 
He refers, inter alia to the work of Milgram evidencing that an individual 
will suppress internal ethical standards quite readily if these conflict with 
loyalty to an authority figure such as a misguided or errant CEO.
115 Brudney. V. (1982). "The Independent Director - Heavenly City or Potemkin Village." Harvard Law R eview  
95(3): 633 .'
116 See for exam ple, Udeni. II. (1997). "Power D im ensions in the Board and Outside Director Independence: 
Evidence from Large Industrial UK  Firms." Corporate Governance: An International R eview  7 (6 2 ).;  Tom asic, R. 
and S. B ottom ley (1993). D irecting the Top 500: C orporate Governance and Accountibilitv in Australian St 
Leonards. NSW, Australia : A llen & Unwin, at 17.
117 Morck. R. (2008). "Behavioral finance in corporate governance: econom ics and ethics o f  the devil's advocate." 
Journal o f  M anagem ent and Governance 12: 179-200.
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However, according to Milgram, dissenting peers and rival authorities
undermine a subject’s loyalty, stimulating independent moral
1 18reasoning.
Recent corporate governance reforms in the UK and the USA have sought 
to weaken this innate but errant response of loyalty in order to render 
corporate governance disasters less common. Along these lines the 
Sarbanes Oxley reforms in the USA require that boards of directors 
contain sufficient independent directors to staff key board committees, 
whilst the Higgs proposals in the UK recommended that listed companies 
have non-executive chairs and senior independent directors thereby 
providing for alternative authority figures on the board. These 
requirements were incorporated into the Combined Code in 2006.119 
China has not yet gone so far in relation to these types of proposals. Nor 
is China likely to do so for the foreseeable future. There are a number of 
political and cultural reasons why this is unlikely.
The first reason is the very hierarchical nature of Chinese authority 
structures, particularly within government bureaucracies at both local and 
central government level and within certain government agencies such as
118 M ilgram, S. (1963). "Bchavioral-Study o f  Obedience." Journal o f  Abnormal Psychology 67(4): 371-378.; 
M ilgram. S. (1974). O bedience to authority: an experimental v iew . London: Tavistock Publications.
119 See H iggs, D. (2003) Review  o f  the role and effectiveness o f  non-executive directors
(The H igss Report) (DTI). These recommendations were included in the Com bined Code 2006, at A .3.2 and A .3.3.
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the State Assets Management Bureau and the Ministry of Finance 
(Enterprise Division). This is in turn reflected in many corporate 
structures. Both those which are corporatized SOEs and most 
corporations within the private business sector are similar in this respect 
due to the usually patriarchal/patrimonial (less commonly matriarchal) 
authoritarian nature of the organisation. 120 Hamilton has contrasted 
western and Chinese society from the perspective of patriarchy, 
patrimonialism and filial piety. Building on Feo Xiatung’s work121 by 
using his metaphors to explain the distinctive patterning in each society 
Hamilton takes the view that Western individuals fall under specific and 
distinct jurisdictions from the club, office or division of a corporation all
the way up to the level of the State and take their rights and duties
1 0 0accordingly. “ In the context of Chinese society there are rarely clear 
social units and ambiguity is common. The metaphor used for Chinese 
society is that of concentric rings flowing out from the centre when a 
stone is thrown into a pond. In this contextual setting a Chinese person 
stands at the centre of the circles produced by his or her own social 
influence. The kinship rings are the closest to the centre and they are
120 There are a number o f  studies indicating this, see for exam ple Hui Y W, (1999), A  Study o f  Authority and 
R elations in Chinese Governm ental A gen cies and Institutional Work Units: N eo  Patrim onilasim  in Urban Work 
Units NY, Edwin M eller Press Ltd. Empirically exam ining issues o f  authority and human relations in Chinese 
G overnm ent organizations and other work units by tracing their developm ent before and after M ao’s era this work 
strongly indicates that the quasi charismatic patterns o f  authority under Mao have given way to more traditional 
patrimonial relationships at the micro level. However, CCP domination continues to prevail politically  at the macro 
level.
1:1 Fei Xiatung, (1986) X ianetu Z/iomnmo  (Rural China) (H ong Kong, Joint Publishing Co) Chs 4 and 5.
122 Hamilton, G. G. (1990). "Patriarchy. Patrimonialism. and Filial Piety - a Comparison o f  China and Western- 
Europe." British Journal o f  Socio logy  41(1): 77-104.
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many and varied but they do not take precedence over more distant 
relationships. Everyone’s circle of influences or circles of relationships 
are interrelated but no one person has exactly the same set. Nevertheless, 
they are ranked and the duties for each relationship are publicly known 
and to some extent codified. According to Fei, individuals calculate their 
actions by knowing with whom they are dealing and knowing the 
relationship that prevails rather that being aware of where those 
relationships fit organizationally. These patterns of behaviour persist and 
are often mirrored at board level in Chinese enterprises. The independent 
director, in the Chinese context, has to operate within them and therefore 
is arguably even more likely to be sympathetic to management proposals
I ^  ^than his Western counterpart. In the light of the above discussion 
CampbelTs call for an ethical framework for cooperation within a 
company may not be that effective without both alternate authority 
figures and directors who are prepared to dissent within the board, even if 
those ethical codes/frameworks have been strongly internalized by board 
members.124
123 For a d iscussion o f  thses factors in the context o f  corporate governance see Lawton P, (1996), "Berle and M eans, 
Corporate Governance and the Chinese Fam ily Firm" Australian Journal o f  Corporate Law  6(3), 348-379.
124 Cam pbell D , (1 9 9 7 ),"  The R ole o f  M onitoring and M orality in Com pany Law: A  Criticism  o f  the Direction o f
Present Regulation" Australian Journal o f  Corporate Law 7, 343-365 at 362; see also Campbell D, (1997),




3.8.1 Duties of directors in the United Kingdom
The general duties of directors are reinforced by specific statutory duties 
spelt out in Pt 10 Ch.2 of the Companies Act 2006. In addition to 
codifying the case law on directors’ duties, these provisions replace 
complicated provisions under the 1985 Act, many of which were 
introduced as a result of financial scandals. 12~ In addition to duties of care 
and skill at common law126, the important fiduciary duties, derived from 
principles of equity as applied to directors include a n umber of important 
principles or rules of law requiring directors to act in good faith. 
Therefore, a director must exercise his powers entrusted to him under the 
company’s constitution for their proper purpose and in good faith for the
i onbenefit of the company as a whole . He must act within his powers. A
I2> Craig, R. (2008). " The enorm ous turnip: a discussion on the com panies act 2006  which like in the child's fairy 
tale is still grow ing " The Com pany Lawyer 29(12): 361.
For a long tim e these w ere subjective in nature taking into account the skills and experience o f  the particular 
director or directors concerned, see for exam ple D o vey  v C ory  11901] AC 477; Re Brazilian Rubber Plantation & 
E sta tes L td  [1911] 1 Ch 425; R e C ity  E quitable Eire Insurance Co  119.35 ] Ch 407; D orchester E im ince  v Stebbing  
[1989] BCLC 498. Breach o f  the duty o f  care and skill was alw ays ratifiable until recently unless the directors 
benefitted at the expense o f  the com pany from their breach o f  duty, see P avlides v Jensen  [1956] Ch 565; 
M ultinational G as L id  v M ultinational G as & P etrochem ical Services L td  [ 1983] Ch 258 and D an iels  v D aniels 
11978] Ch 406. More recently the courts have tended to take a more objective approach to the standard o f  care, see  
N orm an  v Theodore G oddard  [ 1991] BCLC 1028. This has been influenced by the com bined subjective and 
objective test for wrongful trading in the insolvency Act 1986, s 214. Poor m anagement is a normal risk o f  
investm ent and may not g ive rise to an action for unfairly predujicial conduct, Re E lgindata L td  [1991] BCLC 
1028, though a repeated course o f  poor actions amounting to specific negligence may do so, see Re M acro 
(Ipswich) L td  [ 1994] 1 All ER 242. The Companies Act 2006. s 260 (3 ) now allow s a derivative action to be 
brought for negligence. The duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and d iligence is now  contained in Com panies 
A ct 2006, s i 74.
1:7 See for exam ple, Re Smith & E aw cett L td  [ 1942] Ch 304; Punt v Sym ons & Co L td  [1903] 2 Ch 506; P iercy  v S  
M ills & Co L td  [ 1920] 1 Ch 77; H ogg  v Cram phorn  [ 1966] 3 All F.R 420; H ow ard  Smith v A m phol L td  11974] AC  
821. The duty o f  directors to act wi thin their powers is now- contained in Com panies A ct 2006, s 171. O f
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director must not take into account irrelevant factors but rather he must 
act in the interests of the class of shareholders taken as a whole and he 
must not fetter his discretion128. To fulfil his fiduciary duties a director 
must not allow his duty to the company and personal interests to conflict. 
He must not be in a position of conflict of interest or duty. Secret profits 
or otherwise unauthorized profits are not allowed. If a director is in a 
position of conflict of interest and/or duty he must make disclosure129. 
Whilst a company’s articles may waive duties, the duty to disclose is 
reinforced by statutory provisions and the company’s articles of 
association.130 In effect the duty to disclose a conflict of interest cannot be 
waived. Failure to disclose a conflict of interest or duty renders any 
affected contract voidable and any profit made is to be accounted for to
i  n  I
the company and may be held on constructive trust ’ . Directors’ duties 
may be enforced by the company, though often the company may be 
under the control of the wrongdoing directors in which case the law
I T?provides for remedies for minority shareholders ' ~ . These will be
significant importance is the statement o f  directors' duty to promote the success o f  the com pany which lists a w ide 
range o f  factors which directors ought to take into account in promoting the success o f  the com pany for the benefit 
o f  the members as a w hole contained in section 172.
1:8 See Selangor  v C raddock  N o  3 [1 968] 1 WLR 1555; Thor by  v G oldberg  ( 1964) 112 CLR 597; Fulham  F ootba ll 
C lub  v C obra  E sta tes p ic  [ 1994 j 1 BCLC 363. The duty to exercise independent judgm ent is now contained in 
Com panies Act 2006 , s 173.
129 See A berdeen  R a ilw ay  v B laikie B rothers f 1854) 1 Macq 461, HL; B oston  D eep  Sea F ish ing C o L td  v A nsell 
[1986] A ll ER Rep 65; M ovitex Ltd v B ullfield [1988] BC LC 104. The statutory requirement to make full 
disclosure is now  contained in Com panies Act 2006, ss 177.
130 See Com panies A c t  s 177 supra and see also Guiness v Saunders [1988] BCLC 607, CA; [1990] BCLC 402. 
Standard Articles o f  A ssociation usually make waiver o f  the civil rem edies subject to
disclosure.
ut Com panies A ct 2006 , s 178 maintains the com m on law  principles o f  the civ il consequences o f  a failure to make 
full disclosure, see also cases menlrioned in ftn 142 ante.
i3' See the statutory derivative action contained in Com panies Act 2006  ss 260 -  264 and unfairly prejudicial 
conduct contained in ss 994-999.
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discussed in a later chapter11'. However, the duties of directors provide an 
important set of standards for directors and are replicated throughout the 
various jurisdictions of the common law world which have increasingly 
codified these duties in their company law legislation. Some problems do 
remain, particularly the potential conflict of interest of nominee directors. 
The often divergent norms of the law and commercial reality in this 
context have caused problems for the codification of duties of nominee 
directors1'54.
There are a number of views concerning the efficacy of fiduciary duties. 
Many economists argue that the role of fiduciary duties should vary 
across the type of organizational form. Therefore, in the context of the 
closely held firm stricter fiduciary duties are justified in light of their 
organizational characteristics to prevent or cure opportunistic behavior as 
many case law examples show135. There is a continuing debate on this 
subject. Some commentators defend and develop this approach in the 
context of closely held corporations. Others argue that even in closely
|JJ See chapter 5 post.
04 For a discussion o f  this problem, see Salim. M. R. and T. T. Yong (2008). "Market freedom or sharehiolder 
protection? A com parative analysis o f  the duties o f  nom inee directors." International Journal o f  Law and 
M anagem ent 50: 168-188.; See also Boros, E. (1989). "The duties o f  nom inee and m ultiple directors Part 1." The 
Company Lawyer 10(11): 2 1 1 -2 1 9 .;  Boros, E. (1990). "The duties o f  nom inee and m ultiple directors Part 2." The 
Company Law yer: 6 -1 0 .;  Crutchfield, C. (1991). "Nominee directors: the law and com m ercial reality." The 
Com pany Lawyer 12(7): 1 3 6 .; Redmond, P. (1987). "Nominee Directors." University o f  N ew  South Wales Law  
Journal 10(194).
05 Dickerson, C. M. (1997). "Cycles and Pendulums; Good Faith, N orm s and the Commons." W ashington and Lee
Law R eview  54. ; Dickerson C M, (2004), "Bracketed Flexibility: Standards o f  Performance Level the Playing
Field" in MeCahery, J.. M. J. G. C. Raaijmakers, et al. (2004). The governance o f  close corporations and
held firms strict fiduciary duties are counter- productive in encouraging 
over monitoring at the expense of production136. Agency theorist even 
claim that there is no moral basis for fiduciary duties and that they are 
simply an element of contractual tailoring of obligations allowing parties 
to waive fiduciary duties and allow them to signal their governance
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preferences ' . This is, in reality a common practice subject to the 
limitations concerning disclosure mentioned above. Waiver is different to 
a right to ‘opt out’ which is increasingly the case in some jurisdictions1'58. 
This is arguably leading to an erosion of the underlying principles of 
fiduciary duties and could lead to a norm change in the long run. 
However, agency theory (and the nexus of contracts approach which 
agency theory embodies) has been heavily criticized in this respect.
According to Campbell all that agency theory amounts to is a nexus of
1 ->{\
metaphors rather than any real nexus of contracts .
In the United Kingdom, the main function of the board is to be 
responsible for the strategy and management of the company. In general,
,3t' See, for exam ple, R ibstein, L. E. (1995). "Limited Liability and Theories o f  the Corporation." Maryland Law  
R eview  5 0 (8 0 ).;  'I alley, E. (1999). " Taking the T  Out of'Team ': Intra-Firm M onitoring and the Content o f  
Fiduciary Duties." Journal o f  Corporation Law 24.
w  See Easterbrook, F. H. and D. R. Fischel (1993). "Contract and Fiduciary Duty'." Journal o f  Law  & Econom ics 
36(1): 425-446.
Bfi See for exam ple, Mance, J. (2001). "Forecasting the Future: An A ssessm ent o f  the N ew  Delaware General 
Corporations Law, Section 122 (1 7)." Journal o f  Corporate Law Studies 1(2): 449. This provision enables 
corporations to renounce, in advance, any interest or expectancy the corporation may have in specified  business 
opportunities or specified  classes o f  opportunities that com e to the corporation or its officers, directors or 
shareholders. In M ance's v iew  this represents a sensible com prom ise between freedom o f  contract and mandatory 
rules.
139 Cam pbell, D. (1997). "The Role o f  M onitoring and Morality in Company Law: A Criticism o f  the Direction o f  
Present Regulation." Australian Journal o f  Corporate Law' 17: 343-365.
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it is also responsible for overseeing the company's operations including 
ensuring an adequate system of internal control, competent management 
team, and compliance with statutory and legal requirements.140
The Companies Act 2006 is a UK-wide piece of legislation. The 1985 
legislation and Companies (NI) Order 1989 has been changed in order to 
meet four key objectives:
• to enhance shareholder engagement and a long-term investment 
culture;
• to ensure better regulation and a "Think Small First" approach as 
mentioned earlier;
• to make it easier to establish and manage a company;
• to provide flexibility for the future.
The Companies Act 2006 is not complete. It will be supplemented by a 
series of Regulations using powers given to the Secretary of State in 
certain parts of the Act. It will therefore be supplemented by 
Commencement Orders which bring the Act into force.141
140 Important sections o f  the 2006  Act relating to directors' duties are noted. S 171 A director o f  a com pany must (a) 
act in accordance with the com pany's constitution, and (b) only exercise powers for the purpose for which they are 
conferred." Section 172: Duty' to promote the success o f  the com pany. Section 173: Duty to exercise independent 
judgm ent. Section 174: Duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence. Section 175: Duty to avoid conflicts  
o f  interest. Section 176: Duty not to accept benefits from third parties. Section 177: Duty to declare interest in 
proposed transactions or arrangements with the company.
141 Craig, R. (2008), Supra note 125.
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3.8.2 Duties of the directors in China: the law on paper
China did not start developing a range of directors’ duties until the early 
1990s. Prior to 1990, there was little codification to regulate corporate 
directors and managers. In 1994, the first company code of the People’s 
Republic of China - the Company Law - was introduced. The Company 
Law 1994 incorporated many principles and practices of both Anglo- 
American systems and civil law systems.142 With the promulgation of the 
Chinese Company Law 1994 ("the CCL 1994”), the legal underpinning 
for the concept of directors' duties was put into place.143 Although the 
words "fiduciary duties” were not clearly expressed, certain concepts akin 
to these duties manifested themselves in the context of the CCL 1994.144
The new People's Republic of China (PRC) Company Law (Company 
Law), which was adopted at the 18th meeting of Standing Committee of 
the Tenth National People's Congress on October 27, 2005, came into 
force on January 1, 2006. The new Company La w of the PRC is good in
142 One exam ple is that it adopts a two-tier board system  on the one hand, and requires listed com panies to have 
independent executive directors on the other. See Company Law o f  the People's Republic o f  China 1994 ss.52 , 71, 
118 and 123
143 Yang, J. Z. (2006). "The role o f  shareholders in enforcing director's duties: A  com parative studyf o f  the UK  and 
China: Part 1 International com pany and commercial law- review  17( 11): 318.
144 For exam ple. Art.59 o f  the CCL 1994 states that the directors, supervisors and managers shall abide by the 
com pany's articles o f  association, faithfully perform their duties and protect the interests o f  the com pany and shall 
not take advantage o f  their position, functions and powers in the com pany to seek  personal gains which is akin to a 
fiduciary duty o f  loyalty under com m on law. Under this provision, it seem s that directors, supervisors and general 
managers should act in a bona fide and diligent way in the interests o f  the company. H owever, the words "faithful" 
and "the interests o f  the company" em ployed in the context o f  the Art.59 o f  the CCL 1994 have not been clearly 
defined, so that they are not w ell understood by either the directors or shareholders.
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theory and brings some encouraging changes, but how it will be put into 
practice is another matter.145
I No-conflict rule
Article 61 of the CCL 1994 provides a mandatory context which regulates 
two distinct factual situations in which conflicts of duty and interests are 
likely to arise. First, directors and managers are prohibited from engaging 
in their own business or operating business for others in the same 
business category as the company which they are serving, or engaging in 
any acts which may damage the interests and benefits of the company, 
and any profits derived from such acts will be appropriated by the
146company.
Secondly, directors and managers are prohibited from entering into 
contracts or conducting transactions with the company unless they are 
authorised by the articles of association or approved by the shareholders’
147meeting.
145 Krause, N . and C. Qin (2007). "An overview  o f  China's new  Com pany Law." The Com pany Lawyer 28(10): 
316-320.
14^  Art.61 o f  the CCL 1994.
14' Ibid., para.2.
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In order to ensure that directors are precluded from entering into 
engagements in which they have, or can have, a personal interest 
conflicting, or which may conflict, with the interests of the company they 
serve, the Directive 1997 further provides that:
"[EJxcept as permitted by the articles of association or legally 
authorized by the board of directors, a director may not act on behalf 
of the company or the board of directors in his own name. If a third 
party reasonably believes that a director, who is acting in his own 
name, is acting on behalf of the company or the board of directors, 
such a director must clarify his position and status in advance”.148
In addition, if a director or an enterprise in which he/she assumes a 
position is interested, directly or indirectly, in any existing or proposed 
transaction, contract or arrangement of the company (other than a service 
contract), such a director must disclose his/her interests to the board of 
directors at the earliest opportunity. The interested director may not be 
counted in the quorum for or vote at the board meeting with respect to 
such matters. A related party transaction approved by the board of 
directors in violation of the above requirements may be avoided at the 
option of the company, unless the transaction is entered into between the 
company and a third party acting in good faith.149
14S Para. 1 o f  Art.62 o f  the CCL 1994.
149 Art.83 o f  the D irective 1997.
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II Duty of care, skill and diligence
In China, the absence of the duty of care, skill and diligence of company 
directors is the weakest portion of the CCL 1994. The Directive 1997 
clarified that directors must exercise their powers given by the company 
with care, conscientiousness and diligence1''0 so as to ensure that: (1) the 
company's business activities comply with state laws, regulations and 
economic policies and do not exceed the business scope stipulated by its 
business licence;151 (2) directors treat all shareholders fairly;132 (3) 
directors read all commercial or financial reports of the company 
carefully and timely acquaint themselves with the business operation and 
management of the company; " (4) a director personally exercises the 
lawful powers to manage the company free from the control of others and 
shall not delegate his powers to others, except as permitted by laws, 
regulations or approved by informed shareholders in a shareholders' 
meeting;154 and (5) directors accept the lawful supervision and reasonable 
suggestions on their performance of their duties provided by the 
supervisory committee.155 In addition, Art.85 of the Directive 1997 
provides that a director who fails to attend two successive board meetings, 
whether in person or through delegating his duties to others, is deemed
150 Art. 8 1 o f  the D irective 1997.
151 Ibid, Art.81 (1)
152 Ibid, A rt.81(2) .
153 Ibid, A rt.81(3)
154 Ibid, A rt.81 (4) .
155 Ibid, A rt.81(5)
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incapable of performing his duties and the board of directors shall 
propose to the shareholders’ meeting to remove that director.156
3.8.3 Duties of directors in China: the law in practice
These strict rules seem to function against any director and manager who 
might misuse his or her power in a particular situation mentioned above. 
However, good law does not guarantee good practice. This provision is 
difficult to enforce because most listed companies in China are controlled 
by the majority or controlling shareholders.157
I The largest shareholder is the state
The China Corporate Governance Report 2003 presented the picture of 
ownership concentration in China’s listed SOEs: “Data in the 2002 annual 
reports of 734 companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(released as of June 20, 2003) suggests that, in the end of 2002, in 40.9% 
of all the companies (a total of 300 companies), the largest shareholders 
owned more than 50% of total shares... On average, in all 734 companies, 
each largest shareholder possessed 44.3% of its company’s shares.”1''8
156 Ibid, Art.85
157 Yang. J. Z. (2007). "The Shareholder M eeting and Voting Rights in China: Som e Empirical Evidence."  
International Company and Commercial Law R eview  18(1): 4-16.
l' 8 Z hongguo Gotigsi Zhili Baogao 2003 (China Corporate Governance Report 2003), Shanghai Stock Exchange 
Research Center, April 2003, at 46 (Shanghai, Fudan University Press) (hereinafter China Corporate Governance
1 1 9
The largest shareholder normally refers to the Chinese state, suggesting a 
state dominance of shareholding in listed SOEs. The high concentration 
of ownership is closely related to the control of the board of directors, 
which is regarded as the critical link between ownership and corporate
159governance. " For example, in some cases, listing companies and the 
controlling shareholder are often in the same business sector so that it is 
common for the controlling shareholder to take advantage of its 
privileged position to gain additional benefit through distributing 
products, supplying raw materials, sharing resources or other related 
business transactions.160 In some cases, the listed companies help their 
controlling shareholders to gain additional benefit by offering loan 
guarantees or by leasing the controlling shareholder’s facilities at a high 
price.161 Some listed companies are said to have become like "ATMs” of 
the controlling shareholders.162
Report 2003).
159 Green, S. (2003). The Econom ist China's stockm arket: a guide to progress, players and prospects. London, 
Profile.
160 The associated trading betw een listed com panies and large shareholders is popular in China. Statistics show  that 
nearly 40  per cent o f  listed com panies have associated trading with the top 10 large shareholders in sales, 
procurement, providing services, acquirement or leasing assets. Ma. J. (1997) "China's Econom ic Reform in the 
1990s," available at w w w.m em bers.aol.com /junm anew/chp5.htm .
u’' For exam ple, in N ovem ber 2003, X injiang Hops, a barley and beer firm, announced that it had m ade guarantees 
worth RMB 1.8 billion ($216  m illion) in loans to related parties. The lin n ’s assets only total R M B 600 million  
($72.3 m illion). See Green, S. (2004), "Enterprise Reform & Stock Market D evelopm ent in Mainland China 
Special" D eutsche Bank Research, March 25. An investigation by the CSRC found that about 20 per cent o f  listed 
com panies provide guarantees for the controlling shareholders and associated parties, see Ma, J. (1997), supra note 
160.
162 Tong. D. (2006), "Current Conditions, Problem o f  Listed com panies and How to Exercise Regulation: 
Positioning o f  the R esponsibilities o f  Regulatory Department and Regulatory Measures, in Corporate Governance 
Reform: China and the World.” Available at www.cipe.org/china/cg_book__ toe.htm.
120
II The relationship between the state and SOE managers
The state, in the name of the people, is supposed to be the owner of all 
state property including SOEs of all sizes. The State Council is usually 
held to be the ultimate state organ holding state property. When an SOE is 
listed, the local office of the Bureau of State Asset management (BSAM) 
or its local subsidiaries, called state asset management companies 
(SAMs), act as the largest shareholder. The chairman of the board of 
directors is usually a representative from the BSAM. In consultation with
the board, the chairman nominates the managers of the listed SOE and
1oversees the management. "5
The research by Chen, Fan and Wong finds that in China, politicians and 
state controlling owners occupy most board seats. They report that almost 
50% of the directors are appointed by state controlling owners, and 
another 30% are affiliated with various layers of governmental 
agencies.There are few professionals (lawyers, accountants, finance 
experts) on Chinese boards and almost no representative of minority 
shareholders.164
This has led one writer to express the view that corporatisation of SOEs
163 ibid.
164 Chen, D .-H ., J. Fan, et al. (2004). Political Connected CEOs. Corporate Governance and Post-IPO Performance 
o f  China's Partially Privatized Firms, Chinese U niversity o t H ong Kong.
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in China is “nothing different but the logo” 165 Studies have shown why 
BSAM officials are poor monitors of the listed SOE. First, BSAM 
officials are civil servants whose pay is not tied to the performance of the 
companies they oversee. Thus there is no incentive to increase the value 
of the listed SOE. Secondly, their bosses are the local governments, and 
again this causes them to align their interests with the local government, 
whose political interests may be to preserve employment rather than 
increase the efficiency of listed SOEs. The patrimonialism of many work 
unit relationships already referred to also plays an important role in this 
regard. 166 Thirdly, they are not industry experts who know which 
decisions made by the management are value-enhancing and which are 
not. In addition, they have to oversee hundreds of companies in which the 
state has an interest, not to mention that it is also difficult to improve the 
value by raising more capital through a rights issue as this will often be 
met with opposition from the BSAM because this would dilute state 
control.167
Thus, the current Chinese situation is that the state is the major 
shareholder in the highly concentrated ownership pattern from the
165 H uchet, J. F. and Richet, X .(1999), "China in search o f  an Efficient Corporate Governance System: 
international Com parisons and Lessons", Center for Econom ic Reform and Transformation, Heriot-Watt university, 
Edinburgh, discussion paper N o 99/01; Xu, X. N. and Wang, Y .(1997) "Ownership structure, corporate governance 
and Firms” Performance: The Case o f  Chinese Stock Companies", The World bank Econom ic D evelopm ent 
institute, p olicy  Research W orking Paper N o  1794.
166 M iles, L. and Z. Zhong (2006). "Improving coiporate governance in state-ow ned corporations in China which  
way forward." Journal o f  corporate law studies: 229.
167 Xu. L. X. C. L., T. Zhu, et al. (2005). "Politician control, agency problems and ownership reform - Evidence 
from China." E conom ics o f  Transition 13(1): 1-24.
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country’s partial privatization. However, despite its majority ownership, 
the state does not exercise effective control over their companies.168
Ill The securities law and company law leaves much to be desired
There is no doubt that China has decided to encourage shareholders to use 
the statutory derivative action to improve the enforcement of directors' 
duties. But the main problem is the lack of an effective mechanism for 
shareholders to bring an action against directors for wrongdoing. For 
example, Liu points out that: "to make directors and managers 
accountable to the corporation and its stakeholders, it is urgent to deal 
with the loopholes in current legislation and enforce the responsibility of 
the directors and managers through various means, in particular the 
shareholders' derivative actions".169 Lee argues that the lack of express 
remedies for the aggrieved shareholders in the Securities Law creates 
unnecessary ambiguity and confusion which is wholly inconsistent with
170other statutory remedies in Chinese law.
The Securities Law and company law leaves many gaps. It does not 
provide sufficient remedies to compensate securities investors, and does
168 Tam, O. K. (2002). "Ethical issues in the evolution o f  corporate governance in China." Journal o f  Business  
Ethics 37(3): 305.
169 Liu, J. (A ugust 1999) "Legal Reform s in China", D iscussion  Papers on D evelopm ent P olicy  13, Centre o f  
D evelopm ent o f  Research, Bonn.
170 Lee, S. M. (2001). "The Developm ent o f  China's Securities Regulatory Framework and the Insider Trading 
Provisions o f  the N ew  Securities Law." N ew  York International Law R eview  14(1).
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not have sufficient regulation over securities companies and 
intermediaries. As a result, the CSRC, the Supreme Court and other 
authorities have introduced piecemeal legal documents to fill the gaps in 
the law. Supplementary regulations and provisional rules have been 
enacted to deal with some practical issues that are not stipulated in the 
major laws. Currently, securities activities are regulated by about 250 
laws, regulations, standards and Supreme Court decrees.171
However, there is a lack of co-ordination and integration between these 
various enactments. This has typically reflected in the remedial aspects 
relating to securities market misconduct. Before 2002, there was not a 
single case where a victim of market misconduct received a remedy. 
During this time, China’s courts made several unusual legal judgments 
relating to remedies. In 1999, for example, the Chengdu Gongguan 
company was found liable for making false statements and engaging in 
deceptive conduct, and the responsible directors and officers were 
sentenced and fined. The Court, however, rejected an investor's claim for 
damages on the ground that the Court lacked jurisdiction over such 
cases.172 Even more unusually, in September 2001, the Supreme Court of 
China decreed "Some Rules about Hearing False Statements on the
171 Wei, Y. (2006). "Volatility o f  Chinese Securities Markets and Corporate Governance." Suffolk Transnational L. 
Rev 29(2): 2 1 5 ,2 1 7 .
17J Huang, Z. Z. (2003). M eieuo Zheneauan Fa zhong M ingshi Susong (Civil Liability and Civil Litigation in US 
Securities L aw ). Falv (Law Press), Beijing, at 7.
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Securities Market", which stated that because of legislative ambiguity and 
a lack ot limited enforcement resources, the Court would not hear civil 
cases relating to insider trading, false or misleading statements, or market 
manipulation. The situation has improved since. Nevertheless, in many 
cases the misconduct of listed companies and responsible individuals 
only received lenient penalties.17'5 This aspect of corporate governance in 
China will be analysed in more detail in Chapter 5.
It is important to bear in mind the general context of corporate 
governance reform in China. It ought to be understood that after the 
Contract Responsibility System introduced in the 1980s, the second wave 
of reform began as a corporatization of many SOEs and a liberalization of 
the private business sector. The SOE reform was a way of tapping into the 
savings of the Chinese people. As professor Zhang Weiying of Beijng 
University put it:
“Because the state controls the development of China ’s stock markets, 
the guiding ideology is very important. I want to emphasize that up 
until today the guiding ideology in developing the stock markets is 
still to ‘help state enterprises resolve their problems.’ But 1 think we 
should change this wording to say ‘help the state enterprises realize 
management by the people.’. . . There is a big difference here.
173 Mu, X iaoke (2004), Preliminary Study on the Prohibition System o f  Securities Fraud, Econom y and Technology  
Press, at.242. 243.
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Helping SOEs resolve their problems means how to let the peoples’ 
money flow into the SOEs with the worst problems. But helping 
SOEs realize management by the people means how to let SOEs flow 
into the hands of those best able to manage them.”174
The shareholding system motivated local players, especially local cadres, 
enormously. As one enterprise boss put it, “It’s not who owns the money 
that’s important, it’s who gets to use the money.” 175 The promotion of 
town and village enterprises has influenced local cadres who want to 
maximize revenue. At the same time the rent seeking state is also seen as 
residuary of corrupt practices. This has created a political market where 
state assets and authorities are diverted into private interests.176 Also the 
policy of reducing government interference in the running of SOEs, 
whilst developing a sense of enterprise and achieving cost reductions and 
production improvements, has been partially achieved within a climate of
1 7 7reform induced labour unrest and incipient political instability. The 
convergence of the Chinese corporate governance system with those in 
Civil and common law systems has been at best a convergence of form
174 Professor Zhang w as responding to an article by Gao Xiqing, 3 January 2000, his response is quoted in Walter, 
C. E. and F. J. T. H ow ie (2006). Privatizing China : inside China's stock markets. Singapore ; Chichester, John 
W iley & Sons (A sia).
1/5 Walter and H ow ie (2006), supra note 174 at 233.
176 N go, T. W. and Y. P. Wu (2008). Rent Seeking in China London, Routledge. For a consideration o f  
expropriation and coiporate governance in H ong K ong and A sia, see Lang, L. H. P. (2005). Governance and 
expropriation. Cheltenham ; Northampton, M A, Edward Elgar.
177 Hassard, J., J. Sheenan, et al. (2007). China’s state enterprise reform : from Marx to the market. London, 
Routledge. This study o f  the steel industry in China charts the successes and failures o f  the reform policy in that 
industry.
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rather than one ot substance.178 In many respects, at the end of the 
corporatization process, the state was that particular entity from a 
ministry, the latter’s local bureau, or a local government in charge of that 
particular type of company or sector. In reality nothing had really 
changed except the form of the arrangement. The one important 
difference was that the company (more realistically its management) now 
had legal possession of its own assets.179
Whilst these developments were unfolding, the debate over the 
recognition of private property slowly began and became embroiled in a 
number of ideological debates of a fundamentally political nature. Old 
communist attitudes were slow to retreat in the face of arguments for 
reform, fighting a long rear guard action.180 Tied in with these factors is 
the resurgence of strong cultural elements such as guanxi and 
patrimonialism in changing and adaptive ways. These interact in various 
ways with the political elements at different levels. There is therefore a 
strong ‘Chinese’ element to the way corporate governance is conducted in 
China in addition to the role of the state as a strong path dependent
178 M acN eil, M. I. (2002). "Adaptation and Convergence in Corporate Governance: The Case o f  Chinese Listed  
C om panies.” Journal o f  Corporate Law Studies 2(1): 289-344 . M acneil takes the v iew  that there is considerable  
convergence in the legal framework o f  corporate governance in China. He identifies the main path dependent 
influence as the dominant role o f  the state, which had clearly influenced the 1994 com pany law in terms o f  the role 
o f  regulation and the legal position o f  the controlling shareholders. According to him corporate governance in 
China operates in a manner which is fundamentally different from that in West.
I7v See Walter and H ow ie(2006), supra, note 174 at 234-236.
180 For a consideration o f  these political and jurisprudential debates in the slow  legislative gestation o f  the Property 
Law o f  2007, see Zhang. M. (2008). "From Public to Private:The N ew ly  Enacted Chinese Property- Law and the 




In the 1980s, the Chinese State’s first objective was to promote greater 
production efficiency and the Contract Responsibility System was one 
key element of the structure designed to achieve this outcome.181 The 
major debates on reform centred round the adoption of market 
mechanisms in a gradual transition from the centrally planned economy. 
Deng’s insights into the positive outcomes of the application of capital in 
large quantities saw a shift in objectives in the 1990s to the 
recapitalization of SOEs which in turn entailed their corporatization and 
the development of more sophisticated stock markets. According to 
MacNeil, the state had no real incentive to resist stronger convergence in 
securities law and listing rules towards international standards. This was 
because the process encouraged the development of a capital market in 
which some of its shareholdings could be sold without prejudicing its role 
as controlling shareholder. It allowed the government and to some degree 
the CCP to retain control over the direction of the reform process 
enabling appropriate policy shifts when necessary.182 As a result there has 
been a quite successful industry wide packaging and listing. As part of
181 For a consideration o f  the Contract R esponsibility System  see I lassard .T, Sheenan et a l(2007), supra note 177 
at 115-128.
IS" M acN eil, M .I.(2002), supra note 178, at 338-341.
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this exercise the corporate governance reforms discussed above were 
enacted but not always successfully implemented within China’s cultural 
and political milieu. However, the successfiil entrance into the WTO has 
again shifted the focus of China’s policy. China is now concentrating on 
the creation of and support of internationally competitive national 
champions. These will be concentrated in those industries which China’s 
leadership considers to be strategically important for China and the 
continued leadership of the CCP. This policy has focused on just under 
200 major companies. Therefore china’s government is less able to give 
attention to the other 150,000 plus SOEs. Given the state’s financial 
needs, particularly in relation to the development of a welfare state, 
including a workable health sendee and social security system, it is 
slowly selling off its stakes in unwanted companies. This is China’s slow 
path towards the privatization of many SOEs. However, this is not 
privatization in the true sense of the word as until 2007 this was 
politically unacceptable. But following the changes in 1998 when the 
original SAMB was eliminated to be replaced by the Ministry of Finance 
(Enterprise Division) exercising property rights is seen as different to 
exercising ownership rights. But the end result has been that local 
governments are enabled to make decisions affecting the restructuring of 
local enterprises without referring to the centre.183 This has had its own
18'' Walter and H ow ie (2006), supra note 174, at 236-240.
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set of problems as the political appointment of the key lead manager, who 
is himself a politician, usually means that profits are not his chief concern 
but rather political and social objectives, including survival of the 
enterprise and the employment opportunities it presents for local 
people.184
The Chinese model has adopted the formal Anglo-American 
characteristics of independent directors but continues to mandate the two- 
tier board systems. However, it is unrealistic to expect improvements in 
China’s current system of corporate governance simply by adopting the 
latest prescriptions that are being experimented with in Western countries. 
For instance, compared to the German two-tier board structure where 
supervisors have substantial authority to monitor directors by appointing 
and dismissing them, the supervisory board in China cannot be expected 
to play active role in supervising directors and managers due to their 
limited powers, resources, incentives, abilities, and low quality 
information. Measures such as raising the level and quality of information 
disclosure and setting up independent director system are normally 
desirable. They are unlikely to function effectively in China unless a 
more significant development of the accounting and legal professions and 
the administration of commercial law are achieved. But the argument is
184 Tan, L. II. and J. G. Wang (2007). "M odelling an Effective Corporate Governance System  for China's lasted  
State-owned Enterprises: Issues and C hallenges in a Transition Economy." The Journal o f  Corporate Law Studies 7: 
156.
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often made neither the ‘outsider’ system of the Anglo-American world 
nor the ‘insider’ model of Germany and Japan are workable in China 
largely because of its cultural and political heritage and tendency to a 
familial and authoritarian system of governance.185
185 Tan and Wang (2007), supra note 184. Tan and Wang suggest that the best model for China would be one based 
on the Singaporean ‘Tem asek’ m odel.
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Chapter 4 Institutional investors
4.1 Introduction
Corporate governance issues, arising from the agency problems 
concerning the separation of ownership and control and the inability to 
write complete contracts for all possible future eventualities,1 have been 
debated for many years. Since the early 1990s, there has been an 
increasing emphasis on the need for institutional shareholders to play an 
active role in corporate governance. Various commentators in fact have 
argued that institutional investor corporate governance activism could 
become an important constraint on agency costs in the corporation.2
Chinese government introduced a series of complementary reforms to 
build the institutional mechanisms for greater corporate accountability 
since the 1990s. However, these differences between various social and 
economic systems may sometimes be entrenched by the adoption of legal 
systems that are themselves built upon principles that may differ 
substantially, such as the different modes of thinking that have formed 
common law system that is found in many countries which part of the old
1 See, e.g . Hart, O. D . (1995). Firms, contracts, and financial structure. Oxford, Clarendon Press.; Hart, O., Shleifer, 
A ., Vishny, R.W. (1997), "The proper scope o f  government: theory and an application to prisons", The Quarterly 
Journal o f  Econom ics, 1 12(4 ): 112 7-61.
2 See, e.g ., Roe. M. J. (1994). Strong managers, weak owners : the political roots o f  American corporate finance. 
Princeton,’N.J., Princeton University Press.;Black. B. S. (1990). "Shareholder Passivity' Reexamined." M ichigan  
Law R eview  89(31: 595-608.
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British Empire and the USA and the forms of the European derived Civil 
Law system that are (to varying degrees) found in China;’ The purpose of 
this chapter is to assess the role currently and potentially performed by 
institutional investors in China.
4.2 Institutional investors and corporate governance: the theories in 
the West
The agency theorists argue that public corporations suffer from excessive 
costs as managers pursue their own interests rather than the interests of 
shareholders.4 The chief concern of Berle and Means was that “Where
ownership is sufficiently sub-divided, the management can ... become a 
self-perpetuating body even though its share in the ownership is 
negligible.”5 This gave rise to the famous expression “a separation of 
ownership and control”: ownership resting with the myriad of small 
shareholders, and control residing in senior management.6 But this is not 
the case in China.
3 See further, C’harkham, J. P. (,1994). K eeping good com pany : a study o f  corporate governance in five countries. 
Oxford, Clarendon Press.; Charkham, J. P., H. Ploix, et al. (2005). K eeping better com pany : corporate governance  
ten years on . Oxford, Oxford University Press.; also see Kaplan, S.N. (1998), "Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Performance: A com parison o f  Germany, Japen and the US " in Chew, D. H. (1997). Studies in 
international corporate finance and governance system s : a com parison o f  the U .S., Japan, and Europe. N ew  York ; 
Oxford, Oxford U niversity Press.; R oe, M . J. (2003). Political determinants o f  corporate governance : political 
context, corporate im pact. Oxford, Oxford University Press.; Hopt, K. J. (1998). Comparative corporate 
governance : the state o f  the art and em erging research. Oxford, Clarendon.
4 See Jensen, M. C. and W. H. M eckling (1976). "Theory- o f  Finn - Managerial Behavior. A gency Costs and 
O wnership Structure." Journal o f  Financial Econom ics 3(4).; Jensen, M. C'. (1986). "Agency Costs o f  Free Cash 
Flow, Corporate-Finance, and Takeovers." American Economic Reyieyy 76(2): 323-329.
5 Berle, A. A. and G. C. M eans (1968). The modern corporation and private property N ew  York. Harcourt, Brace
6  World, at 82.
6 Ibid.
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It is not surprising, therefore, that the rise in institutional shareholdings -  
with an accompanying increase in the concentration of shareholdings -  
has led many commentators optimistically to predict the end of the 
separation of ownership and control.7
As a result, there is a need for establishing mechanisms to make 
managers maximize shareholder wealth. These mechanisms include 
shareholding of managers, intermediaries and large block holder,8 outside 
directors,9 debt policy,10 the market for corporate control and incentive 
contracts11.
In theory, as Stiglitz argues, individual shareholders with relatively small 
holdings have little incentive to gather and bear the relatively fixed costs 
of collecting information to enable them to monitor and control the 
behaviour of the board. Alternatively, large shareholders may have 
sufficient incentives to obtain the information necessary to effectively 
control management if the benefits of such monitoring outweigh the
7 See, for exam ple Barnard, J. W. (1991). ’'Institutional investors and the new corporate governance." North 
Carolina Law R eview  69: 1135-1187.
8 Morck, R., A . Shleifer, et al. (1988). "Management Ownership and Market Valuation - an Empirical-Analysis."  
Journal o f  Financial Econom ics 20(1-2): 293-315 .;M cconnell, J. J. and H. Servaes (1990). "Additional Evidence  
on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value." Journal ol Financial Econom ics 27(2): 595-612.
9 Cotter, J. F., A . Shivdasani, et al. (1997). "Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth during 
tender offers?" Journal o f  Financial Econom ics 43(2): 195-218,
10 Lasfer, M . A. (1995). "Agency Costs, Taxes and Debt: The UK Evidence." European Financial M anagem ent 
1(3): 265 -285 . jM cconnell, J. J. and H. Servaes (1995). "Equity' Ownership and the 2 Faces o f  Debt." Journal o f  
Financial Econom ics 39(1): 131-157.
u Hart, O. (1995). "Corporate Governance - Som e Theory and Implications." Econom ic Journal 105(430): 678- 
689.
associated costs.S im ilarly , Shleifer and VishnyL) and Agrawal and 
Knoeber suggest that large investors, because of the relevance of the 
resource invested, have all the interest and the power to monitor and 
promote better governance of companies.i4 The studies conducted by 
Smith and Nesbitt in which it is reported that firms targeted by CalPERS 
exhibit superior financial returns tend to support this view.15
The Wall Street Journal, the newspaper of record for executives, bankers, 
and investment professionals, calls hedge funds the “new leader” on the 
“list of bogeymen haunting the corporate boardroom.” 16 And several 
European governments are weighing regulations designed to curb activist 
hedge funds. l/ Has the rise in institutional shareholdings had a 
measurable impact on corporate performance so far?
4.3 Institutional shareholders and corporate governance: the practice 
in the UK
Unlike the relation-based corporate governance system of Japan and
Stiglitz, J. E. (1985). "Credit Markets and the Control o f  Capital." Journal o f  M oney Credit and Banking 17(2 ): 
133-152.
13 Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny (1997). "A survey o f  corporate governance." Journal o f  Finance 52(2): 737-783.
14 Agrawal. A. and C. R. Knoeber (1996). "Firm performance and m echanism s to control agency problems 
betw een m anagers and shareholders." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 31(3): 377-397.
15 Smith, M. R (1996). "Shareholder activism  by institutional investors: Evidence from CalPERS." Journal o f  
Finance 51(1): 227-252.: Nesbitt, S. L. (1994). "Long-term rewards from shareholder activism: a study o f  the 
'CalPERS effect'." Journal o f  A pplied Corporate Finance 6(4): 75-80.
,6 Murray, A ., "Hedge Funds Are N ew  Sheriffs o f  Boardroom", Wall St. J., D ec. 14, 2005 , at A 2; see also Eisinger, 
J.,(2006), M em o to A ctivists: Mind CEO Pay, Wall St. J., Jan. 11, at C l ("The shareholder activists with the most 
clout these days are hedge-fund managers ...").
17 Taylor, E„ and M cDonald, A. (2006), Hedge Funds Face Europe's Clippers, Wall St. J.. May 23, at 
C l (regulations considered bv Germany and the Netherlands).
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Germany, where ownership is concentrated and markets are relatively 
illiquid, the UK is a market-based system characterized by liquid markets 
and non concentrated listed company ownership.18 Since 1990s external 
pressure such as institutional investors for greater corporate 
accountability has intensified in the UK. For example, the Cadbury 
Report stated that, "‘Because of their collective stake, we look to the 
institutions in particular, with the backing of the Institutional 
Shareholders’ Committee, to use their influence as owners to ensure that 
the companies in which they have invested comply with the Code’19 - 
similar views were expressed by Greenbury , Hampel and Higgs. In their 
role as major shareholders, both the Cadbury7 and Hampel Reports20 and 
the resulting Combined Code21 expected institutions to take on the role of 
the large shareholder, who will monitor company management on behalf 
of smaller shareholders. Hence, in this context, institutions are expected 
to take a long-term view of their shareholding positions, and where 
necessaiy, incur expense in intervening to correct mismanagement.
The most obvious course of action open to institutions is to exercise their
18 C hew  D . H .(1997) for a collection  o f  papers dealing w ith these tw o corporate governance system s. S ee Chew, D. 
H. (1997). Studie s in international corporate finance and governance_svstenisjjL^^^^
and Europe N ew  York ; Oxford, Oxford University Press.; The UK governm ent recently has nationlised or part- 
nationlised som e leading UK banks struggling to survive the current crisis. For exam ple, the UK taxpayer is taking 
a controlling share o f  65%  in L loyds Banking Group, See “ Ireasury takes 65% L loyds stake BBC  B usiness  
N e w s , available at http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/business/7929957.stm.
* The Cadbury Report (Financial A spects o f  Corporate G overnance), 1992, Para.6.16 
‘uThe Hampei Report (C om m ittee on Corporate Governance), 199S, Para 5.7  
The Com bined C ode (June 2008), Section 2. E.3; also see The Combined Code on Corporate G overnance 
(2006) .Section 2, E.3:
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right as shareholders to vote at a company’s Annual General Meeting 
(AGM )/“ The Institutional Shareholders’ Committee recommended that 
institutional shareholders should make positive use of their voting 
rights.2 ’ Furthermore, the Cadbury Report stated that:
“Voting rights can be regarded as an asset and the use or otherwise 
of those rights by institutional shareholders is a subject of 
legitimate interest to those on whose behalf they invest. We 
recommend that institutional investors should disclose their 
policies on the use of voting rights.”24
The Greenbury Committee stated that institutional shareholders should 
act to ensure the companies implemented the recommendations set out in 
their code of best practice regarding the determination of directors’ 
remuneration. Increased pressures have been placed on institutional 
shareholders to exercise their right to vote since the election of the 
Labour government in 1997. Prior to their election, the Labour Party had 
signalled that it was considering proposals to include an obligation to 
vote in the fiduciary duties of pension funds and to require fund managers 
to justify their voting decisions to trustees.25 One of the principles of the
22 Short, H. and K. K easev (2005). Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance in the UK. Corporate 
governance : accountability, enterprise and international com parisons. K. Keasey, S. Thom pson and M. Wright. 
Chichester, John Wiley & Sons: 81.
23 Institutional Shareholders' Com mittee, The responsibilities o f  institutional shareholders and agents-statement o f  
principles, updated June 2007.
-4 The Cadbury Report (Financial Aspects o f  Corporate Governance), 1992, Para.6.12
25 See , "Harder Line From L abour", Accountancy. October 1995, a l l 2, reporting Dr Jack Cunningham’s
com m ents at a Fabian Society seminar on corporate governance and "Labour Attacks Investors’ Secrecy",
Financial Time. 5 June 1995, p. 16.
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Combined Code (1998) was that ‘institutional shareholders have a 
responsibility to make considered use of their votes’, and furthermore, the 
Code contained provisions stating that institutions should , on request, 
provide information to their clients on their voting behaviour and should 
take steps to ensure that their voting intentions were translated into 
practice.26 The Institutional Shareholders’ Committee (2007) published a 
statement of principles which made clear that institutional shareholders 
have a responsibility to monitor and communicate with investee 
companies and, moreover, intervene where necessary.27
Pound has claimed that personnel changes on the board and in policies 
pursued by companies were often brought about by the lobbying of large 
investors rather than by takeovers. Pound claimed that takeovers were an 
inefficient and a rather drastic means of correcting mismanagement.28 
Campbell has argued that the so called market for corporate control has 
yet to be shown to achieve the results claimed by agency theory stating 
that great deal of research still needs to be done to establish exactly what
26 T hese code provisions in the Com bined Code (1998) were translated into supporting principles in the Combined  
Code (2003), also see The Com bined Code on Corporate Governance (2006) .Section 2. E.3; The Com bined Code 
(June 2008), Section 2 E.3
27 Institutional Shareholders’ Com mittee, International Corporate Governance Network: Statement o f  Principles on 
Institutional Shareholder R esponsibilities, July 2007.
28 Pound, J. (1993). "The Rise o f  the Political M odel o f  Corporate Governance and Corporate-Control." N ew  York 
University Law R eview  68(5): 1003-1071. Pounds view was criticized by Romano for failing to distinguish a 
conflicts o f  interest explanation from an equally plausible monitoring explanation. She argues that firms with high  
levels o f  institutional ownership experience proxy contests that are less credible because they effectively monitor 
m anagem ents’ performance. In her v iew  Pound does not have data on how  institutions voted in his sam ple proxy 
lights and therefore lacks any direct evidence o f  a significant difference in voting practices between private and 
public funds. See Romano R, "Public Pension Fund Activism  in Corporate Governance Reconsidered" in Baums. 
T„ R. M. Buxbaum, et al. (1994). Institutional investors and corporate governance. Berlin, dc Gruyter.
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the market for corporate control does in fact achieve.29
Some pioneers of relational investing like Monk’s LENS Corporation 
make money by selecting companies with intrinsic value and by pressing 
for changes in corporate governance often produced above market returns. 
They usually press for improvements that ensure that directors and 
managers have the appropriate ability and incentives to produce these 
results. However, a similar result may be produced by the role of banks 
and cross listings in ‘internal systems’ like those of Japan and Germany.30
For example the German Hausbank has the capacity to provide all 
manner of financing. It often places its own executives on the 
Supervisory board of companies. The bank benefits in a number of ways 
not least of which is the payment of fees. In the context of the Japanese 
kereitsu members are financiers, suppliers and owners of each other 
leading to a more profound commercial relationship. Monitoring is a 
function of maintaining valuable commercial relationship rather than 
simply a function of ownership. But all of these types give rise to
29 Cam pbell, D. (1997). "The Role o f  Monitoring and Morality in Company Law: A  Criticism o f  the Direction o f  
Present Regulation." Australian Journal o f  Corporate Law 17: 343-365.; See also Campbell, D . (1990). "Adam 
Smith, Farrar on Company Law and the Econom ics o f  the Corporation," Anglo-A m erican Law R eview  19(3):
185. ; Cam pbell, D , "Why Regulate the Modern Corporatuion? The Failure o f  ‘Market Failure* " in McCahery, J„ 
S. Picciotto, et al, (1993). Corporate control and accountability : changing structure and the dynam ics o f  regulation. 
O xford, Clarendon Press.
30 See M onks, R. A. G. and N . M inow  (2004). Corporate governance. Oxford, B lackw ell at 174-187. For a 
consideration o f  these system s, see Aglietta. M and Breton R, "Financial System s and M odes o f  Corporate 
Control" in Cobbaut, R. and J. Lenoble (2003). Corporate governance : an institutionalist approach. The Hague : 
London, Kluwer Law International.
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potential conflicts of interest. For example, when Warren Buffett became 
CEO of Salomon Brothers his obligations to his own shareholders at 
Berkshire Hathaway would not necessarily align with his priorities as 
CEO of Salomon Brothers. Put simply which one was given his primary 
time and attention? The German and Japanese block holders have similar 
conflicts of interest in their role as officers of their principal employer 
and as active owners of a portfolio investment.31 In the USA there remain 
a number of laws and regulations which cumulatively prevent the 
financial sector executive from being able to exercise control over 
commercial sector executives.32
Buxbaum has also pointed to the different types of institutional investors 
each with its own form of governance structure and investment policy 
objectives which according to him are driven to a large extent by legal, 
institutional and even cultural specifics. In terms of the reasons for the 
existence of a particular institution, which differ to some degree, 
investment policy may vary for a number of reasons. In the case of 
pension funds, pension income is influenced by three main pillars, 
namely social security, firm level and the individual future pensioner. 
Each is dependent on the other and influences the flow of funds into these
M See M onks and M innow  (2004), supra note 30 at 178.
32 W hilst the G lass-Steagal acts w ere substantially repealed in 1999 there remain a number o f  restrictions on 
commercial banks: the Investment Company Act 1940 places limitations on mutual funds w hilst insurance 
com panies are often lim ited by state law. Private pension lunds are required to diversify as w idely as possib le by 
ERISA. The federal system  is limited to equity' investments tlirough index funds under FERSA. See M onks and 
M innow (2004), supra note 30 at 178-179,
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institutions. Two other major factors also influence flow into the 
institution and its investment policies, namely, first the combined effect 
of public policies of taxation and subsidization of savings destined for 
pensions; and secondly, often overlooked at firm level, is whether the 
pension claims are capitalized through the collection and separate 
investment of premiums or whether they are unsecured general claims 
against the firm promising to provide the pension.33
4.3.1 Criticism of institutional investors
I. Lack of willingness and ability to actively monitor and intervene
Perhaps the easiest way an institution can involve itself in the governance 
of a company in which it has invested its clients’ funds is by actively 
voting on resolutions put to the general meeting. However, despite the 
increased pressure on institutions to exercise their voting rights, voting 
still remained low throughout the 1990s. Research by PIRC suggested 
that average voting at AGMs of the FTSE 350 companies had increased 
from approximately 38% in 1993 to 46% in 1998, two-thirds of 
companies still had a voting turn-out of less than 50%. In addition, the 
percentage of votes which oppose management resolutions or record an
33 See Buxbaum R IV1. (1994) "Comparative Aspects o f  Institutional Investment and Corporate Governance" in 
Baums, T., R. M. Buxbaum, et al. (1994). Institutional investors and corporate governance. Berlin, de Gruyter.
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explicit abstention is approximately 2%. 34 Although institutional 
shareholders control a large proportion of votes, they are often reported to 
abstain from voting at annual general meetings (AGMs) or rubber-stamp 
the management’s motions.35 As a result, managers are left with 
substantial levels of discretion as to how they run the firm.36
The first criticism was that institutions may lack the will and ability to 
actively monitor and intervene. As Drucker argued:
“The pension funds are not ‘owners’, they are investors. They do not 
want control...The pension funds are trustees. It is their job to invest 
the beneficiaries’ money in the most profitable investment. They have 
no business trying to ‘manage’. If they do not like a company or its 
management, their duty is to sell the stock”.37
From an alternative viewpoint, Hutton argued that some institutional 
investors such as pension funds have become classic absentee landlords, 
exerting power without responsibility and making exacting demands upon 
companies without recognizing their reciprocal obligation as owners.” 38
34 Pensions Investment Research Consultants (1998), Proxy Voting Trends at U K  Com panies, D ecem ber 1998, 
PIRC. London.
35 See, eg  Goergen, M. and L. R enneboog (2001). "Investment policy, internal financing and ownership  
concentration in the UK." Journal o f  Corporate Finance 7(3): 257-284.
36 Zhang. C'., L, R enneboog, et al. (2008). "Do UK Institutional Shareholders M onitor Their Investee Firms?" 
Journal o f  Corporate Law Studie s 8(1).
37 Drucker, P. F. (1976). The unseen revolution : how pension fund socialism  came to A m erica. London. 
Heinemann. at 82.
■'8 Hutton, W. (1995). The state we arc in. Vintage Press.
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Murphy and Van Nuys argue that pension funds are run by individuals 
who do not have the proper incentives to maximize fund value. ’9 Maug 
argues that while liquid markets make corporate governance more 
effective as it is cheaper and easier to acquire and hold large stakes, they 
also reduce large shareholders’ incentive to monitor because they can sell 
their holdings easily.40 Again, Plender argues that because fund managers 
will lose the mandate to manage their client’s money if they do not 
perform well in comparison to their competitors they are no longer 
interested simply making money for their client. They have become 
overly preoccupied with their investment performance relative to their 
competitors.41
In their role as investors, institution investors need to be free to move 
funds around in order to find the best return for the beneficiaries of those 
funds. In this respect, it is difficult, certainly in a free market climate, to 
argue that institution investors should continue to hold equity positions in 
problem companies and incur additional expense intervening in 
management, particularly when there are no guarantees that intervention
A'Jwill be successful.
39 Murphy. K ., Van N uys, K. (1994). State Pension Funds and Shareholder In-Activism , W orking Paper, Harvard 
Business School.
40 Large, M. E. (1998). "Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Tradeoff between Liquidity and Control? Journal
o f  Finance 53(1): 65-98.
41 Plender, J. (2003). G oing o f f  the rails : global capital and the crisis o f  legitim acy. Chicheter, J. Wiley.
42 Short, H. and Keasev, K. (2005), supra note 22, at 67
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A comprehensive survey found relatively little evidence that shareholder 
activism mattered.43 Even the most active institutional investors spent 
only trifling amounts on corporate governance activism. Institutions 
devoted little effort to monitoring management; to the contrary, they 
typically disclaimed the ability or desire to decide company-specific 
policy questions. They rarely conducted proxy solicitations or put 
forward shareholder proposals. They did not seek to elect representatives 
to boards of directors. They rarely coordinated their activities. Most 
importantly, empirical studies of U.S. institutional investor activism 
found “no strong evidence of a correlation between firm performance and 
percentage of shares owned by institutions.” 44
II Institutional investors as short-term players?
Secondly, the criticism is that institutions are only interested in short-term 
gains. As Charkham argues that many fund managers are not equipped to 
act as long-term investors as their primary understanding is of short-term 
markets rather than industry. According to Charkham fund managers are
4j Black, B .S . (2002), "Shareholder A ctivism  and Corporate Governance " in Newm an, P. (ed.) The United States, 
in N e w  Palgrave Dictionary o f  E conom ics and the Law, Palgrave M acm illan, at 459. D ue to a resurgence o f  direct 
individual investm ent in the stock market, motivated at least in part by the day trading phenom enon and 
technology stock bubble, the trend towards institutional domination stagnated. Large blocks held by a single 
investor remained rare. F ew  U .S . corporations had any institutional shareholders w ho ow ned more than 5-10%  o f
their stock.
44 Ibid, at 462.
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not prevented by fear of dismissal from taking an interest in corporate 
governance. Rather they simply do not feel they are paid to do it. Nor are 
they measured by success in it. In the final analysis fund managers lack 
the skill and resources they would need to do it properly.45 The Myners 
Review found that one-third of schemes had changed investment 
managers in 12 months prior to their survey. The debate over whether the 
focus in quarterly figures was a cause of short-termism was considered by 
the Myners Review.46 From a survey carried out for the Review, it is clear 
that there is much debate over this issue. The Review stated that, although 
it was not possible to arrive at an objective answer to the question, there 
were three clear facts:
* a large number of fund managers believe that their pension fund clients 
are very concerned about short-term performance.
*a number of pension funds and their advisors insist that they are not so 
concerned; and
* pension funds will inevitably look at quarterly performance figures.47
The Myners Review of institutional investment in the UK found that the 
majority of pension fund trustees were not expert in investment - for 
example, 62% of trustees had no professional to assist them; and over
45 Charkham,J. (2005), Supra note 3, at 272.
46 See The M yners R eview  o f  Institutional Investment in the UK: Report March 2001 , available at http://www.hin-
treasury.gov.uk./documents/financial services/securities__and_investments/tin _secjnynfinal.cfm
47 Ibid , para 5.69
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50% of trustees received fewer than three days of training when they 
were appointed.48 The Myners Review concluded that fund managers 
could assume rationally that they could be dismissed after any quarter’s 
performance, and that this could lead to managers being unwilling to take 
a long-term perspective. Furthermore, the lack of clarity over timescales 
would weaken incentives for fund managers to actively intervene in 
underperforming companies.49
III The free-rider problem
Thirdly, the free-rider problem facing institutional investors appear to be 
a real concern. Cadbury (1990) argued that while ‘free riding’ may be an 
option for individual institutional investors, for institutions collectively, 
this situation was becoming less tenable as the proportion of equity they 
own increased.50 Hampel (1998) further stressed this point, arguing that 
the combination of their increased ownership and the growth of index 
tracking meant that many institutions were committed to (either explicitly 
or de facto) retaining substantial shareholdings in companies. In such 
circumstances, Hampel stated that the institution should ‘share the 
board’s interest in improving the company’s performance.’ 51 It was
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid. para 5.70
Mi Cadbury Report (The Financial Aspects o f  Corporate Governance). 1992, para 6.9.
51 Hampel Report (Com m ittee on Corporate G overnance), 1998. para.5.3
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therefore argued by Hampel that institutions were effectively becoming 
locked into companies in which they invest and were, furthermore, 
becoming locked into the UK economy.
However, institutional investors are raising the question “Quis Custocliet 
Ipsos Custodies?”(Who shall guard the guards?). On the one hand, 
pension funds are perceived by the public to be short-termists, imposing 
their views on companies in which they invest by, for example, making 
them pay dividends and not invest in the long term.52 On the other hand, 
academic studies show that pension funds do not get involved in 
corporate monitoring because they find it easier and cheaper to sell their 
holdings , and that they do not want to sit on the board for fear of getting 
price sensitive information or because of the agency problems within the 
funds them selves.A s Stiglitz argues control by large shareholders may 
have a cost; if such shareholders are limited in terms of their
32 Hutton, W (1995) argues that ‘pension funds...have becom e classic absentee landlords, exerting power without 
responsibility and making exacting demands upon com panies without recognizing their reciprocal obligations as 
ow ners’. See Hutton, W. (1995), supra note 38 at 304.
53 For exam ple, Drucker, P. F. (1976), stipulate that ‘pension funds are not ‘ow ners’, they are investors. They do 
not want co n tro l...I f  they do not like a com pany or its management, their duty is to sell the stock .’ Drucker, P. F.
(1976). The unseen revolutio n : how' pension fund so c ia lism cam e to Am erica. London, Heinemann. at 82.; Porter 
(1997) argues that institutional investors .despite their substantial aggregate holdings, do not sit on coiporate 
boards and have virtually no real influence on m anagement's behavior because they invest nearly all their assets in 
index funds rather than directly in com panies, see Porter, M. E. (1992). "Capital choice changing the way 
American interests in industry " Journal o f  Applied Corporate Finance 5(2): 4-16.; Keasey (1997) suggest that 
once pension funds are locked in, it is costly to get involved in m onitoring and they cannot exit in case they are 
considered to trade on insider information. See Keasey, K., S. Thom pson, et al. (1997). Corporate governance : 
econom ic and financial issues. Oxford, Oxford University Press.; Murphy and Van N uys (1994) argue that pension  
funds are run by individuals who do not have the proper incentives to m axim ize fund value. See Murphy, K.and 
Van N uys, K. (1994), State Pension Fund shareholder activism . Working Paper, Harvard Business School.
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diversification, then their interests may conflict with those of small 
shareholders. 54 Furthermore, Stiglitz suggests that large controlling 
shareholders and managers may cooperate in the diversion of resources 
from remaining shareholders.55 As Ball noted there is a considerable 
amount of ‘Voice’ being exercised, but being behind closed doors it is not 
subject to any kind of monitoring and the whole process is therefore very 
unsatisfactory.56
Furthermore, Coffee suggests that there are reasons to believe that some 
institutional investors are less accountable to their owners than are 
corporate managers to their shareholders and argues that the usual 
mechanisms of corporate accountability are limited or unavailable at the
cn
institutional level.' Indeed, Plender suggests that the claim that fund 
managers were engaged in an active dialogue with management behind 
the scenes was ‘inherently unveritlable’.58
Though, recent developments in corporate governance in the UK have put 
pressure on institutional investors to become more active. For example, 
the Institutional Shareholders’ Committee, the association of the four
54 Stiglitz, J . E, (1985). "Credit Markets and the Control o f  Capital." Journal o f  M oney Credit and Banking 17(2): 
133-152.
Ibid.
56 Ball, J. (1991). "Short-termism: M yth or reality?" National W estminster Bank Quarterly R eview  24.
57 C offee, J. C. (1991). "Liquidity versus control: the institutional investors as coiporate monitor." Colum bia Law  
R eview  91: 1277-1368 .
58 W iley. J. (2003). G oing O ff The Rails - Global Capital And The Crisis O f L egitim acy. John W iley & Sons, at 
146.
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major institutional shareholder associations in the UK, states 
“Responsible owners should make use of their voting rights. A high 
voting turnout at general meetings will help ensure that decisions are 
sound and representative.”59 This suggests an interesting line of future 
research on the impact of the regulatory environment on monitoring by 
institutional investors.
4.4 Institutional investors and corporate governance: the practice in 
China
Comparative corporate governance, especially the difference between 
outsider systems of corporate governance as practiced in the market- 
dominated economies of the United States and the United Kingdom and 
insider systems as practiced in the bank-dominated economies of 
Germany and Japan, has received a lot of attention.60 The tremendous 
growth in institutional shareholding over the last decade and the 
increasing role of institutions as relational investors and firm monitors is 
therefore an important issue.61 However, despite the sea change of the 
Chinese corporate sector and capital market during the last 18 years,62
5<> Institutional Shareholders’ Com mittee (July 2007), The Responsibilities o f  Institutional Shareholders and 
Agents— Statement o f  Principles, London, ISC, 4.4 II.
60 K ose, J. and L. W. Senbet (October 1997). "Corporate Governance and Board Effectiveness." NYIJ Working 
Paper N o. FIN -98-045.available at SSRN: http://ssrn.coin/abstracU-U297747.; Shleifer, A . and R. W. Vishny (1997). 
"A survey o f corporate governance." Journal o f  Finance 52(2): 737-783.
61 Chidambaram N. K. and K. John (1997). Relationship Investing and Corporate Governance, Tulane U niversity  
and N ew  York University Working paper.
62 The C hinese stock market was established at the start o f  the 1990s, with the Shanghai Stock Exchange beginning
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there is so far no systematic account of, and no serious exploration into, 
the dynamic aspect of institutional investors control, i.e. the evolution of 
ownership and control that has been intensively studied in the US, UK, 
and Germany,63 though it has a large potential for throwing off its 
emerging status to become the biggest and most vibrant stock market in 
Asia’.64 To understand these implications, one must go back into history.
China started its economic reform and open-door polices in 1978, and 
began to conduct experimental projects in “shareholding'’ vehicles in 
1984. The Chinese stock market was established at the start of the 1990s, 
with the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) beginning operation in 
December 1990 and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SE1ZSE) in July 1991. 
In the spring of 1992, Deng Xiaoping made general speeches during his 
southern Mainland China inspection tour. In the speeches, Deng Xiaoping 
fully affirmed the experiments of reform to introduce the shareholding 
system and securities market. His speech was a powerful spur to speed up 
the progress of reforms.6'*1 Unlike reforms in other transitional economies,
operation in D ecem ber 1990 and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in July 1991. See Green, S. (2003). The Econom ist 
China's stockmarket : a guide to progress, players and prospects. London, Profile.
63 D enis, D. J. and A. Sarin (1999). "Ownership and board structures in publicly traded corporations." Journal o f  
Financial Econom ics 52(2): 187-223.; Goergen, M. and L. Renneboog (January 2003). Shareholder Wealth Effects 
o f  European D om estic and Cross-Border Takeover Bids, ECGI - Finance Working Paper.No. 08 /2003 ..available at 
S S R N : http:/7s.sm. com /abs traet=372440
64 Walter, C. F.. and F. J. T. H ow ie (2006). Privatizing China : inside China's stock markets. Singapore ; Chichester. 
John W iley & Sons (A sia).
65 This sentence was interpreted to mean econom ic growth is the ultimate target o f  the society. In 1984, the Third 
Plenary Session  o f  the Twelfth Central Com mittee o f  the C’CP adopted the D ecision  o f  the Chinese Communist 
Party Central Com m ittee on Restructuring o f  the Econom ic System, encouraging ‘flexible econom ic arrangements
o f  various kinds' in order to enhance efficiency. A shareholding system in its primitive and embryonic form could
1 5 0
China s economic reform has proceeded with little political reform. The 
economic reform was undertaken under the central leadership of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The economic reform started from the 
four special economic zones, to coastal cities, then to capital cities of 
inland provinces and now it has reached an unprecedented stage of all­
round opening demonstrated by China's accession to the World Trade 
Organization. Until the recent world economic downturn, China has 
maintained an annual growth rate of over 9.3% on average and has 
surpassed Britain to become the 4th largest economy in the world.66 In 
2005, the Chinese securities market is the 5th biggest securities market in 
the world.67 In July 2009, China overtook Japan as the world’s second- 
largest stock market by value for the first time.68
4.5 Who are the institutional investors in China?
They are securities investment funds, insurance companies, pension funds, 
and securities companies, Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFIIs) 
and commercial banks.
already be detected in those early ‘flexib le  econom ic arrangements'. Walter, C. E., J. Franser. et al. (2001). To Get
Rich is G lnriushC hina’s Stock Markets in the ‘80s and ‘9 0 s . Hampshire, N ew  York. PALGRAVE at 14.
6* "China lifts annual growth figures", BB C  news, available at http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/lii/business/4594132.stm  
Source from D ealogic: Global Equity Capital Markets 2005.
68 China’s Market Value Overtakes Japan as World’s N o. 2, after Chinese governm ent stim ulus spending and 
record bank lending boosted share prices in July 2009. Available at 
http:/A ,vww.bloom bere.co!n/apps/news?pid=20601087& sid=ra_84o9PPPGqk.
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4.5.1 The insurance companies
Chinese insurers have been allowed to hold equity positions for their own 
account since October 2004.69 Now insurance companies and their asset 
management arm may invest up to 5 per cent of the total assets into the 
A-share market. By October 2005, insurers’ direct shareholding has 
grown to about RMB13.6 billion70 (US$1.7billion) or 1.3 per cent of 
tradable A-shares.71
In addition to their direct holdings, Chinese insurers have since October 
1999 invested indirectly in the stock market through subscribing to 
securities investment funds, subject to a set of portfolio rules.72 It is 
estimated that the indirect investment in stocks by insurance companies 
has reached RMB 106 billion (US$13.3 billion),7' or 10.6 per cent of the 
tradable A-shares. Insurance companies have become the largest single 
type of investors in securities investment funds.74
69 Baoxian Jigou Touzizhe Gupiao Touzi Guanli Zanxing Banfa (Provisional Measures for the Administration o f  
Stock Investment by Insurance Institutional Investors), jointly issued by the China Securities Regulatory 
Com m ission ( “ C SR C ” ) and China Insurance Regulatory Com m ission on October 24, 2004.
70 See "Dali Fazhan Jigou Touzizhe, Cujin Woguo Jinrong Tixi X ietiao Fazhan" (V igorously D evelop  Institutional 
Investors, Promote the Harmonious D evelopm ent o f  the Financial System  in China), Zhengquan Shibao (Securities 
Tim es), D ecem ber 3, 2005 ( “ Institutional Investors Vigorously D evelop ” ).
71 The calculation is based on the average market capitalisation o f  tradable A-shares in 2005, which was about 
RMB 1,000 billion. Source: w w w .csrc.gov.cn.
72 China K now ledge Press (2005), Financial Services in China: The Past, Present and Future o f  a Changing 
Industry. China K now ledge Press, Singapore, p .p .402-403 , ( “ Financial Sendees in China” ).
7 '’ Ib id .
74 China K now ledge Press (2005), Fund Management in China, China K nowledge Press. Singapore, pp. 129-131 
(" Fund M anaeem ent in China").
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4.5,2 Pension funds
The National Social Security Fund (“NSSF”) was established in 2000. 
By October 2005, the total investment in the stock market by the NSSF 
has grown to RMB 20.5 billion (US$2.6billion), up by 57 percent 
compared to the end of 2004.75
4.5.3 Qualified foreign institutional investors
As part of China’s commitment to opening up the domestic securities 
market to foreign investment, Qualified foreign institutional investors 
(QFIIs) approved by the CSRC have been allowed to trade A-shares since 
May 2003,76 but only within their investment quotas allocated by the 
State Administration of Foreign Exchange. The size of the total quotas 
increased in July 2005 from US$4 billion to US$10 billion.77 As of 
October 2005, QFIIs held tradable A-shares worth RMB 17 billion 
(US$2.1 billion), and they invested another RMB 4.4 billion (US$0.55
78billion) in securities investment funds.
The focus of this chapter will be on securities investment funds, because
75 Ibid.
7(1 Financial Services in China, supra note 72.
1' See, "Whv Foreign Investors Are not Saviours", Financial lim es, July 13, 2005.
7S "Institutional Investors Vigorously Develop" .Zhengquan Shibao (Securities Tim es), D ecem ber 3, 2005.
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they have been the principal players in the recent movement toward 
greater institutional activism. Other types of institution are either smaller 
in size, or have emerged as institutional shareholders only very recently.
4.5.4 The emergence of investment funds in China 
I. Self regulation period
Since 1990s the government introduced a series of complementary 
reforms to build the institutional mechanisms for greater corporate 
accountability in China. Investment funds soon became one of the most 
important institutional investors in China. The Authorities believe that 
investment funds can improve investor structure and rationalize securities 
investment activities.
Retail investors have dominated China's securities market. Most of the 
retail investors lack specialized investment knowledge and are interested 
only in short-term speculation. Non-economic information and rumours, 
therefore, heavily influence the market, which often results in unusually 
sharp fluctuations of prices.79 Investment funds, they argued, will
'9 See “Stock Market Changes Face o f  Finance”. China Daily Bus. Wkly. Dec. 14, 1998, at 2.
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approach corporate governance quite differently than individual investors. 
Because Investment funds typically own larger blocks than individuals, 
and have an incentive to develop specialized expertise in making and 
monitoring investments, the former should play a far more active role in 
corporate governance than dispersed shareholders. Their greater access to 
firm information, coupled with their concentrated voting power, should 
enable them to more actively monitor the firm’s performance and to make 
changes in the board’s composition when performance lagged.
The first closed-ended investment fund was Zhuxing investment funds. It 
was launched by Zhuhai International Trust& Investment Company and 
was authorized by the People’s Bank of China, Zhuhai branch in August 
1 9 9 1  8° Then, in October 1991, Wuhan investment funds and Nanshan 
investment funds were authorized by the local branch of the People’s 
bank of China.81 From 1992 to 1997, 79 investment funds were launched; 
more than 1.2 million investors became involved, the total assets were 
more than 9000 million RMB.
80 The origin o f  investm ent funds can be traced to the fund activities conducted by the Bank o f  China and China 
International Trust and Investment Co. In 1987. together with som e overseas institutions, they have initiated an 
investm ent fund targeting overseas investors. See W oguo Laojijin De Fazhan Licheng Yu Shichang Guimo 
(Historical D evelopm ent o f  China's Old Funds and Their Market Scale), Zhongguo Zhengquan Bao (China  
Securities ), available at h ttp ://w w w .csxom .cn; see also Chen, H.Q. (1995), G ongtong Juin Yunzuo Shiwu  
(Practicing Mutual Funds) 28 at 282.
81 See Kumar, A. (1997) (ed.), China's Non-Bank Financial Institutions: Trust and Investment Com panies. World 
Bank D iscussion Paper , at 47 (stating that the first fund was the Wuhan Securities Investment Fund); Touzi Jijin 
Zhoujin N iw ota (Investm ent Funds Are Approaching Us), Renmin Ribao (People's D aily). Dec. 4, 1997, at 10 
(stating that the first fund w as the Shenzhen Nanshan Venture Investment Fund); Zhongguo Jijinve Lishi Huigu 
Yu Fazhan Sikao (History o f  China's Fund Industry and a D iscussion o f  its D evelopm ent), Zhongguo Zhengquan 
Bao (China Securities), ava ilab le  a t http:// w w w .es.com .cn (stating that both were the earliest funds): but see 
Historical D evelopm ent o f  China's Old Funds and Their Market Scale, (stating that the Zhuxin Fund, launched in 
Zhuhai municipality in Juiv 1991, was the first fund in C hina).
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The funds have developed in two stages demarcated by the national 
regulation promulgated in 1997. Before that time, funds were at the stage 
of self-development. There was even no official national legislation or 
regulation directly regulating investment funds before 1997. 82 In the 
absence of national legislation, local regulations were formulated to cover 
investment funds. However, these local regulations are not uniform and 
are far from adequate.
For instance, the approval of investment funds was not unified. Most 
were approved by the provincial and municipal branches of the People's 
Bank of China (“PBOC”), and only a tew funds were approved by the 
headquarters of the PBOC.83 Many problems arose with these funds due 
to the absence of uniform regulation. Consequently the PBOC issued an 
Emergency Notice on May 19, 1993, announcing that approval to set up 
funds and fund management companies would only be given by the 
headquarters of the PBOC. 84 Since the Emergency Notice, the 
development of China's funds has slowed down. The headquarters of the 
PBOC has not formally approved the establishment of any domestic 
funds since then.8'’ The number of funds, however, still increased slowly 
in subsequent years, reflecting the irregularities of the old funds. By the
82 See Kumar,A. (1997) (ed.), supra notes 81, at 47 , 48.
83 See Guifan Xianyou Jijin de Shexiang (A  V ision for Standardizing Current Funds), Zhongguo Zhengquan Bao
(China Securities), N ov. 17, 1997, at 7.
84 See Kumar, A .(1997) supra note 81. at 47
85 Ibid.
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time the Provisional Measures were promulgated in November 1997, 
China had set up 75 funds and 47 fund-like certificates,86 with a total 
capital of more than RMB 7 billion yuan.87
II The call for standardization
In the early stages, investment funds operated in China on a self­
regulating basis without much legal status. Thus, these fluids ran into 
many problems due to a lack of uniformity. First, not only was the 
standard for approval of new funds lax, but different agencies had the 
power to approve. Thus, the headquarters of the PBOC, the local 
branches of PBOC, and local governments each separately approved 
different investment funds.88
There was no department directly overseeing the operation of funds, 
allowing the local branches of the PBOC to assume such supervisory 
roles.89 Nor was there a self-disciplinary body inside the industry.90 Again,
86 See Funds Can Curb Market Volatility, China Daily Bus. Wkly., Sept. 7, 1997, at 3; Historical Developm ent o f  
China's Old Funds and Their Market Scale, supra note 72; Zhongguo Jijinye Lishi Huigu Yu Fazhan Sikao 
(History o f  China's Fund Industry and a D iscussion o f  its D evelopm ent), Zhongguo Zhengquan Bao (China 
Securities), available http:// w ww.cs.corn.cn
87 Zhongguo Jijin Shichang 1998 Nian Huigu Yu 1999 Nian Zhanwang (An O verview  o f  China's Investment Fund 
Market o f  1998 and Prospects for 1999), Zhongguo Zhengquan Bao (China Securities), Mar. 30. 1999, available at 
http:// w w w .cs.cotn .cn .(stating there is a total capital o f  RM B 7.6 billion yuan); Historical D evelopm ent o f  China's 
Old Funds and Their Market Scale, (a total o f  RMB 7.196 billion yuan); Touzi Jijin Zhoujin Niwota (Investment 
Funds Are Approaching U s), Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), Dec. 4, 1997, at 10 (stating that the first fund was the 
Shenzhen Nanshan Venture Investment Fund)(a total o f about RMB 8 billion yuan).
88 See Zhengquanfa Lijie Shiyong Yu A nlie Pingxi (Understanding and Practice o f  Securities Law and Case 
Studies)276 (Yan Gao & Pingjun Yi eds.. 1997) ,see also see also Guifan Xianyou Jijin de Shexiang (A V ision for 
Standardizing Current Funds), Zhongguo Zhengquan Bao (China Securities). N ov. 17, 1997, at 7.
89 See World Bank Discussion Paper, Supra note79; see also Funds Can Curb Market Volatility, China Daily Bus. 
W klv, Sept. 7. 1997, at 3
157
it was not unusual for an old fund to have one company or department to 
act both as the fund manager and fund custodian. In some cases the roles 
ot the fund promoter, fund manager and fund custodian were all assumed 
by one company.91 Furthermore, some funds invested heavily in real 
estate resulting in a low liquidity,92 some lent fund capital at high 
interests, J and some fund managers invested in the name of the 
investment funds with capital from other sources.94
I ll Standardisation of old funds
In 1997 the first national regulation, the Preliminary Securities 
Investment Fund Act, was issued to regulate China’s securities investment 
fund industry. China’s standardised investment-fund industry began in 
March 1998 with the issue of two closed-end funds, Jintai and Kaiyuan, 
managed by the Guotai and Nanfang fund management companies 
(FMCs) respectively.9^  A total of 75 funds and 47 fund-like certificates 
had been launched with the accumulated capital of more than Renminbi
90 See Funds Can Curb Market Volatility, China Daily Bus. Wkly., Sept. 7, 1997, at 3
91 Zhengquanfa Lijie Shiyong Yu Anlie Pingxi (Understanding and Practice o f  Securities Law  and Case Studies) 
(Yan Gao & Pingjun Yi eds., 1997), at 281
y‘ See Funds Can Curb Market Volatility, China Daily Bus. Wkly., Sept. 7, 1997, at 3
9:! See C ong Touzi Yunzuo Kan Xianyou Jijin De Chulu (Looking at the Future o f  Current Funds from the
Perspective o f  Investment Operation), Zhengquan Shibao (Securities l im e s ) , N ov . 24, 1997, at 11.
94 Som e listed com panies entrusted fund managers to invest their capital in the securities market, which has 
seriously infringed upon the interests o f  investors o f  these com panies. See ibid.
95 Som e 75 funds were issued in the early 1990s, and several were listed. However, these funds invested in real 
estate, industrial projects as well as securities, were issued by governm ent-affiliated com panies, and were poorly 
regulated by the P eop le’s Bank. In 1998, the CSRC took over regulation from the central bank and the governm ent 
has since restructured or closed all o f  these ‘old funds'. See Tao Tingting (1999). ‘The burgeoning securities fund 
industry in China: its developm ent and regulation'. Columbia Journal o f  Asian Law 13 (2): 203-244 and Green,
S .(2003), for an introduction to the fund industry in China. Green, S .(2003), China’s stockmarket: A guide to its 
progress, plavcrs and prospects.;Thc Economist, London.
158
('•‘RMB”) 7 billion yuan (approximately) US $1 = RMB 8.3 yuan as of 
September 1999).96
In order to boost investors’ confidence and to attract more investors, 
especially institutional investors, to enter into the securities market, and 
to help the development of the investment fund industry, the legislative 
process for a national securities investment fund law was started in 1999. 
After four years of drafting, discussion and revision, the law of the 
People’s Republic of China on Securities Investment funds was finally 
passed by China’s top legislator on 28 October 2003.
Q7
Since then the growth of the sector has been rapid. In the five years to 
year end 2002, total fund assets expanded some 13 times to Rmbl38bn 
($16.6bn), as table one shows. By this time 71 funds (54 of which were 
closed-end funds, hereafter CEFs) were being run by 19 investment fund 
companies.98 As of August 2004, there were 40 new fund management 
companies opening their businesses, together managing 146 funds, 
including 54 closed-end funds and 92 open-end funds. By the end of 2005 
there were 54 closed-end funds and 154 open-ended funds under the
96 See Funds Can Curb Market Volatility, China Daily Bus. Wkly.. Sept. 7, 1997, at 3; Zhongguo Jijin Shichang 
1998 Nian Huigu Yu 1999 Nian Zhanwang (An O verview o f  China's Investment Fund Market o f  1998 and 
Prospects for 1999), Zhongguo Zhengquan Bao (China Securities), Mar. 30. 1999, available at http:// 
w w w .cs.com .cn .
97 In that sam e time, several thousand privately-raised funds have been raised from corporates and rich individuals 
by com panies which are unregistered and unregulated by the PBoC and (.'SRC.
The CSRC w ebsite provides basic data on fund issuance and trading (w w w .csrc.gov.cn). See also Zhang Kefeng  
et al„ ‘Fund Industry R eview  2 0 0 2 ’, Taiyuan Securities Research, downloaded from E m llP in c w i!y i:o m .c n .
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management of 53 fund management companies. These funds held 44% 
and 17% respectively of the total tradable share capitalisation in China."
IV The Preliminary Securities Investment Fund Act 1997
However, because the authority has little knowledge of investment funds, 
the inefficient monitoring structure and the unstable market affects, 
during the funds development there are so many problems, there included 
funds manager wrong doing and bad quality of asset.100 In order to 
change the situation, the Chinese State Council gave the Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) the power instead of the People’s Bank 
of China to make regulations governing the establishment, carrying on, 
and regulation of investment funds in November 1997. The China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) published new legislation, 
namely the Preliminary Securities Investment Fund Act {Zhenquan Touzi 
Jijing Guanli Zanxing Banfa) on 15th November 1997. This legislation 
contained 57 articles,101 and regulates securities investment funds, which 
invest in stocks, bonds, and other financial instruments.102
94 See China’s Securities and Futures Markets (2006), available at:
w w w .C SR C .gov.cn/en/isn/detail 1.isr>?infoid— 1153810173100& tvpe= C M S.SID  , at 27.
100 See Zhou,Z.Q. the Vice director o f  financial department o f  nat ional congress Speech on Conference o f  the 
securities investm ent funds law in 2003.
101 T hese articles are divided into the follow ing seven chapters: (1) general principles; (2) establishment, issuing  
and trading; (3) fund custodians and fund managers; (4) rights and dut ies o f  fund holders; (5) investment operation, 
and supervision and management o f  funds; (6) punishment; and (7) supplementary provisions.
102 1997 Preliminary Securities Investment Fund Act. art. 2.
V The regulatory authorities
The Preliminary Securities Investment Fund Act 1997 is the first unified 
act to govern investment funds. The aim of this regulation is described as 
to strengthen investment funds supervision, to protect the investors, to 
develop a healthy and stable capital market in China. The new act gives 
the CSRC the power instead of the People’s Bank of China to authorize 
investment funds103.
The Act provides the CSRC with four categories of regulatory powers. 
First, the CSRC has the power to formulate rules and requirements to 
implement the Provisional Measures. The CSRC can specify the contents 
and format of fund contracts, custodian contracts and prospectuses,104 
Second, the CSRC has the power of approval. The establishment of funds 
is subject to the examination and approval by the CSRC,105 as is the 
establishment of fund management companies.106 Also, the CSRC is 
authorized to approve the enlargement or extension of closed-end 
funds,107 the removal of fund managers,108 the resolutions made in fund 
holders' meeting concerning certain matters, 109 and the results of
103 1997 Preliminary Securities Investment Fund A c t , section 5
104 Ibid, art. 8.
1<b Ibid. art. 5
106 Ibid, art. 23
107 Ibid, art. 11
108 Ibid. art.27
109 Ibid. art.. 30. These matters are modification o f  fund contracts, termination o f  funds in advance, and change o f  
fund custodians or fund managers.
liquidation.110
Third, the CSRC has the power to supervise and examine the operation of 
funds. Under their respective authority Article 39 of the Act states that the 
CSRC and the PBOC, at any time, may examine the issuing, trading, and 
operating of investment funds and other related activities. As a result, the 
CSRC can require the termination of a fund because of a serious violation 
of laws or regulations.111 Additionally, if the CSRC has sufficient grounds 
to believe that a fund manager can no longer carry out his functions, it 
can require the fund manager to resign.112
Last, the CSRC has the power to impose legal sanctions. Violations of the 
Act would result in sanctions imposed by the CSRC according to Articles 
43-54. The form of those funds can be open-ended investment funds and 
close-ended investment funds113 which can only invest in securities in 
China.114 In order to maintain independence, there should be no financial 
and administrative links between custodian and manger. 115 If the 
custodian found any investment decision made by funds mangers which 
is illegal they should reject it and report it to CSRC.116
110 Ibid, art. 41.
111 Ibid, art. 40 , section 3.
Ibid, art. 27, section 4.
1,3 Ibid, section 6.
114 Ibid section 2.
u ' Ibid, section 17.
116 Ibid. section 19 (3).
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Another further development is investor protection, according to sections 
21(3) and 27 (3) Investors have the right to attend an investors’ general 
meeting which has authority to wind-up the investment funds ahead of 
schedule; remove the custodian and manger and make other decisions 
which the CSRC thinks should be made by the investors general 
meeting.117 Furthermore, the section itself is impractical. As it does not 
clearly outline the circumstances under which an action can be initiated.
Again, although the Preliminary Securities Investment Fund Act provides 
a basic framework for fund regulation, it is silent in some crucial issues 
concerning the legal nature of funds. The act fails to specify whether the 
legal form of investment funds in China is the contractual fund or the 
corporate fund. It is not clear whether both trust and contract principles 
would apply to China's investment funds, or whether contract principles 
alone are sufficient to govern the legal relationships of funds. The 
legislation leaves this issue open and avoids any mention of trusts.118
VI The Securities Funds Law 2003
Since 2001 the capital market went down sharply and investor
H / Ibid. section 30
118 The term “trust” does not appear anywhere in the Preliminary Securities Investment Fund A ct 1997
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participation in the Chinese capital market has fallen off.119 The CSRC 
have to face the investors claim to build market confidence.120 At that 
time there was a significant change in the CSRCs’ attitude.
The CSRC stressed that the securities investment funds law was vital for 
the healthy and fast development of China's funds industry, as well as its 
stock market.121 In addition, the CSRC also believe that investment funds 
can improve corporate governance of State Own Enterprises (SOEs). 
They insisted that, because the shares that the public holds are widely 
dispersed, individual investors have too small a stake to justify 
monitoring costs; thus, they cannot exert enough discipline for companies 
to improve their operation. Small investors are far more likely to sell their 
shares if they are not satisfied with a company's performance. They 
believe that investment funds can act as an important force in the 
shareholder structure of companies transformed from SOEs. Fund 
managers can represent investment funds in shareholders' meetings of the 
companies in which the funds are invested. As long-term shareholders, 
they have incentives to monitor the management of companies and give 
suggestions concerning their operation. Consequently, the participation of 
funds can theoretically exert more discipline on companies and improve
119 “China's Securities Market B egins Five-Faceted Reform'', P eople’s Daily, see the People daily w ebsite  
http://c is2 0 0 0 .peop le.c oni.c n/gb/ paperl 0 4 . on 27 Feb. 200.1.
129 "Investors Expect Good Return", China Daily Bus. Wkly., 22 Mar. 1998, at 3.
121 Zhou D. J.. member o f  the Financial and Economic Com mittee o f  the National People's Congress speech at the 
international funds law Conference 2002.
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their management. Though, the reality is often different.
In addition, investment funds in China are not only tools for investment, 
but also possible tools for the state to coordinate the stable development 
of the securities market. Because publicly-owned fund management 
companies manage the funds, the state will be able to influence the 
securities market through the funds.122
On 28 October, 2003, The Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress published the securities investment funds law. The new Law 
regulates the functions and roles of securities investment funds, formally 
establishes the regulatory system, emphasises the protection of investors’ 
rights and interests, sets the market entry threshold, specifies the 
liabilities of practitioners, and imposes penalties for violations of the law 
by fund managers and fund Custodian as well as securities administrative 
officials.
4.6 Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodies? (Who shall guard the guards?)
The aims of the new law are to protect the investor’s interests and related
122 See e e  Li Y.( 1995) Zhengquan Touzixue (Theories o f  Securities Investment), Beijing University, at 220,
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parties’ interests, to develop a healthy capital market in China12j. 
Therefore, investment funds themselves have been described as the 
guards of good corporate governance with their allegedly professional 
teams, rational investment behaviour and lower investment costs. These 
characteristics were expected to help stabilize the securities market, 
improve investment portfolios and help listed firms in their corporate
19 4governance. ~ However, can investment funds really achieve those kinds 
of goals under the new law? When we look at that question first we can 
focus on the investment funds structure to consider whether this is a 
balanced and efficient structure.
4.6.1 The problems of the fund manager
The fond manager is required to carry out the day to day management 
function of the investment funds. The law defines a fond manager’s 
obligation and duties in more detail as to what are, and what are not, the 
obligations of the manager in sections 19 and 20. Section 19 goes on to 
enumerate a number of matters which regulations may cover: requiring 
the keeping of records with respect to the transactions and financial 
position of the scheme and for the inspection of those records; requiring 
the preparation of reports with respect to the scheme. Compared to the
12j Securities Investment Funds Law 2003 ,Section I
124 "China's Open-End Fund Helps Liberalizing Dom estic Savings: Interview", available at the People’s Daily 
w ebsitc littp://cnglish.jjeoj?le.cowxn/enalish/200l07<'2 TiPiiJ3.!2 .00]
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1997 act there are some significant changes. For example the manager 
has the right to initiate an investor’s general meeting. In order to protect 
investor s interests, the securities investment funds law even offers the 
investor the right to sue for the funds custodian’s or funds manager’s 
wrongdoing which it is the first time the law to provide such a legal basis.
Yet it is still limited because it fails to specify any necessary substantive 
and procedural conditions of such an action. In addition, there are two 
basic duties placed on the fund manager. One is that as a normal company 
under the company law regulations, they have to increase returns for their 
company and its shareholders; on the other hand the managing company 
acts as a funds manger under the securities investment funds and contract 
law regulation, they have to take care of investment funds for the funds 
investor. This can give rise to a conflict or divergence of interests and 
requires cerebration of how the law deals with these issues.
4.6.2 The problems of the fund custodians
A fund custodian must be a commercial bank which has been authorized 
by CSRC and China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) and has
met the requirement of the securities investment funds law. According to
1 6 7
section 28 the fund custodian and the manager must be legal persons who 
are independent of each other. The main obligation of the fund custodian 
is safekeeping and supervision, compared to 1997 regulation the new law 
also provides the fund custodian with the right to initiate an investors’ 
general meeting, if fund custodian finds an investment decision made by 
manager which is against the law or the investment deed, the fund 
custodian should suspend the action and deliver this information to the 
CSRC and the funds manger, if this decision has already become effective, 
the fund Custodian also should tell this to the CSRC and the funds 
manger immediately.125
However, in practice, there are two main reasons which impact on those 
commercial banks to exercise such supervisions. First in China there are 
only a few major commercial banks which can satisfy the requirement to 
become fund custodians; however they have to face considerable market 
competition. An investment funds manager is an attractive customer for 
those banks. Because a fund manager has the right to choose a bank to 
hold a vast sum of funds that has been raised from the market. Under the 
increase market pressures, the fund custodians have to decide whether to 
lose those valuable customers or to ‘accept’ them. Secondly, fulfilling the 
role of fimds custodians is a completely novel function for China’s
1" Preliminary Securities Investment Fund Act 1997, Section 30
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commercial banks, it requires different professional knowledge to run it. 
As a result, the fund custodian has to develop a very good relationship 
with the fund manager. In the Chinese context this has strong guanxi 
implications. The fund custodian has no right to supervise the decision 
made by the fund manager, nor does it have the ability to understand 
whether or not the decision made by the fund manager has involved 
problems of related transactions, and whether or not the decision is in the 
interest of the funds investor. So far, there is no report on the fund 
custodian using his authority to fire the fund manager because of 
misconduct. However, given the inherited problem of the structures 
created by law, there is much room for negligence, incompetence and 
fraud.
4.6.3 The problems of fund holders
Generally speaking a fund holders’ general meeting can play a very
important role for investors to participate in investment as well as
allowing them to exercise various supervisory functions. However, it is
questionable whether this new law provides a practicable structure for
those investment funds holders. Under section 71, a fund holders’ general
meeting can decide to close investment funds, change the investment
funds type, and remove the funds custodians or funds manager. The
1 6 9
requirement for making those decisions is the agreement of more than 
two thirds of the attending fund holders which collectively represent 
above 50 percent of the total units. Although the new law provides the 
fund holders the right to initiate a fund holders’ general meeting, however, 
according the CSRC new guidlines Administrative Measures for the 
Operation of Securities Investment Funds (Zhengquan Touzi Jijing 
Yimzno Gnanli Banfa) which was published by the CSRC in 2004, fund 
holders can not initiate a fund holders’ general meeting directly. If they 
desire to do so, they have to apply to the fund manager to first decide 
whether to hold the meeting, but if the fund manager do not think it is 
necessary, then the fund holders have to apply to the fund custodians to 
decide. If the custodians still does not think it is necessary, then the fund 
holders can initiate a fund holders’ general meeting under their own name. 
The custodian also has the right to initiate a fund holders’ general meeting, 
but they also have to apply to the fond manager for approval, if the funds 
manager do not think it is necessary , but the custodian still insist that 
then the custodian can initiate a fond holders’ general meeting. According 
section 43 of the Administrative Measures for the Operation of Securities 
Investment Funds (Zhengquan Touzi Jijing Ynnzuo Guanli Banfa) the 
decision made by the investor’s general meeting will not come to effect 
until the CSRC ratifies it.
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Nevertheless, there is a problem with the process, if the fond holders plan 
to initiate a fond holders’ general meeting and to discuss the removal of 
the fonds manger or custodian, then the latter will not approve the general 
meeting. The manager or custodian will not allow this to happen. On the 
other hand even if the fond manager does not agree to initiate a fond 
holders’ general meeting, but the fond holders or the custodian still insist, 
finally there will be a fund holders’ general meeting. This is a tortuous 
journey to initiate a fond holders’ general meeting requiring investors to 
waste time and money. Therefore, this section is not very supportive of 
investors’ right. Additionally, it is a problem of not inconsiderable 
magnitude for the very large number of individual investors to initiate a 
general meeting. Even if this general meeting eventually takes place, the 
legal majority for a decision will be difficult to fulfil in the circumstance 
of most Chinese listed companies. As a result, in practice the fond 
holders’ general meeting offers little protection to investors.
4,6.4 The problem of the investment funds activities
With the Chinese stock markets wracked with short term share churning
and speculation, the government has hopes that investment fonds will not
only draw' people’s bank savings into equities, but also promote long-term
1 7 1
investment styles. Compared to individual investors, investment funds 
enjoy a major advantage as corporate monitors: they are large. They will 
tend to own a greater number of shares of an individual company than 
individual investors do.
The logic of these proposals is that investment funds will behave quite 
differently than dispersed individual investors. Because they own large 
blocks, and have an incentive to develop specialized expertise in making 
and monitoring investments, investment funds could play a far more 
active role in corporate governance than dispersed individual investors 
traditionally have done.
However, the sharpest accusation levelled against activist funds is that 
activism is designed to achieve a short-term payoff at the expense of 
long-term profitability.
I. The voting system
Perhaps the easiest way an institution can involve itself in the governance
of a company in which it has invested its clients’ funds is by actively
voting on resolutions put to the general meeting. The 2005 Company Law
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provided that shareholders representing not less than 3 per cent of the 
total voting rights may make proposals for resolutions. If the proposals 
relate to the issues that have already been contained in the notice of 
shareholders’ meeting, the shareholders may choose to present the 
proposals at the meeting, dispensing with the need to submit the 
proposals to the board of directors ahead of the meetings.126
Tradable shares amount to about one-third of all outstanding shares.127 Of 
these tradable shares, securities investment funds hold an average of 
about 15 percent.128 In a bunch of listed companies, the funds hold a 
larger proportion—in a few cases, as much as 50 to 70 percent—of
I TOtradable shares. ~ Though significant, institutional shareholding 
represents, therefore, only a relatively small stake in the portfolio 
companies.
Without minority protection mechanisms, the majority-voting rule will 
make it virtually meaningless for institutions to intervene on the issues
126 The Com pany Law 2005 , Art 103
127 In China, about one-third o f  shares can be publicly issued, owned by individuals and legal persons, and freely 
traded. These shares are known as individual person shares. Non-tradable shares are legal person shares and state 
shares. The Legal Person category, roughly one-third o f  every listed firm ’s equity is owned by dom estic shares 
institutions (stock com panies, non-bank financial institutions and SOEs with at least one non-state owner) and 
cannot be openly traded. Transfer o f  shares needs special approval from the government. Legal person shares were 
created in 1980s when SOEs were first turned into shareholding com panies. State shares another third o f  equity, is 
ow ned by the state (central and local government departments, as well as SOEs w holly owned by the state). The 
ultimate ow ner is the State Council. State shares cannot be traded, though they can be transferred to other market 
participants such as dom estic and foreign investors, with permission from the CSRC.
128 " Zhengjianhui Fuzeren jiu Gugai he IPO deng Wenti FabiaoTanhua” (C SR C ’s R esponsible Officers Gave Talks 
on Issues o f  the Share Structure Reform and IPO), Shanghai Zhengquan Bao (Shanghai Securities N ew s), April 28, 
2006.
120 China Know ledge Press, Fund Management in China (China Knowledge Press. Singapore,  2005).  a l l 27-128 
(" Fund M a naeem en t  in China").
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that the majority shareholder supports. Again, institutional investors 
generally are profit maximizers, they will not engage in an activity whose 
costs exceed its benefits. They are unlikely to be involved in day-to-day 
corporate matters. Thus investment funds lack the incentives to be active; 
they would be prone to follow the “Wall Street rule” of selling their stock 
when disappointed. Only in exceptional cases where investment funds are 
“ locked in” and cannot sell their shares are they willing to intervene.1,0
II Collective action and free-rider problems
Any positive share price effects from monitoring or intervening will be 
enjoyed by all shareholders regardless of whether or not they participate 
in (or contribute to) the monitoring. This means that if one or two 
investment funds spend resources intervening and (hopefiilly) increasing 
the value of a company’s shares, their competitors who also hold shares 
in that company can free-ride on their efforts -  their performance will 
improve along with that of the intervening institutions but they will have 
spent nothing in the process. For this reason, a rational fund manager will 
only spend time and resources on detailed monitoring or intervening at an 
investee company in limited circumstances.1’1
130 W ei.L., " Jigou Touzizhe Canyu Gongsi Zhili Wenti Yanjiu" (A  Study on the Institutional Investors'
Participation in Corporate Governance), in Gongsi Falv Pinglun (Company Law R eview ) , Gu G ongyun (ed.)
2003 .Shanghai People's Press, Shanghai, pp .113. 123-12.>.
Ibid.
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Ill Conflict of interests
The main argument in the West which has been put forward to explain the 
under-use by the institutions of the corporate governance rights is the 
conflicts of interest that arise at the institutional investor level.132 The 
interests of institutional investors and their controllers would often lead 
them to act in their own best interest and sacrifice shareholder value.133
Investment funds in China also suffer from conflicts of interests between 
fund managers and fund beneficiaries which inhibit their activities as 
monitors of portfolio companies. Many investment fund management 
companies are affiliated with -  in effect subsidiaries of and controlled by 
-  another financial institution, such as an investment bank or an insurance 
company. Managers in such funds may be reluctant to antagonize present 
or future clients of their parent company with their governance activities. 
Thus, the easiest and safest way to avoid any problems is for affiliated 
investment funds not to engage in governance activism at all.
132 B lack, B. S. (1990). "Shareholder Passivity Reexamined." M ichigan Law R eview  89(3): 595-608.:R ock, E. B. 
(1991). "The L ogic and (Uncertain) Significance o f  Institutional Shareholder Activism." Georgetown Law Journal 
79(3): 469-472 .
133 Camara, K. A. D. (2005). "Classifying Institutional Investors." Journal o f  Corporation Law 30: 219.; Romano, 




Institutional investors are expected to have a long term perspective and 
base investment decisions on the fundamental value of stocks. The 
authorities in China hope that with an enlarged institutional investor base 
and the increased professionalism of institutional investors, they will 
incur expense in intervening to correct mismanagement.
However, majority listed companies in China are mainly state-owned 
enterprises which are newly established shareholding companies upon 
transformation from the socialist enterprise system. Only about one-third 
of shares can be publicly issued, owned by individuals and legal persons, 
and freely traded. Though significant, institutional shareholding 
represents, therefore, only a relatively small stake in the portfolio 
companies. Without minority protection mechanisms, the majority-voting 
rule will make it virtually meaningless for institutions to intervene on the 
issues that the majority shareholder supports.
In addition institutional investors in China are asking the question “Who
shall guard the guards?” The interests of institutional investors and their
controllers would often lead them to act in their own best interest. Thus,
institutions often devoted little effort to monitoring management. This is
1 7 6
because they lack the willingness and ability to actively monitor and 
intervene. When the micro gaunxi and overriding political issues at a 
macro level are added to the firmament of corporate governance in this 
context it can be seen how highly contingent and institutionally specific 
are the stock markets of China and even those of developed economies 
like Germany and Japan.134 This has meant a number of varying problems 
in different jurisdictions for the role of institutional investors in corporate 
governance.135 In China’s case the problems are exacerbated by the 
political and cultural milieu in which the movement towards convergence 
with international norms in stock market regulation and listing rules has 
been introduced. Whilst, as MacNeil has asserted,136 such regulation did 
not challenge the governments’ role as controller of corporatized SOEs, 
the role of institutional investors in corporate governance could do. Only 
very recently has there been a slight increase in institutional shareholders 
bringing minority shareholder actions. This will be explored in Chapter 5.
134 See Baum s and Buxbaum (1994), supra note 33, at 8-10.
135 S ee for exam ple, Hadden T, "Corporate Governance by Institutional Investors? Som e Problems from an 
International Perspective"; and Hauck M, "The Equity Market in Germany and its Dependancy on the System  o f  
Old A ge Provisions" both in Baums, Buxbaum (1994), supra note 33.
116 M acN eil, M. I. (2002). " Adaptation and Convergence in Corporate Governance: 1 he Case o f  Chinese Listed 
Companies." Journal o f  Corporate Law Studies_2( 1): 289-344.
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Chapter 5 Minority shareholder protection
5.1 Protection of minority shareholders’ rights and interests: the 
theory in the West
From very early on in the corporate governance debate, some scholars1 
argued that “Many problems associated with the inadequacy of the theory 
of the firm can also be viewed as special cases of the theory of agency 
relationships” An agency relationship can be defined as a contract under 
which one or more persons (the principal) engage another person (the 
agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating 
some decision-making authority to the agent." Agency problems arise 
because contracts are not written and enforced without transaction costs. 
Agency costs include the costs of structuring, monitoring, and bonding a 
set of contracts among agents with conflicting interests. Agency costs 
also include the value of output lost because the costs of full enforcement 
of contracts exceed the benefits.4 They argued that the central problem of 
corporate governance was a “principal-agent” problem: how to get
1 W ilson, R. (1968). "Theory o f  Syndicates." Econometrica 36(1): 119-&.;Ross, S. A. (1973). "Economic Theory 
o f  A gency - Principals Problem." American Economic R eview  63(2): 134-139.; Ross, S.A . (1974). "The Econom ic 
Theory o f  A gency and the Principle o f  Similarity".in Balch, M„ D. M cFadden, et al. (1974). EsM>^..o.n, econom ic  
behavior under uncertainty. Amsterdam ; Oxford, North-Mol land Publishing Co.; Heckerman (1975). "Motivating 
Managers to Make Investment Decision." Journal o f  Financial Econom ics 2.
2 Jensen, M. C. and W. 11. M eckling (1976). "Theory o f  Firm - Managerial Behavior, A gency Costs and Ownership 
Structure." Journal o f  Financial Econom ics 3(4).
2 Ibid.
4 Berlc, A and G  C. M eans (1933). The Modern Corporation and Private Property. N ew  York, M acmillan.
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corporate managers to act as loyal and committed “agents” for the 
shareholders or “owners” of corporations.5 Berle and Means’ theory 
contends that manager and the owners of a firm do not have the same 
interests and motivation to make full and efficient use of corporate assets. 
The purpose of corporate governance is thus to align the interests of 
managers with that of the owners.6 Proponents such as Ross argued that 
“examples of agency are universal.”7
In a fundamental paper, La Porta et al. argue that stock market 
development should be positively correlated with shareholder legal 
protection.8 Shleifer and Wolfenzon formalize this argument with a model 
in which controlling shareholders sell out to diversify if their rights as 
portfolio investors are legally protected. Otherwise, they remain 
undiversified block holders in the companies they manage and consume 
what private benefits they can extract from their public shareholders.9
La Porta et al. measure shareholder rights by focusing on six specific 
legal rights shareholders have in the United States and counting how 
many of them shareholders have in other countries.10 They find that in the
5 Jensen. M. C. and M eckling W. H. (1976). Supra note 2.
6 Berle, A. and M eans G. C. (1933), Supra, note 4.
; Ross, S .A . (1973) Supra note I, at 134.
8 La Porta, R., F. L opezD eSilanes, el al. (1997). "Legal determinants o f  external finance." Journal o f  Finance 52(3): 
1131-1150.
° Shleifer. A. and D . W olfenzon (2002 ). "Investor protection and equity markets." Journal o f  Financial Econom ics 
66(1): 3-27.
10 This index adds one point if  the country lets shareholders mail in proxy votes, does not require shares to be 
deposited prior to a general shareholders' meeting, allow s cumulative voting or proportional representation o f
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1990s countries with stronger shareholder protection were characterized 
by larger stock markets and more diffusely held large corporations and 
that these countries tend to have legal systems derived from British 
common law. The common-law counties are Australia, Canada, England 
and Wales, Hong Kong, Ireland, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United 
States, and several African countries including Nigeria, and they clearly 
do have more widely held large firms than the other countries, all of 
which employ civil codes of one form or another. La Porta et al. conclude 
that diffuse ownership and shareholder capitalism require solid legal 
protection of public shareholders’ property rights in their investments.11
However, he fails to find any temporal correlation between changes in 
shareholder protection and ownership diffusion. Franks, Mayer, and Rossi 
argue that British shareholders had none of the legal rights La Porta et al, 
enumerate until 1948, and only attained their current level of protection in 
the final third of the twentieth century.12 Yet they find that the ownership 
of new British firms dispersed as quickly early in the twentieth century 
and in its latter decades. Chefflns has argued that the historical record in 
the US does not support la Porta’s thesis. At the turn of the 19/20th
minorities in the board, provides an oppressed minority remedy, lets an owner of 10  percent or less o f  the share 
capital call an extraordinary share holders’ meeting, or lets shareholders preemptive rights be voided only by a 
shareholders’ vote. La Porta et al (1997). Supra note 8 , at 1131.




centuries there were circa 500,000 equity investors and this rose to circa 5 
million by the early 1920s despite the fact that the major securities and 
minority shareholder protections were introduced in the 1930’s. This 
leaves open the question as to whether the introduction of minority 
remedies and investor protection today will help the diffusion of 
shareholdings along the US lines but he points to the German system 
which in the early 20th Century had far better minority shareholder and 
investor protection laws but where concentrated shareholdings remained 
the norm.13
Chefflns also argues that the UK experience casts doubt on the extent to 
which legal regulation matters in the corporate governance context. 
Rather, he argues that a highly specific set of laws governing companies 
and financial markets do not have to be in place for the development of 
dispersed ownership and strong securities markets. He argues that strong 
institutional structures can perform the function that the advocates of the 
Taw matters’ thesis say the legal system needs to play.14 From another 
perspective he also argues that there is historical evidence supporting the 
role of mergers and takeovers in the march towards a US style of 
separation and ownership, which in recent times, is influenced by
13 C'heffms B R, (2003) "Law as bedrock: The Foundations o f  an Econom y Dom inated by W idely held Companies 
" Oxford Journal o f  Legal Studies 23(1), 1-23.
14 Cheffins. B. R. (2001). "Does law matter? The separat ion o f  ownership and control in the United Kingdom." 
Journal o f  Legal Studies 30(2): 459-484.
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competition law in determining when such changing events occur15 and 
also that tax law has a part to play. According to Cheffins and Banks 
during the 20th century a system of outsider/arms length corporate 
governance took shape and became fully entrenched in the UK because 
taxation in terms of corporate profits, managerial income and investments 
and also inheritance taxes became burdensome for blockholders who 
sought to exit by selling their shares. Equally, tax incentives for 
institutional investors ensured that these other investors were willing to 
buy shares. For example, dividends were regarded as unearned income 
coming at the high end of tax rates for individual owner-directors 
whereas pension funds were tax exempt on their dividends16
Canadian shareholders had few of the shareholder rights until the 1960s, 
but Morck et al, find that Canadian corporate ownership grew widely 
dispersed by the middle of the twentieth century and that family- 
controlled pyramidal groups staged a roaring comeback at the century’s 
end and under unprecedented strong shareholder rights laws.17 France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Sweden all had economically 
very important stock markets off and on through their history-especially 
at the beginning of the twentieth century, as noted by Raj an and
15 Cheffins, B. R. (2003). "Competition Law and Corporate Ownership Structure : A European Research Agenda." 
European B usiness Organisation Law R eview  4: 3-30.
16 Cheffins. B. R. and S. A. Banks (2007). "Corporate Ownership and Control in the UK : The Tax Dimension."
Modern Law Review: 778-811.
Zingales.18 Even today in the US, where private benefits of public 
companies is low,19 some notable large companies, including Microsoft, 
Walmart, Coco-Cola and Intel, have relatively high ownership 
concentration. Indeed there were many large family controlled companies 
in the US until the 1980s.20
Again, Mark Roe has advocated political economy-based theories.21 
According to Roe, political economy-based theories are better than the 
legal origins theory in explaining that politics affects whether policy 
makers want to, and can, build financial markets.22 With respect to 
ownership concentration, Roe argues that because social democracies 
prefer the interests of other constituencies to those of shareholders, they 
will pressure corporate managers to subordinate shareholder interests, and 
only concentrated large shareholders can effectively compel managers to 
resist these pressures.23
In addition, the theory of asymmetric information provides a much more
Zingales, L. and R. G  Raj an (2003). "Banks and Markets: The Changing Character o f  European Finance." 
N B E R  Working Paner No. W 9595. Available at SSRN: http://ssm .com /abstract=391131
19 An indication is the low  premium o f  5.4% enjoyed by voting shares. See Lease, R. C„ J. J. M cConnell, et al. 
(1983). "The Market Value o f  Control in Publicly-traded Companies." Journal o f  Financial Econom ics 1.1: 439.
Hall. P. D. (1988). "A Historical O verview  o f  Family Business in the United States." Fam ily  Bus iness R eview  
l ( l) .; s e e  also A strakan..!. I I. and M. C. Shanker (2003). "Myths and Realities:Fam ily B usinesses Contribution to 
the US Economy." Family Buisiness R eview  9(2): 107 - 123.
21 R oe, M. J. (2000). "Political preconditions to separating ownership from corporate control." Stan lordJLaw 
R eview  53(3): 539-606.; Roe, M.J., (2006), "Legal Origin and M odem  Stock Markets", J Olin Centre for Law, 
E conom ics, and B usiness D iscussion P aper,Harvard Law School, Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com /abstract~908972.
22 Ibid.
^  Roe, M.J.,  (2000),  supra notc’21, at 603.
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plausible explanation of missing markets. This idea has found many 
applications in the financial markets over the last 30 years. Akerlof 
shows how this phenomenon can prevent a market from being established. 
The basic problem is that when individuals have access to private 
information that is known only to them or their close associates, they 
become information monopolist. Adverse selection can prevent a market 
becoming established or lead to a low-quality market. Moral hazard and 
other problems can also precipitate a suboptimal outcome.24 After the 
Enron case and the WorldCom case, many scholars"' considered that 
investors’ trust in the securities markets is very important. La Porta, 
Rafael and Shleifer stress more fundamental legal system differences 
turning on judicial independence, disclosure, and securities laws.26 Now, 
a global recession has now become the biggest threat to many companies 
all over world. The international financier George Soros blames this on 
what he calls "‘market fundamentalism”.
“The economics profession has developed theories of "random 
walks" and "rational expectations" that are supposed to account for 
market movements. That's what you learn in college. Now, when
-4 Akerlof, G. A. (1970). "Market for Lem ons - Quality Uncertainty and Market Mechanism." Quarterly Journal o f  
E conom ics 84(3): 488-500.
25 Stout, L. A., (2 0 0 2 ) , "The Investor Confidence G am e". UCLA School o f  Law, Research Paper N o. 02-18. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abs1rac1-322301; Tamar Frankel (1999) .Trusting And Non-Trusting:
Comparing Benefits, Cost And Risk, available at http://papers.ssm .com /sol3/papers.cfm 7abstract_id-214588;La 
Porta. R., F. L opez-D e-S i 1 anes, et al. (2002). "Investor protection and corporate valuation." Journal o f  Finance 
57(3): 1147-1170.
26 La Porta, R„ F. Lopez-De-Si lanes, et al. (2008). 'T h e  economic consequences o f  legal origins." Journal  o f  
Economic Literature 46(2):  285-332.
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you come into the market, you tend to forget it because you realize 
that that's not how the markets work.”27
In addition to the question of whether the law matters in relation 
concentrated shareholdings and their effect on corporate governance is 
the question of to what extent, if any, minority shareholder protection 
laws discipline management behaviour. Coffee, for example, considers 
minority shareholder protection to be an effective weapon in this regard. 
According to Coffee and Swhwartz, the derivative action deters 
managerial misconduct and thereby reduces the agency costs inherent in 
corporate management.28 However, Fischel and Bradley have doubted the 
effectiveness of litigation arguing that it is far from obvious that 
managerial liability in shareholder litigation will reduce agency costs. 
This is because other measures of corporate governance have already 
encouraged managers to act in shareholders’ best interests. Additionally 
liability rules play little or no role in creating incentives for beneficial 
conduct.29 Other commentators have pointed out that it is virtually 
impossible to empirically assess the benefits of deterrence of corporate 
wrongdoing because it does not result in positive actions for
27 Schifferes,S .(2008) "Soros warns global boom is over", BBC Business N ew s report, 19 May, available at 
Http:/7N e\vs.bbc.co.uk,/2/h i/busi ness/7408620, stin.
28C offee ,J . C. and D. E. Schwartz (1981). "The Survival o f  the D erivative Suit - an Evaluation and a Proposal for 
L egislative Reform." Columbia Law Review' 81(2): 261-336.
29 Fischel. D. R. and M. Bradley (1986). "The Role o f  Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law ;
A Theoretical and Empirical Analvsis."  Cornell Law Review 71(2): 262.
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examination/’0 Romano, in particular, points out that for circa 200 such
actions commenced in the Delaware courts, only one makes it to a full 
court hearing on the substantive issues thereby laying down legal 
guidelines for appropriate conduct. The rest are settled.31 Miller has 
argued that there are important differences in terms of disciplining 
management between the England and the US which are politically 
derived. According to him the differences in costs, traceable to the tort of 
champerty in England and the limits on the market for control in the US 
have resulted in minority shareholder litigation playing a more important 
role in the US whilst the market for corporate control is more effective in 
disciplining management in England. In the latter jurisdiction there have 
been very few derivative actions especially those involving listed 
companies.32 Whilst there have been a large number of minority 
shareholder actions based on the unfair prejudice remedy, except for a 
very few instances,33 they have been concerned with smaller, usually 
private companies for which the provision was originally designed.34
30 See for exam ple, Thom pson, R. B. and R. S. Thomas (2004). "The Public and Private Face o f  Derivative 
Lawsuits." Vanderbilt Law R eview  57(5): 1747-1793.
31 Romano, R. (1991). "The Shareholder Suit - Litigation without Foundation." Journal o f  Law Econom ies & 
Organization 7(1): 55-87.
32 Miller, G. (1998). "Political Structure and Corporate Governance: Som e Points o f  Contrast between the United 
States and England." Columbia Business Law Review (1): 52. For an exam ple o f  a major UK derivative action 
which w as brought by an institutional investor, see Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newm an Industries ltd [1982] 
Ch 204, CA.
33 See for exam ple. Re Blue Arrow ole [1987] BCLC585; Re Tottenham Hotspur pic [1994] 1 BCLC 655; Re 
A stec (B SR ) pic [1998] 2 BCLC 556. In the latter case Jonathen Parker J explained that the concept o f  legitimate 
expectation has no place in the context o f  public companies.
^A lthough the unfair prejudice remedy was designed with the small company in mind several instances o f  its use 
in public com panies have been made. N ow  the Companies Act 2006, s 995 allow s for a petition by the Secretary o f  
State in circum stances which could cover a public company. The vast majority o f  reported cases concern smaller 
private com panies which is similar to the situation in Asian jurisdictions where similar provisions apply, see 
Lawton, P. (2007) "M odeling the Chinese Family Firm and Minority Shareholder Protection: The (long Kong 
Experience 1980-1995" Managerial Law 49; Salim, M. R. and P. Lawton (2008). "Law in a Post -Colonial State:
186
In the context of the UK, Reisberg argues that the derivative action is not 
just another corporate asset in the context of serious breaches of directors’ 
duties but is a mechanism of corporate accountability. The derivative 
action also has sufficient relevance to merit independent existence rather 
than moving towards a single form of action under the unfair prejudice 
remedy. That is if the central issue of costs can be tackled to make the 
action financially worthwhile. He proposes action on three 
complementary levels, first at the conceptual level a Functional and 
Focused model to govern derivative litigation, secondly, the strategic 
level whereby the employment of appropriate incentives and fee rules to 
advance the premise behind the conceptual model and thirdly, 
maintaining doctrinal consistency by clarifying the interaction between 
the derivative action and the unfair prejudice remedy.35
5.2 Protection of minority shareholders’ rights and interests: law and 
practice in China
5.2.1 The role of the market
The Chinese regulatory body adopted policies based on La Porta's 
scholarship on the positive link between capital market development and
The Shareholder Oppression Remedy in Malaysia." Global Jurist Frontiers 8(1): 1-21.
35 See Reisbera, A. (2007). Oerivative actions and corporate governance : theory and operation. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press.
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public shareholder protection.36 The reformers in China believe that stock 
market mechanisms are more efficient at rationalizing productive assets 
than the intermingling of government administration and enterprise 
management.37 An active market for corporate control is considered to be 
essential for the efficient allocation of resources. This market allows able 
managers to gain control of sufficient shares in a short period of time to 
remove inefficient managers. However, the reality is very different in 
China. China’s market suffers from a lack of liquidity and an active 
corporate control market does not exist in China.
5.2.2 The structure of the ownership
Basically, there are three categories of shares issued by China’s A-share 
listed companies, each with different rights, benefits and prices: state 
shares, legal-person shares, and individual person shares.
About one-third of shares can be publicly issued, owned by individuals 
and legal persons, and freely traded. These shares are known as
76 See generally La Porta, R., F. Lopez-D e-Silanes, et al. (2000). "Investor protection and corporate governance." 
Journal o f  Financial Econom ics 58(1-2): 3 -2 7 .;  La Porta. R. et al. (1997). supra note 8 , (postulating that poor
investor protections result in capital markets that are both smaller and narrower). In a speech given at the 
International Seminar on Investor Protection in June 2002, Zhou Xiaochuan. then the Chairman o f  the CSRC, 
specifically  mentioned that "foreign research proves that the better investor protections in a country or a region, 
the better developed the capital market (in that country or region), and the stronger its capability to resist financial 
risks.” Zhou Xiaochuan, Baohu Touzizhe Quanyi Shuli Touzizhe Xinxin Guanxi Zhongda (To Protect Investors' 
Rights and Interests and to Build Up Investors' Confidence Are Critical), Zhegquan Shibao (Securities Times) 
(P.R.C.). June 26, 2002. available a t http://news.xinhuanet.eom /fortune/2002-06/26/content_457416.htm  
37 See Xu, J. (1987). "The state-share System: A New  Avenue for China's Hconomic Reform." Journal o f  
C om parative Econom ics. 11(3): 513.
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individual person shares (geren gu).
About one-third of company’s equity is made up of state shares (guojia 
gu). The ultimate owner is the State Council, but these shares are 
managed by bureaus of the Ministry of Finance (MOF, previously by the 
State Asset Management Administration), as well as by SOEs wholly 
owned by the state. Only representatives of the state can own them, and 
they are not freely tradable: authorisation is required from the MOF to 
transfer them. ’
Legal person shares (faren gu) make up the final third of the average 
listed firm’s equity structure. Only legal persons can own them. The 
legal-person shares are usually held by state-owned or controlled 
enterprises. Some Legal person shares are also held by government 
bureaus (which has created much confusion over the exact difference 
with state shares). They cannot be traded on the stock market, although 
they can be transferred between legal persons subject to the agreement of 
the stock exchange where the firm is listed. It was only, however, after 
August 2000 that such transfers became popular. In 2003 the government 
set up an agency SASAC to act an investor on behalf of the state in 196 
large SOEs. These own 6.9 trillion in assets and represent 2.5 trillion of
-,s Green. S. (20<U). China's stockm arkct: a guide to its progress,.p layers and prospects. London. Profile at 30.
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owners’ equity. Those SOEs not owned by State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) are subject to 
local government established bureaus- Bureau of sate asset management 
(BSAM) to manage state assets. Over 32 such provincial agencies have 
approved so far. As indicated in chapter 3 this makes it more likely that 
the government will sell of those SOEs that are problematic, however, 
whilst these agencies are tasked with separating government function 
from enterprise management and thereby relieve themselves from social 
and public duty burdens, being staffed with bureaucrats and party 
officials government and political interference continues through SASAC 
and BSAMs.39
It was not unusual for between 60% and 80% of the shares of Chinese 
listed companies to be state owned, especially in strategic areas. Often 
such control is exercised through a wholly state owned enterprise (SOE) 
out of which the listed company had been spun off. The Shanghai Stock 
Exchange in 2003 noted that:
“A prominent characteristic of Chinese listed companies is an 
overwhelmingly large percentage of non-tradeable shares, which 
represent about 2/3 of all the listed company’s combined equity.
39 Tan, L. I I. and J. G. Wang (2007). "M odelling an Effective Corporate Governance System  For China's Listed 
State-owned Enterprises: Issues and Challenges in a I ransitional Economy. JyiuiPilLLlLCorjypi a t e Studies 
7(143): 175.
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The tradeable shares represent the remaining 1/3. A majority of 
listed company’s non-tradeable shares are 60%-80% of their total 
number of shares. A few companies have more than 90% shares 
not tradeable. About 6% of all the listed companies have more 
than 40% of their total equity in tradeable shares. Only 0.4% of all 
listed companies have only tradeable shares. On average, the 
larger the size of the company, the higher the percentage of state 
shares, which demonstrates that large listed companies are 
essentially state-owned.”40
A survey by a group of scholars from the World Bank demonstrates that 
parent SOEs control the boards of listed SOEs.41 At the end of 2001, 
government agencies and state-owned enterprises, who owned 68% of the 
shares, occupied 69% of the board seats. On the other hand, tradable A- 
share holders, having ownership of 30%, appointed only 4% of the board 
seats.42 At the end of 2005, among the country’s 1,400-plus listed 
companies, the number controlled or held by the state was near 900, 
accounting for 65% of the total. The State shares and Legal Person shares 
in these companies total more than 340 billion, accounting for 74% of the 
total non-tradable shares and making up 64% of the total share capital of
40 Shanghai Stock Exchange. China Corporate Governance Report 2003 -  Executive Summary, at 8 . available at 
http://72.14.203. l 0 4 /search?q=cache:ZzgLIt8 VlvOJ:rru.worldbank.org/Discussions/O.
41 Tenev. S., and Zhang, C. L. (with Brefort, L.) (2002). Corporate G overnance and Enterprise R eform in China: 
Building the Institutions o f  Modern Markets .Washington DC. World Bank and the International Finance 
Corporation. 83 -8 6 .
42 Ibid at 83-84
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companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock exchanges.4'’ 
Despite the process of corporatisation, the state still holds the majority of 
shares across the 1,600 companies currently listed on the Chinese stock 
exchanges.
I. The problems of this ownership structure
The large proportion of non-traded state and legal-person shares has 
created a number of problems. The ownership structure makes it very 
difficult to establish an efficient takeover market and a primary stock 
market.
First, in the main movements in share price are caused by trading among 
individual shareholders, which is often conducted on a speculative and 
random basis. Much blame has been placed on the non-tradability of state 
shares.44 Because state shares are not tradable, their prices remain 
constant and do not react to fluctuations in the market.45
Secondly, the non-tradability of large blocks of shares means that
43 "China’s Transfer o f  Slate Shares to SSF Under Way", SinoCast China Business Daily N ew s, 1.3 March 2006.
44 See Qiu,X. (2004), "Eight Dangers in the Split between Tradable and Non-tradable Shares", China Securities. 12 
January , available at Http://wvvvwcs.com .cn /csnew s/20040112/457126.asp (in Chinese), See also article 1(2), 
Guiding O pinions Concerning the Reform o f  Non-Tradable Shares in Listed Com panies (adopted by the C'SRC, 
State-Owned A ssets Supervision and Administration Com mission, Fiscal Ministry', Central People s Bank and 
M inistry o f  Com merce on 23 August 2005).
45 T am .O . K. (2002). "Ethical issues in the evolution o f  corporate governance in China." T m rn a U f Biisines^
Ethics 37(3): 305.
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directors are insulated from market discipline. Controlling shareholders 
have monopolist position and influence so they can easily control or 
dominate the nomination and appointment of directors and senior 
management officers and virtually preclude other shareholders from 
participation in making operating decisions. Thus, directors have little 
need to account for their decisions or behave responsibly.46 Why worry if 
there is no threat to their jobs? When State shares are non-transferable, 
management expects to be always in control and they see the making of 
good relations with government officers as being of first importance.
Third, as La Porta concludes, “... the central agency problem in large 
corporations around the world is that of restricting expropriation of 
minority shareholders by controlling shareholders...”47 The controlling 
large shareholders have frequently intervened in the operations of the 
listed firms to benefit their parent companies, using the listed firms to 
guarantee loans for related entities and exposing the listed firms to 
unnecessary financial and operating risks. They are frequently engaging 
in benefit transfer through misappropriation of funds or related-party 
transactions to expropriate listed companies and infringe upon the
46 M iles, L. and Z. Zhong (2006). "Improving corporate governance in state-owned corporations in China which
way forward." Journal o f  corporate law studies: 229.
47 La Porta, R„ F. Lopez-de-Silanes. et al. (1999). "Corporate ownership around the world." Journal o f  Finance 
54(2): 471-517.
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interests ot other shareholders, the public investors in particular.48 For 
example, in 2001, the largest shareholder of Meierya — a then profitable 
company — colluded with other insiders to embezzle US$44.6 million, 
41% of the company’s total equity. In the same year, the largest 
shareholder of Sanjiu Pharma, a one-time blue chip in China, extracted 
US$309.1 million, 96% of the listed company’s total equity. In addition, 
in a 2003 report on China’s corporate governance problems, the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange concluded that:
“[The]..shareholding structure of Chinese companies is 
problematic. First, the institution for implementing state 
shareholder’s rights is unsatisfactory. Either the government exerts 
too much influence on listed companies and the company’s 
objective is affected by political considerations, or there is a lack of 
monitoring on the shareholders, resulting in insider control in the 
form of misuse of company assets and [pursuit] of private 
objectives.” 49
Russell also reports that in early 2004 nearly two-thirds of companies'
48 In addition, controlling large shareholders or parent com panies have often manipulated the profits o f  the listed
firms or transferred huge amounts o f  expenses or losses to the listed firms through relate-party transactions and
arbitrary transfer pricing. A s a result, quite a number ot Chinese listed com panies turned into operating losses
shortly after their listing in the stock market and brought about significant losses to public investors. See, e.g.Zu, J.
1 1 .  M. 1 .iu, et al. (2007). "The developm ent o f  corporate governance in China." The Company Lawyer 28(7): 200. 
“9 Shanghai Stock Exchange. China Corporate Governance Report 2003 — Executive Summary, supra note 40.
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issued shares were held by controlling shareholders in the form of state 
bodies and other legal persons in China, and this has had the effect of 
distorting share prices and creating a conflict of interest between the large 
and small shareholders.50
II Reforming the split share structure
For the past several years, the government has made attempts to reform 
the split structure of the stock market. The latest reform was initiated in 
2005. The move in reforming the split share structure was a pilot ‘full 
flotation’ scheme that is to be adopted with a limited number of listed 
companies which have a smaller size of state shareholding. It is stated in 
Article 3 of Measures for Administration of Split Share Structure Reform 
of Listed Companies that:
“split share structure reform of listed companies shall be subject to 
the principles of openness, equality and fairness, and conducted by 
the relevant shareholders of the A share market on the basis of 
equal consultation, good faith and mutual understanding and 
independent decision-making.”51 
The first four companies selected to cany out the pilot program were
50 Russell,M .E. (February 2004), " The People’s Republic o f  C h in a-V isit Report: Banking 011 R eform ", available 
at w ww.citlon.co.uk/pdf/features/China Report2.04.pdf.
51 2005 Adm inistrative Measures on the Split Share Structure Reform o f  Listed Companies, Chapter 1 . Article 3, 
CSRC, available at h t t p : / / w w v v . c s r c .gov.cn/n575458/n40019 48 /n 4002120/4069846.html
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announced on May 9, 2005.52 The program rapidly expanded, and by 
early 2006 shareholders had approved the reform proposals of nearly a 
quarter of China’s listed companies.53
The split share structure reform was prompted by economic 
considerations.54 An economic scholar who was head of the Chinese 
securities law amendment drafting team even went so far as to state that 
the “the split share structure is a problem of the legacy of Chinese policy 
and not a legal problem”.55
The program has three main features, first it attempts to be flexible rather 
than impose a one-size-fits-all solution; secondly it leaves the final 
decision to shareholders (especially the owners of tradable shares); and 
thirdly, it tries to deal with short-term market volatility/6
However, China’s stock exchanges were not established to promote 
privatization of the state-controlled economy, but were conversely 
designed to strengthen the state’s ability to allocate capital. For example
52 Three o f  these four com panies (Hebei Jinniu Energy Resources, Sany Heavy Industry', and Shanghai Zi Jiang)
received approval from shareholders for their reform proposals, but one company(Tsinghua T ongfangfs initial 
proposal was rejected. See Cooper, M. C. (2007). "New Thinking in Financial Market Regulation: D ism antling the 
"Split Share Structure" o f  Chinese Listed Companies." Journal o f  Chinese Political Science 13(1): 60. 
x! Cooper, M .C.(April 2008), Ibid.
54 Lee, S. L. (2008). "From Non-Tradable to Tradable Shares: Split Share Structure Reform o f  China's Listed  
Companies." Journal o f  Corporate Law  Studies 8( 1).
55 Tan Xiao, Gu quan fen zhi gai ge la lu san lun (Legal D iscussion o f  Split Share Structure Reform)
(C h i n a I a w i ti fo. 2005).
54 Takeshi. I. (2005). "Reform o f  China's Split Share Structure Takes Shape." Nomura Capital Market Review  8(3).
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Liuhongru, Vice Minister of State, Commission for Restructuring the 
Economic System, explained that “[w]hat we resolutely oppose is 
privatization. But we do not because of that oppose a stock-holding 
system”.57
Thus, the key obstacle to implementing a ‘full flotation’ scheme is the 
controversy over pricing-while the Government wants to sell these shares 
at the market value at which the tradable shares now trade, the investors, 
concerned about the prospect that their current holdings will be diluted 
when flows of state shares pour into the market, expect huge discounts. 
These understandably, entail some difficult tasks in the short run.58
5.2.3 The role of the state
The state has incentive to keep enough equity interest so it can achieve its 
policy goals easily through the listed firm vehicle. First, the role of 
raising equity capital for SOEs following conversion to the corporate 
form was important. The state does not only want the enterprises it owns
57 Cao, L, (1995). "The Cat that Catches Mice:China's Challenge to the Dominant Privatization Model " Brooklyn 
Journal o fln tern ational Law 21(97).
58 Leng, J. (2006), The interaction between domestic and overseas capital markets and coiporate governance o f  
Chinese listed com panies in Norton, J. J., J. Rickord. ot a!.. Eds. (20061. Corporate governance Post-Fnron: 
Comparative and international Perspectives, British Institute oflnternational and comparative law, at 451.
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to be run efficiently, but also serves role includes such as the maintenance 
of urban employment levels, direct control over sensitive industries, or 
politically motivated job placement.59 The dominance of the Chinese 
Communist Party: The Central Committee of the Communist Party has 
declared that “[t]o meet the needs of a modern enterprise system and to 
survive and grow amidst fierce competition, SOEs must build a 
contingent of highly qualified managers and nurture a large number of 
skilled entrepreneurs. The Party must manage and supervise its SOE 
cadres.’'60 The Central Committee also highlighted the central role of the 
party in China’s socialist market economy by describing it as follows:
“Strengthening and improving the Party leadership is the 
fundamental guarantee for speeding up the reform and 
development of SOEs. To manage well SOEs in general, efforts 
must be made to establish a leadership system and organisational 
and managerial system in them that conforms to the law of the 
market economy and China’s actual situation, to strengthen the
59 Thus, w e should understand as internally contradictory various proposals for the state to retain ownership o f  
certain enterprises but to run them entirely on profit-oriented lines. Tenev and Zhang (2002) supra note 40. go even  
further by suggesting that the state’s current equity stake be replaced by an interest akin to nonvoting preferred 
stock.The problem o f  continuing state ownership o f  enterprises cannot be finessed so easily. Nonvoting preferred 
stock might be a good investm ent in the right circumstances.but it is hard to see why a policy maker who believes 
that state ownership ought to mean som ething would be satisfied with it or why the state should com mit itself 
never to sell it. Indeed, in replacing its equity stake with nonvoting preferred stock, the state would be giving up its 
ability to use control not just to pursue noneconom ic goals, but also to defend itself from exploitation by 
m anagement or controlling shareholders or even to exploit other shareholders for its own econom ic benefit.
■° The Com munist Party's concern with increasing the quality o f  management personnel in state owned enterprises 
is w ell known and this concern clearly extends to majority state owned listed companies; see further, “The 
D ecision o f  the Central Committee o f  the Communist Party o f  China on Major Issues Concerning the Reform and 
D evelopm ent o f  State-Owned Enterprises”, Adopted at the Fourth Plenum o f  the I5‘h CPC Central Committee on 
September 22, 1999.at 9.
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building of their leadership, and to adhere to the principle of 
relying on the working class wholeheartedly.”61
The central role of the Party in Chinese listed companies has recently 
been strengthened in the 2005 amendments to the PRC Company Law.62 
The emphasis on the import role of the Chinese Communist Party was 
stressed in answers to other questions. The Party’s role is central within 
most listed Chinese companies and Art 19 of the Company Law (as 
amended in 2005 ) provides that:
“In accordance with the Constitution of the Communist Party of 
China, the organization of the Communist Party of China shall be 
established in a company so as to carry out the activities of the 
Communist Party. The company shall provide its communist 
organization with conditions necessary for carrying out its 
activities.”
It is often the case that the Chairman of the company is also the Party 
Secretary of the local Communist Party branch within the company, 
effectively fusing managerial and political control in one office. Often the
61 Ibid. at plO. However, it has been said that the Party has long had difficulties in dealing with corrupt 
practices involving its members: see further, Lu, X. (2000). Cadres and corruption : the organizational involution  
o f  the Chinese Com munist Party. Stanford, Calif. ; [Great Britain], Stanford University' Press. See also,D ickson, B.
J. (2003). Red capitalists in China • the party, private entrepreneurs, and prospects for political change. Cambridge ; 
N ew  York. Cambridge University Press.
6" Art 19 o f  the 2005 version o f  the Company Law (amended in October 2005) is much stronger than the 
equivalent provision (Art 17) o f  the 1994 version
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manager is also the trade union official.
Lack of capital is another biggest risk facing many China's state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). Thus, the stock market in China was organized by the 
government as a vehicle for its SOEs to raise capital and improve 
operating performance.63 As Wu, an eminent economist with the State 
Council put it: "In the eyes of some government officials and SOE leaders, 
the function of the stock market is to help enterprises raise cash and bail 
them out."64
In 1990 and 1991, China’s two stock exchanges — the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges were opened with great fanfare. In slightly 
over seventeen years, China’s stock market has grown to become one of 
the largest in Asia (second only to the Japanese market) with market 
capitalization of close to US$500 billion. About 1,400 firms have gone 
IPO and raised close to 800 billion RMB (around US$100 billion). 
Corporate China, especially the SOEs has benefited greatly from rapid 
equity issuance growth and public enthusiasm for the equity market due 
to a lack of other attractive investment vehicles. China now boasts 1,600 
listed companies, more than 130 securities firms, over 100,000
63 Su, D . (2004). "Leverage, insider ownership, and the underpricing o f  IPOs in China." Journal o f l n ternational
Financial Markets. Institutions and M oney 14(1).
64 W U, J. L. (1994). Xiandan Gongsi Yu Give Gaiae (M odem Companies and Hnterprise Reform ). Tianjin, Tianjin 
Renmin Chubanshe. at 185.
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practitioners, and over 70 million investor accounts. The state therefore 
wants to continue to be involved in the build up of the Chinese stock 
market. However, such state involvement creates a conflict of interest 
between the state as controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. 
Even worse, the state is playing two roles at the same time — controlling 
shareholders and regulators.
Secondly, one other important use of the market has been to raise 
revenues for the government budget. China imposed a six rmb per 
thousand rmb stamp tax on stock transactions when its stock markets 
were created since 1990. Driven by the huge transaction volume, China's 
securities stamp tax revenue more than doubled in 2006 to 17.95 billion 
yuan (2.24 billion U.S. dollars) and skyrocketed 516 percent to 12.1 
billion yuan in the first quarter of 2007.6~ The tax rate was later 
readjusted a couple of times. China has collected more than 100 billion 
yuan (some 12 billion US dollars) in stamp tax on stock transactions since 
then.66 The then Primeminister Zhu had plans to offload more than 1 
trillion yuan of state-held shares in listed SOEs in 2001 — and much of 
the funds were to be used to finance an ambitious unemployment, 
medical and old-age insurance program. However, since June 2001, the
63 See "China raises stamp tax on securities to cool stock market" available at
h ttp ://B nglish .peop ledaily .com .cn /200705/30 /eng20070530_379116 .h tm l.
66 See " China lowers stamp tax imposed on securities transaction" , available at
http ://E nglish .peopledaily .com .cn/200501/24/eng200oO l 24 1 / 1690.htm l.
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share prices of China’s stock market have been moving in the opposite 
direction to the strong growth trend of the country’s economy. The 
shanghai Composite Index, which covers yuan-denominated A-shares 
67and hard currency denominated B-shares,68 fell 14 per cent in 2004 and 
experienced a free-fall to a six-year low on 1 February 2005. Meanwhile, 
the Shenzheng Composite Index has been at its lowest level since 1997.69 
Then, the government halved the tax rate from 0.2 percent to 0.1 percent 
in a bid to boost the depressed equity market in 2005.
Third, it is also important not to assume that the stockmarket has become 
the dominant source of funding for industry. Chinese listed companies 
prefer equity financing over debt financing. Issuing shares to raise capital 
has been an enduring favourable option for these firms, as compared to 
bank loans and corporate bonds. Many listed companies have regarded 
the stock exchanges as places for a ‘money grab’ (‘QuanQian’) and do 
not care about investor rights. Instead, they rarely pay dividends and 
often provide false information. The market remains dysfunctional as the 
mechanism for protecting investors’ rights has yet to be fully established 
and enforced./0
67 D om estically listed shares, denominated in Renminbi, originally could only be owned by Chinese citizens. With 
the introductionof the QFII schem e in 2002 they can now be owned by approved foreign institutional investors.
“ D om estically listed shares o f  China-incorporaled companies, denominated in U S$ in Shanghai and HK$ in 
Shenzhen. Initially reserved for foreign investors, starting from March 2001, mainlanders can trade B shares as 
w ell. However, they must trade with legal foreign currency accounts.
69 Asia Pulse/XIC ‘Shanghai Stock Market Hits Six-yea'- F ow ’ Asia Times Online (2 Feb 2005), available at Asia
Times Online imp: . v- vvw\atiitH s^.LX'>ni/'at iines.T'.'limti/CiB02Ad0MlU.Tll-
70 Asia Pulse/XIC ‘China M oves to Cage its Rampaging Bears’ Asia Times Online (20 Jan 2005). available at A sia
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5.2.4 The role of the Securities Regulatory Commission
I The listing system and regulatory corruption
In October 1992 the State Council formed the Securities Committee and 
its executive arm, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), 
to take charge of overall supervision and regulation of the securities 
market in China. In April of 1998, and as part of the State Council 
structural adjustment, the SCSC and CSRC were merged into one single 
authority - the China Securities Regulatory Commission - as the sole 
State Council securities regulatory authority responsible for the uniform 
administration and supervision of securities and futures markets 
throughout the country.
In theory, the securities market principal watchdog - China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC), should assume the primary 
responsibility of supervising and monitoring the stock market by 
promoting good behaviour and truthful disclosure and by punishing 
wrongdoers. The main duties, powers and functions of the CSRC are 
defined by the Securities Law,71 and include rule-making, regulations, 
supervision and administration, and investigation and imposition of
Tim es Online hltir/VaiimesOI .atim esxN )ni/aliines/C hina/(j,A 20A d^2Jhim j 
’’ See Article 179 o f  the Securities Law 20(b .
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penalties.
Initially, when performing the above duties, the CSRC had the power to 
investigate and to gather evidence; to question the parties to any case or 
other related units or individuals; to inspect and make copies of securities 
documents or seal them up for safekeeping; to investigate fund accounts 
and securities accounts of the parties to a case or other related units or 
individuals, and, where necessary, to apply to a court to have funds and 
securities frozen. These power are now expanded by the revised 
Securities Law to include the power to conduct on-site inspection of 
issuers, listed companies, securities companies, securities investment 
fund management companies, securities services organisations, stock 
exchanges an securities registration and settlement organisations, the 
power to freeze or seize corporate or individual capital, stocks, bank 
accounts any other property or evidential materials in cases of suspected 
illegal activity (without the need to go through a court, but in accordance 
with its own Implementation Measures on the Power to Freeze and Seize 
[Assets], issued by CSRC on 30 December 2005), and the power to 
suspend for 15 days the trading activity of persons suspected of stock 
manipulation or insider trading, with a permissible 15 day extension for 
complicated cases. 72 No unit or individual under examination or
72 Ibid.
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investigation may refuse to co-operated with the authority or obstruct the 
investigation or conceal information.73 Further, the CSRC is authorised to 
share information with other financial supervision and administration 
authorities of the State Council, and all relevant state authorities are 
required to cooperate with the CSRC in its performance of its supervision, 
inspection and investigation functions.74
In order to monitor compliance by listed companies with its Regulations, 
the CSRC introduced a “checkpoint system” in 2001. The “Rules on The 
Examination of Listed Companies 2001” provide that these checkpoints 
include an examination of the governance structure, the financial affairs, 
use of company funds and the disclosure of information by the company. 
The CSRC may also carry out special investigations on major issues 
highlighted by investors or exposed by the media.75 It may impose 
sanctions against the company for non-compliance with its regulations. 
Lastly, it can, by virtue of a “quick response to information” system, 
review any information submitted by the media or other organisations 
about a company to verify its truth and tackle potential problems before
73 See Articles I80& 183 o f  the Securities Law 2005.
14 See Article 185 o f  the Securities Law 2005.
75 Lu, T. (2003), Corporate Governance in China, Working paper, Chinese Academ y o f  Social Sciences, available 
at http://old.iw cp.org.cn/ccca/pdf/Corporate% 20Governance% 20in% 20China% 20°-o20Prof.pdf; In July 2001, for 
exam ple, the Journal o f  Caijing disclosed the accounting fraud o f  Yinguanxia. The CSRC launched an immediate 
investigation. On September 6 , it reported the results o f  the investigation to the public and the responsible directors
w ere sued. The responsible accounting firm and its s taff  were also penalised and had their authorisation to conduct 
a business withdrawn.
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they materialise.76 However, in practice they have to face conflicting 
situations. On the one hand, the controlling shareholders of most listed 
companies are usually local governments or entities controlled by them. 
On the other hand, as a quasi-governmental agency, the CSRC lacks 
independence and is ultimately subject to government will.
Listing quota is one of the important characteristic of China’s listed 
companies. Under the quota system, the CSRC assigns the listing quota to 
the planning commissions of various provinces, then to IPO candidates.77
Pistor and Xu argue that the quota system served two important functions 
with respect to development of the Chinese stock market. It helps to 
mitigate the asymmetric information problems investors and regulators 
face. It also provides the local bureaucrats an incentive to choose viable 
companies to go IPO. Partly due to the quota system, China has achieved 
partial success in its stock market development.78
However, the quota system has inherent weakness. The listing of a 
company is usually decided not on commercial merits but on political and 
sectional considerations. Clearly this aspect alone has created fertile
76 Ibid.
77 In m ost cases, the corporatization (or corporate restructuring) is organized based on the actual quota an IPO 
obtains. The local government, in order to boost the post-IPO performance o f  the listed firms, has incentive to 
inject quality assets into the listed companies, and divest low quality assets or debt.
7S Pistor. K. and C. Xu (2005). "Governing Stock Markets in Transition Economies: Lessons from China."
Am erican Law and E conomics R eview 7( 1): 184-210.
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grounds for many forms of rent-seeking activities that could give rise to 
significant ethical issues. The local bureaucrats thus have incentives to 
select the firms (IPO candidates), through whom they can grab the largest 
rents. Similarly, they also choose the ownership structure by which their 
benefits can be maximized. The utility function of the local bureaucrats is 
definitely different from that of the minority shareholders.
The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) proclaimed early 
in 2001 that the year would be the “year of supervision.”79 A wide- 
ranging effort has been made to follow through on the agenda of the year 
of supervision, and important progress has been made. The cancellation 
of the listing quota, the introduction of the sponsor and initial public 
offering pricing systems was one of the most important initiatives.80
Under this system, the government has given up its power to control the 
number of share issuers. Enterprises intending to issue shares need to find 
a securities company to act as their sponsor (baojian reri) in applying for 
share issuance, and the sponsors become responsible for review of the 
issuer’s application documents an information disclosure, and for
?c’ “Year o f  Supervision’ for China's Stock Market: Roundup,” People’s Daily. December 30, 2001, available at 
httn://english.neopledailv .coin.cn/200112/30/eng20011230 87763 ,shtmj.
80 It: w as expected that com panies launching IPOs would have to make inquiries about share prices among  
institutional investors, w hich would make prices more reasonable and let second market investors have more say in 
the price formation process. A s the sponsors and the listing applicants were to take more liability' for the 
correctness o f  financial figures and listing qualifications, it may help block bad and disqualified ones from the 
beginning. See ‘Sustainable growth needed for China's stock market  0 /  October. 2004, available at 
http://enG.Iish.peopledailv.com.cn/20041 o/()7/eng2(K)4100 /  1 > 0 2 12.html
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supervising the conduct of the issuer during the course of share issuance. 
The sponsor will bear joint liability for any wrongs on the part of the 
issuers that occur during the share issuance process. The sponsorship 
system is designed to assign a first gate-keeper to be in control of the 
quality of listed companies.81 This system is further formalised in the 
newly revised Securities Law.8-4 The CSRC hoped this move would 
provide the listing procedures to be administered by the stock exchanges 
were transparent and independent,83 and remove much of the grounds for 
non-productive rent seeking activities and would have a positive effect on 
the quality of companies that would go public.
However, campaign-style supervision and control is not feasible. Despite 
the CSRC’s efforts to promote regulatory transparency and accountability, 
there remain problems with the approval procedures for public offerings 
and new shares issues. Many financial analysts still believed that it was 
still an open secret that listing candidates and investment banks gave 
massive payments to public relations firms to lobby the Public Offering
84Review Committee members.
In tact, at times the CSRC even gets blamed for being unable to control
81 For more detailed examination o f  the sponsorship system, see Mao, B. and R. Sun (April 2004). "Upgrading the 
Sponsorship system: The CSRC M akes M oves to Enhance Market Quality." Q u n a L a w  &Pract?ce 85.
82 See Article 11 o f  the Securities Law 2005.
**•’ China 's  two stock exchanges are supervised by and administrat ively accountable to the C S R C .
84 'Securi t ies Official Held for Allegedly Taking Bribes ' South China Morning Post  ,1 7, Nov 2004. 6.
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the corruption cases that its own investigative efforts are increasingly 
bringing to light. Although the corrupt practices predate the present 
CSRC administration, the public sees more cases of corruption and may 
blame the CSRC for not doing more.
The recent “Wang xiaoshi case’ and ‘Wang yi case’ are one of the latest 
manifestation of regulatory corruption at the CSRC. Wang xiaoshi, a 
deputy division director in the CSRC’s Department of Public Offering, 
has been arrested on corruption charges, including taking bribes from a 
businessman to facilitate the IPO application review of a favoured 
company. This case could lead to a more comprehensive probe into stock 
market listing approvals.8*
The other scandals at listed firms have put many high-ranking officials in 
an uncomfortable spotlight. Wang Yi, the former vice chairman of the 
CSRC and the vice president of the China Development Bank, who built 
up an extensive and strong network within the securities markets during 
his seven-year career with the stock markets watchdog agency, has been 
detained for alleged corruption, which facilitated the illegal listing of 
Pacific Securities.86
85 Ibid.
K6 "Missing Funds Spark Probe o f  Bank Vice President". The econom ic observer online. 06 Jun 2008  
http://w w w .cco. com .cn/ens/P olitics/2008/06/26/104454.htnil
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II ST, PT Company and delisting system
It is interesting to note that the two stock exchanges in China have 
created a “ST” (Special Treatment) and later “PT” (Particular Transfer) 
for listed companies facing various degrees of financial difficulties that 
would have led to their suspension but were allowed to remain listed 
under some restrictions labels.
In 1998, China slapped trading curbs on companies with two straight 
years of losses, setting a 5 per cent daily price limit, up or down, instead 
of the usual 10 per cent for ordinary shares. The counters were classified 
as special-treatment shares. A year later, China's regulators put companies 
with three years of losses under PT status, and saddled them with a 5 per 
cent daily limit.87 Most of the PT companies have little probability of 
escaping their labelling because of heavy debts and the inferior quality of 
their assets.
ST and PT firms are given time to restructure. However, because of the 
entirely rational expectation among investors that these firms are likely to 
be subject to a local government-led rescue bid, ST/PT firms are often the 
focus of much speculative trading activity. The share price of a firm will
87 PT firms are only traded on Fridays on a separate market from the main board and are also subject to 
ex tensive C SR C  m onitoring .
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more often than not rise, rather than fall, when it enters ST.
Thus, the moral hazard problem created by such concessions and special 
treatment for those poorly performing companies.The public, by and 
large, have expressly voiced the opinion that continually loss-making 
companies should be de-listed from the stock market. The former Premier 
Zhu, when interviewed by domestic and foreign journalists after the 
closing of the 4th Session of the 9th National People's Congress, pointed 
out that "clearing up the listing of companies is the key matter so far as 
strengthening the role of supervision is concerned. The CSRC is now 
invoking various kinds of measures to reinforce this work. De-listing will 
be one of them"
On 22 February 2001, the CSRC issued a circular to clarify rules on 
suspending and terminating the listing status of a loss-making company. 
Under these rules, a company which has recorded three years of 
consecutive losses can apply to the stock exchange for a ‘grace period’ to 
restructure its business.88 Since 2002 the CSRC has moved to gradually 
eliminate the PT category altogether by introducing an automatic trigger 
for a de-listing once a company has recorded three years of losses. 
Following these rules, a Shanghai electronics company, Narcissus
88 McGregor. R. (2001) " First Chinese Company to be Delisted Today". Financial Times 11. Apr. 24
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Electric Appliances, was delisted on 24 April 2001, in a landmark event 
for China’s stock exchanges, which had never lost an enterprise in their 
11-year trading history as of that date.89
However, in practice, it is still difficult to delist companies because both 
local governments and investors are unwilling to see this happen. For 
local government, delisting a local firm would mean losing a low-cost 
fund-raising tool; for the investors, exclusion of the company from the 
market would result in huge losses.90 In an attempt to improve such 
incentives, since 2002 the CSRC has moved to gradually eliminate the PT 
category altogether by introducing an automatic trigger for a de-listing 
once a company has recorded three years of losses. But, these companies 
would then be likely to be prime targets for acquisition by competitors 
and some might be bought by companies hoping to gain a backdoor 
listing.
5.2.5 The role of auditors
One of the main objectives of the corporate governance structure is to 
‘ensure that minority shareholder receive reliable information about the 
value of firms and that a company’s managers and large shareholders do
ibid.
Leng, .1. (2006). supra note 58, at 321
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not cheat them out ot the value of their investment...”91 Transparency in 
corporate financial statements is essential for public confidence in the 
capital market. A high level of financial disclosure and transparency will 
contribute to the establishment of confidence to the security market and 
direct resources to the entities that produce more wealth. To maintain the 
confidence of Chinese capital markets, there is a high demand for good 
corporate governance, and financial disclosure and transparency are 
essential characteristics of good corporate governance.
The history of accounting in China can be traced back 2000 years, but it 
was not until the early 1990s that a double-entry bookkeeping system was 
introduced. 92 Business firms in China have long been small and 
dominated by family. In Chinese culture the merchants have been 
considered inferior to other professions and people of higher ability have 
not gone into business.93 After 1949, in common with many countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe, accounting in China came under the Soviet 
influence. The approach developed by the Soviets emphasised the central 
plan and the role of the accounting function was to service the 
information needs of the central planners. Bailey describes the role of 
accounting in a socialist economy as one where the national economy
91 Bushman, R. M. and A. J. Smith (2003). "Transparency, Financial Accounting Information, and Corporate 
G overnance." Econom ic Policy R eview -Federal Reserve...Bankof.New.York 9(1).
92 Leng, J. (2006), supra note 58
93 Nakamura, M. (2008). C hanging corporate governance practices in China and J a p a n ..ia c ^
American practices. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan at 20-2e
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becomes the accounting entity and the individual enterprise is represented 
as an accounting sub entity. The implementation of a national chart of 
account causes the accounting system of all enterprises to be 
interconnected. Therefore, the accounting in each and every enterprise is 
converted into an instrument of national economic administration for 
realisation of control over their activities. The central authorities in a 
socialist economy use the accounting system as a means for maintaining 
control over the activities of the state enterprise. Accountants are 
accordingly required to perform a state control function on behalf of the 
central authorities.94
The Open Door policy of 1978 led to major changes in the economy, 
which have greatly affected the accounting function. As far back as 1980 
it was suggested that it was time for accounting to become part of 
economic management rather than the traditional Chinese description, a 
tool of economic management. uThe year 1993 may well represent the 
start of a new era in Chinese accounting history”.9'' The introduction of 
China’s first accounting standard, known as the Accounting Standard for 
Business Enterprises (Basic Standard), effective from July 1 1993, was 
the first of a series of steps which transformed Chinese accounting 
practices.
94 Bailev. D. T. (1988). Accounting in Socialist countries. London, Routledge.
95 Seapens. R.W and l lao, Z.P. (1995). "Chinese accounting reform: reasons and effects", in Blake, J, Gao. S.
(Fds), Perspectives on Accounting and Finance in China. London and N ew  \o rk . Routledge, at 261.
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However, the cultural values of China may indicate that the practice of 
auditing and behaviour of auditors as practiced and required in Western 
countries may not be easily transported to PR China. Liu refers to the 
importance of networks (guanxi) in the conduct of business development 
in China as follows:
“Guanxi and networking are important components of Chinese 
business behaviour...[M]ost observers of Chinese business 
behaviour are well aware that the use of guanxi in business 
networking is strategic. It is the use of social relations and 
networks for business interests. However, it is equally important to 
note that most studies have also demonstrated the limits of guanxi 
and networking”.96
Regarding financial transparency, most listed companies in China are 
audited by local accounting firms but no reliable information exists to 
determining which accounting firms are more reputable. The speech by 
former premier, ZhuRongji, at the 16th World congress of Accountants in 
November 2002 highlighted the issue of falsified accounts and the need
97for the highest ethical standards amongst accountants.
% l,ui, T .(2001) "A B rief note on Guanxi" in Appelbaum, R. P.. W. L. F. Felstiner. et al. ("2001). Rules and
networks : the legal cu lture o f  global business traj]^idiPJls- Oxford, I lart. at 390. 
i>: See k‘Bu Zhuo jiazhanu" (N o falsified accounts). People s Dailv. 19 Nov. a )0 2 , A.>
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5.2.6 The choice for investors
Another problem is that the price-earnings ratio in the primary market is 
set artificially high. In Western markets, a high price-eamings ratio (P/E) 
generally indicates that investors are expecting future growth in earnings 
(but it may also simply indicate low earnings). As a rule, P/Es in Western 
markets float between 10 and 20.98 In market comparison, for much of the 
1990s P/Es in Mainland China were above 40 and even by the end of 
2002, after a sustained fall in prices, at the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(SHGSE) prices averaged 35 times earnings and at the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (SHZSE).This means firms can raise equity capital at a very 
low cost, and that they provide investors with virtually no meaningful 
returns on assets. Given the fact most of China’s listed companies do not 
pay dividends at all, the costs of raising equity capital for these 
companies are even lower than the average level.99
But why in the first place would the investors want to buy these shares if 
returns are so low? Three factors are particularly important in helping to 
explain the irrational investment pattern: first, investors have very few 
alternatives for capital investment in China. Because of captial account
1)8 Green, S. (2003). The E conom ist China's stockmarke t : a guide to progress,.^laY^jaidLBrosBgc^. London,
Profile.
99 Gu. W eiping (2001) ’Why Do Chinese Listed Companies Prefer Hquity Financing to Debt Financing?" Shangshi 
G ongsi (Listed Com panies). Jun. 8 .
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controls, investors cannot easily remit financial assets out the country to 
invest in equities overseas. Neither has the corporate bond market been 
developed much. Bank deposit interest rates are set low. Many small 
investors cannot afford to invest in real estate in China. Thus, investing in 
equities is such a popular way to invest in China.
Second, there are so many investors coming into stock market who do not 
understand the risks. Most of these individual investors are middle-aged 
individuals or senior citizens, with an average age of 43.01 years.100 The 
majority of them (86%) are low- or middle-income, and 55.63% have an 
annual income below RMB 20,000 ($2,418). 101 In addition, many 
Chinese individual investors may lack basic financial or investment 
knowledge, as 43.81% of them have no higher education.102 Again, the 
Government has used editorials in the state run newspaper People’s Daily 
to influence the trading of shares in the stock market, such as encouraging 
investors to trade when the market sentiment was low, and discouraging 
investors to trade when the market seemed ‘excessively speculative.’ In 
addition, some Chinese economists, who were then seen by investors as 
the government’s ‘think tanks’ or policy advisors, had assured investors 
that ‘60-80 times price-earnings are absolutely normal’ and ‘the
100 Chen Bing el at. (2002), Zhongguo Gushi Geren Touzizhe Zhuangkuang Diaocha (An Investigative Report on 
the S itu a tio n o f Individual Investors in China's Securities Markets) 13 (Shenzhen Zhengquan Jiaoyisuo Zonghui 
Yanjiusuo (Research Inst, o f  the Shenzhen Stock Exch.) Paper N o. 0055, available at
http://yjw k.cninfo.com .cn/finalpage/2002-05-10/571541 .PDF
ll’1 Ibid. at 16.
11 ~ Ibid, at 14
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government will definitely not allow the market to decline,’ which had 
misled small investors into buying shares at high prices, in the hope of 
making lucrative returns at a later time.103
Third, there is too much speculation in Chinese stockmarket. Only a third 
of the shares of a typical SOE are tradable in the market. The market is 
not very liquid in general. Thus, some of investors view stock buying as a 
speculation tool for gains from short-term share trades in the secondary 
market rather than a long-term, value-based investment vehicle. They 
believed that as long as there was a ‘fool’ willing to buy shares from the 
previous holders, everybody can make gains in share trades until the last 
‘fool’ is unable to find anyone else to sell the shares to, and bears all 
losses as the unlucky end chain of the ‘fool’s game’.104 Therefore, they 
buy into these shares regardless of their long-term return prospects.105
Indeed, some institutions such as banks, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
even the department of the central government breaking the law by using 
public funds and inside information to speculate in shares.106 Soft controls 
over their budgets mean that any profits they make can be skimmed off
m  " Forcing China’s Stock Market D ow n to the Bottom: Tails o f  Robbing Wealth in China’s Stock Market",
Business Watch 24 (12 D ec 2003).
il'’4 See, Leng,.1.(2006), supra note 58 at 293.
1<b Gu W eiping(2001), Supra note 99.
106 The General Administration o f  Sports was reported to have appropriated 131 m illion yuan (U S$15.8  m illion) 
for the 2008 Beijinu O lympic organizing committee since 1999. About 109 m illion yuan (U S$13.2  m illion) o f  the
money was misused to invest in Chinese stockmarket. See ''Auditor: ( .erttral government misuses U S $ 1 .lb  ol 
funds.” available at http:/Av\v\v\chinadailv.cotii.ctt''cngh\sh/dpc/20()0-0Cvx9/cpntenu4p555i.,huii
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into informal accounts and retained, while losses can be put through their 
books and replaced by budgetary transfers or loans from the state
107banks. For example, there is the shocking story reported by the 
financial journal Caijing, in which a well-known broker confessed to 
having raised 2 billion Yuan from banks and other state units to "stir-fry” 
the market.108
It is not surprising therefore that many small investors adopted 
investment strategies that are widely seen as being essentially short term 
and speculative in nature. As a result, investing in the stock market has 
become one of the most risky businesses in China, and there have been 
reported cases where retail investors, many of them pensioners, 
committed suicide upon losing all their savings in the stock market.
5.3 Shareholders’ protection: law and legal enforcement
In China, the framework of civil liability on securities fraud is set up in 
the 1994 Company Law of China (as amended in October 2005, came 
into effect in 2006) and the 1998 Securities Law of China (as also 
amended in October 2005). In addition, the General Principles of Civil 
Law provide the bottom line for civil liability issues in general. With
l!,; See Green,S. (2003), supra note 98. 
1!'s Caijing Magazine 2005, 3, 12 at 19.
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these three layers ot statutory provisions, the whole statutory framework 
is still too brief to execute, in strong contrast to that of the administrative 
and criminal liability.109
5.3.1 Protection of minority shareholders’ rights and interests under 
the Company Law 1994
Article 111 of the 1994 Company Law entitled a shareholder, in the case 
of the resolutions of shareholders meeting or the board of directors 
contravening laws and regulations an prejudicing the interests of 
shareholders, to apply to the court for an order banning such acts. Its full 
text reads:
In the event the resolutions of shareholders' meetings or the resolutions of 
the board of directors are in breach of laws and administrative regulations 
or infringe on shareholders' legal interests and rights, the shareholders 
shall have the right to initiate litigation to stop such breach or 
infringement.
However, this provision fails to specify any necessary substantive and
10l) M iles, L. and Z. Zhona (2006). "Improving corporate governance in state-owned corporations in China which  
wav forward," Journal o f  corporate law studies: 229.
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procedural conditions of such an action. First, the provision provides 
‘'excessively narrow” 110 scope for shareholder actions. Article 111 
requires the existence of both a “violation” (of laws or administrative 
regulations) and an “infringement” (upon shareholder rights) to justify a 
shareholder action. 111 By the operation of this provision, if resolutions 
violate laws or administrative regulations but do not immediately harm 
shareholder interests, shareholders are not permitted to sue.112
Secondly, this provision only provides that the shareholders have a right 
to bring an action to the court for an injunction to stop the illegal acts or 
infringing acts, but fails to guarantee any equitable remedies for injured 
shareholders. 113 Therefore, even though shareholder interests are 
infringed upon by resolutions legally adopted at a shareholders' meeting 
or by a board of directors, Chinese shareholders may still be unable to 
apply for injunctions against such resolutions.114
110 Mi Xinli. Paisheng Susong-X iaogudong Quanyi de Shihou Jiuji [Derivative L aw su its-E x  Past Rem edies o f  
M inority Shareholders], Fazhi Ribao (Legal Daily) (P.R.C.), May 16, 2001, at 8 .
111 See Xianchu Zhang(1998), Practical Demands to Update the Company Law, 28 Hong Kong L J . 248, 251, at 
252 (suggesting tw o possible readings o f  Article 111: “the grammar o f  Art. I l l ,  separating the two phrases 
(violation and infringement) by only a comma, makes the confusion even worse because it may suggest two  
reasonable readings: violation and infringement are two conditions that need to exist at the same time to justify a 
shareholders' action; or they are two separate conditions and each may independently constitute the ground o f  the 
action”).
112 See Gu Gongyun, G ongsifa Xiuding de Ruogan Jianyi (Several Suggestions on the Amendment o f  the 
Company Law), Shangshi Gongsi (Listed Company) Vol. 5. 2000, available at
http://ww w.people.com .cn/G B/iXiper87/703/84318.htm l; Apparently, Professor Gu's reading o f  Article 111 is 
consistent with the first reading suggested by Professor Zhang. See id. (claim ing that “violation and infringement 
are two conditions that need to exist at the same time to justify a shareholders' action ).
!i:! See Zhana. X. C. (1998). "Practical Demands to Update the C om pany Law." 1 lonu Kong Law Journal 28: 248. 
!! '4 Ibid.
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Finally, although this provision clearly provides the shareholder with a 
private right ot action, the provision fails to indicate any procedural rule 
on shareholder litigation. It is far from clear that an action brought by 
shareholders under Art. I l l  of the CCL 1994 should be a direct action 
(personal action) or a derivative action.
5.3.2 Protection of minority shareholders’ rights and interests under 
the Company Law 2005
Nevertheless, the Chinese Company Law 2005 (“the CCL 2005”) 
envisages the foregoing problems. Article 150 of the CCL 2005 states that 
a director, a supervisor or any senior officer shall be liable for any losses 
of the company if he/she violates any provisions of laws, or 
administrative regulations, or the articles of association of the company in 
performance of his/her official duties.115
In addition, Art. 152 of the CCL 2005 provides certain procedural rules, 
stating that shareholders) who have either individually or collectively 
held more than 1 per cent of the shares of the company for more than 180 
consecutive days may petition in writing to the supervisory board to 
initiate legal proceedings against the wrongdoing director or senior
!i- See Art. 150 o f  the CC L 2005
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officers in the people's court. If a supervisor commits any of the acts 
described in Art. 150 of the CCL 2005, the aforementioned shareholders 
may petition in writing to the board of directors to initiate civil 
proceedings against the supervisor in the people's court.116 If the 
supervisory board or the board of directors refuses or fails to initiate any 
legal proceedings upon receipt of the written petition put forward by the 
shareholders, or fails to initiate any proceedings within 30 days of the 
receipt of the shareholders' petition, or the situation is so urgent that the 
company will suffer irreparable losses if legal proceedings are not 
initiated immediately, the shareholders as prescribed above shall have the 
right to directly initiate legal actions in the people's court in their own 
name for the benefits of the company.117 The CCL 2005 also extends the 
right for shareholders to sue any person who encroaches on the lawful 
rights and interests of the company, thus causing any loss to the company 
in accordance with the provisions of Art. 152. Inevitably, the CCL 2005 
has strengthened the position of both minority shareholders and the 
supervisory board.
Nevertheless, certain rules governing the derivative action, such as the 
threshold requirement and the demanding requirement under the CCL
1,6 CCL 2005. Art. 152.
11' See Art. 150 o f  the CCL 2005.
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2005, may still be quite expensive and burdensome, and could unduly 
deter the bringing of derivative actions by minority shareholders in 
China.118
5.3.3 Securities law offers another legal channel to protect the 
substantive rights of shareholders
I Article 42
Article 42 of the Securities Law provides that if a shareholder holding 
five percent or more of the issued shares of a corporation sells the shares 
in his possession within six month s of purchase, or if he repurchases them 
within six months after selling them, the profits generated from such sale 
or repurchase shall be disgorged. Moreover, the corporation's board is 
responsible for collecting the profit from the shareholder.119 If the board 
fails to collect, other shareholders may demand that the board do so. If 
the board does not collect the profit from the shareholder and a loss to the 
corporation results, the responsible directors shall be held jointly and
118 See Ai1.150 o f  the CCL 2005, at 327. In China, on the one hand, 1% o f  com pany-issued share capital in most 
listed com panies would mean hundreds o f  thousands o f  shares and a collective action by minority shareholders 
will be alw ays necessary to satisfy the threshold requirement. On the other hand, most com panies are controlled by 
the m ajority/controlling shareholders who have their representatives seating in the boards. Therefore both demands 
on shareholders based on a percentage and demands on the board o f  directors/supervisory board will  make it 
difficult for minority shareholders to initiate a derivative action.
n ° Securities Law ] 098, Art. 42. This restriction does not apply to securities companies that acquire live percent or 
more o f  the shares in the corpora tion as part oi an underwrit ing arrangement for die securities of the corporation.
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severally liable to compensate the corporation for damages.
II Article 63
Article 63 of the Securities Law provides that issuers and underwriters 
are liable to investors for any financial losses in the course of trading in 
securities that resulted from any false or misleading statement or material 
omission in prospectuses, accounting reports, annual and interim reports, 
and other materials. Furthermore, the responsible directors, supervisors, 
and managers of the issuers or underwriters are jointly and severally 
liable for damages to investors. Article 63 is the only provision under the 
Securities Law that relates to civil remedies for misrepresentation made 
in securities transactions. 120
5,4 Legal rules lose their teeth without enforcement
The PRC Company Law goes on to provide various legal remedies that 
are available to shareholders who may have suffered at the hands of 
management, for example, Article 1 of the PRC Company Law (as 
amended in October 2005) provides that this Law was enacted in order 
to “protect the legitimate rights and interests of companies, shareholders
120 Liu, H. (Mar 2003). "Halfway to Effective Shareholder Protection." China L. A: Practice
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and creditors...” Further, Art 4 of the Company Law provides that the 
‘"shareholders of a company shall, according to law, enjoy such rights of 
owners as benefiting from assets of the company, making major decisions 
and selecting managerial personnel.” The new Art 153 allows 
shareholders to bring group actions before the people’s court where 
damage has been caused “to the interests of any shareholders of the 
company” by any illegal action by a director or senior officer of the 
company.121 This provision follows Art 150, which states: “If the directors, 
supervisors and senior executives violate the laws, administrative 
regulations or the articles of association of the company in performance 
of their functions and thus cause loss to the company, they shall be liable 
for compensation.”
It should be noted that the 1998 PRC Securities Law was also amended in 
October 2005. It also contains some very general principles that seek to 
protect the interests of all investors in listed companies. For example, Art 
4 of the Securities Law speaks of the parties involved in the issuing and 
trading in securities having “equal status” and having to adhere to “the 
principles of voluntariness, compensation and good faith.”Art 15 also 
provides that unless otherwise approved by the general meeting of
121 This has not worked w ell in the past and w e have yet to see if  these new provisions are any more 
effective; See further. PRC Supreme People's Court, “Some Provisions o f  Supreme People’s Court on 
Trying Cases Involving False Statements Related to Securities Market”. (Effective 1 February 2003);
B Hu, " On Civil Compensation  in Securities 1 aw Violations in the perspective ot the company law and the 
securi ties  law", avai lable at http://\vww.cipe.org-'printeriricndly.;pr intpage.php.
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shareholders, funds raised by the company through the issue of shares 
must be used for the purposes set out in the prospectus; this provision 
responds to a common practice of listed companies raising funds for a 
particular stated purpose and then using these shareholder funds for quite 
different purposes.
Art 20 of the Securities Law 2005 requires that any documents prepared 
for the issue of securities must be “truthful, accurate and complete.” One 
of the most common problems in the listing of Chinese companies has 
been the use of inaccurate or fabricated information to support the listing 
or share issue, such as the use of false company accounts. Public 
shareholders obviously suffer from practices such as these. The Securities 
Law also contains a number of provisions (Arts 73-76) regarding insider 
trading by such persons as directors and senior executives of the company; 
insider trading is obviously more likely to benefit corporate controllers 
and insiders and outsiders, such as public shareholders. The Law deals 
with other securities market offences; these include the manipulation of 
the securities market (Art 77), and the fabrication or dissemination of 
false information (Art 78). Securities Law penalties for manipulating the 
securities market include the disposal of the illegally gained securities 
and the confiscation of illegal gains as well as the giving of a disciplinary 
warning to the person directly in charge and the person responsible for
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the manipulation (Art 203). No provision is made for the payment of 
damages to those who have suffered as a result of the securities 
manipulation (although, as we have seen, the Company Law does contain 
some compensation related provisions). A number of other provisions of 
the Securities Law refer to failures by controlling shareholders, (eg Art 
71, Art 150(6) and Art 214).
Chapter 1 of the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in 
China issued in 2001 by the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) proclaims the following general principles regarding the 
protection of minority shareholders in listed companies:
“ l . A  listed company shall establish a corporate governance structure
sufficient for ensuring the full exercise of shareholders’ rights.
2. The corporate governance structure of a company shall ensure fair 
treatment toward all shareholders, especially minority shareholders. 
All shareholders are to enjoy equal rights and to bear the 
corresponding duties based on the shares they hold.
3. Shareholders shall have the right to know about and the right to
participate in major matters of the company set forth in the laws...
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4. Shareholders shall have the right to protect their interests and rights 
through civil litigation or other legal means in accordance with 
laws and administrative regulations..
In regard to the dangers of abuse of power by dominant shareholders in 
China’s listed companies, the CSRC Code goes on to provide that: “The 
controlling shareholders owe a duty of good faith toward the listed 
company and other shareholders. The controlling shareholders of a listed 
company shall strictly comply with laws and regulations while exercising 
their rights as investors, and shall be prevented from damaging the listed 
company’s or other shareholders’ legal rights and interests, through 
means such as assets restructuring, or from taking advantage of their 
privileged position to gain additional benefit.”
However, the key question of whether the amended rules governing 
shareholder derivative action have any real “teeth” against the
wrongdoing directors in China remains to be seen. Pistor and Xu argue
that because the law is incomplete, law enforcement by courts cannot be 
expected effectively to deter violations. 122 A leading corporate 
governance expert in China said that “[a]fter 20 years of exploring
gradual reform, Chinese enterprises have come to realize the corporate
122 Pistor. K. and C. Xu (April 2003). Deterrence and Regulatory Failure in I merging Financial Markets: 
C om paring  China and Russia,  Working paper available irotn www.wclia .harvard .edu.
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governance is (at) the centre of the enterprises reform in China”. She is of 
the view that although “ a basic legal framework has been established, 
there is vast scope for further institution building to improve the 
corporate governance practice of Chinese enterprises.” She concludes that 
“[a]t present, China has not established a complete law enforcement 
system concerning securities markets. This is one of the important causes 
for the frequent occurrences of insider trading and market 
manipulation”.123
5.4.1 The role of the judiciary in China
In the UK and US, judges can play an important role in corporate 
governance, for example by making and clarifying the law governing 
directors. But this is often a different story in China. As Donald Clarke 
has noted, “perhaps Chinese courts are not designed to do, and should not 
do, the things Western courts do.”124
The Chinese view their judicial system as merely another bureaucratic 
body. For example, Courts’ loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party was 
re-empasized in 2006 with the launcing of a new campaign on “socialist
123 See Lu T. (2004), "Corporate Governance in China", in Kala Anandarajah (Ed), Cmporate„Govemance 
C om pliance .Singapore, LexisN exis.
124 Clarke. D.C. (2003), "Empirical research into the Chinese judicial system", in Jensen. E. G  and T. C. Heller
(2003). Beyond com m on  knovvledue : empirical approaches to liie rule ol law . Sianloid , |C.neat Biitain |, Stanioid 
Law and Politics, at 164-192.
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rule of law theory”. In the speech Luo, head of the Party’s Central 
Political-Legal Committee, appeared to be drawing a distinction between 
“rule of law” and “socialist rule of law,” with the latter emphasizing the 
legal system’s obligation to follow Party leadership, and in particular Hu 
Jintao’s theory of a “harmonious society.”125 In a follow-up speech, Cao 
Jianming, vice-president of the Supreme People’s Court, linked the 
campaign to the need to avoid the “negative influence of Western rule of 
law theory”126-an apparent reference to those within and outside China 
advocating Western-style judicial independence for China.
Indeed, the Chinese courts are widely perceived to lack independence or 
experience in dealing with corporate and securities disputes. The 
judiciary in China has not played a dynamic role in developing a body of 
law to protect the interests of minority shareholders. It is not unusual for 
courts to decide not to deal with a particular matter, regarding it as
ii:> "Luo Gan zai shehui zhuyi fazhi liman yantaoban shang qiangdiao: shenru kanzhan shehui zhuyi fazhi linian 
jiaoyu, qieshe jiaqiang zhengfa duiwu sixiang zliengzhi jianshe" ("Luogan em phasizes in a sym posium  on socialist 
rule o f  law theory; deepen education on socialist rule o f  law theory, enhance the ideological an political 
construction am ong workers in the political-legal system"), Zhongguo fayuan wang (China Court Web), 14 April 
2006, available from I ltlp://w vvvv.chinacourt.org/public/detail.phr>?id---20i 7 53 . In a speech in Novem ber 2006, 
Luogan again called for strengthening Party oversight o fleg a l institutions. He also added a more direct critique o f  
those advocating judicial independence and Western-style legal reforms. Luo warded against underestimating the 
influence o f  such arguments, in particular arguments that deny the Party’s leadership of legal and politicla  
institutions, on those working in the political-legal system. He also stated that ‘-hostile forces” were trying to use 
legal institutions as an entry-point for Westernizing an splitting Cina. Luogan, “Zhangfa jiguan zai guojian hexie 
shehui zhong danfu zhongda lishi shim ing he zhengzhi zeren” (-Political and legal institutions should an important 
historical m ission and political responsibility- in the construction o f  a harmonious society”), Qiushi (Seeking Truth). 
N o .3 (2007). available at http://www.qsiournal.eom.cn/qs/20070201 /G B/qs% 5e448% 5e0% 5e 1 .htm.
136 “Cao Jiaming zai shehui zhuyi fazhi linian yantaoban shang qiandiao: renming fayuan yao laogu shuli shenhui 
zhuyi fazhi linian” ("Caojianmin em phasizes in the symposium on socialist rule o f  law theory'': the People’s courts 
must steadily establish socialist rule o f  law- theory”), Zhongguo fayuan wang, 14 April 2006, available from 
h tt p: w v.yy, chi n a c tut rt. o rg: pu b Ij c •; d ct a i 1. pp.? i dy  20! 7 5 5 . Cao also spoke o f  the need to avoid “extreme ‘left' 
thoughts" and the “remnants o f  feudalism.” His speech appeared primarily aimed at placing the courts in line with 
current Party ideology, and thus perhaps designed to insulate them from criticism for excessive reliance on Western 
m odels. But such com m ents  also reflect the SPC's  move away from aggressively promoting court reform.
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beyond their competence, and instead referring it to another branch of
127government. Courts are also reluctant to implement or enforce their 
judgements (especially those involving coercive measures) against state- 
owned enterprises if they were responsible for the same locality, or if 
their judgments led to the closure of the enterprise and unemployment of 
workers. 128
To make things worse, the Supreme People’s Court of China even banned 
temporarily lower courts hearing cases against corporate fraud in the 
middle of 2001. In September 2001, the Supreme Court of China issued a 
Circular to lower courts, directing them to stop temporarily accepting 
cases concerning three kinds of securities fraud: corporate misstatement, 
inside trading, and market manipulation.
The reason for the suspension was given one month later by an official in 
the Research Office of the Supreme Court in a China Central TV station 
interview.129 The official claimed that both the Company Law and the 
Securities Law were very rough and hardly provided any guidance to 
judges. He also admitted the lack of competent judges familiar with 
securities market rules and the inability of procedural rules dealing with
127 Tom asic. R. and A. N eil (2007). "Minority shareholder protection in China's top 100 listed companies." 
Australian journal o f  A sian law 9(1).
128 Ibid.
The content o f  the interview was summarized in '/.hengejuan Minshi peichang Zan HU shuoli  ( Sue toi 
Damage in Securities Market  is Temporar ily Banned')  Caijing Zazhi (Finance Magazine) (20 Oct 2001).
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such novel matters as massive numbers of plaintiffs in one action. At the 
end, the Supreme Court official asked for the patience of the public in 
giving courts time to prepare for the securities fraud case.130
This situation began to change after the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) 
issued its first judicial interpretation in this regard to assert court 
jurisdiction over cases involving false disclosure on 15 January 2002.131 
One year later, the SPC again released its second interpretation on private 
securities litigation, detailing the rules on damage calculation and the 
scope of compensation, which was an improvement on the first 
interpretation.
5.4.2 The difficulties of bringing a minority shareholder action 
I Civil Procedure Law
Lee argues that the lack of express remedies for the aggrieved 
shareholders in the Securities Law creates unnecessary ambiguity and 
confusion which is wholly inconsistent with other statutory remedies in 
Chinese law. 132 Hu argues that owing to the insufficient legal
130Ibid
131 McGregor, R .(2002) "China to A llow  Investors to Sue Listed Companies" Financial Tim es 15 Jan , at 9
133 See Lee, S. M. (2001). "The Development o f  China’s Securities Regulatory Framework and the Insider Trading
Provisions o f  the N ew  Securities Law." N ew  York International 1 aw Revie w  14(1).
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infrastructure in China, it will be difficult to hold violators of the laws 
accountable for their wrongdoings133
The Civil Procedure Law1'4 provides that in order to institute a lawsuit, a 
plaintiff must have a “direct interest” {zhijie lihai guanxi) in the case. 135 
In contrast, a derivative lawsuit initiated by a shareholder is usually for 
the benefit of a corporation. Therefore, in practice, the immediate 
impression of most courts when a shareholder files a derivative lawsuit is 
to assume “the shareholder is not qualified to be the plaintiff’ and “the 
case should not be accepted.”136
II The Supreme People’s Court Guidelines 2003
In 2003, the Supreme People's Court introduced guidelines entitled 
“ Several rules on adjudicating civil lawsuits against listed companies on 
the ground of false statements”137 to allow local courts to hear actions
1:0 Hu, R. (N ovem ber 2002), “ The Recent Developm ent o f  Corporate Governance in Great China Area, 
Shareholder Rights and the Equitable Treatment o f  Shareholders” . Fourth Asian Roundtable on Corporate 
Governance,.
134 Zhonghua Renm in G ongheguo M inshi Susong Fa (Civil Procedure Law o f  the P.R.C.) J, Apr. 9, 1991, available
at http:// law .chinalaw info.com /new law 2 0 0 2 /slc/slc.asp?db=chl& gid=p 110
135 Ibid, art. 108(1).
m  See Sun, Y. (2000), Lun Gudong Daibiao Susong Zhidu (A Discussion o f  the Shareholder Derivative Lawsuit 
System ), 5 Shandong Daxue Xuebao (Zhexue Shehui Kexue Ban) [Journal o f  Shandong U. (Phil. & Soc. Sci. 
Version)] 99.
137 This was to replace an earlier set o f  regulations " Notice regarding civil lawsuits against listed com panies on the 
grounds o f  false statements 2 0 0 2 ” which were practically unenforceable due to a lack o f  clarity as to when 
investors were entitled to com pensation, how compensation w'as to be calculated, the difficulty in establishing a 
causal link between shareholder loss and the false statements and the reluctance of the court to hear class actions 
brought bv shareholders. See !.i,N. (2004), "Civil litigation against China's listed firms: Much ado about nothing?" 
Asia Programme Working Paper, No 13 , February 1. at 1-3. 1 his can be viewed at 
www.riia.ors/pdtfresearch/asia/W PFeb04.pdf .
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brought by individual shareholders for false statements issued by 
directors about the company, but the civil case shall not be accepted by 
the court, unless the cause of action is based on the conclusion reached by 
the CSRC or other state organs such as the Ministry of Finance.138
First, requiring an enforceable administrative decision as the pre­
condition for civil action stirred up big controversy. Investigation of 
securities fraud is often labour-intensive, time-consuming, expensive, and 
burdensome. The CSRC has long been criticized for its failure to react to 
and probe into the various blunt market abuses punctually, due to its lack 
of competent staff or some political concern. This requirement prevents 
shareholders from asserting their right to bring an action to protect their 
investment as soon as possible.
Second, the Rules provide that issuing false statements means falsely 
recording major events, making misleading statements, omitting to 
disclose certain information, or disclosing information in an inappropriate 
manner.139 However, they only protect certain types of losses suffered by 
minority shareholders. According to the Rules, losses will not be 
recovered if investors sold their shares before the discovery of the false
! ’s Tbe Suprem e People's Court guidelines 2003. Art 6 
K'9 The Suprem e People's Court guidelines 2003, Art.! /
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statements. Article 18 provides:
“the court should presume a link between loss and the false 
statement if the following situations exist: (1) there is a direct 
relationship between these shares and the false statement; (2) the 
investor holds the shares between the date the false statement is 
issued and the date it is discovered, or buys them before the false 
statement is discovered; (3) the investor loses his investment 
because he sells these shares or holds on to them after the false 
statement is discovered.”
The Rules also provide for the joint and several liability of persons 
responsible for issuing the false statement. Articles 26-28 provide that 
persons other than the company who contributed to the making of the 
false statements, or who were aware of the false statements but had done 
nothing, would be jointly and severally liable to compensate shareholders. 
This increases the likelihood of compensation for minority shareholders 
who otherwise might lose out because the “proper” defendant had 
become bankrupt.
In fact, there are certain cases that have recently been initiated by inj ured
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shareholders in China in which there appears to be reluctance on the part 
of the courts to hear a case through a derivative action because of a lack 
ot detailed procedures applicable to derivative actions. Consequently, 
although many company directors have been punished by either 
administrative sanction or criminal prosecution as a result of making false 
disclosures, frauds and market manipulations, the injured shareholders 
have been left without proper remedies in respect of matters of illegal 
actions. Indeed, the limited scope for effective civil litigation against 
directors and controlling shareholders in securities fraud cases in China
i Anhas been well documented. For example, writing in 2004, Naomi Li 
and Stephen Green found that over 1000 civil actions have been filed 
against some 14 companies in China, but they noted “most remain in 
legal limbo with courts refusing to make judgement, and none having 
been settled by a court judgement in favour of the investors.”141
Wu, Xu and Yuan found that for the period from 1992 to 2003 find that 
the inverse relationship between ownership concentration and legal 
investor protection does not hold for state controlled firms. By way of 
contrast, for the less numerous, non state- controlled listed firms whose 
shareholders do not enjoy political power, legal investor protection is
1,10 I-i.N. (2004). "Civil litigation against China's listed firms: Much ado about nothing?" Asia Programme Working
Paper, No 13 . February 1, at 1-5.
141 Ibid, at 25.
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negatively related to ownership concentration. Accordingly they find that 
La Porta’s thesis does not hold in all types of firm. The implication of this 
is that the nature of the controlling shareholder should be taken into 
account, especially if it is the state.142
Ill Minority shareholder protection under the Company Law 2005
The Company law' 2005 (brought into effect in January 2006) reinforces 
shareholders’ right of taking direct action against wrongdoers in a 
company. Article 152 in particular gives guidance on bringing a 
derivative action. It specifies that a shareholder can bring an action 
against any director, supervisor or manager if he violates any law, 
administrative regulation or the articles of association during the course 
of performing his duties. The requirements are that a shareholder or 
shareholders should hold either separately or in aggregate 1% or more of 
the total shares of the company for a period of at least 180 days. The 
article also allows a derivative action against any third party who 
damages the company’s interests. However, the provision also 
emphasizes the exhaustion of internal remedies by requiring shareholders 
to raise the issue complained of with the board of directors or the 
supervisory board and urge them to seek remedies before lodging a
14- Wti. S.. N. 11. Xu. et al. (2009). "Slate Control, l.egal Investor Protection, and Ownership  Concentration: 
Evidence From China." CorporatejLiovcrnaiice: An Inh^atioj ian<cvicxv_ 17(^.): I /6.
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derivative action. Only when the minority have evidence to prove that 
the company is controlled by the wrongdoers can they initiate a derivative 
action.
Cheng recently analysed 26 cases to show that 42% involve expropriation
of assets, 34% relate to misstatements in annual reports, 4% relate to non
payment of dividends, 8% relate to the use of the companies to provide
guarantees to a third party without the authority of the board and 12%
relate to improper alteration of the articles. She comments on the dogged
perseverance of the shareholders who bring their actions against the odds.
For example in the pre 2005 legislation case of Wit & 11 other minority
shareholders v Hong Gimng, the action was turned down several times by
various people’s courts in different cities. They waited until the Supreme
people’s Court issued the Notice on ‘Acceptance of cases of Disputes
over Civil Tort Arising from False Statements in the Securities Markets’
in 2002 and filed the case again, eventually winning. Cheng notes that
since the new company law the attitude of the judiciary to handling
minority suits has changed for the better. Of her sample of 26 cases 11
had been decided under the new company law and shareholders had
succeeded in 9 of them. Even those that were not successful had the effect
of alerting the authorities resulting in a positive outcome. For example,
the case of Zhang Qiuju v Wuhan Petroleum a minority shareholder
2 3 9
lodged a derivative action against Wuhan Petroleum for selling state 
assets at an under value in 2007. This was a politically sensitive case 
because the government and public opinion supported severe punishment 
for such behaviour. The defendant argued that the decision to sell was 
made by the board which had the assets valued by professional appraisers 
and due and proper process had been adhered to.
On consideration of all the facts, the judge turned down Zhang’s claim on 
the basis of her failure to exhaust internal remedies. However, the 
publicity surrounding the case drew the sale of state assets to the attention 
of the CSRC which blocked the transaction. Overall Cheng reports that 
there is some improvement in the way the courts deal with this type of 
minority shareholder action in light of the clearer guidelines laid down in 
article 152. This is a small but important improvement in the context of 
China.143
5.5 Conclusion
The issue of how to protect the rights of the minority shareholders of 
firms is an important one in China where the state is by far the largest
143 Cheng, W. Q., (2008) "The Protection o f  Minority Shareholders after the N ew  Company Law -  Tw enty-Six
Case Studies" paper del ivered at the Conference on economic and Legal Kefoim Beijing Institute of Business, 
O ctober 2008.
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majority shareholder of many listed companies. The formal framework of 
corporate governance adopted from the Anglo-American system is, based 
on competitive external markets with a strong role for the court system. 
This corporate governance system also relies on arms-length transactions 
and shareholder sovereignty that protects the small and diverse individual 
shareholders. However, some of these key conditions are the result of the 
social, political and legal evolutionary processes as well as the 
developments of the market mechanism. As indicated earlier in this 
chapter the role of minority shareholder and investor protection in terms 
of both influencing the concentration of shareholdings and its role in 
disciplining management - or least holding them to account for 
misbehaviour remains the subject of considerable debate in the West.
It is quite obvious that China does not have the accompanying economic
conditions and social institutions for this stylized model to work. The
important path dependency factor in China is clearly the role of the state
in controlling state enterprises; and whilst in policy terms the government
wishes to separate its role from management and ownership along with
the consequential social and welfare burdens, the political make up of the
SASAC and BSAMs continues to retain ties and influence over SOEs. It
is now generally accepted that there is no single system of corporate
governance applicable to all countries, although the globalization of the
2 4 1
world economy has exerted some pressure on the need for convergence 
and harmonization in some areas of governance arrangement.144 The 
evolution of China’s corporate governance system depends much on its 
economic, social and political conditions and their respective stages of 
development.
144 Letza, S., X. P. Sun,  Kirk bride, J. (2004).  "Shareholding versus stakeholding: a critical review of corporate 
governance." Corporate nnvpmnnp.e-nn International Review 12(3).  242
Chapter 6 Co-determination/ Industrial democracy
6.1 Introduction
In China, a firm belief in the principle of the corporation’s responsibility 
to society and stakeholder relationships as a necessity to hold the society 
together is a product from the era of planned economy. Since 1949 the 
communist government has assumed the responsibilities of protecting all 
worker interests. On that day, membership as a SOE worker was of great 
value to workers not only because of the monetary benefits, but also 
because they regard their job as their whole life position and their social 
identity within society. Most of them have worked on the same job for 
many years and have invested much time and energy to develop the 
particular skills required because they assumed that they would be there 
for life. Their promotions and wage increases, even their reputation and 
their families' reputation, are all decided by their job performance in their 
enterprise community. SOE workers regard themselves as the owners of 
the nation and the leaders of the Chinese people.
Since 1978, the state is not concerned so much with communist ideology,
in the sense of a centrally planned economy, any more. China's pragmatic
policy goals are economic development and a stable society. When
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workers’ relationship with the SOEs cease, they lose their high self­
esteem as members of a leading class. Is the Chinese workforce doomed 
to repeat the experiences and responses of their counterparts in the 
European industrial revolution? Will similar institutions, trade unions or 
collective bargaining, be stable institutional responses to their 
circumstances? Do employee representatives—while seeking to govern 
the firm in a manner that protects their own interests—indirectly protect 
the interests of minority shareholders and thereby increase firm value? 
The important question considered in this chapter is the extent to which, 
if any, the values encapsulated in the co-determination model of the 
communitarian form of capitalism encountered in Germany, from which 
some elements of corporate governance have been copied, can 
successfully take root in modern China as the reform continues along an 
ideological path towards a socialist market with Chinese characteristics. 
Or, are the dominant factors in China such that a different trajectory is 
more likely?
6.2 Stakeholder theory in West
The classical theory is that corporate managers are only and exclusively 
responsible to their shareholder and that this responsibility includes a
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duty to maximise the profits and the wealth of shareholders.1 Many legal 
and finance scholars have focused on the relationship between 
shareholders and managers, particularly on the problem of getting 
managers to act as faithful agents for shareholders. Even in the early 
1990s, it had become quite unfashionable for corporate executives to talk 
about their jobs in any terms other than maximizing shareholder value.
However, a classical theory that once was unchallengeable must yield to 
the facts of modern life. At the height of the economic depression in the 
United States in 1932 Dodd made a dramatic plea in the pages of the 
Harvard Law Review:
‘There is in fact a growing feeling not only that business has 
responsibilities to the community but that our corporate managers 
who control business should voluntarily and without waiting for 
legal compulsion manage it in such a way as to fulfil these 
responsibilities.’2
This resonated with Berle and Mean’s insistence that large corporations 
serve not only the owners or the controllers, but all society.3 In the name 
of normal business activity, corporations were too often given a licence to
1 See Dodd, E. M. (1932). "For W hom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?" HARM L , R EV  45: 1145.
? Dodd, E.M. (1932),  Ibid at 1146.
:i Ibid.
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destroy people’s lives and damage the environment. According to 
Mitchell rather like the shark evolving into a perfect eating machine, the 
device of limited liability has allowed the corporation to perfect its 
function, namely that of permitting corporations to externalise the costs 
ot stock price maximisation that is to push those costs onto others. 
According to Mitchell, the corporation has become the perfect 
externalizing machine.4 In the view of Deakin and Konzelmann corporate 
governance must no longer confine its analysis to the relationship 
between managers, boards and shareholders. This narrow focus was a 
major contributing factor to the 2000-1 round of corporate scandals of
c
which Enron was the most emblematic.'
A firm should be run in the interests of all its stakeholders rather than just 
the shareholders. A business corporation is an economic institution which 
has a social service as well as a profit making function.6 As such, 
stakeholder theorists argue that corporations owe an obligation to society 
to act in a socially responsible manner even if such actions are not legally 
mandated.7 Employees, creditors, suppliers, customers and the local 
community are primary stakeholders often mentioned and emphasised
4 M itchell, L. E. (2002). Corporate irresponsibility : America's newest export. N ew  Haven ; London, Yale 
University Press, at 99.
5 Deakin, S. and S. J. Konzelmann (2003). "After Enron: An A ge of Enlightenment? Organi^.tio_n_10(3).
6 Dodd, E .M.. (1932).  supra note 1 at 1148.
7 Grossman, II. A. (2005).  "Refining the Role o f  the Corporation: the impact o f  corpora te  social responsibili ty on 
shareholder  p r imacv theorv." Deakin Law Review 10(2): 575.
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within a broad definition of stakeholdins.8
O
Generally, a stakeholder model of corporate governance gives 
stakeholders a ‘Voice’ in firm management and seeks to accommodate 
their diverse interests in deciding upon corporate action.9 Freeman’s 
initiative on stakeholder management as a business strategy also has an 
instrumental orientation.10 As Campbell explicitly posits, “I support 
stakeholder theory not from some left wing reason of equity, but because 
I believe it to be fundamental to understanding how to make money in 
business” 11
Again, according to Stakeholder Capitalism edited by Kelly et ah, 
stakeholder theory is based on the grounds that individuals well endowed 
with economic and social capabilities will be more productive; companies 
which draw on the experience of all of their stakeholders will be more 
efficient; while social cohesion within a nation is increasingly seen as a 
requirement for international competitiveness.12
A case study from the worker/stakeholder cooperatives in Mondragon in
8 Freeman. R. E. and D. I... Reed (1983). "Stockholders and Stakeholders - a N ew  Perspective on Corporate 
Governance." California Management Review 25(3): 88-106.
9 Sigurt, V. (1999) " Varieties o f  Corporate Governance: Comparing Germany and the UK" in Hall, P. A. and D. W. 
Soskice (2001). Varieties o f  capitalism : the institutional foundations o f  comparative advantage. Oxford, Oxford  
University Press, at 387, 388.
10 Freem an. E. R. (1984). S trategic m a n a g e m e n t: a stakeholder ap p roach . Boston.M ass., Pitman.
“  Campbell ,  A. (1997),  "Stakeholders:  the case in favour", Long Range Planning, Vol. 30 No.3. at.446
12 Kelly, (1. D. Kcllv, c t a i .  (1997).  Stakeholder  capitalism. Macmillan, at 244.
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the Basque area ot Spain suggests that sensible balance can be achieved.1"’ 
In a survey in December 2005 by management consultants McKinsey, 
only 6 per cent of the 4,238 executives surveyed worldwide agreed with 
the Milton Friedman line that the sole purpose of business was to produce 
high returns for shareholders; 84 per cent thought high returns had to be 
balanced with contributions to the broader public good.14 The view 
classically summed up by Milton Friedman as ‘[t] he social responsibility 
of business is to make profits’.15 As a concept, CSR directly challenges 
the dominant Anglo-American paradigm of corporate governance, which 
emphasises profit maximisation for investors as the most efficient means 
of promoting wealth creation for society as a whole.
Employees, as one key stakeholder group, and their relationship with the 
corporations are often part of the debate about corporate stakeholder 
theory and social responsibility (CSR). This is only logical, as employees 
constitute the heart of every corporation. Through their jobs employees 
gain much information about how things are going within a corporation, 
and how they might go better. Employees often have a good sense of 
which managers are doing a good job, and which are not. On many
13 Turnbull, S. (1995). "innovations in Corporate Governance: The Mondragon Experience." Corporate 
Governance: An International Review  3(3): 167-180.
14 Mckinsey (2006). "Global Survey o f  Business Executives: Business and Society'." T he.M cKinsey. Quart 2.
15 Friedman.M ., "The Social Responsibility' o f  Business is to Increase its Profits", I . h e . N e ^
September 13. 1970: see H enderson, D. (2001). Mismiided virtue : false notions o f  corporate social responsibility,
Insti tute o f  Econom ic  Affairs.: Bakan.  J. (2004). J.jTe_yprpo^ .!hg_pathjdpmc^ pt  protit  and j x n y e i .
New York, Free Press at 34.
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matters employees are likely to be better informed than the scattered 
small shareholders of a public corporation. This may make employees 
more effective monitors of managers than shareholders.16 Employee 
governance may also be an effective commitment device to induce 
employees to invest in firm-specific human capital. Employees develop 
firm-specific human capital and, like the firm owner, make “investments” 
in the firm. These non transferable skills and knowledge may be critical 
to the competitiveness of the firm.
As Grant argues, if knowledge is the pre-eminent productive resource and 
most knowledge is created by and stored within individuals, then 
employees are the primary stakeholders. This creates a challenge for 
management to establishing mechanisms by which cooperating 
individuals can co-ordinate their activities in order to integrate their 
knowledge into productive activities.17 In Tech Corporation Ltd v Millar 
(1973) 33 DLR (3d) 288, a Canadian Court said:
If today the directors of a company were to consider the interests of 
its employees no one would argue that in doing so they were not 
acting bona fide in the interests of the company itself. Similarly, if
16 See Stiglitz, J. E. (1985). "Credit Markets and the Control o f  Capital." Journal o f  M oney Credit and Banking 
17(2): 133-152.; Eugene Fama has argued that lower level managers are often good monitors o f  higher level 
managers. See Fama, E. F. (1980). "Agency Problems and the Theory o f  the Firm." Journal ofPoH tjcalE conom y  
88(2): 288, 293.
17 Grant, R. M. (1997). "The knowledge based view o f  the firm: implications for management practice.' Long  
Range Planning 30(31: 452.
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the directors were to consider the consequences to the community 
of any policy that the company intended to pursue, and were 
deflected in their commitment to that policy as a result, it could not 
be said that they had not considered bona fide the interests of the 
shareholders.’18
In the UK the case law had always took the view that there should be no 
charity at the board except such as is for the benefit of the company but 
even the classic case which laid down this test accepted that it would be 
for the company’s benefit to organise an event for the benefit of workers 
in order to foster loyalty to the company.19 Although more recent cases 
have accepted that there is nothing to prevent a commercial company 
having a substantive charitable or philanthropic object.20
Again, it has been argued that good corporate citizenship can be used to 
attract, retain and motivate the best workers.21 McDonnell supports 
employee governance as a way to ensure that corporations are governed 
in part in the interests of employees.22 He identifies three approaches: 
employee share ownership; electing employee representatives to the
18 See Teck Corp. v. Millar (1972), 33 D.L.R. (3d) 288 at 291.
19 Hutton v West Cork Railway Cod  883) 23 ChD 654 at 658.
20 Re Horslev and Weight Ltd 119821 Ch 442 at 450; for a consideration of'these developm ents see Pettet B, (1997) 
'From Cakes and A le to Corporate Social R esponsibility’ Current Legal Problems 50, 289.
21 Benioff, M. and K. Southwick (2004). C ompassionate Capitalism :H ow ,
Integral Part o f  D oing  W ell. T he C areer Press.
22 McDonnell .  B. f I. (October  15. 2002). "Corporate Constituency Statutes and Kmployee Governance." Minnesota 
Public I aw  Research  Paper No. 0 2 - 13 . Available at SSRN: http: / /ssrn.com/abstract-349b42
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board of directors; and employee involvement in quality circles, work 
councils or the like. He believes that employee involvement in corporate 
governance can work as a potentially powerful additional mechanism to 
control managerial opportunism and to direct the corporation towards 
greater efficiency. ‘ Thus, employee involvement in corporate governance 
works as a potentially powerful additional mechanism to control 
managerial opportunism and to direct the corporation toward greater 
efficiency. Employees have an abundance of information on the 
functioning of the corporation and managers, and incentives to use that 
information to improve the corporation’s performance, if given a way to 
do so.24
Parkinson also argued that employees are not merely one of several 
‘outside’ groups but are in a special position with a claim to be regarded 
as ‘insiders’. This claim is equal to that of the shareholders to demand 
that the company be run for their benefit. From his perspective he 
envisaged a function for worker participation that extends beyond the 
requirement of social responsibility. In his view the function of 
participation is not merely to restrain profit maximisation but to inculcate 
an open ended commitment to the furtherance of the interests of an 
employee in addition to those of the shareholder constituency. He viewed
23 Ibid.
24 See Stiglitz, J F. (1 9 8 5 ) ,  supra note 16; Eugene Fama has argued that lower level managers are often good 
monitors o f  higher  level managers. See Fama, E.F.. (1980), Supra note 16, at ^88, _9a.
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employee participation as a corrective to corporate power responding to 
the doubts concerning the legitimacy of the power exercised by 
companies over the lives of their employees. Employee participation 
would provide a practical means of broadening company goals for their 
benefit although the nature of these would be largely in relation to 
community concerns. Though the latter would not be free from conflicts 
of interest for which he suggests an alternative way of addressing that 
issue in this context. Parkinson’s response to the issue of private power 
was to subject companies to a form of democratic control and not by 
subsuming them within the machinery of the state. Rather, he preferred 
countering private power through internal democratization by way of 
employee participation or control. ‘
6.3 The development in the UK
Traditionally, corporate governance theory in the US as expressed in 
academic legal literature is clearly focused on shareholder wealth 
maximisation as the dominant corporate function. In contrast, the 
kcommunitarian’ or ‘social responsibility’ model of governance seems 
more dominant in many European countries."6 This variety of capitalisms
25 Parkinson, J. E. (1993) Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory o f  Company Law Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, Chapter 9, The Democratic Imperative: Beyond Social Responsibility.
26 See generally Venanzi. Daniela and Fidanza. Barbara(2006), Corporate Social Responsibility and Value Creation
- Determinants and Mutual Relationships in a Sample ol European Listed H in ts  . Available at SSRN. 
h ttp : / /s srn .com /abs trae t-939710
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leinforces the argument that there are differences in corporate governance 
systems that are determined largely by factors other than a particular 
model of economic thinking, among which are the historical, political and 
cultural influences at play.27
The UK had flirted with the idea of ‘industrial democracy’ under a 
number of labour governments. The labour government of 1974-9 had a 
number of alternatives for economic strategy after the earlier post war 
labour governments had failed to deliver on their promises. The left had 
developed proposals for industrial democracy giving stronger rights to 
workers as an integral part of its strategy to transfer power from private 
firms. Support for this approach had come from both the Trade Union 
Congress (TUC) and the labour conferences in the early 1960s. 
Unfortunately, their proposals were uncertain and ambiguous. It was 
recognised that different decisions would be made by workers groups and 
would need to be reconciled with one another and with the objectives of 
national planning. Little progress was made on developing a solution to 
these potential conflicts in the party’s policy development.28
27 See for exam ple W hitley, R. (1999). D ivergent capitalism s : the so c ial structuring and change o f  business 
system s. Oxford, Oxford University Press. ; Thelen. L ,  "Varieties o f  Labour Politics in the Developed  
Democracies"; Wood, S., "Business, Government, and Patterns o f  Labour Market Policy in Britain and the Federal 
Republic o f  Germany" ; Vitols S. "Varieties o f  Corporate Governance: Comparing Germany and the U K " ; Teubner, 
G , " Legal Irritants: H ow  U nifying Law Ends up in N ew  Divergencies" in Hall, P. A. and D. W. Soskice (2001). 
Varieties o f  capitalism : the institutional foundations of comparative advantage. Oxford, Oxford U niversity Press,
at 3 8 7* 388"....................................
28 W ickham-Jones, M. (1996). Economic strategy and the Labour Parly : . p M t i c s j m d j W ^ ^
Basingstoke, M acmillan  Press Ltd.at 68-70 and 142-14)
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Following considerable prevarication the government set up a committee 
on industrial democracy under Sir Alan Bullock which failed to reach 
agreement. In 1977, the majority of the committee proposed that 
companies with over 2000 employees should be compelled to accept 
equal numbers of worker representatives to those appointed by the 
shareholders onto their boards. This amounted to a rejection of the 
German two tier board system. The employers’ representatives on the 
committee expressed considerable hostility to these proposals producing 
their own minority report. The latter criticised the majority view as being 
aimed at control by and the exercise of increased power by trade unions.29 
The government proposed legislation based on a moderated version of the 
majority report. However, in the face of further opposition from the 
Confederation of British Industry, it was postponed to be followed by a 
white paper in 1978.30 The government’s attempt to promote worker co­
operatives was also unsuccessful. The labour movement’s flirtation with 
industrial democracy was all but dead. A Conservative government 
headed by Margaret Thatcher was elected in 1979.
Mrs. Thatcher launched a free market property rights counter revolution
29 The Bullock Report, (1977) Report o f  the Committee o f  Inquiry on Industrial D em ocracy, Cmnd. 6706, HM'SO . 
In addition to the M ain (majority) Report at vii and the Minority Report at 167 there was a note o f  dissent relating 
to the number o f  em ployee representatives on the board by com mittee member Mr N . S. W ilson at 163. See also  
Hadden, T„ (1977) Com pany Law and Capitalism (2nd Edn) London, W eidenfeld and N icolson , Chapter 13 
Industrial D e n w c r a c ^ a t s t o ^  and Davies, P. L. (1976) industrial Democracy, European BxEgrjepce: Two 
reports prepared for the Industrial Democracy C o m mjttee 11MSO.
■'(l (1978) Industrial Dem ocracy, Cmnd. 7231. London. HMSO.
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upon the world which from 1979 has travelled in the opposite direction. 
The UK has stood apart from Europe as an influential exponent of the 
Anglo-American market based approach to corporate governance/1 The 
following decade saw a major change in the political and industrial 
landscape of the UK. The state retreated from the nationalised industries 
and the private sector stepped in. The aftermath of the miners’ strike saw 
the retreat of the trade unions and a considerable decline in their 
membership.32
tHThe EC 5 Directive on industrial democracy was stalled and constantly 
negotiated down by the British government which saw it as an alien 
imposition. The EC requirement to duty to show consultation with 
worker representatives in the form of trade unions was legislated for in a 
very mild form, though since 1995 this has changed.34 Meanwhile the 
drive to extend the boundaries of the property owning democracy 
continued apace. Employee share schemes were encouraged and given
B ecause o f  the current financial crisis, huge amounts o f  money have been committed in financial support for 
many industries. The UK has spent £81 bn to prop up Royal Bank of Scotland, HBOS and Lloyds TSB as w ell as 
nationalizing Northern Rock and parts o f  Bradford & Bingley. In US, a $700bn schem e approved last year, known  
as the Troubled A sset R elie f Programme, was used to help lenders like Citigroup and Bank o f  Am erica as w ell as 
the autom obile industry. See BBC Business report "Global downturn: In graphics" available at 
http://new s.bbc.co.U k/2/hi/business/7893317. stm.
32 Deakin, S. and G. S. Morris (2005). Labour Law (4th cdn). Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing at 766.
33 Du Plessis, J. J. and .1. D ine (1997). "The Fate o f  the Draft Fifth Directive on Company Law: Accom m odation  
Instead o f  Harmonisation." Journal o f  Business Law 23.
34 Deakin, S. and Morris, G. S. (2005) supra note 32 at 822. In Case C-382/92 EC C om m issiojLvJJnited Kingdom  
[1994] IRLR 292 and Case C -383/92 [1984] IRLR 412, EC'J held that the original position in the Trade Union and 
Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 making consultation subject to the voluntary act o f  the em ployer
infringed obligations imposed by the directives relating to redundancies and transfer o f  undertakings. The 
legislation was therefore amended to require employers to consult, at their choice, eithei a lecoguised union or an 
elected  representative o f  the affected employees.
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tax advantages. The co-determination approach adopted in the company 
law harmonisation project was completely stalled. The change in political 
attitudes and relative demise of the trade unions which had their own tried 
and tested form of collective bargaining led to their turning away from 
any flirtation with the concept of industrial democracy.
6.3.1 The influence from the EU
The European Union, for example, acknowledged the importance of 
social and market pressures, noting that civil society must be recognised 
as playing a significant role in this new business governance. The United 
Kingdom has also implemented EU laws requiring at least partial 
adaptation of the shareholder primacy model, to reflect aspects of the 
European 4 stakeholder ’ approach to corporate regulation-specifically, 
employee board representation.3^
John Armour and Simon Deakin have claimed that recent developments 
in the UK have significantly reduced the centrality of shareholder 
interests and, largely due to the implementation ol EU Directives, have 
succeeded in moving the UK’s system of corporate governance closer to
35 See D avies, P. (2003). "Workers on the Board o f  the European Company?" Industrial Law Journal 32.; Barnard,
C. and S. Deakin (2003). "Reinventing the European Corporation: Corporate Governance. Social Policy and the 
Single Market." Industrial Relations Journal 33: 484.
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that of Germany where debt-holders and employees already have a 
variety of formal decision rights that limit managerial discretion in 
several important areas relating to investment, financing and restructuring 
strategies.36 However, for a market-oriented economy and system of 
governance such as the UK, formally entrenching debt holder and or 
employee representatives into corporate decision making would be a 
radical departure from existing practice.
6.3.2 The political impaction
The British New Labour Party emphasis on stakeholding, with the further 
consideration that:
“We believe that in the appointment of non-executive directors 
companies should recognise that there are other stakeholders in the 
future of the company than shareholders.”'1 
It was this critical distinction which let the Hampel committee on 
Corporate Governance in the UK off the hook of more formally 
recognising stakeholder interests among the duties of company directors:
‘A company must develop relationships relevant to its success. 
These will depend on the nature of the company’s business; but
36 Armour. J., S. Deakin, et al. (2003). " S h a reh o ld er  primacy and the trajectory o f  UK corporate governance."
British Journal o f  Industrial Relations 41(3): 531-555.
1' In October 1994. at the annual Labour party' conference in Blackpool, Tony Blair gave his first platform speech
as the leader o f  the Labour party. At the end o f  his speech he declared that the party needed a new statement o f  
aims and a modern constitution.l ater, Blair gave speeches about stakeholding on ISih and /.9th ol January' and 
11th o f  Februarv, 1996. The NSS , 29 Mar 1996.
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they will include those with employees, customers, suppliers, credit 
providers, local communities and governments. It is management's 
responsibility to develop policies which address these matters; in 
doing so they must have regard to the overriding objective to 
preserving and enhancing the shareholders’ investment over 
tim e...’38
The approach to CSR taken by the Hampel Committee is indicative of the 
consensus that had formed by the 1990s.’9 The committee insisted that 
good corporate governance should take into account the various 
stakeholders affected by the company’s operations, but was unwilling to 
mandate particular management structures giving those stakeholders 
representation in decision-making processes or to impose legally 
enforceable duties benefiting those stakeholders.
The UK government’s major review of company law, reporting in 2001,40 
underlined this approach by opting to retain CSR as a voluntary matter 
reither than making it a direct legal obligation, and the theme has been 
reiterated since, with Stephen Timms, Energy and Corporate 
Responsibility Minister, describing CSR as ‘going beyond legal
38 Hampel Report (1998), "Committee on Corporate Governance Final Report", London ,para 1.16
'! ,bid-
4,1 Department o f  Trade and Industry, Company Law Review Report. 2001.
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requirement’.41 The former Department of Trade and Industry’s (now 
BERR) line was to ‘see CSR as the voluntary actions that business can 
take, over and above compliance with legal requirements’.42 The CLR 
Steering Group indicated that it would not consider fundamental changes 
to the Anglo-American model of corporate governance:
“We interpret our terms of reference as requiring us to propose 
reforms which promote a competitive economy by facilitating the 
operations of companies so as to maximise wealth and welfare as a 
whole. We have not regarded it as our function to make proposals 
as to how such benefits should be shared or allocated between 
different participants in the economy on the grounds of fairness, 
social justice or any similar criteria.”43
Approaches to reform such as those proposed by Parkinson in relation to 
employee participation were therefore regarded as beyond the scope of 
the review. In light of the UK’s historical flirtation with industrial 
democracy and its stalling of the 5th EC Directive on Co-determination 
this is not surprising.
The government identified the enhancement of shareholder engagement 
and a long term investment culture as one of the four key objectives of its
41 Webb, T. (2004). "What w ill the UK government do about its new reporting proposals ?" Ethical ,Corporation 
S eptem ber.
4~ Corporate social responsibility: a government update, available at w \v\v.csi\gov,u L \ v ^
43 C L R  Steerin« G roup  (1999),  M odern  Law for a Competitive Economy: The Strategic f ram ew ork ,  para.2.5.
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Company Law Reform Bill, introduced to the House of Parliament in 
November 2005 44 and passed into law in November 2006 as the 
Companies Act 2006. The Act includes a section which gives the 
government authority to require institutional investors to disclose how 
they have exercised their voting rights on resolutions tabled at company 
meetings.
6.3.3 The new development of the 2006 Companies Act
In the United Kingdom, there are limited exceptions to this general rule: 
directors have a duty to consider the interests of employees in performing 
their functions. Section 309 of the Companies Act 1985, introduced in 
1980, states that directors, as part of their duty to the company, are to 
have regard to the interests of the company’s employees in general, in 
addition to the interests of its members. A generous interpretation of this 
provision is that it elevates the interests of employees to the same level as 
those of shareholders. It also leaves it to directors to decide how to 
balance those interests when they are in competition with each other. A 
more pessimistic interpretation is that the section ‘does not compel the
^  The other key objectives o f  the Company Law Reform Bill are: ensuring better regulation and a I hink Small 
First’ approach; m aking it easier to set up and run a company; and providing flexibility lor the future. 1 he Bill was 
introduced to the H ouse o f  Lords in N ovem ber 2005 and brought forward to the House o f  Com mons in May 2006.
It received Roval A ssent in N ovem ber 2006 as the Companies Act 2006. It is the longest Act ever to have been 
passed by Parliament as it repeals, and restates in plain English, almost all o f  the current Companies Acts, which it 
largely replaces. See Craig. R. (200S). " The enormous turnip: a discussion on the companies act 2006 which like 
in the child's fairv tale is still growing " The CooiBgfl.V Lawyer 29( 12): .>61.
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directors to do anything they would not otherwise have been inclined to 
do . Instead, it simply requires (and there is debate about its mandatory 
effect) directors to ‘have regard to’ employees’ interests; that is, ‘the duty 
is merely a procedural one, having no substantive content’. Perhaps this is 
what lies behind Len Sealy’s observation that section 172 ‘is either one of 
the most incompetent or one of the most cynical pieces of drafting on 
record’.46
The 2006 Companies Act also sets out a duty on directors to act in the 
way they consider ‘in good faith, would be most likely to promote the 
success of the company for the benefits of its members as a whole’.47 
Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 introduces a ‘duty to promote the 
success of the company’. The section has its origins in the 
recommendations of the Company Law Review Steering Group which 
reported in 2001.48 The section begins by stating that a director must act 
in the way that would be most likely to promote the success of the 
company for the benefit of its members as a whole. The section then goes 
on to state that in fulfilling this duty, a director must have regard to a 
range of factors including the interests of the company’s employees (thus
45 Parkinson, J. E. (1993). Corporate power and responsibility : issues in the theory o f  com pany law . Oxford, 
Clarendon, at 84.
46 Seaiy, L. (1987). "Directors 'wider' Responsibilities-Problems Conceptual, Practical and Procedural " Monagh 
Law R eview  13: 177.
47 Com panies Act 2006, s. 172 (1) cam e into force in 2008.
48 Company Law R eview  Steering Group, Modern Company Law For a Competitive Econom y-Final Report (2001, 
Volume 1). Appendix C: see also Department of 1 rade and Industry, Company Law Kefoim White 1 aper (March 
2005), pp. 20-1.
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replacing the present section 309), its suppliers and customers, the impact 
of the company’s operations 011 the community and the environment, and 
the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high 
standards ot business conduct.49 Other factors to be considered include 
the likely consequences of any decision in the long term.
These additional considerations reflect the government’s acceptance of 
the ‘enlightened shareholder value’ approach to company law reform, 
which assumes that a company’s relationship with its stakeholders affects 
the returns to shareholders, and that it is therefore in shareholders' 
interests that directors take account of broader stakeholder concerns.50 
But in reality the section goes 110 further than would normally be 
expected in terms of the considerations of a sensible board of directors 
determining what is in the interests of the company for the benefit of its 
shareholders as a whole. Boards have always had to balance the often 
competing interests of its primary and secondary stakeholders.
Labour rights commentators on the United Kingdom’s 2006 codification 
of ‘enlightened shareholder value’ duties for directors, while welcoming 
their potential to enhance discussion of social issues at board-level, may
49 Ibid.
59 The governm ent also considered, and rejected, an alternative approach identified b \ the CLR Steeling Gtoup- 
referred  to as the ‘pluralis t’ approach-in which the interests o f  a range o f  stake holders aie accom m odated without 
the interests o f  a single group (shareholders)  being overriding. See House ol Com m ons l.ibiaiv K eseu iJ i  1 apei 
06/30.  p. 11.
2 6 2
also have been right to observe that their impact in practice will probably 
depend on the willingness of trade unions, nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) and socially oriented shareholders to query how 
boards have interpreted the “enlightened” part of their mandate.51
On the other hand, amendments to UK company legislation have seen the 
provision requiring directors to have regard to the interests of employees 
as well as shareholders52 replaced by a more general directors’ duty 
provision.53 In addition to the criticisms of the former statutory provision 
discussed above, its effectiveness in protecting employee interests has 
been questioned on the basis that it does not require those interests to be 
given priority, and because the duty is owed to the company and therefore
r *
is enforceable only at the instance of shareholders. ‘ However, the 
enshrinement of the concept of ‘enlightened shareholder value’ through 
the new statutory provision55 means that employees will have to compete 
with a range of other stakeholders for legal recognition.56
51 Ergon: Focus on Labour (7 December 2006), 6. available at
htlp://w w w .ergononl ine.net/news_publications/newsletters/ergon_focus_on_labour_decem  ber_2006.html 
Com panies Act. 1985 (UK ), s. 309 (1)
:'3 Com panies A ct 2006  (U K ), s. 172.
54 Villiers,C ., "Section 309 o f  the Companies Act 1985: is it Time for a Reappraisal? ", in Collins, H. C„ P. D avies, 
et al. (2000). Legal regulation o f  the em ployment relation. London, Kluvver Law International, at 595-597.;Lord  
Wedderburn (2002). "Employees, Partnership and Company Law." Industrial Law Journal 31: 106-8.
55 See D avies, P., (2005), "Enlightened Shareholder Value and the N ew  R esponsibilities o f  Directors: What D oes 
the B est Director D o for the Creditor?” (Inaugural W.E. Hearn Lecture, Law School, The University o f  Melbourne, 
4), available at http://cclsr.law.unimelb.edu.au/do\vnload.ctm ?D ow nloadFile=BC 82395E-09A D -D B76-
F 1D 0 B 2 A F F B 4 1CF9D
56 Wedderburn, 13. P 0 0 4 L  The F utu re o f  C o m pany L a v U . F M . £ ^
The Institute o f  E m ploym ent  Rights, at 43.
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6.4 The German co-determination
In contrast, the German corporate governance system is frequently 
described as representing a stakeholder or pluralistic approach.57 In 
Germany, there has been a long-standing policy that employees should 
share in the decision-making of their firms. The freedom under the 
German system available to company directors to consider purposes other 
than profit maximisation/shareholder value, e.g. employee interest or 
social interests, arises implicitly from the German legislative framework 
as a whole and the fact that the German constitution prescribes a "social" 
market economy.58
In contrast to most Western economies, Germany has a two-tier board 
with a management board (Vorstand) and a supervisory board 
(Aufsichtsrat). The supervisory board represents the shareholders and 
employees. Through the Montanmitbestimmungsgesetz of 1951, 
Germany required mining, coal, and steel workers have the right to 50% 
representation on their company’s boards with the remaining 50% 
representing shareholders. The Mitbestimmungsgesetz of 1976 extended 
this right to all firms with employees numbering in excess of 2,000. The
57 Corfield, A. (1998). "The Stakeholder Theory and its Future in Australian Corporate Governance: A  Preliminary 
Analysis." Bond Law R eview  10.
58 Article 20 o f  the Federal  Constitution (Grundgesetz)  states: "The Federal Republic o f  Germ any is a democratic 
and social  republic." This is supplemented by Article 14(2) Federal Constitution (Grundgesetz) : "Property commits.  
Its use should also serve the general public ".
264
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz of 1952 required stock corporations with 
employees numbering between 500 and 2000 provide labor one-third 
representation on their boards. Exceptions to codetermination included 
firms of any size that are family controlled or are involved in media, 
religious, union, or political activities.5 ) The interests of certain employee 
groups are considered through the co-determination provisions as those 
employees have the right to elect representatives on the supervisory board 
which supervises the board of directors of the respective companies. 
Nevertheless, the employee representatives within the Aufsichtsrat have 
the same rights and duties as the representatives nominated by the 
shareholders, they are all non-executive company directors.60
Another form of labour representation in business decision-making in 
Germany is Work Councils Codetermination. Under these laws, plants 
must have councils elected by workers; firms with multiple plants must 
have aggregate councils; and holding companies (Konzeme) with 
multiple firms must have group councils. For example, German law gave 
Work Councils rights to co-determination with the Management Board in 
connection with dismissal, employee vocational training and grievances.
59 Fauver, L. and M . E. Fuerst (2006). "Does good corporate governance include em ployee representation?
F.vidence from G erm an  corpora te  boards." JpinwiJjotJF^ 82(r>). 6 .-6.
60 Ibid.
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The German co-determination system is particularly well suited for the 
investigation because it has demonstrated over the last 30 years that three 
apparently conflicting goals might be achieved at the same time.61 First, is 
the goal of enhanced economic performance of corporations and the 
integration of employees into the process of corporate decision making. 
Labour, with its operational knowledge, acts as a check on the private 
control benefits of large shareholders and the perquisite-related abuses by 
management. If only management proposes board members, then only 
management has access to the board. It is likely that embedded in project 
choices there are benefits to large shareholders or management that do 
not improve small shareholder wealth and hence firm value. Again, 
detailed knowledge of operations allows employees to act as a check on 
choices made for the benefit of large owners and management, but to the 
detriment of firm viability and hence labour interests.6"
As Prigge surmises:
"... at least as members of Wirtschaftsausschuss, work councillors 
can collect both a wide range of basic plant-level information as 
well as information on the business and financial situation. 
Conditions seem to be such that a works councillor sitting on the 
supervisory board has a solid information base at his disposal and,
Cl1 a  new  German Corporate Governance Code was introduced in 2001 and now beais much closer resemblance to
the A nglo-A m erican  model, a l though the core value remains the protection of the inv\.stoi.
6” Supra note 59, at 684
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equally important, his information base most likely is highly 
complementary to the information the shareholder representatives 
have...from a mere informational perspective the makeup of the 
supervisory board...is a good starting point for management board 
monitoring...This may be one main reason why internal employee 
representatives are generally highly appreciated supervisory board 
members of the capital side.63
Secondly, advantages of the German co-determination system include 
reduced employee turnover, stronger corporate identification of 
employees and enhanced industrial peace.
As Freeman and Lazear discuss, codetermination provides a mechanism 
for the credible exchange of information between the board and the 
workers. During difficult times for the firm, the union will be well aware 
of the problems and forthcoming with concessions. Of course, during 
times with better firm performance, labour too will expect to benefit. At 
the very least, the probability of a costly strike when the firm truly cannot 
afford a wage increase is likely to decrease with codetermination. This 
free and credible exchange of information should also improve 
cooperation and lead to a team approach to management. Workers with
6-’ Prigge.S., "A survey o f  German corpora te  governance",  in I lopt, K. J. (1998). ( om p a ia li\ e corpoiale 
governance : the state o f  the art and emerging research. Oxford. C laiendon.
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operational expertise should now have a means to propose ideas to the 
highest levels of the firm and thereby improve efficiency. Employee 
representation may improve the coordination and flow of specific 
knowledge within the firm, i.e., create an information intermediary 
between management and other employees.64
Third, this applies to companies which are subject to the co-determination 
system, the interests of shareholders and employees often coincide in 
practice.65 A study by the renowned German Max Plank Institute 
examined the decision-making process of the 40 biggest German 
corporations during the 1990s and revealed that shareholders and 
employees in most cases have common rather than distinct objectives and 
interests.66 Several observations might help to illustrate this phenomenon. 
First of all, employees, as well as shareholders, have a great interest that 
"their" particular company remains or becomes competitive and generates 
profit because only then it will be guaranteed that staff does not become 
redundant. Second, somewhat surprisingly, the study revealed that 
shareholders and employees often formed coalitions against the 
management in order to achieve common goals such as better and
64 See Freeman, G. and Lazear, E. P. (1995), "An Econom ic Analysis o f  Works Councils", in Rogers, J. and 
Streeck, W. (eds) (1995). Works councils : consultation, representation, and cooperation in industrial .relations. 
Chicago, London, University o f  Chicago Press at 27-52.
65 See M ax Planck Institute, Arbeitsbeziehungcn in Deutschland: Wandel durch Internationalisierung. Beric-ht tibcr 
Forschung am M PIfG (2002); a summary o f  the study can be accessed online, see Max Planck Institute,
h ttp ://w v v v v .m p g .d e /e n g lish /p o rta l/iiK lex .h tin l.
'i,; Ibid.
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expanded transparency or resistance against skyrocketing management 
remuneration.6' Other areas of cooperation between employee and 
shareholder representatives included opposition against management 
plans to accumulate undisclosed reserves in order to reduce corporate 
profits.68
The observation that the interests of employees and shareholders often 
coincide in practice is also supported by a representative study, which 
asked (non-employee) shareholders whether codetermination procedures 
on the supervisory board should be restricted. Only one per cent 
expressed the view that employee representation should be totally 
abolished, but 64 per cent of the private shareholders indicated that they 
are happy with the current state of employee representation on the 
supervisory board (31 per cent supported reforms).69
Of course, there are also disadvantages of the German co-determination 
such as efficiency considerations or a conflicting duty situation on the 
supervisory board. However, as West Germany had been one of the 
fastest growing and strongest economies in Europe since the Second 
World War. The codetermination model had been partly responsible for
67 ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Poll bv  TN S Em nid  for the German Manager Magazin. January’ 2005.
269
decades of high productivity and robust economic growth70 on balance 
and in the long term. It seems that the positive impacts of co­
determination procedures, at least in the German context, outweigh any 
negative influences caused by the system.71 Roe has argued that co­
determination influences managers and blockholders to retain their ‘semi­
private’ blockholding structure therefore limiting the development of 
securities markets.72 Charkham, however, puts this down in part to the 
German public’s agnosticism towards the cult of equity and reflects 
German managements’ lack of enthusiasm for the stock market.73 It is 
also important to note that the system of co-determination is an important 
part of the total system of corporate governance in Germany. It is one 
important piece of the jigsaw puzzle, fitting in with the other elements of 
the institutional structures. 74 According to Geniin and Wagner, the 
variety of regulations in those countries having a co-determination system 
reflects a variety of preference and culture on the one hand and on the 
other differences in development, thereby emphasizing the importance of 
historical development, path dependency and culture.75
70 M ichel, G. (2003), "Corporate Governance, Employees, and the Focus on Core Com petencies in France and 
Germany" in M ilhaupt, C. J. (2003). Global markets, domestic institutions : corporate law and governance in a 
new  era o f  cross-border deals. N ew  York ; Chichester, Columbia University Press at 206.
71 FitzRoyTF. and K. Kraft (2005). "Co-determination, efficiency and productivity." British Journal o f  Industrial 
Relations 43(21: 233-247.
7" Roe, M  J, "German Co-determination and German Securities Markets in Hopt, K. J. (1998). Comparative 
corporate governance : the state o f  the art and em erging research. Oxford. Clarendon.
77 Charkham, J. P., H. Ploix, et al. (2005). Keeping better com pany.Lcorpmate Oxford.
Oxford University Press.
74 Prigge, S.,"A Survey o f  German Corporate Governance" in Hopt et al.supra note72.
Gerurn, E. and Wanner. It., "Economics of Co-determination in View ol t . o i poiate Governance in l lopt  et al 
(1998) supra notc72.
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6.5 Employee participation in corporate in China
6.5.1 The principle of the corporation’s responsibility to society is a 
product from the era of the planned economy
In China during the Mao period, like the former Soviet Union, labour 
relations are claimed to be based on a “tacit agreement” or moral 
arrangement between the State and labour that protects workers’ 
interests.76 Where such contracts are fulfilled, labour movements are 
rare.77 Cook describes state-labour relations in the former Soviet Union in 
this manner:
[T]he regime provided broad guarantees of full and secure 
employment, state-controlled and heavily subsidized prices for 
essential goods, fully socialized human service, and egalitarian 
wage policies. In exchange for such comprehensive state provision 
of economic and social security, Soviet workers consented to the 
party’s extensive and monopolistic power, accepted state 
domination of the economy, and complied with authoritarian 
political norms. Maintenance of labour peace in this political
76 Thom pson, E. P. (1971). "Moral Economy o f  English Crowd in Eighteenth Century." PasL&_Present(50): 76- 
136.; Scott, J. C. (1976). The moral econom y o f  the peasant: rebellion and subsistence in S outheast A sia . N ew  
Haven ; London, Yale University Press.
77 Cook, L. .1. (1993).  The Soviet social contract and why it failed : welfare policy and vwrkgrslpojitjcs from 
ajezh n ey  to Yeltsin. Cambridge. Mass. ; London. Harvard (jniveisity Piest.,, 1 udlam. J. ( 1 9 9 1 ). Refoim and the 
Redefinition o f  the Social Contract under Gorbachev." WoiTd...PoJitj.c> 43.
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system thus required relatively little use of overt coercion.78
During that period, China adopted a strict socialist planned economy, 
under which enterprises were owned and controlled by the state, “ with 
all key decisions being made in accordance with State policy and 
objectives”77 In Chinese socialism, it was declared that because the state 
owned not only productive materials but also labour, the government 
should allocate labour resources. Therefore, SOE employees were 
recruited and allocated by the state according to labour and employment 
plans.
Communism produced a class of workers with strong emotional ties to 
and material interest in maintaining that system.80 In Marxian labour 
theory, labour is a commodity when workers are separated from 
productive materials but own their labour. That is, because workers do 
not own productive materials, they have to sell their labour, which is 
under the workers' direct control, to capitalists at the price amounting to 
the cost of labour force reproduction. Only when labour and productive 
materials are controlled directly by workers is labour not a commodity.81
78 Cook, L., f 199.3), supra note 77, at I-2.
79 Gul, F. A. and J . S. L. Tsui (2004). The governance o f  East Asian corporations : post Asian financial crisis. 
B asingstoke ; N ew  York, Palgrave Macmillan, at 27.
80 Linz, J. J. and A. Stepan (1996). Problems o f  democratic transition and consolidation : southern Europe, South 
Am erica, and post-com m unist Europe. Baltimore ; London, Johns Hopkins University Press.
8 f See G t T k w u ,  G u a n y u  Laodongli~Suoyouzhi Wenti D e Guandian Jieshao | An Introduction to the Theories o f  
Labor Ownership], in JianguoYilai Laodongli Suoyou/.hi Lunwenxuan (Selection ol A itielts on l.aboui owneiship  
since the Establishment o f  the People's Republic ot China] (Xu Jiewen Gu kcw u eds., 1982).Gongren Pi ess, at
In Chinese socialist economics, workers can directly control their own 
labour. Chinese workers may sell their labour to the state or to others. 
However, they indirectly control and use productive materials through the 
state's management. Therefore labour is a commodity in China's socialist 
economy.8" The profits made by the state are put into the common pool of 
welfare for the people. Workers still own the surplus product they 
produce through the state-owned system that replaced “the all-people- 
ownership” system.8'5 In theory, workers will benefit through China's 
long-run prosperity and the victory of socialism achieved by the 
economic reform.
The largest share of China's economy is the state-owned economy named 
“the all-people-owned economy.” China's constitution provides that the 
all-people-ownership system is the primary component and the base of 
China's economy.84 Chinese SOEs used to be production units as well as 
social and political organizations responsible for their employees’ 
welfare.85 Labour relations in SOEs in China were characterized as 
“organized dependence” of workers on firms. In this arrangement, 
workers depended on their work units or employers for highly secure jobs
504.
82 See Dai Yuanchen Zhongguo Laodongli Shichang Peiyu Gongzi G aige (D evelopm ent o f  Chinese labour market 
and w age reform) 1994, Beijing Press, at 10-13.
83 See Hsu, R. C. (1991). Econom ic theories in China. 1979-1988. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, at 31.
84 1982 Xianfa (1982 Constitution o f  the People's Republic o f  China), Art 7.
8' Walder, A. G. (1986). Communist neo-1raditionuljsm__i_wovk^ncljiGh(jntyjnjUu . Betkeley .
London, University o f  California Press.
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as well as cradle-to-grave welfare coverage, although provisions of 
welfare varied across firms.
SOE employees usually enjoy health services, housing, pensions, 
education, and entertainment provided by their enterprises. In many cases 
the cost of these benefits exceeds the total wage bill, no matter how poor 
the actual quality of these social sendees. A survey found that 70 percent 
of state enterprise workers felt that social benefits were as important as 
their cash incomes. In the same survey, workers reported that the most 
important social benefits were, in order of priority, health services, 
housing, and pensions.86 For a Chinese worker, the loss of a position in a 
state-owned firm means loss of medical benefits, shelter, pensions, and 
entertainment. However, the reality was often rather different in that the 
benefits of the ‘iron rice-bowF were always deliberately limited to a 
minority of the industrial workforce as a whole. There were often much 
less generous benefits in the far more numerous small and medium sized 
SOEs. As a result these could not always count on the docility of their 
workforce.87
As Walder suggests, “the extraordinary job security and benefits, the
86 A sian D evelopm ent Bank/M inistry o f  Labour PRC. Study o f  Social Welfare and Labour Adjustment for 
Enterprise Reform (H ewitt A ssociates, 1995) Cited in China &M ongolia DEP T, World Bank, REP. N O . 14924- 
CHA. China Reform o f  State-Owned Enterprises , available at http:// www.w orldbank.org/pics/eco/14924
87 Hassard, J., J. Sheenan. et al. (2007). China's state enterprise reform : froni,,Maj3  to,the,.market. London.
Routledge at 153.
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goods and services distributed directly by the state enterprise in a 
situation of scarcity that affects other sectors of the workface more 
severely, is an important source of the acceptance of the system.”88 In the 
pre-reform period, though SOE workers also have the right to participate 
in the enterprise’s democratic management. They participate in and 
supervise the management through the Employee Representative 
Conference (zhigong daibiao dahui) .89 However, they dependence on 
SOEs for almost all their basic needs and a lack of alternatives gave 
management powerful leverage over workers. Walder writes: “This 
complex web of personal loyalty, mutual support, and material interest 
creates a stable pattern of tacit acceptance and active co-operation for the 
regime that no amount of political terror, coercion, or indoctrination can 
even begin to provide.”90 Membership as a SOE worker is of great value 
to workers not only because of the monetary benefits, but also because 
they regard their job as their whole life position and their social identity 
within society.
88 Waldev, A., (1986), supra note 85.
89 Zhonghua Renm in Quanmin Suoyou Zhigongye Qiye Fa [State-Owned Industrial Enterprise Law o f  the People’s 
R epublic o f  China] (Apr. 1 3 ,1 9 8 8 ) , Zhongguo Renming Gonghueguo Falu Fenglei Zonglan, Jmgjifa, VOL. 2.
[Classified A ssem blage o f  the law o f  the People’s Republic o f  China, Econom ic Law] 1209. art. 5. 45. See also
1994 Zhonghua Renmin Gongsi Fa | 1994 Company Law o fth e  People’s Republic of China]
90 Walder, A. (1986C supra note 85 at 249
6.5.2 The economic reform and the changing relationship between the 
SOE and employee
Since 1978, China has chosen a route of evolutionary transformation 
from a central-planned economy to a free-market economy. In the late 
1980s, the economic developments following the Four Modernizations of 
1979 produced workplaces that were increasingly regulated by labour 
contracts, displacing the "iron-rice bowl” model of earlier years.91 Market 
reform has changed state-labour relations. The theory of all-people- 
owned labour has been replaced step by step by the labour commodity 
theory, along with the establishment of the labour contract system that the 
growing market economy called for.
When the theory of labour commodity became the dominant official 
ideology in the early 1990s, the government abandoned all ideological, 
political and moral imperatives for job security in SOEs. The transition to 
a socialist market economy in the 1990s coincided with a growing 
assumption of managerial control for employers."92 SOEs and their 
employees are now equal parties to an employment contract. One side
Q| Won. J. (2004). "Withering away o f  the iron rice bowl? The reemployment project o f  post-socialist China."
Studies in Comparative International Developm ent 39(2): 71-93 .;See also Peerenboom, R. (2001). "Globalization, 
Path D ependency and the Limits o f  Law: Administrative Law Reform and Rule o f  Law in the People's Republic o f  
China." Berkeley Journal o f  International Law 19: 161, 208.
l)- N ee, V. and Y. Cao (2005). "Market Transition and the Firm: Institutional Change and Income Inequality in 
Urban China.” M anagement and Onmni/ntion Review 1(1 )■ 23.; See also Jonathan, P. and D. Greenfield (2004).
"The Importance o f  Core Labor Rights in World Development. J he M ichiganjo u in a l of 1 nU^najLonal. J.,dw 26(39). 
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sells its labour for living materials and another side buys labour for 
profits. Both sides are free to choose with whom they make an 
employment contract or terminate an employment contract for their own 
benefit as long as they do not violate the law.
The 15th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (1997) stated that 
large and medium-sized state-owned enterprises should be corporatized 
and that the process of creating a modern enterprise system should be 
sped up.9'5 Reform of SOEs in China implies a possible end to traditional 
labour relations and welfare provisions. Workers who will be laid off no 
longer depend on their firms as before, and their collective action is thus 
less risky.94 Today in China, even though workers are considered as the 
masters of the State and enjoy very high political status in society, it has 
never been made clear how that important political and legal status is 
guaranteed in practice, especially in employment relationships. 95
6.5.3 The adaptation of corporate theory in China
The Chinese corporate governance approach, as will be shown in this 
study, has essentially been modelled on selected organizational features
93 Wei, Y. W. (2003). "An O verview  o f  Corporate Governance in China." Journal o f  International Law and 
Com merce 30: 23.
94 Cai, Y. (2006). State and la id -off workers in reform China : the silence and collective action o f  the retrenched. 
London, Rout ledge, at 4.
9' Ibid.
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ot German and Anglo-American systems.96 The government has adopted 
a rather legalistic approach based oil rules apparently borrowed from 
mature market economies.97 Chinese economists also seem to have 
adopted a definition of corporate governance that is primarily influenced 
by the agency-cost theory.98 As Wu has argued:
“Because a company does not have its own mind and 
consciousness, only through an organization system-namely 
managerial staff' directed by its corporate govemance-it can be 
governed...A check and balance relationship is formed within that 
structure, through which the owner entrusts its capital to the board 
of directors.”99
Thus, corporate governance is often taken by Chinese economists and 
policy makers to mean the organisational structure consisting of the 
owner, board of directors and senior managers. Within this structure a 
check and balance relationship is formed. In this structure the owner 
(often the state as majority owner) entrust its capital to the board of 
directors. The board of directors is the highest level of decision making of 
the company and has the power to appoint, reward and penalise, and 
dismiss senior managers. 100 However, as already pointed out, a 
considerable amount of political interference remains through SASAC
96 Tam, O . K . ( 1 9 9 9 ) .  The d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  corporate governance in China. Cheltenham. Edward Elgar, at 8 6 .
97 Ibid, at 19
98 Ibid.
99 WU. J. L. (1994).  X iandan Gongsi Vn Oive G aise (Modern Companies and Enterprise Reform}. Tianjin. Tianjin 
Renmin Chubanshe,  at 185.
!0° Ibid at 184.
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and local BSAMs.
A modern corporate system is generally understood among Chinese 
policy makers and commentators to possess the following attributes:101
* clearly clarified property rights;
* designated authorities and responsibilities;
* separated functions between government and enterprise;
* scientific management.
According to the CCL 2005, Article 4, the shareholders of a company 
shall be entitled to enjoy the capital proceeds, participate in making 
important decisions, choose managers, and so on.102 Directors are under a 
duty to act in the best interest of the corporation under Article 47 of the 
CCL 2005.
6.5.4 Employee participation in corporate decision making-the law 
on paper
China’s legal system had its origin in continental Europe. Europe’s 
emphasis on “social solidarity”, its scepticism about the merits of 
unfettered competition, and the formal inclusion of labour in corporate
l0‘ This definition was first adopted in the 1993 CCP Decisions and reaffirmed in the 1999 Decisions.
The C om panv  Law o f  the People ’s o f  China 2005, Article 4
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management in some European countries all reflect the greater 
importance that European culture attaches to the community, particularly 
as opposed to American culture.103 American doctrines of ‘employment at 
will’ and ‘freedom of contract’, both reflections of strong individualistic 
values, contrast with German concepts of ‘Labour rights’ and ‘good faith’ 
in contracting.104
In 1993, China promulgated its first Company Law to regulate the 
formation, organisation or dissolution of companies. The ultimate 
ideological goal of the CCL 1994 is to:
“ ... adapt to the needs to establish a modem enteiprise system, 
standardize the organization and activities of companies, protect 
the legitimate rights and interest of companies, shareholders and 
creditors, safeguard social and economic order and promote the 
development of the socialist market economy.” 105
Article 5 of the CCL 2005:
“When undertaking business operations, a company shall comply 
with the laws and administrative regulations, social morality and
103 See Salacuse, J.W. (2006), " The cultural Roots o f  Corporate Governance", in Norton, J. J., J. Rickord, et al.,
Eds. (2006). Corporate governance Post-Hnron: Comparative and international Perspectives, British Institute o f  
International and comparative law, at 451.
104 See Casper, S .,(1999) "The Legal Framework for Corporate Governance: the Influence o f  Contract Law on
Com panies  Stra tegies in G erm any  and the United States" in Hall, P. A. and I). W. Soskice (2001). Varieties o f  
c ap i ta l is in j  the institutional foundations ol com para t ive ad vantagg. Oxloid, Ox lot d Lniveis ity  Pi ess, at 3 8 / ,  j8 8 .  
iTb C l  opubiic o f  China 1995 (Company Law 1993) Art. I
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business morality. It shall act in good faith, accept the supervision 
of the government and the general public, and bear social 
responsibilities.”106
The Chinese government has made provisions in its Company Law for 
employee participation in the corporate governance of SOEs through 
representation on the supervisory board.107 Articles 45 and 68 of the CCL 
2005 stipulate that a proper proportion of workers’ representatives should 
be elected as board members in limited liability companies established 
with investment from two SOEs or two state investment holding entities, 
or in state-funded companies. According to articles 52 and 124 of the 
CCL 2005, the boards of supervisors in limited liability companies and 
joint stock companies should also contain a proper proportion of workers’ 
representatives. Employees are represented to a significant extent on the 
boards of directors and supervisors of companies that have corporatized 
and transformed their ownership.
Chinese Company law 2005 also requires listed companies to adopt a 
two-tier board structure composed of a Board of Directors (BOD) and a 
Supervisory Board. The BOD is defined as a decision-making unit108 and
106 The Compnay law o f  the People’s Republic o f  China 2005 (Company Law' 2005 ) Article 5
107 Tam, 0 ,K . (1999), supra note 96, at 61
108 A m ong  other  duties, the B oD  is empowered to appoint the CEO and other senior managers, call shareholders’ 
meetings, determine internal management systems and undertake othei necessmy decisions, authorised by 
shareholders .
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the Supervisory Board as the ‘‘monitoring organ”.109 Members of both the 
BOD and the Supervisory Board are appointed by, and report to 
shareholders. Listed companies in China are required to include a 
supervisory Board Report (SBR) in their annual reports by the Chinese 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC).110
Notwithstanding the effectiveness of the current arrangement, this 
formalized participation reflects a line of thinking among Chinese policy 
makers that suggests some acceptance and recognition of the role of 
employees in the development of corporate governance. 111 Therefore it 
seems worthwhile to investigate whether the German two-tier board 
structure, which establishes some form of employee representation on 
board level, provides a potential way for introducing CSR requirements 
into Chinese law. The reality of reform has meant that many large SOEs 
have had to rid themselves of a considerable proportion of their often 
bloated work force leading to a number of problems.
At the same time in the private sector, poor conditions have lead to 
activist workers and campaigning lawyers and eventually the introduction
109 The responsibilities o f  the Supervisory Board include (I) financial review; (II) monitoring directors’ and 
m anagers’ com pliance with law, regulations and Articles o f  Incorporation, (HI) requesting directors and managers 
to alter and /or rectify any o f  their personal actions if  they are in conflict with the firm’s objectives; (iv) proposing 
temporary shareholder m eetings, whenever they deem them to be necessary; (v) fulfilling any other duties that are 
stipulated in the articles o f  association for the firming (vi) attending the meetings o f  the BoD; and (vii) submitting
a report to the shareholders at the AGM . This list o f  activities illustrates the statutory role o f  the Supervisor)' Board.
110 This  requirement is stipulated in CSRC (1998) “Standards on the Content and Format o f  Information Disclosure 
by Public Issuing Companies .  N o.2: Annual Reports.
1 = 1 Ibid.
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of a new labour law.112
6.5.5 The employee participation in corporate affairs —the practice
I The Trade Union in China
Trade Unions are important organizations for workers in capitalist 
systems, although their power varies. It is found that two important 
factors determine the power of a trade union: First, the extent to which 
unions, as a broad national pattern, are integrated into the process of 
managerial decision making, especially concerning work reorganization. 
Secondly, is the existence of laws or corporatist bargaining arrangements 
that regulate firm-level union practice from outside the firm.llj
Workers want unions to speak for them but are dissatisfied with their 
performance. However, communist systems are characterized by weak 
mass associations like trade unions. In the former Soviet Union: Prior to 
a take-over, communists inside the trade union movement strive 
unceasingly and by all means available to generate hostility to the 
capitalist state. Once in power, with the state now supposedly on the side
112 See for exam ple,! [arnev, A. (2008). The China price : the true cost o f  Chinese com petitive advantage. London. 
N ew  York, Penguin B ooks., Chapter 5 "The stirring masses"; Hassard, J.,Sheenan, J.(2007) note 87, Chapter 7 
"State Capitalism, Labour unrest and worker representation"; Philion, S. E. (2009). W orte|^ d ,giTfficracYjni.CM M .s
transition from state socia lism . N ew  York ; London, Routledge.
*' I uruer. I,. (1991 ). Oemocracy at work ! c h a n I t h a c a ,  N Y ., 
Cornell Universitv Press, at 12.
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ot worker, the relationship is totally changed. This apparently signifies 
the trade unions almost total surrender of their position as independent 
institutions to promote and defend the workers’ interests and welfare.114
What happened in the former Soviet Union also holds true in China.115 
Workers’ interests are represented industrially through the All China 
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU)-the only workers’ organization 
with legal approval. ACFTU are used to counting nearly 90 percent of 
state enterprise workers as formally trade union members, as was also the 
case with other former socialist states.116
The ACFTU was founded in 1925. It has always been closely aligned 
with the CCP. In 1949, the government passed a law authorizing the 
creation of a national union which role was taken over by the ACFTU. In 
the early 1950s any union leaders who tried to assert a role for the union 
independent from the party were removed from their posts. Therefore, the 
ACFTU became what was known as a ‘transmission belt’ for party 
propaganda as well as an enforcer of labour discipline. Rather it was the 
danwei work unit that looked after workers interests. During the chaotic 
period of the Cultural Revolution 1966-1976 unions were labelled as
114 Godson, J. (1981), "The Role o f  the Trade Union", in Schapiro, L. and J. Godson (1981). The Soviet worker : 
illusions and realities. London. The M acmillan Press at 106-29.
1,5 Lee, L. T. (1984). The structure o f  the trade union system in,,Chinavj,,94 [Hong Kong], Centre o f  Asian
Studies, University o f  Hong Kong.
Pravda,A. and Ruble,B. (1986) "Communist Trade Unions: Varieties o f  Dualism," in Pravda, A. and B. A.
Ruble (1986). Trade unions in com m unist states. Boston ; London, Allen & Unwin.
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economist and ‘welfarist’ and had their meetings suspended. By the time 
economic reforms began in 1979, the ACFTU had been marginalized.117 
Indeed, as early as 1955, in a report to the central government, the 
ACFTU admitted that “the phenomenon that the trade union demands 
independence from the Party has largely disappeared. It is now focused 
on production matters.”118 Consequently, as defined in the trade union 
charter, the major task of the trade union is to help management fulfil 
production goals. Under the planned economy the main work of the trade 
union officials was to organize production campaigns and deal with 
welfare issues such as housing, or as some unionists put it at a National 
People’s congress meeting in April 1994, “issuing film tickets, managing 
meal coupons and collecting bathing tickets.” 119 To avoid potential 
conflict in the past, it has tended to concentrate its work in non-industrial 
areas such as welfare and housing
At the enterprise level there was often a closer alliance between the union, 
Party and enterprise manager than between the union and workers. Indeed 
for many a position in the union was a career path.120 The trade union is a
117 See Harney, A. (2008), supra note 112, at 131 -2.
1,8 The General O ffice o f  the A ll China Federation o f  Trade Unions (1989) (ed.), Jianguo yilai zhonggong  
zhongyang guanyu gongren vundong wenjian xuanbian (Selected the Foundaing o f  the PRC), Beijing. Gongren
chubanshe, (Workers Press), at 357.
See “Trade unionists on the lnew role' ot unions in the modern enteipiise system in Summary o f  World
Broadcasts, FE/ 1966 G /5 ,08.04.1994.
,J| A lthough Chinese law says that trade union officers must be elected by w oik eis oi their representatives, all too 
often in practice thev are appointed bv the government or party. Even when workers do elect their own union 
leader, more often than not the leader turns out to be the government's or party s nominee. Indeed the Institute of 
Industrial Relations in B eijing’s Haidian district trains cadres for such positions, see Harney ante n 111 at 1 .A -134.
weak bureaucracy compared to others, in particular those which play key 
roles in economic planning and development. All bureaucracies are 
subsumed under the Party’s tutelage, but the potentially ‘subversive’ 
nature ot the union’s role accords it closer Party state supervision.121 As 
Walder points out in his work on the Chinese enterprise, informal, client 
list relations between management and workers operated both to 
guarantee production and ensure a relatively privileged position for 
workers in state-owned enterprises.122 As a result union officials of this 
older ilk were not accustomed either to confronting management or to 
raising issues concerned with employment conditions and were to a 
certain extent side-lined by the informal relationships between 
management and workers.
The state has, nonetheless continued to exercise strong political control. 
While it has allowed managers to adopt capitalist techniques of control, 
extraction of effort and rationalization, it has not allowed workers an 
independent voice to pursue their interests in the new dispensation. Nor, 
until the new labour law in 2008, has it provided institutional 
arrangements which reliably protect their wages and conditions. As wage 
levels, hours of work, benefits and so on were stipulated during the period 
of central economic planning by the state rather than the enterprise, trade
121 As an example,  trade union staff  members have more difficulty getting approval to go abroad for training fas
opposed to investigat ion tours) than functionaries from other bureauciacies.
“2“ Walder, A .G .f  1986). supra note 85.
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union officials at enterprise level seldom had to negotiate the baselines or 
confront management on these issues. Chinese workers have long 
realized the weakness of trade unions. In the mid-1980s, some workers 
pointed out that “that trade union should be disbanded or at least 
reorganized.”123 The revival of ‘workers congresses’ in the mid 1980s in 
the SOEs, ostensibly to promote industrial democracy, has not been 
effective in achieving this goal. Both Philion and to a lesser extent 
Hassard et al1"4 document the unrest amongst workforces brought about 
by the reforms and the arguments for industrial democracy that emerged 
partly to defend what they had been promised under Mao, namely the 
welfare security of the ‘iron-rice bowl’ and the job security of the ‘iron 
armchair’. The reform produced new forms of coercion that characterised 
social relations in Chinese industry and new mechanisms of resistance to 
that coercion. According to Philion resistance to the new forms of labour 
coercion and its attendant ideologies sheds light on the nature of the 
economic transition. A great deal of SOE’s workers’ anger was inflamed 
by corruption amongst cadres and officials becoming not only more 
common but also more transparent as the assets of many danwei were 
sold off in less than appropriate circumstances by a string of officially 
appointed managers.125 Government became adept at dealing with protest
1:3 The A C FTU , Zhongguo zhigong duiwu zhuangkuang diaocha 196 (An Investigation o f  Chinese Workers 196).
Beijing: G ongren  chubanse, (Workers Press). 1987 
!"4 See supra note 87.
123 Philion,S.E . (2009),  supra note 112 at 2, 53-54.
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and adopted an increasingly ritualized form of negotiations and 
increasing smaller compensation to workers for loss of their rights. 
However, the enterprise paternalism’ mindset has been a real barrier to 
the capacity of SOE workers to engage in a discourse of industrial 
democracy in a way that might effectively create an alternative to the 
neoliberal privatization and the loss of social rights and security that the 
policy of reform demands. Equally failure has been in part due to 
weaknesses at the organizational level where the discourses on industrial 
democracy were self limiting. The party had always been against the 
formation of independent unions or indeed any organization which might 
function as a base for political opposition.126
However, under the pressure coming from below, the voice within the 
ACFTU that calls for representation is growing. “Without representative 
and defence functions,” as one top ACFTU official explicitly claimed, 
“the existence of the union is unnecessary.” 127 Union cadres from the 
ACFTU to its subsidiary branches have shown their desire to perform 
these functions. “ We owe workers so much. If we do not represent them, 
what use does the union have?” said one union official in Shanghai. 
Gongyun yanjiu (Labour Movement Research), an ACFTU journal, now
126 Philion, S .E .(2009), supra notel 12 at 144-146. . . . . .
127 Zhang Junjiu(1999), "Gonghui Yaozai Guoqi Gaigezhong Shixian Wu Tupo Yi Jjiaqiang' ( The trade union
should realize ‘five break throughs’ and ‘one enhancement’ in the refoim of SOEs ). iri Gonghui ruhe eanvu guoqi
gaige (H ow  the Unions Partic ipate in the Reform o f  SOhs). Gongyun /i l iao btanqi bu (the editorial department ol 
"Labour  M ovem en t  Reference Materials"),  at 183.
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publishes more and more articles by union cadres and labour researchers 
that openly express their frustration and dissatisfaction with the current 
state of trade unions. They criticize unions’ role as “ambiguous” and their 
status as “dependent,” and complain that unions’ rights stipulated in the 
Trade Union Law are “unenforceable” and “amount to nothing.” Some 
even imply that the socio-economic basis for officially run unions (guan- 
ban gonghui) 110 longer exists with the abandonment of a planned 
economy, and call for “a redefinition of unions’ status and role” in the 
market economy.128
Although trade unions try to advance the economic interests of workers at 
both the central and local levels129, their institutional weaknesses severely 
limit their effectiveness. Their operations are commonly either formalistic, 
co-opted by management or the Party or both. Hence in the reform period, 
although the trade union has tried to fight for workers and has become the 
“most important source” for negative news of high-level governments,130 
it can hardly function as an independent organization or assume the role 
of organizers for workers’ collective action against the management, not 
to mention against the government.131 For example, the union chairman at
128 Chen, F. (2003). "Between the State and Labour The Conflict o f  Chinese Trade Unions' Double Identity in 
Market Reform." The China Quarterly 176: 1011.
129 Chan, A . (1993). "Revolution or Corporatism? Workers and Trade Unions in Post-M ao China." The Australian 
Journal o f  Chinese A ffairs 29: 31-61.; Chen, F.(2003), supra note 127, at 1006-28.
'■^Gongren Ribao (Workers daily ) August 10, 1998.
i‘ 1 Weston , I . (2002).  "‘L earning from Dacjingk More Dark (_ louds for workers in S late-O w ned Enterprises.
Journal o f  Contem norarv  China 11(33).; Chen, F..(20(b), supra note 12/ at 1006-28.
.  .. _  - 2 g g
an SOE in Xi’an opposed the manager’s proposal that workers who failed 
to buy shares in the enterprise be arranged for xiagang (laid off). He was 
dismissed. The union chairman at another SOE in Jinan, Shangdong 
province accused the manager of corruption and extravagant spending of 
company funds for his private benefit that had caused wage arrears for 
workers for months. He was removed from his post by the 
management.133
The ACFTU has tried to strengthen its representing role in industrial 
conflict. It’s most recent effort was a push to have the Trade Union Law 
amended so that it might give unions some more muscle when it conies to 
representing labour. In addition to some revisions and new articles that 
define “defending workers’ legitimate rights as unions’ fundamental and 
only responsibility,” and that make the Law more enforceable, a 
significant amendment to Article 27 is that unions are allowed to 
represent workers in the event of collective action in order to “talk things 
out” (xieshang) with management.134 However, to what extent this article 
can translate into some real power for unions remains to be seen.
Lacking effective state protection as well as organizations of their own, 
workers have become increasingly vulnerable to the "whip of the market"
l j '  G ongren  R ibao (W orkers’ D aily  ), 9 August 1999.
Ibid."10, July 1999.
G ongren R ibao (W orkers ' D aily), 28 O ctober 2001.
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and to despotic managerial power.b5 As a result workers will be even less 
convinced of the utility of taking their grievances to the unions. With this 
channel of articulation becoming increasingly redundant, they are likely 
to seek other forms of self-expression, be that passive forms of resistance 
such as a lack of enthusiasm on the job or more active ways such as 
strikes and go-slows. But spontaneous contentions-no matter whether 
undertaken by workers in the private or state sectors or by those already 
laid off-do create a situation of "collective bargaining by riots"136 that 
places pressure on management or governmental agencies
II The Works Council in China
Most SOEs have signed to strengthen workers' "democratic management" 
in enterprises. However, while the Enterprise Law empowers Works 
council to participate in enterprise administration, scrutinize policies 
advanced by the management, and supervise managers' performance,137 
their actual role is extremely limited. Few managers take the councils 
seriously. Asserting that they are the sole persons who have the legal right 
to make managerial decisions, managers either simply ignore Works
m  Lee, C. K. (1999). "From organized dependence to disorganized despotism: changing labor regimes in Chinese
factories." The China Quarterly 157 . _
Tarrow, S. G. (1998). Power in m ovem ent: spcial.moysni§ilfe-3Qi£QIl£§Qt.ifiM§..P.6iiti?§.* Cambridge, Cambridge
U niversitv  P ress, at 34.
1,7 Zhang. Y. Q. (1997). "An Interm ediary: The Chinese Perception o f  Trade U nions since the 1980s. Jo u m a l_g j
C ontem porary  C hina 6( 14).x  . 291
council or just treat their activities as a matter of formality or ritual.138
Reform plans such as bankruptcy, merger, privatization, and layoffs are 
commonly carried out without the approval of the works council. Yet, 
despite its weak position, workers in China still look to the council to 
protect their interests. The reform period has seen a number of attempts 
by workers to prevent undesirable reform measures on grounds that the 
reform plan has not been approved by the works council.139 But local 
governments may claim that SOEs belong to the state, so workers are not 
the legal owners and their approval is unnecessary. Thus, more often than 
not, workers’ action fails.140
6.6 Conclusion
The rapidity and scale of China’s transfonnation requires that these 
developments are adopted quickly to avoid exacerbation of the severe 
social and political consequences which are already in evidence. The 
Kenan Working Group on CSR in China has published a new report 
which suggests that if policymakers and citizens want China’s social and
1)8 Gongren RiBao ( Workers' D a ily )  13 July 1998
1,4 For exam ple, when the Chongqing Knitting Factory w'as declared bankuipt in 1992, workers were gieatly  
agitated. M ore than 200 workers forced their manager to go to the local court to withdraw the bankruptcy 
application because, as they claimed, the reform plans had not been approved by the workers council. X ie Delu 
(1993), Zhongguo zuida pochanan toushi (A Comparehensive Prospective on China s B iggest Bankruptcy Case), 
Beijinti Jiricji smanli chubanshe (Economy and Management Press).
140 Tian, Z ehone(  1999), “Guanvu dui pochan qiye zhaokai zhidaihui wenti de s.kao" (Som e 1 houghts on the  ^
C onvening o f  the Workers’ Council in Bankrupt Enterprises), Beijing gongren (Beijing Workers Press), n o .U -4 .
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environmental progress to run in line with its economic growth, they must 
develop and implement innovative ideas that encourage positive 
change.141
Again ,the decline and collapse of the socialist economies of the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe; the rapid development of East and Southeast 
Asian economies; and a gradual realization on the part of the Chinese 
leadership that economic development lay, not in developing an 
indigenous version of the Soviet model but in an indigenous version of 
the 4Asian’ model.
The answer is by no means clear, but the experience for Chinese workers 
is so different from that of their European counterparts before them, that 
it is unlikely to be similar. For Chinese workers, the dominance of the 
state’s social control, not least as employer; the traditions of worker- 
management compliance; the vast labour reserve in the countryside and 
the extent of foreign investment will ensure that their response is 
significantly different.142 The role of the CCP and its political oversight 
limits and restricts any real potential for independent worker participation 
in business. The old enterprise paternalist mindset inculcated into SOE
141 Source: “Promoting C SR  in China: Statement o f  Finding Released” , N ovem ber 2004  
http://www.c.srwire.com/Nevvs/308Rhtml
142 O'Leary, G. (1998). Adjusting to capitalism : Chinese Armonk. N.Y. ; London, M .b.
Sharpe, at xv.
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workforces is continued in various new ways in both the state and private 
sectors. The historical progress of the reform, cultural mindset and 
continuing political oversight in a society now emphasizing a 
‘harmonious society’ as its current leading norm has meant that the 
corporate governance elements of co-determination adopted form 
Germany will follow a particularly Chinese path.
And again, the scale of the Chinese transformation is so much greater 
than the whole of Europe’s industrial revolution and its pace so much 




In this study, I focus on the issue of the development of corporate 
governance in China including its selective adaptation of elements of 
governance structures from Western models of corporate governance. I 
have also explored whether China’s political, social, cultural, and legal 
traditions will continue to influence the continuing developments in 
Chinese company law, or whether the evolution of China’s corporate 
governance system must inevitably converge with Western models, 
particularly the Anglo-American system if it is to succeed economically 
in terms of the competition that exists between governance systems.
When learning from the West in finding appropriate measures, care needs
to be taken to understand the background and reasoning to the measures
adopted in the West and whether such measures are likely to work in
China. Simply copying from the West without effective implementation
and compliance of the standards to appease international investors is
unlikely to work in the long run. I have considered in outline several
theoretical frameworks, particularly agency theory, political determinants,
stakeholder theory and corporate social responsibility as well as the law
matters thesis and path dependency. In the context of China, all of these
approaches have some insights to offer. However, as I hope I have
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demonstrated, in the particular circumstances of China the historical 
development and strength of culture (which though it changes over time) 
combined with a strong centralization of power moderated by local 
political, social and economic imperatives have all impacted on the 
development of corporate governance. Adoption of new laws has been 
partially successful as they become embedded with Chinese legal 
characteristics.
Because each corporate governance system has within it political, social, 
economic, and cultural variations that play a greater or lesser role in how 
flexible and accommodating those investors will be towards those who 
act as their economic agents. Thus, the success of the convergence will 
depend not only on learning from the West and designing laws, rules, and 
regulations that are suitable to the Chinese social and economic 
developments and legal culture, but also on the supporting legal 
infrastructure such as the quality of judges and the independence and 
efficiency of the judiciary and the appropriate mix of government 
regulation and self-regulation. Indeed as already discussed the judiciary 
in China play a different role to those in a Western democracy. Most 
importantly, the effective enforcement of the law and the provision of 
appropriate remedies are lacking in China.1 Pitman Potter argues that
1 Shi, C. (March 22, 2004). H o w to  Avoid Gangster Capitalism. ^ th l„ 4 im a M o m in a J ^ o st: lw
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China is engaging in selective adaptation of international norms and the 
success of that exercise depends also on institutional capacity building.2
First this study highlights the difference between the legal cultures and is 
an important factor in identifying how the Chinese tradition and the 
Western models can achieve consensus in what serves as the appropriate 
model for a modern Chinese corporate governance system. Corporate 
governance has been a globally debated topic. With multinational 
corporations entering new global market, it is clear that there are some 
differences in corporate governance rules among the various legal 
systems. China has quite a long history of trying to reform the 
organization of enterprise by introducing western style corporate forms 
since the late 19th century with varied success.3 The latest and most 
comprehensive revision took place in October 2005. As a continuation of 
many earlier efforts it remains to be seen how successful it will be over 
the medium term. In the late Qing dynasty, Chinese reformers grappled 
with models derived mainly from Germany as conveyed by the Japanese. 
The first Chinese Corporate Law was enacted in January 1904, during the 
late Qing Dynasty. China then adopted certain Soviet legal forms in the 
1950s and Western models again in the 1980s. Unfortunately, none of 
these appear to have yielded much success. They appear to be examples
2 Potter, P. (2004). "Legal Reform in China-lnstitutions, Culture, and Selective Adaptation." Law& Social Inquiry 
2(4): 465-95.
'' P rom ulgated  bv the president o f  the PRC on the same day. The Law became clleaiv*. on 1 July 1094.
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of legal transplantation that have been at best only partially successful.
First, within China’s existing political structure and traditional culture, 
legal processes can never escape political pressures. “At the heart of the 
matter is the manner in which culture, as a process, tends, cultivates and 
regulates particular types of economic outcomes.” 4 In China, the 
existence of Confucian and communist traditions has left deep 
impressions in the social fabric and the economic landscape.5
I have emphasized how the law was often limited in China and 
subservient to Confucian and Neo Confucian codes of conduct. 
Confucian governance was thus a matter of using moral teaching to shape 
people’s behaviour. To some considerable extent these ideas of order, 
harmony and mediation have remained of considerable importance in 
Chinese society, despite the class struggle and chaos of the Cultural 
Revolution. Whilst the idea of rule of law gained popularity it has often 
been translated as rule by law as the legal process as part of the economic 
reforms became a means of policy implementation at various levels of 
government.
4 Tricker, R.,1., "Corporate Governance: A Ripple on the Cultural Reflection , in C. legg, S., S. G. Redding, et al. 
(1990). Capitalism in contrasting cultures. Berlin ; N ew  York, \V. de Gruyter, at 38.
5 For a discussion o f  path dependence in China’s econom ic transition, See Guthrie. D. (2002). Dragon in a thrce- 
piece s u i t : the em ergence o f  capitalism in China. Princeton, N .J ., Woodstock, I linceton University Press, at 24-
41 .Some o f  the distinctive features o f  Chinese corporate governance are discussed by lam, O.K. (1949). _l_he 
D evelopm ent o f  Corporate  Governance m C  Irina. ( heltemliam, Ldwuid Llgai.
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Therefore, Chinese culture puts more emphasis on morality and arts,
human responsibilities and unity, while Western culture stresses science 
and religion, individuals’ freedom and differentiation.6 Core values in 
economic behavior include a “concern for reconciliation, harmony [and] 
balance” coupled with “practicality as a central focus.”7 Culture, in the 
sense of basic societal norms has always been important.8 The fusion of 
the concept of family with that of state thus provided a basis for elevating 
morality to the status of state law.7 Law has always been an instrument of 
the state in China often focusing on responsibilities to the state.10 As such 
it was not very interested in social regulations among autonomous 
individuals, and least of all in defending individual rights against the 
state.11 Whilst there has often been litigation in classical China it always 
had peculiarities of its own.12 Whilst the role of law declined post 1949, 
alongside the imperial traditions, the communist legacy has been a major 
source of influence on today’s legal system in China.13 During this period,
6 Tang, J.Y., "Moral Idealism and Chinese Culture", in Cheng. Z.-y. and N. Bunnin (2002). Contemporary Chinese 
philosophy. Oxford, Blackwell Publishers.
' Ibid. at 76
s It is stated in the Great Learning, one o f  the Confucian classics, that: ‘The ancients who w ished to illustrate 
illustrious virtue through the Kingdom, first ordered well their own states. Wishing to order w ell their states, they 
regulated their families. W ishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated their persons” Cited in Qu, 1.
(1965). Law and Society in traditional china. Paris, Mouton, at 255.
In fact, a great part o f  Confucianism is the rational justification or theoretical expression o f  the Chinese family 
system  as a social system . See Fung, Y.-L. (1966). A short history o f  Chinese philosophy, N.Y. : London : Free Pr. : 
Collier-M acm illan, at 147.; Qu, T. (1965), Supra note 8, at 22-22.
10 In contrast to traditional China. ‘The monarch (o f  medieval Europe), it is argued, may make law; but he may not 
make it arbitrarily, and until he has remade it-lawfully -he is bound by it. See Berman, H. J. (198a). Law and 
revolution:1he Formation o f  the Western Legal Tradition, C ambridge, at 9.:>.
11 Bodde. D. and C. Morris (1967). Law' in Imperial China: exem plified by 190 Ch'ing Dynasty eases, wjth 
historical, social, and juridical commentaries Cambridge (Mass.): Ilaivaul University Pies.s, London. O xtoid  
University'Press ,at 4.
12 Wang, C-H.,( 1963), ‘Legal Reform in China’, in Chinese..SociM..Md Political.R eview  Jun 1917. quoted in 
Cameron,M . F„ The Reform Movement in China 1898-1912 (New York: Octagon Books.), at 174.
n  The com m unist  era is defined here as the era from the communist victory in I 94') to the beginning o f  the 
econom ic  reforms in 1979. Although, the Chinese Communist Party continues to monopolize political powci in
2 9 9
the function of Law and the legal system was reduced to serve the 
communist government as an instrument. The notion of an independent 
legal system governing all actors in a society was as alien to the Chinese 
communists as it was to the imperial mandarins.
China started its economic reform and open-door polices in 1978, and the 
Chinese communism party insisted that in the primary stage of socialism, 
the task of law was to facilitate development of the market economy, to 
assist maintaining public order and to eliminate political threats.14 Indeed, 
the Chinese government made no effort to hide the guidance (as one form 
of control) of the CCP over the building of the legal system. The central 
role of the Party in Chinese listed companies has in reality been 
strengthened in the 2005 amendments to the PRC Company Law.15
The Party’s role is central within most listed Chinese companies and Art 
19 of the Company Law (as amended in 2005) provides that the party 
shall be established in every company. As a result, it is often the case that 
the Chairman of the company is also the Party Secretary of the local 
Communist Party branch within the company, effectively fusing
Chinn, gradunl but substantial changes have taken place in China s econom ic and the political system. The 
com plexity o f  the political system  in China today is such that it is no longer appropriate to characterize the present 
regim e as com munist.
14 Wen jiab ao , P rim e M in ister o f  China, “O ur Historical Tasks at the Prim aiy Stage o f  S ocialism ” B eijing  Review,
2007. 12, availab le  at http ://\vw w .bjrevie\v .com .cn/lianghui/tx t/2007-03/l2 /content_58768.htm
managerial and political control in one office. Senior managers are often, 
in reality political appointees who have considerations of a political and 
social nature (as well as self interest) rather than maximizing shareholder 
wealth. The recent reforms in relation to BSAMs have only served to 
reinforce this trend.
The Chinese corporate governance approach, as shown in this study, has 
essentially been modelled on selected organizational features of German 
and Anglo-American systems. 16 For example, the regulatory body
adopted policies based on La Porta's scholarship on the positive link 
between capital market development and public shareholder protection.17
However, China’s market suffers from a lack of liquidity and an active
corporate control market does not exist in China. Similarly, I have shown
how the internal elements of corporate governance, the two tier board and
in particular the bolting on independent directors have raised more
problems than it solves. This is because in the political and cultural
context of China a different milieu applies which often exacerbates the
type of problems encountered in the west, especially in relation to
16 Tam, O.K., (1999), The developm ent o f  Corporate Governance in China, Edward Elgar, at24
17 See generally La Porta, R., F. Lopez-De-Silancs. et al. (2000). "Investor protection and corporate governance." 
Journal o f  Financial Econom ics 58(1-2): 3-27.; La Porta, R., F. LopezDcSilanes, et al. (1997). Legal detenninants 
o fe x te m a lf ln a nc e " Jom:nal o f  Finance 52(3): 1131-1150.(Poslulating that poor investor protections result in 
capital markets that are both smaller and narrower). In a speech given at the International Seminai on Investor 
Protection in June 2002, Zhou Xiaochuan, then the Chairman o f  the CSRC, specifically mentioned that ‘‘foreign 
research proves that the better investor protections in a country or a region, the better developed the capital market 
[in that country or region], and the stronger its capability' to resist financial risks. Zhou Xiaochuan, Baohu 
Touzizhe Quanvi Shuli Touzizhe Xinxin Guanxi Zhongda G o  Protect Investois Rights and Inteiests and to Build 
Up Investors'  Confidence Are Critical), Zhengquan ShibaoJSecurilies l imes) (P.R.C.). June 26, 2002. available al
http://ne\vs.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2002-(.)6/26/content 45 /4 1 6.him
independent non executive directors reinforcing the tendency to follow 
the leader irrespective of whether they are acting in an appropriate 
manner.
The securities market principal watchdog - the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC), has, in practice, has long been 
criticized for its failure to react to and probe into the various blunt market 
abuses punctually, due to its lack of competent staff or some political 
concerns. Indeed, they have to face conflicting situations. On the one 
hand, the controlling shareholders of most listed companies are usually 
local governments or entities controlled by them. On the other hand, as a 
quasi-governmental agency, the CSRC lacks independence and is 
ultimately subject to government will. Its bureaucrats do not have the 
same rank as those from the relevant ministries controlling various 
sectors of the economy. In fact, at times the CSRC even gets blamed for 
being unable to control the corruption cases that its own investigative 
efforts are increasingly bringing to light. Investment funds speculation, 
using inside information, has been particularly problematic.18
Nor has the judiciary in China played a dynamic role in developing a
18 The General Administration o f  Sports was reported to have appropriated 131 m illion yuan (U S$15.8 m illion) 
for the ')008 Beijing O lvm pic Orcanizing Committee since 1999. About 109 million yuan (U S$13.2 m illion) o f
the money was misused to invesfin  Chinese stockmarkel. See “Auditor: Central government misuses U S $ 1 . lb  o(
funds." httjX/C\\’ww.chinadaiiv.ci)ni.cn/en^iish{d(2C:200>i)0L-?-^oi'>tent_ip.’^ i . n t m
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body of law to protect the interests of minority shareholders. Rather until 
very recently bureaucracy often suspended relevant cases or declared the 
courts ill equipped to deal with such cases. The Chinese view their 
judicial system as merely another bureaucratic body. The Chinese courts 
are widely perceived to lack independence or experience in dealing with 
corporate and securities disputes. Because it is not unusual for courts to 
decide not to deal with a particular matter, often regarding it as beyond 
their competence, and instead referring it to another branch of 
government major problems are swept under the carpet.19 Courts are also 
reluctant to implement or enforce their judgements (especially those 
involving coercive measures) against state-owned enterprises if they were 
responsible for the same locality, or if their judgments led to the closure 
of the enterprise and unemployment of workers.20 To make things worse, 
the Supreme People’s Court of China even banned temporarily lower 
courts hearing cases against corporate fraud in the middle of 2001, due to 
the lack of competent judges familiar with securities market rules and the 
inability of procedural rules dealing with such matters. In 2003, the 
Supreme People's Court introduced guidelines to allow local courts to 
hear actions brought by individual shareholders for false statements 
issued by directors about the company, but the civil case shall not be 
accepted by the court, unless the cause of action is based on the
19 Tom asic. R. and Andrews N .. (2007) "Minority shareholder protection in China's top 100 listed companies",
Australian journal o f  Asian law, 9 (1). at 141.
conclusion reached by the CSRC or other state organs such as the 
Ministry of Finance.21 In practice, although many company directors have 
been punished by either administrative sanction or criminal prosecution 
as a result of making false disclosures, frauds and market manipulations, 
the injured shareholders have been left without proper remedies in respect 
of matters of illegal actions.
Institutional investors in China generally play an even less constructive 
role in China than they do in the Western context because of similar 
factors and the added complexity of the Chinese situation. This research 
focused on securities investment funds, because they have been the 
principal players in the recent movement toward greater institutional 
activism.
In theory, institutions are expected to take a long-term view of their 
shareholding positions, and where necessary, incur expense in intervening 
to correct mismanagement. Thus, the rise in institutional shareholdings 
has led many commentators optimistically to predict the end of the 
separation of ownership and control."" Since 1990s the Chinese authority 
introduced a series of complementary reforms to build the institutional
The Supreme People's Court guidelines 2003 , Art.6
22 See. for exam ple  Barnard.  J. W. (1991). "Institutional investors and the new corporate governance."  North
Caro lina Law Review 69: 1135-1187. --------  304
mechanisms for greater corporate accountability. In the early stages, 
investment funds operated in China on a self-regulating basis without 
much legal status. Thus, these funds ran into many problems due to a lack 
of uniformity. Some funds invested heavily in real estate resulting in a 
low liquidity,23 some lent fund capital at high interests,24 and some fund 
managers invested in the name of the investment funds with capital from 
other sources.25 On 28 October, 2003, The Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress published the securities investment funds law.
The CSRC believe that investment funds can improve corporate 
governance of State Own Enterprises (SOEs). They insisted that, because 
the shares that the public holds are widely dispersed, individual investors 
have too small a stake to justify monitoring costs; thus, they cannot exert 
enough discipline for companies to improve their operation. They believe 
that investment funds can act as an important force in the shareholder 
structure of companies transformed from SOEs. As long-term 
shareholders, the investment funds have incentives to monitor the 
management of companies and give suggestions concerning their 
operation. Consequently, the participation of funds can exert more 
discipline 011 companies and improve their management.
23 See "Funds Can Curb Market Volatility", China Daily Bus. Wkly., Sept. 7, 1997, at 3
24 See C ong Touzi Y unzuo Kan Xianvou Jijin De Chulu (Looking at the Future o f  Current Funds from the 
Perspective o f  Investment Operation), Zhengquan Shibao (Securities Times), Nov. 24, 1997, at 1 1.
25 Som e listed com panies entrusted fund managers to invest their capital in the securities market, which has 
seriously infringed upon the interests ot investors ot these companies. See ibid.
However, investment funds can not really achieve those kinds of goals 
under the new law in China as examined in Chapter 4. The funds manager 
is required to carry out the day to day management function of the 
investment funds. There are two basic duties placed on the funds manager. 
One is that as a normal company under the company law regulations, they 
have to increase returns for their company and its shareholders; on the 
other hand the managing company acts as a funds manger under the 
securities investment funds and contract law regulation, they have to take 
care of investment funds for the funds investor. This can give rise to a 
conflict or divergence of interests and requires cerebration of how the law 
deals with these issues. The main argument is that the interests of 
institutional investors and their controllers would often lead them to act in 
their own best interest and sacrifice shareholder value.
The main obligation of the fund custodian is safekeeping and supervision. 
A fund custodians must be a commercial bank which has been authorized 
by CSRC and China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) and has 
met the requirement of the securities investment funds law. However, in 
practice, there are two main reasons which impact on those commercial 
banks to exercise such supervisions. An investment funds manager is an
attractive custom er for those banks. Because a funds managei has the
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right to choose a bank to hold a vast sum of funds that has been raised 
from the market. Under the increase market pressures, the fund 
custodians have to decide whether to lose those valuable customers or to 
‘accept’ them. The fund custodian has no right to supervise the decision 
made by the funds manager, nor does it have the ability to understand 
whether or not the decision made by the funds manager has involved 
problems of related transactions, and whether or not the decision is in the 
interest of the funds investor. So far, there is no report on the fund 
custodian using his authority to fire the fund manager because of 
misconduct.
Another accusation levelled against activist funds is that activism is 
designed to achieve a short-term payoff at the expense of long-term profit 
ability. In China, tradable shares amount to about one-third of all 
outstanding shares. Of these tradable shares, securities investment funds 
hold an average of about 15 percent.26 Though significant, institutional 
shareholding represents, therefore, only a relatively small stake in the 
portfolio companies. Institutional investors generally are profit 
maximizers, they will not engage in an activity whose costs exceed its 
benefits. Institutions are unlikely to be involved in day-to-day corporate 
matters. Thus institutional investors lack the incentives to be active in
he IPO deng Wenti FabiaoTanhua" (C S R C s Responsible Officers Gave Talks 
on Issues'of the Share Structure Reform and IPO). Shanghai /.hengquan Rao (Shangha, Seeunt.es  News). Apnl .8 ,
terms of monitoring they are prone to follow the Wall Street rule of 
selling their stock when disappointed.
In the chapter on Industrial democracy, which examined the issues that 
have arisen in relation to efforts in recent years to transplant German and 
Anglo-American corporate governance mechanisms to China, I explored 
corporate governance practices associated with shareholder value 
maximization versus stakeholder value maximization principles in China 
in the context of co-determination.
Managers as the agents of the shareholders of a firm are supposed to 
make decisions based on the shareholder value maximization principle; 
subject to the existing contractual relationships with others, such as 
employees. The current campaign of ‘building a socialist harmonious 
society’ has paved the way for Chinese corporate governance, especially 
in dealing with the relationship between shareholders, management and 
other stakeholders, such as the employee.
Since the communist government came to power in 1949, it has assumed 
the responsibilities of protecting all worker interests. Communism 
produced a class of workers with strong emotional ties to and mateiial
interest in m aintaining that system.
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At that day, Chinese SOEs used to be production units as well as social 
and political organizations responsible for their employees’ welfare. 
Labour relations in SOEs in China were characterized as “organized 
dependence” of workers on firms. In this arrangement, workers depended 
on their work units or employers for highly secure jobs as well as cradle- 
to-grave welfare coverage, although provisions of welfare varied across 
firms. Membership as a SOE worker was of great value to workers not 
only because of the monetary benefits, but also because they regard their 
job as their whole life position and their social identity within society.27
In the pre-reform period, though SOE workers also have the right to 
participate in the enterprise's democratic management, they participate in 
and supervise the management through the Employee Representative 
Conference (zhigong daibiao dahui).28 However, their dependence on 
SOEs for almost all their basic needs and a lack of alternatives gave 
management powerful leverage over workers.
Since 1978, the state is appears less concerned with socialist ideology,
~ Walder, A. G. (1986). Communist neo-traditionalism* work and authority in Chinese indus try, B erkelg, London.
Universitv o f  California Press . r t  n
28 Zhonehua Rerun in Quanmin Suoyou Zhigongye Qiye Fa (State-Owned Industrial Enterpr.se Law o f  the P eoples 
R epublic o f  China)(Apr. 13, 1988) 1994 Zhongua Renmin Gohgheguo Falu Fenlei Zonglan, Jinji Fa, Vol. 2 
(C lassified  A ssem blage o f  the Law o f  the People's Republic o f  China, Econom ic Law) 1209 art 5 See also 
Zhonghua Renmin G ongsi Fa (Company Law o f  the People's Republic o f  China) (Jul. 1, 1994) 1994 Zhongua 
Renmin G ohgheguo Falu Fenlei Zonglan,  Jinji Fa, Vol. 2 (Classified Assemblage of the Law oi the cop ies  
Republic o f  China, Econom ic Law) 1034. art. 4.3. 33
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lather Chinas pragmatic policy goals are economic development and a 
stable society. Market reform has changed state-labour relations. The 
theory of all-people-owned labour has been replaced step by step by the 
labour commodity theory, along with the establishment of the labour 
contract system that the growing market economy called for.
On paper, the Chinese government has made provisions in its Company 
Law for employee participation in the corporate governance of SOEs 
through representation on the supervisory board.29 The system of a 
supervisory board was seemingly inspired by the German style of 
corporate governance. However, the Chinese supervisory board’s 
apparent resemblance to the German model is confined mostly to its 
name and the participation of workers.
The number of supervisors could be just one or two for smaller limited 
liability companies, and greater than three in the case of joint stock 
limited liability companies. Therefore, these employees cannot 
reasonably be expected to carry out effectively the primary supervisory 
board role as this would be likely to involve confrontation with their 
superiors in the company hierarchy for whom they work. Given its 
limited function and unclear mode of operation, the supervisory board
i9 Tam, O .K ..,(1999), supra note 16 , at 61
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cannot be expected to play an effective role.
Again, the establishment of the supervisory board in China is not based 
on the same social and philosophical considerations as for the setting up 
of supervisory boards in the German codetermination model of corporate 
governance. In Germany, another form of labour representation in 
business decision-making is Work Councils Codetermination. German 
law gave Work Councils rights to co-determination with the Management 
Board in connection with dismissal, employee vocational training and 
grievances. But in China, that is a different story. Communist systems are 
characterized by weak mass associations like trade unions. The trade 
unions’ had made an almost total surrender of their position as 
independent institutions to promote and defend the workers’ interests and 
welfare.
It can hardly function as an independent organization or assume the role 
of organizers for workers’ collective action against the management, not 
to mention against the government. Their operations are commonly either 
formalistic, co-opted by management or the Party or both.
Work Councils is another form of labor representation in business
decision-making in China. Most SOEs have signed to strengthen workers'
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democratic management" in enterprises. The Enterprise Law empowers 
Works council to participate in enterprise administration. However, in 
practice few managers take the councils seriously. Asserting that they are 
the sole persons who have the legal right to make managerial decisions, 
managers either simply ignore Works council or just treat their activities 
as a matter of formality or ritual.
With this channel of articulation becoming increasingly redundant, they 
are likely to seek other forms of self-expression. This creates a situation 
of "collective bargaining by riots" that places pressure on management or 
governmental agencies. Whilst the reforms resulted in rationalization 
leading to mass layoffs there was some attempt by the workers to use 
arguments along co-determination lines to protect their interests but these 
were generally a failure in part to the lack of institutional strength on the 
part of workers organizations and the paterna list mentality of the workers 
themselves.
Since coming to power in 2003, facing serious social issues, the new 
generation of leaders in China has put forth a series of new guidelines and 
policies towards building a socialist harmonious society. These new 
guidelines and policies have pointed the way for coiporate governance.
The Chinese Communist Party in its 16th plenum raised the ideas of
312
respecting labour, respecting knowledge, respecting intellectuals, and 
respecting creativity,” and required the strengthening of the labour 
protection system in enterprise. How this approach will lead to any 
substantive change in relation to the role of employees in corporate 
governance remains to be seen.
To summarise the situation to date, the very different political, social and 
cultural context of China has resulted in a form of corporate governance 
which is still very Chinese in character once one looks beyond the form 
of governance structures adapted from Europe and Anglo-American 
model. The substance of the reality is largely determined by the political 
imperatives (and hence determinants), the culture and other factors 
particular to China, like the role of guanxl In that sense corporate 
governance in China is truly a Taw unto’ itself.
The future of China’s corporate governance reforms
Based on the above assessments, a reasonable order of reform measures 
at the next stage can be designed
First, the differentiated treatment of shares is a historical problem in
China’s securities market: there are different policy treatments between
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tradable and non-tradable shares upon the issuance of the stock. Non­
tradable shares cannot be traded in the market, but the holders of these 
non-tradable shares control the company. For a long time, this 
differentiated treatment has caused many problems in corporate 
governance, such as the dominances by one majority shareholder. Many 
majority shareholders control all the assets in the company and therefore 
infringe upon the interests of the minority shareholders. The difficulty is 
in designing a selling plan that could be accepted by both the Government 
and the public investors. However, the removal of barriers in relation to 
these categories of shares would go some way to helping to create a more 
balanced market in relation to the many thousands of SOEs that the state 
is willing to let go.
A large shareholding by the state in the companies gives it economic 
power to exert administrative intervention and thus influence market rules. 
As discussed before, state-owned enterprises are more likely to pursue 
non-wealth maximizing goals. When the stock market is also used to 
achieve the political goal that the governments will maintain the control 
of the large SOEs in many sectors of the economy, it is unlikely that the 
Western style of corporate regulation will be strictly enforced. In addition, 
the high savings rate and lack of alternative investment channels explain 
why the stock market in China could develop quickly even though
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investors were frequently cheated.
Recently, Chinas main stock exchange plans to launch an international 
board in 2010 that would allow foreign companies to sell shares 
denominated in Chinese currency for the first tim e/0 Companies from the 
UK and other foreign countries will be able to have their shares traded on 
Chinese stock markets. Shanghai deputy Mayor Tu Guangshao, the 
former vice-chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC), said in an interview that the international board is expected to be 
launched next year.
Indeed, a listing on a Chinese stock exchange could help foreign 
companies by allowing them to tap China's huge pool of savings and by 
raising their public profile. It is unknown so far to what extent this new 
plan will contribute to a good corporate governance practice. Clearly, it 
will change the picture that the SOE is the dominant player in the Chinese 
stock market. The other important development that could help many 
thousands of other privately held companies in China gain access to 
equity capital and again add diversity and investor choice to the stock 
markets would be to make it easier for privately owned corporate
30 The Shanghai Stock Exchange is working on the board as part o f  efforts to promote the city as a regional 
financial center, the newspaper Shanghai Daily said, citing a Shanghai deputy m ayor.T he board is expected to be
launched next year," the deputy mayor, Tu Guangshao, said in comments Chinadaih  _00 J - O S - 0 , .
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businesses in China to list on the stock exchange. Therefore a 
combination of privatisation of SOEs, more liquidity in the categories of 
shares, foreign listings in China and easing of opportunity for private 
corporate businesses to list on the Chinese exchanges would over time 
revolutionise the Chinese stock markets.
Second, the quality of the judiciary has improved tremendously over the 
last decade or so, but judicial independence and expertise needs to be 
further enhanced. A system of binding judicial precedents would also 
help to enable judges to develop principles of law in a predictable way to 
fill any legislative gaps. It is imperative that a case reporting system is 
developed in China. It is one of the greatest criticisms of both academic 
and practising lawyers in China that a reporting system does not yet exist. 
Such a system would slowly help in the training and practice of law and 
also the accountability of the judiciary.
Thirdly, the CSRC in China is currently too weak to curb serious
securities fraud. In the meantime, the urgent task is reducing government
intervention in the day-today workings of the stock market and making
the CSRC independent of the Government and free from conflicting
responsibilities. This will essentially strengthen the regulatory capacity of
the CSRC and make it easier for the CSRC to punish violations, thereby
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creating a favourable external environment for corporate governance 
reform of listed companies. As part of such a reform the ranking of the 
officials of the CSRC should be increased on par with those of leading 
industrial sector ministries. This would, in the cultural and political 
context of China do more to help them successfully carry out their 
allotted functions.
In addition, China still has not adopted international accounting standards. 
This, coupled with the common problems of fraud and false accounting, 
makes it hard for investors to be confident about the financial health of 
the companies. The next step is to deepen legal and regulatory reforms 
aimed at improving information disclosure and corporate transparency. 
Hand in hand with this development is the need to train accountants to 
high standards. In recent years there has been a phenomenal growth in 
Chinese students studying accounting and finance in Western universities 
-  because they perceive both the need and demand for person with such 
knowledge and skill in China.
Again, as employees have a major role to play in corporate governance, it
is necessary to take into consideration their interests and given them a
proper position within the framework of corporate governance. In this
sense, it is necessaiy to accomplish the transfer of state-ow ned enterprises
3 1 7
from administrative governance to economic governance, and construct 
of a framework under which all employees can make efforts in regard to 
governance. In addition, the Chinese government is willing to change the 
legal standing of workers to advance the political mantra of a more 
’’harmonious society”. Thus, China's trade unions should be transformed 
by law. Previously they only focused on social welfare; in the future they 
will be able to act more like Western trade unions, weighing in on 
discipline, safety, remuneration, and working hours. Though any such 
move is fraught with political difficulties as the CCP is reluctant, if not 
hostile to the idea of its retreating from control of the trade union 
movement and the party’s role and representation within business units, 
to allow a more active role for worker and employee voice would do 
much to ease the frustration felt by many workers in China’s rapid and 
often uncertain development.
The cause of the problems mentioned above is very complicated. As 
Mark Roe has pointed out, corporate governance depends on much more 
than simply getting the law right. The presence of other institutions is 
critical.31 Indeed, China was in transition from a state-owned economy to 
a market economy, and conflicts during the transition period have been
M Roe, M . J. (2000). "Political preconditions to separating ow nership Iro n  corporate control." S tanforcllavv 
R ev iew  5 3 ( 3 ) :  539-606.
complex. “Crossing the River by Feeling Each Stone” refers to the 
pragmatic policy ot the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, to move ahead 
with economic reforms slowly and pragmatically. The West has not got 
all the answers yet and is still searching for solutions to some of its 
corporate governance problems, as current financial crisis demonstrate. 
Chinese reformers, while learning from the successes and mistakes of the 
West, must also pay due regard to the circumstances of China and be 
confident enough to discuss, debate, and devise their own solutions which 
would work in China.
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